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ABSTRACT IN ENGLISH 
*** 
For more than a Century cocoa has constituted the primary export crop of both Ghana and Côte 
d’Ivoire, yet the consumption of chocolate products has remained very low across both nations. 
Focusing on Ghana in particular this thesis attempts to answer the question of how then cocoa attains 
value and significance to people if not as a consumable good?  
The theoretical frame for this work is primarily a critical discussion of a number of academic 
approaches to ‘value’, on the basis of which the thesis’ author proposes to engage the analytical term 
‘spatialized value’. This term implies the identification of numerous boundary enactments that serve in 
different ways to delimit or enable the spaces of significance and value affordable to the natural good 
which both the anthropologist and his informants recognize as ‘cocoa’. The thesis thus discusses a 
number of situations in which cocoa is valuated in terms of shifting spatial capacities.  
In terms of ethnographic material, this thesis is based on engagements with farmers on cocoa 
plantations and communities in the direct vicinity of the southern Ghana-Côte d’Ivoire border, talks 
with rural cocoa depot workers and border officials, journeys with cross-country cocoa truckers, and 
interviews with portside government officials. The thesis seeks to investigate the contemporary 
Ghanaian cocoa production practices through notions of spatiality and time borne out of both colonial 
legacies and pre-colonial traditions, an inquiry that entails land disputes, religious devotion, practices of 
corruption, and more.  
What emerges through the analysis is a nuanced insight into cocoa as a complex locus for generating 
meaning and value among people of southwestern Ghana of the early Twenty-first Century – a picture 
that takes the reader much beyond any simple ideas of a neat global commodity chain. 
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RESUMÉ PÅ DANSK  
*** 
Gennem mere end hundrede år har kakao været den største eksportafgrøde fra såvel Ghana som 
Elfenbenskysten, men dog er forbruget af chokoladeprodukter i begge disse lande forblevet lavt. Med 
særligt fokus på Ghana forsøger denne afhandling at besvare spørgsmålet om, på hvilke måder kakao i 
stedet opnår værdi og betydning for lokale mennesker hvis ikke som et forbrugsgode? 
Den teoretiske ramme for dette værk baserer sig primært på en kritisk diskussion af en række 
akademiske tilgange til ’værdi’, og på denne baggrund foreslår denne afhandlings forfatter brugen af en 
analytisk term kaldet ’spatialiseret værdi’. Denne term indebærer identifikationen af talrige 
grænsedragende handlinger, der på forskellig vis hindrer eller muliggør de rumlige udfoldelser, indenfor 
hvilke betydninger og værdi kan tillægges den naturlige råvare, som både antropologen og dennes 
informanter genkender som ’kakao’. Denne afhandling diskuterer derfor en række situationer, 
hvorigennem kakao værdisættes i kraft af skiftende rumlige kapaciteter.  
Med hensyn til etnografisk materiale så er den nærværende afhandling baseret på interaktioner med 
bønder på kakaoplantager og i lokalsamfund i umiddelbar nærhed af den sydlige landegrænse mellem 
Ghana og Elfenbenskysten. Dertil kommer samtaler med arbejdere på kakaodepoter og med 
grænsevagter, køreture med lastvognschauffører på langtursruter for kakaotransport, samt dertil 
interviews med myndighedsrepræsentanter i havneområder. Afhandlingen tilstræber en udforskning af 
praksisser for nutidig ghanesisk kakaoproduktion gennem forståelser af rumligheder og tidsligheder,  der 
fremkommer på baggrund af såvel eftervirkninger fra kolonitiden samt prækoloniale traditioner, en 
undersøgelse der involverer stridigheder om landrettigheder, religiøse forståelser, praksisser for 
udøvelse af korruption, med mere. 
Gennem afhandlingens analyse fremkommer et nuanceret indblik i kakaoens rolle som et kompliceret 
knudepunkt for dannelser af mening og værdi blandt mennesker i det sydvestlige Ghana i det tidlige 
enogtyvende århundrede – en skildring der bringer læseren langt videre end simple forståelser af en 
pænt organiseret global forsyningskæde. 
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MAPS OF GHANA 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Map 1: Administrative regions of 
contemporary Ghana. 
Map 2: Approximate indication of 
the Sefwi traditional tribal area. 
Map 3: The typically preferred transport 
route for cocoa trucks between Bonsu 
Nkwanta and Tema. 
 
Map 4: The River Bia and its tributaries passing 
through the western part of Sefwi and the River 
Tano passing through the eastern part. 
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MAP OF PRIMARY ETHNOGRAPHIC FIELDWORK AREA 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 5: The westernmost part of the Sefwi traditional area along with a section of the boundary line 
towards Côte d’Ivoire. On the map are indicated only the names of communities and certain other 
locations that comprise central parts of the ethnographic analysis of this thesis, or which serves as 
convenient regional orientation points. While numerous other communities and roads also exist 
through this geographical area, these have however been omitted here for the sake of clarity. 
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FOREWORD 
*** 
The present thesis constitutes my main contribution to a collaborative academic research 
project at the Department of Ethnology of the Saxo Institute of Copenhagen University . The overall 
research project titled ‘Natural Goods? Processing Raw Materials in Global Times’ has aimed to 
combine insights from the fields of ethnology, anthropology, and cultural history in order to explore 
the practices through which people at different places and times have worked together to extract and 
process materials that subsequently appear as particular raw and pure natural goods. This project has 
been headed by Associate Professor, Frida Hastrup, and each of the four researchers of the project 
group has focused on one particular natural good as such emerges in a particular setting1. In this regard 
this thesis draws upon a number of insights generated through the works of my closest academic 
project colleagues (see for instance, Hastrup 2018, 2014; Brichet, 2014, 2012; Andersen 2014), and the 
development of my own ethnographic ruminations in the present context is an attempt to contribute to 
the project group’s overall discussion of natural goods as entities that emerge as co-produced rather 
than pre-given. The many fruitful discussions I have shared with my project team members, fellow 
Saxo Institute PhD students, and other department colleagues – not least my main advisor, Associate 
Professor, Signe Mellemgaard – have likewise greatly helped to shape this analytical enquiry into its 
present shape, and for this I owe them all big thanks. I also want to express a particular thanks to 
geographer Michael Helt Knudsen, whose personal words of advice to me based on his own prior field 
studies in Juaboso District of Ghana – and especially around the frontier town of Bonsu Nkwanta – 
have greatly helped me situate and sharpen my own ethnographic inquiry right from the beginning.  
From the Ghanaian side I likewise have many people to thank, first and foremost my 
primary fieldwork assistant, Eric Opoku, whose wide ranging knowledge on regional matters in 
Juaboso District and personal cocoa farming experiences proved invaluable for the first stages of my 
research in 2014. Likewise, I owe a particular thanks to journalist, Monsieur Pascal of Radio Rainbow 
FM in Juaboso, who assisted me with guidance and French and Aowin translations during a short 
supplementary fieldwork period on the Côte d’Ivoire side of the border in 2014. In the Ghanaian cocoa 
transport sector I particularly wish to thank the trucking trio of Ali, Muhammed, and Prince, who so 
generously invited me to share their already crammed truck cab space with them on what turned out to 
be one particularly eventful and challenging cross-country journey, parts which have come to feature as 
                                                                 
1 For more information on the overall Natural Goods project, please see: http://naturalgoods.saxo.ku.dk/  
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central case material in the present thesis. Many other people across Ghana have likewise earned my 
deep gratitude for their help in providing me insights into the many nuances and controversies of the 
nation’s cocoa sector, yet due to the sensitivity of a lot of this information, their names shall better 
remain anonymous in the present context. I hope that each of those persons and groups “who all know 
themselves” will likewise recognise themselves and their own significant contributions inside this text. 
Named as unnamed, my thanks go out to you all.  
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INTRODUCTION 
*** 
Cocoa is often described as a specific type of raw foodstuff, a consumable ingredient, and 
a particular product of nature. Such objective classifications contain a number of rarely explicit 
assumptions of clear physical and conceptual separation from the surroundings and of something that 
has been reduced to its finest essence. Such an understanding of cocoa is often sufficient in commercial 
settings, in the laboratory, or in the supermarket where cocoa to the people dealing with it becomes 
knowable as a singular entity. 
However, as this thesis will demonstrate through an ethnography of cocoa in a West 
African setting, cocoa can also be understood as a dynamic set of value-charged relations rather than as 
any kind of singularly definable raw material. To arrive at this finding, I have sought out and identified 
numerous fieldwork situations in which cocoa becomes ascribed with meaning and notions of value 
through encounters with other inanimate materials, living beings, and other recognized structures and 
entities. My approach has been to look for boundaries around cocoa in order to explore, materially and 
immaterially, what cocoa both can and cannot be in my specific fieldwork context. Through the lens of 
conceptual boundaries, I thus explore how cocoa gets made as a composite valuable resource, as it 
travels across different spheres of activity, transgressing, performing, reproducing, contesting categories 
along the way. The theoretical onsets for this project come primarily from various social scientific 
approaches to notions of ‘value’ combined with various works exploring ideas  of movement, 
boundaries, and spaces. To anticipate, in this thesis I explore Ghanaian cocoa as a matter of ‘spatialized 
value’ – my overall analytical term meant to capture cocoa as a set of relations that make it emerge as 
valuable as it crosses different boundaries on its way from tree to chocolate. 
 
Boundaries of the Borderlands 
*** 
So, how does cocoa emerge as a valuable natural good in the rural borderlands of Ghana 
and Côte d’Ivoire? The cocoa cultivation in these areas takes place throughout most of the space 
available for agricultural purposes, and the question of what cocoa is and becomes to the people who 
make their livelihoods from it here is closely related to the ways it brushes up against – and permeates 
across the boundaries set to regulate and confine its flow. Therefore, below the seemingly uniform 
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foliage of the evergreen cocoa tree canopies one finds an intricate and dynamic pattern of processes 
woven over time across the space of actions between people and other living beings that work to shape, 
reproduce, transgress, and transform what cocoa is or may become. To understand cocoa in this field, I 
contend, necessitates an understanding of the boundaries reproduced there, one of which is the 
national boundary line separating Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. I will for this reason start out the 
introduction to the topic and the setting of the analysis through an ethnographic focal point placed on 
one of the many rural town communities situated in the vicinity of this border. 
Akaatiso is a bustling small town situated right at the boundary line between Ghana and 
Côte d’Ivoire on the southwestern side of the Bia National Park/Resource Reserve in Western Region 
of Ghana. In 2014 the town could still not boast of any electricity, running water, organized waste 
treatment, or paved roads, but accommodation charges for non-local travellers were on the other hand 
very reasonable compared to the rest of the region. There was a freshly built rudimentary police station 
in the town, sponsored by the elected town chief in a bid to try and lobby the regional authorities to 
assign police officers to the community, so far without success. The armed garrison of Ghanaian 
immigrations and customs officials along with their colleagues directly across on the Ivoirian side of the 
town were at the time of my stay still the only law enforcements present.  
The official border crossing in Akaatiso consists on the Ghanaian side of a couple of 
simple plastered brick buildings with corrugated tin roofs; one painted in two shades of blue colours 
housing the local CEPS (Customs Excise and Preventive Service) unit of the Ghana Revenue 
Authority, and the other building painted in shades of green housing the locally stationed PBU (Border 
Patrol Unit) members of the GIS (Ghana Immigration Services) district garrison2. Immediately across 
on the Ivoirian side an open-sided building provides shelter against the sun to the border protection 
personnel stationed there as well as to their motorbikes, and next to it stands a customs building in 
green, yellow, turquoise and sandy white that serves a matching purpose as the one on the Ghanaian 
side. The Ghanaian customs officers check all travellers for taxable or contraband goods that they 
might be carrying across, while the immigration officers check the travellers’ identification documents 
and provide armed enforcement of the border. The border crossing itself consists of a bare wooden 
gate frame set in an irregularly maintained wooden picket fence some 1.5m high and painted blue along 
the bottom and white on the top. The fence does not extend more than a hundred metres or so in 
                                                                 
2
 Specifically, this Akaatiso division of  GIS officially belongs under the command of  the GIS district 
headquarters situated at the larger border crossing of  Oseikwadjokrom a couple of  hours’ drive to the North. 
11 
 
either direction before being replaced by a line of planted trees that indicate the continuation of the 
national boundary line beyond the town itself.  
On a day in April 2014 Akaatiso was bustling with the news of a dramatic incident that 
had taken place the same morning. A driver of a mini truck from the town had been stopped at the 
local customs checkpoint near the Ivoirian border. Normally this driver would pay something to the 
officer present so that he could pass by with his cargo of cocoa beans undeclared into Côte d’Ivoire, 
but today the officer was accompanied at his post by a newly assigned colleague whom, as I was told, 
he did not yet completely trust. For this reason the officer chose to refuse the usual cash bribe and 
acted instead as if he had never met the driver before. The driver took offence to this cold treatment 
and the embarrassment of being openly rejected with cash in hand, and he furthermore became agitated 
at the prospect of having his truck inspected for contraband goods. The situation quickly turned into a 
quarrel and from there escalated into a physical fight where the officer, aided by his new colleague, 
eventually beat up the driver. 
I was initially told this story during lunchbreak that same day at small cocoa farm outside of Akaatiso. 
There I had joined a handful of town residents who were assisting an elderly local farmer with the 
harvest of cocoa pods on his farm. A relative of the farmer rode in from town on a bicycle and brought 
everyone lunch prepared by the farmer’s wife. While people sat around and ate the visitor excitedly 
shared the fresh gossip. 
According to the story of the incident, after the rough beating the driver lay bloodied and with torn 
clothing on the middle of the dirt road. In his angry frustration the driver proceeded to shout a curse 
[duabɔ]3 at the officer by rubbing his naked bottom on the ground while saying that the River Bia 
would take the officer. This, according to local beliefs, evoked a strong curse implying that the officer 
would now likely not have long left to live. 
The officer, however, did not immediately take the driver’s words seriously and shouted haughtily back 
at him that he was not afraid of the river. 
At this point in the account the farm workers listening together with me made audible gasps and shook 
their heads while muttering disapproving comments. As one of them later explained to me, the officer 
                                                                 
3 Twi term for ‘the act of  cursing’; the curse as a noun was instead referred to as [dua]. Both Twi and the 
regionally prevalent Sefwi are dialects of  the same Akan language group shared by the populations across all of  
contemporary south-western Ghana and parts of  south-eastern Côte d’Ivoire (Hall 2010 [1983]). 
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had just made the situation much worse by adding his own challenging reply to the River. Now, for 
sure, the River Bia would come and kill him. 
Later in the morning, as our lunchbreak messenger continued, the officer had started to feel physically 
unwell and became increasingly afraid for his health. He therefore went first to the home of the driver 
and commanded him to lift the curse. The driver, still hurt and angry, refused to do this, so the officer 
had then continued on to consult the town chief and the elders and request their help to settle the affair 
and lift the curse. 
The lunchtime gossip ended here at this rather suspenseful point. Back in town again around sunset  
other local residents filled me and the other returning farm workers in on the subsequent developments 
of the day: 
The town chief had become very annoyed at hearing about this incident, since he had previously 
prohibited curses from being made in the community. The chief called the driver and the officer to his 
palace and asked for a fine of 1.000 Ghanaian Cedis (GH₵) to be paid by them for this curse incident, 
an amount which he was however willing to lower to 600 GH₵. The driver said that he did not have 
that kind of money and in fact only owned 200 GH₵. The officer then suggested that they pay 300 
GH₵  each, which the driver rejected by stating he did not want to pay anything, since it was the 
officer’s unfair beating of him that had driven him to say the curse in the first place, and so to his view 
the officer ought to pay the whole fine himself. This put further pressure on the officer, since he very 
much wanted the curse to be lifted, while he also did not have the money to pay the entire fine. 
Additional attempts at reaching a settlement were made over the course of the day, and eventually 
through the assistance of friends and family networks a sufficient amount of money was raised to cover 
the fine. Some of this money was then passed from the chief to his primary linguist, an elderly man 
skilled in communication with the spirit world. The linguist spent the money on the purchase of ritual 
ingredients which enabled him to go down to the River Bia and talk to it, presenting appeasement 
offerings while carefully explaining the misunderstandings behind the curse, so that the River in turn 
would agree to lift the curse and not kill the officer after all. 
13 
 
 
Image 1: A part of the River Bia in its material form. Photo taken by author near Addaikrom village, Juaboso 
District, Ghana. March 2014. 
 
This event expresses a number of different locally perceived boundaries, the appearance and 
transgression of which are bound up with cocoa and farming on this frontier of southwestern Ghana. 
Throughout this area knowledge of, adherence to, and at times deliberate transgressions of various 
physical and conceptual boundaries constitute important aspects of the ways in which people attempt 
to manoeuver themselves forward in life under circumstances characterised by scarce access to 
resources, such as education, money, consumable goods, and access to available farmland. The incident 
that happened between the customs officers and the truck driver, and subsequently the larger local 
community, revolved around their mutual acknowledgement of the presence of a number of different 
significant boundaries, and I have chosen to open the thesis with the recounting of this particular case, 
since I find that each of these boundaries indicates ways in which cocoa attains value throughout this 
region. Some boundaries served as de facto permeable markers of difference that enabled the creation 
of value in the form of monetary profit from cocoa. Meanwhile other boundaries worked to limit the 
growth, movement, and potential value attributions of the same. In the following few passages I will 
first present an initial outline of some of the boundaries actualized through the opening ethnographic 
case, before proceeding to introduce the larger empirical and analytical scope of the thesis.  
14 
 
First, running through Akaatiso and beyond there is the physical imposition of the 
geographical boundary line separating the nations of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. This politically founded 
line imposes a basic distinction between people inhabiting the surrounding areas as being either 
Ghanaian or Ivoirian national citizens. Furthermore this line has provided some people with 
employment at this place as immigrations and customs officers, relegating others to the roles of civilian 
border area inhabitants and border-crossing travellers, or in some cases, cross-border smugglers. This 
particular national boundary, however, as the story of the incident relates, has been locally known to be 
quite permeable through the payments of monetary bribes, dependant on whether or not freshly 
arrived officers have also passed the threshold of trust that allows them into the circle of confidentiality 
among financially corrupted senior border personnel.  
The incident revolves around monetary price boundaries too, since the bags of cocoa 
beans that the driver carried would fetch a larger sum of money if sold on the Ivoirian side than on the 
Ghanaian side, where government policies have kept the prices fixed at a lower level4. The Ghanaian 
government holds a long-running state monopoly on exports of cocoa, consequently prohibiting all 
private actors from moving these types of goods across the borders of the nation. The events on this 
particular day prevented the driver from passing the border at all, but had he succeeded in doing so, he 
may have reaped sizeable profits from the sale of his cocoa. Furthermore, it may have been to his 
subsequent advantage to attempt to reinvest the money earned in bags of Ivoirian cocoa fertilizer that 
could then be brought back across the border and sold at a profit in Ghana. In the 2014-15 seasons 
government subsidized cocoa fertilizers were widely reported to be in short supply throughout several 
areas of Ghana, but the ready availability of Ivoirian originated fertilizers in parts of the Ghanaian 
southwestern borderlands suggested that this shortage was, at least partially, mitigated by imports 5. 
Another boundary made apparent from the incident concerns anti-corruption measures 
and the long-running practice of the Ghanaian public sector to appoint government officials to 
positions in parts of the country different from the ones in which those persons originated. While the 
driver was known as a local resident, each of the two officers involved had come from elsewhere. 
                                                                 
4
 These differences will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 1 of  the present thesis. 
5
 Such shortages of  agricultural inputs are not limited to this particular time period only but have recurrently 
taken place in Ghana since the initiation of  structural reforms in the 1990s for the purposes of  increased cocoa 
market liberalisation (Amanor 1999: 38-39). 
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Additionally, officials would be expected to be rotated to other job placements every four to five years 6. 
These measures, as multiple government workers have informed me, were put in place to curb potential 
temptations toward nepotism or corruption among government employees. Still, in the case of the 
described incident at least a partial bond of trust had nevertheless been established between the local 
driver and the senior non-local official posted there. The collusion between them however turned out 
not to be strong enough to withstand the arrival of a new customs officer with still unknown 
allegiances. Instead, the otherwise obsolete social boundary between local civilian and non-local 
officials became instantly reinstated again through the senior officer’s denial of familiarity towards the 
driver, to the ultimate chagrin of both persons involved. 
Finally, the further complications of the unfortunate incident also explicate a locally 
acknowledged existence of a foundational distinction between a material and a spiritual realm of 
existence7, the latter represented by the ensouled River Bia. The boundary between these two realms is 
in turn considered as permeable through the evocation of curses as well as the ritual offering of gifts. 
The oral and somatic gestures of the agitated beaten driver were recognised by members of the local 
community to have successfully reached beyond the boundaries of the material realm and enabled 
powers from the spiritual realm to transgress into and cause harm in the human physical world. The 
River Bia would therefore, as expected by many community members of Akaatiso, reach beyond its 
own regular boundaries to ‘take’ the cursed officer. This looming transgressive spirit act apparently 
required another powerful boundary crossing human act to undo: a ‘linguist’ skilled in communication 
with the spiritual realm had to make ritual appeasement offerings to the River Bia and through carefully 
chosen words thereby attempt to counteract the initial reckless words and actions of the driver and the 
officer that had caused the dangerous situation to arise.  
Taken together, then, I suggest that this case exemplifies a few of the numerous 
boundaries, solid, permeable, and overlapping, that all influence the livelihoods of people around 
Akaatiso and the surrounding geographical areas of this ‘final cocoa frontier’ of Ghana, as it has been 
described (Knudsen & Fold (2011). See also Berry (2008); Amanor (2008)). These boundaries 
simultaneously afford a certain physical and conceptual range to people, within which cocoa cultivation 
and related commercial activities can be undertaken, and concurrently create certain contingently, 
                                                                 
6
 And to be more specific, stationed GIS officers are routinely rotated between the handful or so different border 
crossing posts within each of  their assigned districts, in addition to their larger periodic redeployments to other 
border districts elsewhere in the country. 
7
 On this cosmology, see for instance Meyer (2015); McCaskie (1995); Minkus (1980); Meyerowitz (1951).  
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spatially bound ranges for meaning and value association. Through the chapters of this thesis, I will 
explore Ghanaian cocoa by focusing on the constitution of such materially and immaterially expressed 
boundaries. As I will introduce more fully below, such boundary enactments express solid, permeable, 
and overlapping qualities, which produce what I shall propose to term the ‘spatialized value’ of cocoa. 
 
Introducing the Scope of Analysis 
*** 
In rural Ghana, cocoa production might at first glance seem to be all about cocoa as a 
particular type of natural good and the conversion of such into money. The people who cultivate it, 
transport it, and sell it tend to express little to no interest in cocoa as a consumable item, but curiously, 
neither are they quick to circumscribe its importance in absolute objective terms such as money, weight, 
or quality types. Rather, during fieldwork, I found either a deliberate lack of talking about numerical 
value terms, or, when numbers were mentioned, they were often applied either loosely or in deliberately 
obfuscating ways. How could this be? The reason, I will argue, has to do with a common emphasis on 
the preservation of indeterminacy as a particular way for Ghanaians to cope with difficult conditions of 
life characterized by a scarcity of material resources and livelihood opportunities, widespread practices 
of corruption, a recent history of social upheaval, and the contemporary mixture of cultural influences 
from both near and afar. Ghanaian cocoa production is deeply entangled in all of these circumstances, 
and it is a commonly held wisdom that full openness about the true extent of one’s available resources 
only makes one more prone to losing it all. Instead, careful manoeuvring and partial displays of one’s 
assets lead to a safer way forward towards ambitions of obtaining material wealth and higher social 
status. Cocoa, in this setting, becomes a means towards achieving various goals of a better life, and my 
suggestion is that cocoa therefore becomes charged as a peculiar locus of potentiality, the dimensions 
and outer bounds of which, however, remain surreptitiously dynamic and deliberately underdetermined 
until the points when it is exchanged for cash or favours. 
Crucially, this means that studies employing quantitatively based methods to explore the 
dimensions of value generation across the Ghanaian cocoa business face a significant obstacle, as 
numerical expressions are frequently obfuscated and rendered imprecise, whether one enquires into 
what may be seen as illegal, dubious, or even entirely mundane aspects of people’s work and 
livelihoods8. In consequence, I find that important insights can be gained if one approaches cocoa as a 
                                                                 
8
 For instance, Michael Helt Knudsen who has conducted geographical PhD fieldwork in Juaboso District (the 
same administrative district as the majority of  this thesis is based in), reports that quantitative research in this 
17 
 
natural good, the value of which is generated through multiple dimensions, only one of which concerns 
decidedly commercial transactions. Accordingly, this thesis will suggest that value creation through the 
Ghanaian cocoa sector is better understood as something that dynamically involves the spatial 
dimensions of the material good and its production of contexts. Centrally, I have found it necessary to 
identify an analytical approach that is suitable for conditions where numerical boundary indications are 
both true and false, and where it remains an open secret among my informants that real value is 
generated in the marginal spaces between boundaries as formally represented and boundaries as 
surreptitiously performed. 
To explore cocoa in this sense as an intentionally vague mass of potential , continuously 
shaped through the interplays between overt and covert boundary enactments, I develop an analytical 
term I call ‘spatialized value’. This term is an attempt to build on the traditions of previous social 
scientific studies of value that have tended to approach the concept of value either as an intrinsic 
quality of a particular good or as the actualisation of difference during events of exchange . This thesis 
proposes that it makes sense to treat the value of Ghanaian cocoa as materializing both of these 
features9. 
 
 
Sources of Inspiration from Regional and Theoretical Literature 
*** 
As a way to frame the present ethnographic exploration of the characteristically secretive 
cocoa business, I have found inspiration from, among other sources, anthropologist Brenda Chalfin. 
Chalfin has studied the dynamics between people and regulatory frameworks in several parts of Ghana, 
including local market traders of the shea nut business of north-eastern Ghana (Chalfin 2000), as well 
as studies among officials at Kotoka International Airport in Accra, Ghana (Chalfin 2010, 2008). One 
of Chalfin’s insights has been to “pose the perceived corruption of [Ghanaian] public officials such as 
customs officers, not as a ‘problem to be solved’  […] but, first and foremost, as a problem to be 
understood, with complex political, economic, and cultural underpinnings and effects.” (Chalfin 2010: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
local context is hampered by A) a lack of  tradition for recording exact numbers. B) landholding measurement 
systems that have changed over the years, and informants would frequently refer implicitly to different units of  
measurements based on ropes, miles, poles, or acres. C) Suspicion and caution among informants that frequently 
made such persons lie or intentionally underestimate numerical expressions of  their assets during interviews 
(Knudsen 2008: 55). 
9
 All of  this will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2 of  this thesis. 
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XV). Similarly, rather than attempting to uncover purported ‘truths’ or ‘facts’ hidden behind people’s 
practices of secrecy, I have instead made it the scope of this thesis to explore some of the ways in 
which the many boundaries, material as immaterial, formal as informal, shape and shroud the Ghanaian 
cocoa business with images of secrecy, profitability, and corruption.  
Inspired in part by anthropologist David Graeber’s use of Ferdinand de Saussure’s 
linguistics to theorise value as ‘meaningful difference’  (Graeber 2001) coupled with anthropologist Jane 
Guyer’s term ‘marginal gains’ (Guyer 2004), I explore how people’s notions of value lead to fuzzily 
bounded notions of space. The spatial aspect of my approach meanwhile draws in part on insights from 
the ‘spatial turn’ in recent decades in African studies (Engel & Nugent 2010) and from the social 
scientific sources in general (Lefebvre 1991 [1974], Smith 2008 [1984], Munn 1986, Barth 1969).  
For my main fieldwork area of Ghana, the Sefwi traditional region, the extensive research 
and publications by anthropologist Stefano Boni have been especially helpful due to his often 
pioneering documentation of Sefwi oral history and customs (Boni 2008, 2007, 2005, 2001, 2000, 
1999). For insights into recent and contemporary conditions of cocoa cultivation in the westernmost 
parts of Sefwi, especially Juaboso District, articles by geographers Niels Fold (2004) and Michael Helt 
Knudsen (2010, 2008, 2007, Knudsen & Fold 2011), along with my personal conversations with them, 
have likewise contributed to the framing of my ethnographic fieldwork. On the topic of south 
Ghanaian cocoa farming and cultural traditions, works by Tsutomu Takane (2002), Kojo Amanor, 
(2008, 2007, 2001, 1999, 1996), Gareth Austin (2005, 1996, 1987), Ivor Wilks (1993, 1973), Thomas 
McCaskie (1995, 1986), Paul Nugent (2002), Sara Berry (2009, 2002, 2001), Polly Hill (1997[1963]), and 
Gwendolyn Mikell (1992) have also been important as a crucial contextualization of my work. For 
literature on Ghanaian and wider African border issues, works by Paul Nugent (2011, 2002, Engel & 
Nugent 2010, Nugent & Asiwaju 1996), Carola Lentz (2003), E. O. Saffu (1970), I. W. Zartman (1965) 
and others have likewise been significant. The specific dialogues with these and other sources will be 
introduced in the analyses that follow. 
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On Methodology 
*** 
This thesis is primarily based on three periods of ethnographic fieldwork conducted in 
Ghana in 2014 and 2015, constituting in total about five months. Additionally, I have drawn on more 
than a decade of prior personal experiences from Ghana, where I have been involved in numerous 
development initiatives financed through the Danish governmental Danida (Danish International 
Development Assistance) agency. These involvements comprised both volunteer NGO work since 
2002 at regional and local community levels in Ghana’s Northern Region, as well as a student 
internship with the BSPS (Business Sector Programme Support) unit at the Danish Embassy in Accra 
from 2008-09. 
My present and most recent ethnographical material has been generated throughout a 
handful of districts in the southwestern rural frontier region bordering Côte d’Ivoire, as well as in the 
commercial port of Tema, the capital city of Accra, and along some of the road networks in between. I 
have attempted to follow cocoa beans from their origins in small farming communities in the Ghanaian 
and Ivoirian borderlands and further along the so-called ’commodity chain’ to the coast, interviewing 
numerous human stakeholders along the way, including farmers, border officials, depot workers, 
truckers, quality control officers, and many other private persons, business representatives, and 
government officials. In each case I have probed the dimensions and boundaries of people’s 
engagements with cocoa, whether material (i.e. geographical boundaries, limits of job mandated 
activities, etc.) or immaterial (i.e. collaboration with certain others, barriers to trust, etc.).  
My methodology has primarily been centred on engaging people through qualitative 
conversations while attempting to participate as much as possible in their work ta sks in relation to 
cocoa. This has in practical terms entailed weeks of volunteering for various kinds of menial cocoa 
farming work along with multiple tag-alongs during short and long cocoa transportation activities, 
quality control procedures, GIS border patrols, and occasional development stakeholder interventions. 
In the case of information sought among highly ranked government and business officials it had 
proven necessary for me to proceed through formal time-constrained interviews, but even in such 
settings I strove for a conversational approach through a pre-made list of topics of interest rather than 
any fixed interview questionnaire. This purposely open-ended methodology enabled me to continuously 
remain open for the pursuit of surprising angles of information that would appear over the course of 
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such talks, an approach that corresponds well to what O’Reilly characterizes as ‘iterative -inductive’ 
research (O’Reilly 2012: 29-30). 
In some cases in the remotest parts of rural southwestern Ghana, I relied on the help of 
local assistants to translate between Sefwi and English, as well as to locate road tracks and pathways to 
various village communities and individual farmsteads that could not be found through the available 
maps. Similarly, a shorter supplementary research around communities situated on the Ivoirian side of 
the border was also made possible through the helpfulness of local assistants who provided me with 
necessary translations between Sefwi, Aowin, French, and English.  
Extensive note-taking and photography during participant observation provided another 
rich source of ethnographic material for the present thesis, as did the collection and documentation of 
several material items related to cocoa production in Ghana. The collection of such ethnographic items 
furthermore served the purpose of components for a planned subsequent ethnographic museum 
exhibition after the completion of the thesis. 
A consequence of my chosen fieldwork methodology coupled with my analytical 
aspirations is a style of writing that does not attempt to hide the co-presence of the fieldworker. It 
would have been self-contradictory otherwise, I believe, since my argument goes that cocoa is 
continuously becoming what it is through encounters with other entities, which necessarily also 
includes the influence of the fieldworker asking, observing, reflecting, and in general being unavoidably 
present among those people who engage themselves with the natural good that both they and I call 
‘cocoa’. What will therefore emerge through the following is a text that by choice and by necessity 
weaves in and out of closely recounted events from the field combined with reflections from afar. The 
intentional brevity of this initial section on methodology and scholarly context will for this reason be 
compensated through more thorough discussions and reflections throughout the thesis.  
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Synopsis of the Thesis 
*** 
This thesis argues that cocoa in Ghana attains value through numerous boundary making, 
boundary moving, and boundary transgressing activities. I have structured the work into five main 
chapters that each deals with a part of this boundary work. Together the five chapters establish the 
basis for my proposal that the value of cocoa can be understood as inherently spatial and dynamic. 
Chapter 1 introduces the overall Ghanaian cocoa business through ethnographic focus 
on one particular cocoa farming community, situated in a remote part of the tropical southern Ghana – 
Côte d’Ivoire border zone. The marginality of this community, relative to the national authorities and 
the cocoa businesses of either country, helps me identify a number of issues that problematize 
understandings of cocoa as one essential type of natural good. Instead, the incommensurability of 
boundaries imposed around this place invites another view of cocoa as potentiality of value that can be 
variously realised. 
Chapter 2 explores the movement of cocoa as a commercial product through the 
Ghanaian road networks from rural depots to the ports. By contrasting the work of truck drivers with 
that of portside logistics personnel I analyse how the supposedly same cocoa can be seen to emerge 
alternately as a solid material and as an abstract flow. I proceed to discuss these findings in relation to a 
number of academic approaches to the concept of value and conclude the chapter with substantiating 
the proposition that the value of cocoa moved through commodity chains can be gainfully understood 
as a series of boundary-making and boundary-traversing activities that include spatial dimensions. 
 Chapter 3 explores the multiple ways in which diverse regionally based notions of spatial 
boundaries influence cocoa cultivation in the rural southwestern Ghana. Based on research combining 
historical material from the region with examples from a number of old and recent ethnographic cases 
discussed by other academic researchers I attempt to outline how such physically and conceptually 
reproduced boundaries result in frequently contested and overlapping territorial claims, which in turn 
shape multiple opportunities and barriers for value generation through cocoa cultivation. 
Chapter 4 goes on to explore the significance of certain temporal boundaries related to 
cocoa farming in my fieldwork area of rural southwestern Ghana. With an initial focus on the frontier 
town of Bonsu Nkwanta I analyse the ways in which individuals’ desires towards experiences of future 
success through obtainment of material wealth mix with religious and spiritual beliefs, economic and 
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ludic activities, and all set against the cyclical conditions of cocoa farming. I present the argument that 
in the rural Ghanaian setting where gradual, linear accumulation of wealth through smallholder cocoa 
farming most often fails, churches, banks, spiritualists, and lotto schemes in turn become vested with 
the hope and faith of many local population members. 
Chapter 5 expands the temporal theme introduced in the previous chapter by shifting the 
focus to acts of individual agency in the form of cheating, corruption, and other illicit ways of making, 
breaking, and exploiting the many boundaries of the Ghanaian cocoa business for the purposes of 
experiencing personal success through the obtainment of material wealth. I argue that deliberate 
preservation of indeterminacy serves as an effective way to create and exploit spaces for secret profit 
margins, which I consider hidden instantiations of spatialized value.  
In the conclusion of the thesis I sum up the findings of the preceding chapters with a 
final short ethnographic case framing a topically arranged deliberation on the combined ways in which 
the multiple practices of people in the cocoa business of Ghana imbue the cocoa of this place with 
characteristics of spatiality, value, and future potentials, in effect shaping the cocoa as a complexly 
constituted natural good. The concluding argument of the thesis is therefore that cocoa can be gainfully 
understood as innumerable connections that are constantly made and remade in countless ways.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image 2: Ripe cocoa pods on a tree in a cocoa plantation in Western Region Ghana, 2014.  
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CHAPTER 1: 
COCOA IN A MARGINAL BORDER COMMUNITY  
*** 
The village of Topman lies in the far periphery of the Ghanaian state. The tiny village 
borders the boundary line towards Côte d’Ivoire in a place secluded from any major thoroughfares and 
it is surrounded by verdant cocoa plantations in all directions. The village is not depicted on any map 
that I have been able to find, and instead it was purely by coincidence that I one day found my way 
there. 
During my 2014-15 fieldworks I spent some time around a number of communities close 
to the Ghanaian-Ivoirian border areas in parts of the Western Region of Ghana in the hopes of 
learning more about the importance of this international boundary line for cocoa in relation to farming 
practices, commercial activities, and government administration. As my travels brought me closer to the 
national border zone the presence of the Ghanaian customs and immigration authorities also became 
more evident. Uniformed soldiers had already carefully perused my passport and permit papers at a 
checkpoint some 8kms inland before they had allowed me passage along the country roads leading 
towards the actual border zone. 
Cocoa has been Ghana’s primary export commodity for close to a century with a total 
output in 2013 of an estimated 850.000 tonnes, only surpassed in volume by Côte d’Ivoire, the 
country’s neighbour to the West, which in the same period exported some 1.480.000 tonnes. Together, 
these two countries produced about 71% of the world’s total harvest of cocoa beans (ICCO 2013). In 
Ghana the majority of the cocoa producers are small-scale farmers, numbering in total around 720.000 
people, which when including family dependants are estimated to make up around 25-30% of the 
nation’s total population of around 20 million inhabitants (Anthonio & Aikins 2009). Given all these 
numbers it seemed remarkable to me how limited the availability of chocolate products was in 
contemporary Ghana, especially outside the largest cities. Additionally, among the population of the 
rural cocoa growing areas of Ghana’s Western Region – the primary area of most of my fieldwork – 
chocolate tends to be perceived as a costly luxury good. To my mind it seems rather remarkable that a 
sizeable number of farmers experience that manufactured chocolate products are both too difficult to 
find and too expensive to buy, considering the fact that they themselves are growing cocoa beans on as 
much as 97-98% of their own available farmlands, as farm size surveys have revealed (Knudsen & Fold 
2011: 383). Since cocoa in Ghana thus appears to be less associated with impressions of taste in the 
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form of chocolate products than among consumers elsewhere around the globe, I wonder how cocoa 
might instead feature in the lives of those people who shape their livelihoods around the cultivation, 
regulation, and transport of it. What different kinds of meaning and value do such people associate 
with this good, and to which degree does it make sense to treat cocoa as one objectively definable raw 
material – and not multiple? 
My first encounter with the village of Topman happened entirely by coincidence. One 
day during fieldwork my assistant and I had turned our rented car down a small unmarked dirt road in 
the search for a Ghanaian border post called ‘Oscar’, based on a tip provided us by another border 
official10 earlier in the day. We had not yet heard of Topman, but we succeeded in finding the ‘Oscar’ 
front post without much trouble. Three small square huts made of aerated concrete bricks covered with 
corrugated tin roofs appeared after a turn of the road, all surrounded by cocoa trees belonging to 
nearby small farms. Between the last two huts a rope hung limply across the road with knots of small 
torn strips of red-white barricade tape tied to it here and there as a sort of improvised indication of the 
border crossing. The dusty wheel track wound itself out of sight in between the cocoa trees on the 
other side. At the guard post the arrival of our car was met by the stern looks of two Ghanaian soldiers 
who stepped out onto the road dressed in green and brown baggy camouflage pants, black polished 
military boots and white undershirts. Their lack of uniform coats did not seem particularly out of place 
on this day where the weather was very hot and humid. The initial intimidating gestures from the 
immigration officers soon relaxed into smiles once they had inspected my identification papers and 
learned that I had come here in the hope of talking with them and not to try and travel into Côte 
d’Ivoire through this border crossing that was officially closed for traffic. A conversation with a 
European traveller did not occur frequently here, and the officials received my visit as an amusing break 
from an otherwise largely monotonous working day. As they soon told me, except for four pedestrian 
travellers from Togo with dubious paper works, nothing much had happened here today, other than 
the usual trickle of local farmers. 
I spoke for a while with the officials about their lives and the functions of their jobs, but 
it was not until well into the conversation that I became aware that this particular place technically was 
                                                                 
10
 The border officials that I refer to here and over the course of  the present chapter are members of  the GIS 
(Ghana Immigration Service) unit headquartered at the Dadieso border crossing and whose members in shifts 
are deployed to various border posts and road checkpoints northwards from Dadieso to Africa (the latter 
community still erroneously listed as ’Tanzania’ on Google Maps as of  05.08.2018) and northeast-bound to the 
town of  Jato. These GIS officials are therefore part of  a different command chain than the ones discussed in 
relation to the town of  Akaatiso in the introduction chapter of  this thesis. 
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not the border itself. The district’s border authorities had instead moved the border post back to this 
spot closer to the main road for the sake of convenience, since the dirt road up ahead was in a very 
decrepit state and the access to telecommunications signals, clean water, and other supplies out there 
were all problematic. In fact, as the GIS officers told me, there was a small Ghanaian village called 
Topman some two kilometres up ahead, right before the real border. At the conclusion of our talk the 
officers granted permission for my assistant and I to pass the rope barrier and make a visit to this 
village, on the condition that we both promised to return back the same day and not continue to Côte 
d’Ivoire, since such a course of action might lead to trouble for the posted officers, if their superiors 
were to find out. 
The road onward was indeed in a bad condition and was in several places almost washed 
away by the region’s frequent tropical rains. A dirt bike or a 4WD vehicle would clearly have been 
preferable here instead of our small passenger car that now struggled forward in zigzags between 
potholes and rainwater channels in the already rough wheel tracks. The landscape around us consisted 
of densely planted cocoa trees behind meter tall grasses along the roadsides which here and there gave 
way for glimpses to earthen coloured clay farm huts secluded in the otherwise verdantly green 
landscape of cocoa trees. While we slowly advanced alternating between first and second gear my 
assistant remarked how the signal strength of our cell phones rapidly decreased. From two indicator 
points back at the Oscar station to now one and soon after ‘no-signal’ signs on both screens. Evidently, 
wherever we were headed lay outside the coverage of both MTN and Vodafone, at the time the two 
largest telecommunications companies in Ghana. 
After the last ascend of a forested hilltop we finally arrived at the Topman village where 
people with loud yells stepped out of their huts and expressed their puzzlement and surprise to 
suddenly see strangers among them. I soon after found myself placed in a plastic garden chair under the 
shade of a tree in the middle of the village with a group of people gathering around me. Meanwhile 
some of the many children brought out long wooden benches from the huts so that the other adults 
could sit down as well. At first I saw only women and children around me, but soon after several men 
also showed up, most of them sweaty and in dirty work clothes with machetes in their hands, directly 
back from work out in the surrounding plantations. 
I was right away presented with a welcome offering of a plastic cup filled with slight ly 
murky water, and after a few polite mouthfuls and a presentation of myself, I gained the opportunity to 
ask a few questions to the people present. I learned that the village of Topman was founded in 1973 -74 
by a Ghanaian man named Yekpo Woyome who purchased some tracts of the area’s virgin forests 
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from the chief of Boinzan, a traditional Sefwi village chieftancy based some 25km from there. The 
Sefwi tribe, a subgroup of the Akan tribal lineage, were considered to be the indigenous population of 
the region and had primarily formed their livelihoods through hunting and extensive agriculture before 
pioneer settlers from other parts of Ghana brought cocoa here during the latter half of the 20th 
century11. Mr. Woyome chose to give his newly founded settlement the name of ‘Top-man-krom’ (krom 
in Twi and Sefwi means ‘hamlet’) in order to reflect his own ambitions for his future career as cocoa 
farmer, and the place soon became referred to in daily speak as ‘Topman’. More immigrants joined him 
as neighbours over the coming years and contributed to the building of the village and the replanting of 
the area’s dense tropical forests into the many small household based cocoa plantations that 
characterise the region today. 
The conversation with the residents of Topman offered a wealth of information about 
the forty-odd year history of the village, about techniques for cocoa farming, and the life conditions for 
smallholder families here at this place. I jotted down notes as quickly as I could in my notebook, all the 
while I attempted to gain a better impression of the surroundings. Cocoa was without doubt the focal 
point for much activity around here. From the seat under the shade of the trees I could look out 
toward the open sunbathed square in the middle of the village. The square was surrounded by semi-
detached clay huts; some with tin roofs, some with straw; some with painted walls, but all with facades 
that opened up towards the central point. The centre of the square was taken up by several pole 
mounted wooden drying platforms raised above the ground, the style of which was identical to many 
other places around the region. On such platforms mats made of bound bamboo strips could be 
unfurled so that fermented cocoa beans could be spread atop them to dry in the sunlight for typically 5-
6 days until they were ready to be sold. Even though cocoa could be grown all year round it was at this 
point outside the main crop season, so on this day only a single drying platform was in use. A brownish 
layer of cocoa beans was visible on top of it, and in the afternoon heat a thick sour-sweet odour of 
cocoa spread all the way over to the place where we sat. Cocoa was ever present in Topman, and just 
like the permeating smells of it, I soon realised that the raw material in this borderland was not easily 
reigned in. Instead, cocoa took on the appearance of both a defined resource and an ephemeral 
connection. 
 
                                                                 
11 More on this topic in Chapter 3 of  this thesis. 
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Cocoa Production in Ghana and Elsewhere 
*** 
From the distanced overview offered by world maps it is easy to spot a climatic 
boundary-making factor for cocoa cultivation, since the cocoa tree – in the Linnean system classified as 
Theobroma cacao – is a tropical plant that requires warm, shady surroundings characterised by frequent 
rainfall, high humidity, and temperatures ranging between 20° and 32° Celsius, and as such it does not 
thrive outside of a relatively small belt around the Equator (Mossu 1992). Although the cocoa tree is 
indigenous to the Amazon its seeds were spread to the Equatorial parts of Africa and Southeast Asia 
through the seafaring connections of the colonial times (Wood & Lass 1989 [1955]; Clarence-Smith & 
Ruf 1996). The tropical forest areas of southern Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire had over time proven highly 
suitable for commercial planting of the cocoa tree, and from the closing decades of the 19 th century the 
British and the French colonial powers had both encouraged the cultivation and export of cocoa from 
their tropical West African territories to supply the growing market demands for chocolate products 
primarily in Europe and North America (Chaveau & Léonard 1996). In Ghana the commercial cocoa 
cultivation took its start at the Akwapim area some 20km inland of the capita l of Accra (Hill 1997 
[1963]; Dickson 1969), and from there over the course of the 20 th century the planting of cocoa 
gradually spread across the rest of the country’s southern tropical forest areas, spurred on by steadily 
increasing international demands for cocoa, high population growth levels, as well as low establishing 
costs for cocoa farming (Austin 2005; Woods 2004; Crook 2001). 
The story of the founding of the village of Topman serves as a fairly typical example 
from the final phase of the long period of cocoa farm establishments, which from the late 1960s and 
early 1970s also reached the remotest corners of the Western Region of Ghana – a part of the nation 
which had hitherto remained a relatively sparsely populated tropical forest. Some researchers have 
characterised this region as the ‘final cocoa frontier’ of Ghana (Knudsen & Fold 2011) based on the 
fact that this area was the last where undeveloped land remained available for prospective cocoa 
farmers. Many of the earliest immigrants managed to obtain cheap or even free plots of land through 
petitions placed with chiefs of the Sefwi tribal communities (Boni 2005; Awanyo 1998; England 1993). 
Such chiefs acted – and still act – as traditional custodians of tribal lands and have ruled over the 
distribution of access to lands that were considered to belong to a particular tribal authority, called a 
‘stool’ (Awanyo 1998). In this regard the judicial heritage of Ghana differs from that of Côte d’Ivoire, 
since the British colonial authorities of the once-named ‘Gold Coast Colony’ – the current Ghana – 
initially opted for a more indirect form of rule where the traditional chieftancies were secured a number 
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of privileges and rights through the colonial legal system. Among these were the rights of chiefs to 
mediate and decide verdicts over local conflicts through so-called ‘Native Courts’ along with the right 
to administrate collective rights over tribal lands (Crook 2001). A largely opposite development from 
this took place in Côte d’Ivoire where the French colonial administration established a centralised legal 
system and nationalised the rights to land (Amanor 2007: 211-12), with the subsequently applied 
‘laisser-faire’ principle that land in effect belonged to those who put it to use 12. In both countries these 
principles were upheld after the attainment of independence from the colonial powers, something 
which for Ghana took place in 1957 and for Côte d’Ivoire in 1960. 
Back in the shade under the tree in Topman in 2014 some of the village elders told me 
about the time they initially came here as young people seeking a future as cocoa farmers. They had all 
travelled here from other parts of Ghana, and each of them had been granted their plot of land by the 
Boinzan chief, under whose power this area was traditionally considered to lie. In principle all land 
grants such as these were only to be considered as temporary leases for typically 99 years or so, since all 
lands here according to tradition belong inalienably to the Sefwi tribe and therefore sooner or later 
ought to return again to tribal control. However, this aspect worried neither the population of Topman 
nor any other of the region’s farmers that I spoke with, since the 99 year leases undoubtedly surpassed 
the lifetimes of the initial farmers as well as possibly those of their children, and additionally there was a 
widespread expectation that all such leases, if necessary, could become renewed by the farmers’ 
grandchildren or great grandchildren. 
From the time of its foundation in 1973 and up until today cocoa had formed the 
pivoting point for life in Topman. Even though the small vegetable gardens around the village also saw 
the cultivation of food crops such as cassawa, plaintain, and rice, the people of Topman emphasized 
how cocoa constituted by far the most important crop around there as it served as their sole source of 
income. The community members I spoke with estimated that the population here in total produced 
around 2.000 bags of cocoa every year, each containing the official Ghanaian standard weight of 64kg. 
These bags were sold to the three local cocoa ‘purchasing clerks’ operating there. These people in turn 
arranged to bring the cocoa bags further inland in Ghana via motorbikes to larger rural depots, with 
which they each were affiliated. In this particular regard the life conditions in the village had improved 
somewhat over the most recent decade or so, I was told, since before then people had to walk with 
                                                                 
12 In 1963 the Ivoirian President Houphouët-Boigny publicly reaffirmed this principle with the statement that: 
”La terre appartient à celui qui la met en valeur” [The land belongs to those who develop it] (Chaveau 2000: 
105). 
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each bag on their head first out to the main road some 5 km away and there wait for transport 
opportunity with a trotro [locally operated minibus transport service] or a passing truck onwards to 
Bonsu Nkwanta, which was the nearest larger frontier town some 10 km away. Only once there would 
the farmers be able to sell their cocoa produce to purchasers at the depots.  
The arrival in Topman of licenced purchasing clerks (LPCs) working on behalf of the so-
called Licenced Buying Companies (LBCs) came about as a result of changes that had taken place in the 
Ghanaian cocoa business since 1992. At that time COCOBOD, the Ghanaian government institution 
that until then had held a monopoly over the country’s cocoa sector, opened up for a partial 
liberalisation of the business following pressure from the World Bank and IMF (Fold 2004; Kolavalli & 
Vigneri 2011). Although the Ghanaian government still to this day handles all official quality controls 
and maintains its monopoly on cocoa exports via the CMC (The Cocoa Marketing Company) it has 
since the late 1990s now been possible for private purchasing companies to obtain licences to operate 
in the cocoa producing districts. With the partial liberalization of the cocoa market this has resulted in 
the establishment of currently about 37 LBCs, while the government’s formerly monopolistic 
purchasing company, the PBC (The Produce Buying Company) in turn has become restructured into an 
independent company with only partial state-ownership, and which has had its total market share 
reduced to currently about 40%, all according to business insiders I spoke with. COCOBOD still 
dictates the official farm-gate purchasing price for all cocoa in Ghana, which differs from the system in 
Côte d’Ivoire where a more complete liberalisation of the cocoa market has meant that prices here 
since 1999 have been continuously negotiated between purchasers and farmers (Gilbert & Varangis 
2003). Additionally, the maintenance of the Ghanaian governmental quality control system means that 
Ghanaian cocoa has earned a reputation for being of a finer and more uniform quality than for example 
Ivoirian cocoa with the result that Ghanaian cocoa is sold at premium prices on the world market 
(Kolavalli & Vigneri 2011). 
In Topman as well as in other communities around the region I repeatedly heard similar 
explanations when I asked about the differences in cocoa production between Ghana and Côte 
d’Ivoire. Apart from mentioning the different pricing systems as well as the presence of the 
governmental Ghanaian quality control, several cocoa farmers throughout the area told me that Ivoirian 
farmers were not as patient as Ghanaian farmers when handling cocoa beans. Ivoirian farmers did 
reputedly not care to spend time to manually remove excess plant fibres and other materials from the 
fermented cocoa beans, and neither did they want to wait the necessary five to six days for the cocoa to 
dry in the sun before bagging it for sale. Instead some Ivoirians lit fires under their drying tables with 
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the consequence that their cocoa became roasted rather than dried and gained a bad smoked taste. 
Other stories had it that Ivoirian farmers rushed to sell their cocoa before it was sufficiently dry, and so 
the beans would become mouldy before they could even reach the ports and be shipped out. For of all 
such kinds of reasons, as I was assured, Ghanaian cocoa is of a better quality than Ivoirian. The way in 
which these farmers cultivate and treat their cocoa has thus become associated with both notions of 
national identity and norms for how one ought to perform the work as a proper Ghanaian cocoa 
farmer. 
The three cocoa purchasing clerks in Topman were all locally residing farmers who had 
chosen to take on part time jobs for the companies PBC, Armajaro, and Akuafo Adamfo, of which the 
latter two were private actors on the market in contrast to the still partially state-owned PBC. The 
purchasers were all paid on commission and each of them managed their own little padlocked ‘buying 
shed’ where they could receive, weigh, and store the bags of cocoa that Topman’s farmers offered 
them. The same system was in place at practically every other village around the region, and in the same 
way as during my previous talks with other cocoa farmers I was told in Topman that cocoa here was 
exclusively a cash crop: people cultivated and sold the raw product but did not consume it themselves. 
From what I was able to gather this meant that cocoa was not utilised as an ingredient in any local 
dishes, nor did it appear to be part of any local myths or traditions. The local forms of cocoa 
application were typically limited to either usage of cocoa butter for skin pomade, or in some cases the 
discarded husks of the harvested cocoa pods were burned and the ashes mixed with shea nut or palm 
tree oils, rolled into small greyish balls and used locally as a rudimentary kind of soap. Finally, the local 
population would sometimes during the harvesting work put fresh cocoa beans into their mouths and 
suck on the thin layer of slightly sweet pulp around it, while the bitter raw bean itself would be spat out 
again. Other than this specific instance, cocoa in this place was not considered as foodstuff. Chocolate 
was a product known to most, but such products were considered to be expensive luxury goods that 
were only very occasionally affordable – if even available – during visits to market days in nearby larger 
rural towns such as Bonsu Nkwanta or further away. The ways in which the raw cocoa beans would 
later on become transformed into processed chocolate was explained to me as both unknown and 
uninteresting according to everyone I talked with. 
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In the Borderlands of the Authorities: Topman and Blank Spots on the Map 
*** 
Mr. Woyome, the initial founder of Topman village, had already died in 1978, I was told, 
but it seemed likely that he would not have experienced many further structural developments around 
the place, even if he had gone on to live there for forty years instead of only four. The group of 
community members talked loudly on top of each other while relating to me how they felt that they 
had become forgotten by the Ghanaian authorities. They still did not have any borehole at the village 
and had to fetch water from a nearby pond and carry it back in buckets. They also still did not have 
access to electricity nor any health clinic or school in the village, and the dirt road leading there they 
had had to construct entirely on their own. The children of the village walked along this road to and 
from the primary school in a neighbouring village out by the main road some 5km away. No NGO had 
yet found its way to this place, and the people living here implored me to try and somehow bring aid to 
the village. 
The meeting with the villagers of Topman left me rather astounded. How come this place 
in 2014 still had such a poor infrastructure and remained unconnected to grids of electricity, water, 
telecommunications, and development initiatives? Where were the fruits of the forty years of cocoa 
cultivation and sales to be found? At the time of my visit the official purchasing price of cocoa was 212 
GH₵ per standard bag, an amount which at the time corresponded to about 75 USD, but in the village 
I was told that such amounts of money did not reach far, once the costs for the children’s schooling, 
stable foodstuffs and clothing, as well as necessary purchases of agro-chemicals for farming were 
covered. 
A few days later I asked for more information about Topman village at the District 
Assembly office in the town of Juaboso. The employees there reported that the district administration 
regrettably was not in possession of any information beyond the listing of which electoral district the 
village belonged to, as well as the recorded population number of the place, which most recently in 
2008 was registered as 202 people. The village furthermore did not feature on any of the district 
authorities’ maps over the area, since only communities with currently existing public institutions had  
been indicated on those. I asked somewhat surprised whether I could be referred to another public 
authority for more information about Topman, but the officials replied in the negative that this 
particular District Assembly office was supposed to be in possession of the most detailed local data 
existing anywhere among Ghana’s authorities. The confidence of their answer seemed unperturbed by 
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the fact that I was enquiring about a community not even indicated on the wall map hanging in the 
anteroom of the District Planning Office. 
The poor availability of public records regarding the Topman village soon after brought 
my conversation with two of the District Assembly employees over to the topic of the authorities’ work 
in general. I learned that the district authorities here in praxis had very little influence on the cocoa 
sector. The national government had instated a legal prohibition against the establishment of local taxes 
and fees on goods or activities related to cocoa production, which left the authorities here completely 
dependent on the disbursement of government funds from the capital. There had lately, however, been 
some problems with these payments, so the district authorities of Juaboso were in March 2014 still 
awaiting the receipt of the budgeted operating funds for the third and the fourth quartiles of the 
previous year, in addition to those of the first quartile of this year. For this reason numerous public 
work tasks and initiatives were currently placed on hold, and the thought of expanding the offer of 
public services to yet another village in the district therefore seemed entirely unrealistic at the time. 
During my visit to the District Assembly the somewhat stagnant, dusty atmosphere of 
the place was contrasted by the loud noise of traffic coming from the roads outside. Heavily loaded 
trucks were steadily driving south towards the coast with cargoes of cocoa, while more lightly burdened 
trucks returned to the area with fresh pallets of empty jute sacks pre-stamped with texts saying: “Ghana 
Cocoa Board – Produce of Ghana”. At the same time government employed Quality Control Officers 
(QCOs) were busily driving back and forth in jeeps and on motorbikes answering calls to make 
inspections of each bag of cocoa that steadily arrived from the nearby villages to the numerous LBC 
depots in town. While the district administration’s connection to the rest of the country at this time 
appeared partially severed, the connections made through cocoa production, on the other hand, looked 
to be thriving. 
I left the District Assembly office somewhat perturbed after having learned how villages 
like Topman could remain almost invisible in the public administrative system and how this system in 
turn appeared largely disconnected from the society it was meant to govern. I recalled how I a few days 
before had visited a public primary school in a nearby village where every single student during the 
morning assembly had raised their hands in reply to my question of who among them had parents that 
cultivated cocoa. After the assembly session had ended the headmaster of the school had stepped over 
to me and confided that actually both he and the school’s other four teachers had their own private 
cocoa farms too that they tended to outside of work hours. The contrast between this event and the 
visit at the District Assembly now struck me as quite vivid, since unlike my prior expectations it seemed 
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that cocoa among the public administrative authorities was far more absent than in any other place, 
public or private, which I had visited in the region. 
Despite the discouraging words from the district administration I still hoped that I could 
find more connections to Topman at some of the other government authorities of the region, among 
these in particular those specialised in cocoa. At first I had no luck with this search at the governmental 
QCC (Quality Control Company), since this authority only became involved once the purchasers had 
brought the cocoa to the depots in the larger communities around the region. However, later on I 
gained an insight during a visit to the district office of CHED (Cocoa Health & Extension Division) in 
Juaboso. This subdivision of the Ghanaian cocoa authorities was specialised in the fight against plant 
diseases and pests with an aim towards general improvements in the quality and outputs of the cocoa 
tree stocks of the country. From the district office in Juaboso the employees went out to local farms 
and communities where they diagnosed the healthiness of the cocoa trees growing there and 
recommended various treatments when necessary. Additionally these employees taught short courses to 
educate local traditional authorities and prominent farmers in ways in which to improve the yields of 
their cocoa plantations, with the assumption that these community leaders in turn would teach other 
local farmers by way of example. 
Inside the CHED office the division’s cartographer excitedly showed me how he was in 
the process of digitising the data of the institution. Ever since his employment had commenced about 
two years ago he had steadily worked on the creation of various digital map files with information 
about the cocoa farms of the district, all based on information brought back to him by his colleagues 
from their measurements and tests in the field. The cartographer opened up one such map file in the 
Auto-CAD computer programme, activated some filters, and then pointed out to me how he indicated 
the healthy plantation plots around Juaboso with a green colour, whereas farms with infected trees were 
indicated with red. As he explained, this colour coding made it easy to keep an overview of the ongoing 
needs for farm health interventions around the district.  
I asked the cartographer if he could also show me the status of the area around the village 
of Topman. This name was not at first familiar to him, so I had to describe the general area around the 
village in more detail before he figured out which place I was referring to. The cartographer then 
zoomed out his map a bit and scrolled a couple of screen widths to the left, until the westernmost part 
of the district came into view. No colours or detailed lines were visible here, and the area appeared like 
an empty black sector intersected by a jagged vertical white line indicating the national border towards 
Côte d’Ivoire to the west. 
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After a brief moment of silence the cartographer went on to explain how a bureaucratic 
obstacle unfortunately still hampered the work of his department in this particular area to the west of 
Juaboso. The issue was that this locality still featured under the name of ‘Bia Tawya Forest Reserve’ 
under the authority of Ghana’s Forestry Commission, although the entire area in fact had been settled 
and cultivated by cocoa farmers since the 1970s and early 80s. The petition for a reclassification had 
been put in motion with the national authorities in Accra, he added, but the official paperwork had 
unfortunately still not yet caught up with the realities. Here at the CHED office they were hoping that 
all necessary permissions would get in order within a few years, since it was not conducive for the 
department’s tasks toward improving the health of the cocoa sector when they still did not have a 
mandate to operate in all parts of the district where the cocoa was actually grown and where plant 
diseases and pests likewise appeared and would spread from. 
The blank sector on the map remained on my mind for some time after I took my leave 
from the personnel at the CHED office. Again it seemed that Topman and its population had slid 
outside the purview of the authorities, and this time into an unregulated frontier zone in the 
borderlands between human cultivated lands and reserved wild nature. Anthropologist Anna Tsing has 
described a frontier as the following: ”A frontier is an edge of space and time: a zone of not yet – not 
yet mapped, not yet regulated. It is a zone of unmapping: even in its planning a frontier is imagined as 
unplanned.” (Tsing 2005: 28). Tsing’s description appeared in the context of timber logging in the 
Kalimantan region of Indonesia where the unruliness of the place would likely appear equally present to 
a pioneering lumberjack as to a government representative as to a visiting anthropologist. However, 
when I tried to think of Topman through this ‘frontier’-definition, it rather appeared to me instead that 
it made little sense to speak of this place as a frontier in any absolute sense. From the perspective of the 
offices of the district capital Topman appeared far more like an unregulated, unplanned frontier zone 
than what I had experienced it as inside the village itself. For the population of Topman the ‘frontier’ 
had now long since become a place of home, and with this view came also the desire to become 
connected with the rest of Ghana. All wild growing forest had long since been parcelled out and turned 
into plantations. The Cocoa pioneers themselves had grown old and their children and grandchildren 
born in the village had gradually taken over the work on their parents’ and grandparents’ plots.  Even 
the cocoa trees were here well into the second or third generation, since the old trees had gradually 
been cut down and replaced with new seedlings. What would it take for this place to no longer be a 
frontier – either for the national authorities residing afar or for the population residing within? Could 
the prayers of the local community for the arrival of an NGO or for the attention of the government 
authorities be interpreted as expressions of a desire to become included in the rest of the nation?  With 
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reference to Tsing’s ‘frontier’ definition it appeared to me that Topman had somehow become locked 
into a situation where decades of inactivity from the government side had found recurrent legitimacy 
through the area’s persistent status of ‘frontier’ , as a ‘planned unplanned zone’ – and thus perpetually 
outside the scope any official development agenda. 
The perception of these remote corners of the Western Region in general as Ghana’s ‘last 
cocoa frontier’ seemed quite persistent among Ghanaians I spoke with across the country and a 
number of factors hampered a transition of the perception from ‘frontier’ to regulated civilization. One 
historically grounded factor was the continued local rule which the British colonial powers had 
admitted the traditional authorities throughout the country while these colonisers at the same time 
decided the overall administrative lines of the colony from the offices of the regional and national 
headquarters. Thereby the foundation was made for the situation where the traditional chief of Boinzan 
in the early 1970s could distribute the area around Topman to immigrant cocoa pioneers, while at the 
same time the area remained classified as a ‘Forest Reserve’ in the files of the government offices 
hundreds of kilometres away in Accra. This phenomenon has been evidenced in multiple cases across 
the African continent over the 20 th century, leading to what conservationist William Adams called 
“classic ‘paper parks’, there in the official government list, but invisible on the ground.” (Adams 2004: 
8). In post-colonial Ghana this form of classificatory discrepancy had been exacerbated by the 
conditions in the governmental system that for decades had suffered from administrative irregularities 
and delays caused by political turmoil and mismanagement, including persistent problems with the 
distribution of the government funds.  
 
Cocoa in the Borderlands of Categories: Movements and Liquid Resources 
*** 
Back in Topman I went for a walk along with some villagers down to see the actual 
border crossing to the neighbouring country. From the backside of the village a winding footpath led 
through a lightly sloping landscape consisting of cocoa plantations and scattered farm huts down to a 
little stream in a dale some 900m away. An unassuming little wooden bridge some 1,5m wide and 8 -
10m long spanned across the shallow water and connected the two countries. Here there were no 
crossbeams, signs, or buildings in sight, and if not for the words of my hosts I would have been 
unlikely to have guessed that this place in fact constituted an international border crossing. I gazed 
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toward the other side of the narrow bridge, but the footpath beyond soon disappeared into the green 
foliage without any immediate signs of human habitation. 
 
Image 3: View towards Côte d’Ivoire from the wooden foot bridge near the village of Topman in southwestern 
Ghana, March 2014. 
The Topman villagers told me that the border officials typically came down here to the 
bridge and camped for periods of time during the main season for cocoa harvests in the months of 
October to January. The rest of the year, however, they stayed back at the Oscar post and only made 
occasional motorbike patrols to the place. The same sort of praxis took place on the Ivoirian side 
where there were no nearby human settlements either. To the Ghanaian customs- and immigrations 
authorities in this part of the country the control over the movement of people and cocoa were their 
two primary areas of responsibility. Movement of cocoa across the borders was totally prohibited, but 
differences in prices between the countries made it tempting for some people to try and smuggle this 
good across anyway. The flows of cocoa would thus change in accordance with the ebbs and flows of 
the relative strengths of the two economies, international demands for cocoa, and with the political 
situations in the two neighbouring countries. Some years the cocoa price had been higher in Ghana 
than in Côte d’Ivoire, but during the latter years the situation had been the opposite. Some of the 
residents of Topman told me how a 64kg bag of cocoa in Côte d’Ivoire at the moment could be  sold 
for a price equal to 260 GH₵ while at the same time the official purchasing price in Ghana only stood 
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at 212 GH₵. When I asked whether this price difference meant that Ghanaians would smuggle their 
cocoa across the border, my hosts smiled uneasily and shared a few looks with each other before one of 
them shrugged and replied diplomatically that any society would of course have a few people breaking 
the rules while the majority abided the law. The punishment for smuggling was very severe too, the 
Topman villager added, so if the border officials arrested you, you would be in big trouble. I asked what 
this punishment actually entailed but did not learn much more about it, since it had apparently not yet 
happened that anyone from around Topman had been arrested. If you were caught red handed the 
border officials would in theory hand you over to the district police, who would then bring you before 
a court of justice, but this whole process was described to me in uncertain and general terms. In 
practice, my Ghanaian assistant later explained to me, rare situations such as these would typically be 
solved locally to spare the trouble for everyone involved. In return for the donation of a negotiable sum 
of money to the border officials an unlucky smuggler would be let off with a spoken warning, and the 
authorities in turn would avoid the hassle of having to spend time and resources on paperwork.  
During our walk along the pathway back to Topman a young man on a motorbike drove 
quickly past us coming from the direction of the border crossing. One of the villagers pointed at the 
passing motorbike and remarked casually that – speaking of cocoa smuggling – nowadays it was most 
often Ivoirian purchasers who travelled across the border and offered to buy the cocoa directly from 
the individual farmers. Cocoa smuggling seemed to be a well-known praxis here in this area, although 
the phenomenon took place as series of covert connections between the countries.  
The question of the smuggling was evidently also a very sensitive topic to the Ghanaian 
border officials and not something that they found it easy to talk about with a visiting foreigner. The 
light mood that had been present during my initial talks with the border personnel back at the Oscar 
post instantly hardened into distrustful looks and carefully weighed answers the very moment I – on 
the return trip from Topman – asked them about the topic of cocoa and smuggling. A sudden string of 
sceptical counter questions from the GIS officers now raised doubts about my former presentation of 
myself and my claims to be visiting with a purely academic purpose; could I really be a researcher from 
Copenhagen University, or was this merely a cover story hiding my true identity as an undercover 
journalist? The officials repeatedly mentioned the word ‘Anas’ in their line of critical questions to me, 
and I later on learned that many people among the Ghanaian border protection authorities still felt the 
consequences of a corruption scandal that had hit the institution in 2010. At this time a Ghanaian 
undercover journalist with the pen name Anas Aremeyaw Anas had caused a public uproar in the 
Ghanaian media by broadcasting a number of secretly filmed videos showing border officials receiving 
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monetary bribes in return for letting cocoa past their border posts. The scandal drew a lot of public 
attention and resulted in a high profile court case and several people losing their jobs even among 
highly placed border officials (The Daily Graphic 2014). The topic remained delicate to the border 
authorities to this day, because on the one hand it was their official duty to prevent any kind of 
transport of cocoa beans across the border, while on the other hand they experienced an ongoing 
pressure from members of the local population, who would offer them enticing shares of the profit if 
they would merely look the other way when, for example, a motorcycle loaded with a bag of cocoa 
passed by. By being stationed at a remote border post in a poorly salaried job position and in a country 
where corruption was widespread, it was seemingly easy to become tempted. The categorical rules and 
regulations from the distant capital city could easily lose their logical appearance here in this place 
where the outlook and the everyday life were different, contributing instead to the common image of 
African borders as sites of repeated negotiations between travellers and officials based on socio-
economic factors, along with factors of gender, age, class, ethnicity, and nationality (Mechlinski 2010: 
103). 
To where does the cocoa of Topman flow? Does the farmer choose to sell his cocoa to 
the Ghanaian purchasers, as the law prescribes, or does he follow the temptation of the higher prices 
offered by the Ivoirian purchasers from across the border? Does the Ghanaian farmer’s cocoa ga in the 
stamp of a quality product or a discount product, regardless of the fact that the material characteristics 
of the cocoa remain the same? The fieldwork in the cocoa plantations of this borderland region has 
reminded me of the Italian author Claudio Magris’ (1989) story of a mythical, unique place high up in 
the Alps where the two slanted roof sides of a little alpine cabin send the rainwater toward the 
wellspring of the Rhine on the one side and the wellspring of the Danube on the other. An otherwise 
insignificant gust of wind in this place can thus easily be capable of pushing a drop of rain from the 
direction of one river system and into the other. It is likely with good reason that this place is described 
in purely mythical terms, since it hardly makes practical sense to pursue the clarity of the map or the 
category into such a detail that single raindrops on an alpine rooftop will become labelled as either 
foundational components of the Rhine or the Danube. Likewise, from the point of view when standing 
in the village of Topman it was easy to pause and wonder about the world market’s distinctions 
between Ivoirian and Ghanaian cocoa and what the big difference between them is supposed to be 
anyway. 
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Unbounded Cocoa 
*** 
The Topman case indicates to me that the closer one studies the boundary lines of these 
borderlands, the blurrier they tend to get. According to the political maps the border between Ghana 
and Côte d’Ivoire officially runs through the thalweg of the little stream west of Topman, but in 
practical terms the border is most of the year only enforced back at the Oscar border post some three 
kilometres away – a situation that places the village in an ambiguous position in relation to the 
Ghanaian law. Topman is also caught in a dubious zone as far as the Ghanaian administrative system is 
concerned, since the community is concurrently situated within the bounds of an old – although today 
only fictive – forest reserve, and from this point of view cannot exist, while it is nevertheless also 
registered by name and population numbers at the district authorities, and thus its inhabitants can place 
their votes at political elections with the same legality as the rest of the country’s population. On top of 
these factors Topman exists in an unclear position in relation to the Ghanaian cocoa authorities who 
on the one hand have steadily purchased all the cocoa offered to them by farmers of the village over 
the past forty years, while on the other hand these same authorities still do not have the mandate to 
assist the same farmers with education and subsidized agro-chemicals, since Topman geographically 
resides under the authority of another government institution. 
Although Topman administratively speaking is situated in an ambiguous zone partially 
outside the reach of the Ghanaian state, the village clearly does not exist in a vacuum. The cocoa 
appears in this regard not only to constitute the reason for the initial establishment of the village and its 
continued means of survival, but cocoa additionally stands as the place’s strongest ongoing – although 
composite – connection to the surrounding world. For the population of Topman cocoa constitutes 
their primary livelihood and the best available means for them to make an economic income, and for 
this reason the traffic of motorbikes loaded with cocoa bags represents the busiest – if not almost the 
only – type of vehicle traffic on the rough dirt track from the village back into Ghana. Both the 
Ghanaian state licenced cocoa purchasers as well as the Ivoirian smugglers bring money to the village, 
which in turn enables the villagers to pay for their children’s schooling, in addition to the purchase of 
foodstuffs, clothes, agro-chemicals, and various consumable goods during visits to market days in the 
nearby larger towns. Cocoa is here a tool for the population of Topman to reproduce their connections 
to the outside world. 
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Other connections are more complicated, not least when the occasionally present border 
officials dutifully insist that cocoa beans harvested from trees around Topman ought to not be moved 
the few hundred metres westward to Côte d’Ivoire, since Ghana ian cocoa should not become Ivoirian, 
regardless of the fact that it is not obviously possible to tell the difference between the beans, if this 
were to happen anyway. The lower Ghanaian cocoa purchasing prices combined with the border 
officials’ looming threats of punishment for smuggling and – unofficially – apparently widespread 
willingness to look the other way in return for monetary gifts, all contributes to an ambivalent 
perception of the state among the population of Topman. The community members identified 
themselves to me in general as Ghanaians, but despite forty years of presence here the mutual 
recognition of them by the Ghanaian state in the form of public services and infrastructure has still not 
arrived. Instead, the state power becomes primarily expressed in a more negative form through the 
presence of the armed border protection personnel and the steady pressure put on the farmers to sell 
their produce at the lower Ghanaian price, unless they are willing to offer the payment of bribes to the 
border officials or risk facing the legal punishment for clandestine engagements with smuggling.  
The borderlands around Topman therefore appear as a ‘frontier’ from the point of view 
of the Ghanaian state, which in some ways keeps the local population locked inside a marginal position. 
This margin, however, also constitutes a space of potential, a flexibility to take advantage of the 
differences between the cocoa markets of the two countries to generate a personal profit – and from 
one’s position on the periphery of the power of the authorities also to get away with it. A complex 
interplay happens here where cocoa contributes both to the enforcement and the transgression of 
national boundaries, while concurrently the boundary-making efforts shape certain national types of 
cocoa, and all the while the actual cocoa moves silently and steadily from one category to another, 
almost as if it was wind-blown raindrops over a mythical alpine rooftop. 
From the point of view of these borderlands between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire it may be 
possible to recognise cocoa as a certain type of natural good bearing a particular Latin name, but the 
value associated with the cocoa appears as completely entangled in a multitude of other aspects of life 
around Topman, and remarkably the cocoa here in this place appears as almost anything other than the 
raw foodstuff that it is primarily known as in many other places in the world. This is just one of the 
complex conditions that people live with in these borderlands where both cocoa and the geographical 
boundary at the same time appear as defined with categorical sharpness, but also as differently blurred 
and porous in the daily practices – the latter aspect further recognized as a notorious characteristic of 
African borders in general (Coplan 2010:1). At the village of Topman, where I was immediately told 
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that the border is not the border, people practice this paradox through easy and difficult, evident and 
hidden connections. Cocoa contributes to the establishment of physical and conceptual boundaries, just 
as cocoa contributes to the transgressions and connecting activities across those very same boundaries. 
Therefore, I suggest that although cocoa can be perceived as a firmly defined product of nature, it can 
also equally be approached as dynamically combined meaning-making relations. 
Crucially, in this place where the imposed boundary lines do not align perfectly next to 
each other, a sort of marginal space emerges around Topman, and from this position local residents can 
create monetary gains from the sale of cocoa to either country. The concept of ‘marginal gains’ has 
been intricately studied by anthropologist Jane Guyer in her 2004 book of the same title. In this work 
Guyer researches the multitude of different currencies and exchange systems that had once been used 
across pre-colonial and early colonial Atlantic Africa. According to Guyer the forms of exchanges that 
took place across different currency systems presented particular opportunities for individuals to make 
profits. As Guyer wrote: “When one scale is not exactly reducible to the terms of another, a margin for 
gain lies in the negotiation of situational matching.” (ibid: 51). Cast in this light, the many entrenched 
boundary contestations and uncertainties amid these cocoa farming Ghanaian borderlands can, I argue, 
be reinterpreted as value generating spaces, since such vacuous, overlapping, or encroaching boundary 
discrepancies create margins that in turn enable particular opportunities for value generation. 
As the presented case of Topman has shown, such marginal spaces for profit generation 
through cocoa may come about through incidental incommensurability of different administrative 
systems, as well as through deliberate opportunistic acts or selective passivity among human actors. 
Both these types of perspectives I shall continue to explore over the following chapters, starting with 
an enquiry into the many boundaries and value generating activities observable in the commercial cocoa 
transport sector of Ghana, specifically as pertains the so-called ‘commodity chain’ of cocoa.  
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CHAPTER 2:  
COCOA IN CHAINS AND COCOA ON TRUCKS 
*** 
”Chako driver-side! - - - Chako mate-side!” 
[Steer to the driver’s side! - - - Steer to the mate’s side!] 
Ali and Prince shouted at the top of their lungs as they ran barefoot next to our heavy 
cocoa truck while it careened backwards down the hillside. 
Seconds ago both men had jumped from their seats inside the truck at the realisation that 
the worn down gear shift had failed and the truck’s struggling forward climb was about to be reversed. 
With no time to put on shoes or flip flops they had rushed out the passenger side door, leaving only the 
driver Muhammed and an instantly worried anthropologist inside. 
The shouts of Ali and Prince were barely audible inside the cab despite the open side 
windows. The brakes of the undercarriage were screeching away while the suddenly unburdened engine 
roared out in futility. Brake! – release…, Brake! – release…, Brake! – release… 
Muhammed’s frantic series of stomps on the brake pedal and pulls on the handbrake sent 
the creaking truck suspensions into series of vibrations that violently jolted the cabin and sent loose 
items tumbling around. A pen, an old cable-charging cell phone, a dusty oil rag, a homemade slingshot, 
a roll of electrician’s tape, a partially consumed cluster of bananas, and other sundry items were rapidly 
being shaken from their storage spots atop the instrument panel to find new temporary resting places 
on our labs, between the seats, or on the floor. Amid anxious glances at the side view mirrors and the – 
thankfully – currently empty road behind us, the forward view to the lush tropical hilltop ahead grew 
increasingly distant. 
Making a full stop on the incline turned out to be impossible, so what the team now tried 
to do was to minimize the backwards momentum while counterpoising the angle of the truck to the 
careening trailer in a frantic attempt to keep both vehicles on the road till the valley below. If just one 
rear wheel of the trailer were to drop into one of the steep rainwater ditches along the roadsides it 
might topple the entire truck violently onto its side, damaging its chassis beyond repair, rupture the 
cargo hold, and also likely injure the people on board. In Ghana tow trucks were in notoriously short 
supply and badly damaged vehicles were often just scavenged for parts by their owners and the remains 
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then left on the roadsides where they crashed. Thus, the four of us had no lack of recent visual 
impressions of battered wrecks from our earlier journey in mind as our truck went back downhill. The 
reversed wind flow now also brought a sour-sweet smell to permeate the dusty air in the cab, and when 
breathing in we were served an olfactory reminder of our valuable cargo which had so suddenly turned 
into a deadly weight pulling on our backs; 38.4 tonnes of fermented cocoa beans. 
A silent massive weight. A dense unwieldy volume. A thick sour-sweet smell. Such 
compounded sensual impressions was how cocoa most often presented itself to the people working on 
the rough roads of Ghana, hauling cargoes of cocoa from the many inland depots and down to the 
coastal ports. The journey together with Ali, Muhammed, and Prince was one of several occasions 
where I had the opportunity to travel together with a team of Ghanaian truckers as they made their way 
from the cocoa depots of the distant frontier town of Bonsu Nkwanta and down to the port city of 
Tema. I had initially sought to join such truck rides in an attempt to directly follow Ghanaian cocoa 
beans as those products were transported all the way along the so-called ‘commodity chain’, from the 
trees of the farmlands to the oceangoing ships of the ports. What I encountered made me reflect 
critically on the concept of commodity chains, as well as more widely on notions of structures and 
movement - and ultimately on theoretical approaches to the value of cocoa in both a social and an 
economic sense. The exploration of these issues is what this chapter is all about. 
The crux of the matter ahead concerns the stark contrast between the significance 
ascribed to Ghanaian cocoa among truckers and (as we shall imminently see) transport logistics 
personnel, even as either party formally collaborates with the other in bringing cargoes of cocoa across 
Ghana, from rural depots to portside warehouses. The discrepancies between the socio-economic 
values ascribed to such volumes of cocoa inform the discussion of theory undertaken in the latter part 
of this chapter. To anticipate, I will suggest that a common denominator between the two parties may 
be identified through an analysis that treats both ‘space’ and ‘value’ as interdependent and inherently 
performative dynamic concepts.  
First, though, a brief postscript to the events described above: Somehow, on this 
suddenly dramatic day, through both luck and the skilful efforts of the team, our truck had managed to 
remain on the road and eventually come to a grinding halt at the bottom of the hill. To the relief of us 
all, neither had anyone been injured nor had other vehicles appeared on the countryside road behind us. 
The whole team breathed in quiet relief for a few minutes afterwards and voiced some few thankful 
words of prayers. Then, after sharing a few more comments among each other and after regathering 
their resolve, Mohammed put the truck engine back into gear and pressed down hard on the gas pedal. 
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This time, hopefully, we would have better luck on the climb and not least on making that final crucial 
gear shift before reaching the crest of the hill. 
 
Chained Flows of Cocoa 
*** 
In the main transport logistics building of the PBC (Produce Buying Company) in the 
port of Tema the senior official carefully drew a series of circles on a piece of paper. Then he scribbled 
a few letters inside each circle and linked each to the adjacent one with a series of arrows. The elderly 
official was a bulky man with an imposing figure, wearing a black tailor-made business suit with 
intricate gold stringed embroidery around the neckline, the colours of which matched the golden 
frames of his reading glasses. As we sat in the dimmed light of his air-conditioned office, an image of 
what he referred to as the Ghanaian cocoa commodity chain gradually emerged on the paper on the 
work desk between us.  
 
 
 
Returning his gaze to me over the brim of his glasses and pointing a finger to his finished drawing the 
official slowly explained the contents of each circle. First, one had the local societies of farmers that 
produced and sold the cocoa beans. Then there were the LBCs (Licensed Buying Companies) that 
purchased the cocoa and put it into standardized 64kg sacks at their local depots. Then came tests and 
approvals by the governmental QCC (Quality Control Company), followed by truck transport from 
inland depots to the portside warehouses. At that point there would be another QCC inspection before 
the CMC (Cocoa Marketing Company - the monopolistic business agency owned by the Ghanaian 
government) would take over and sell the cocoa, which would finally be quality tested one last time 
before becoming exported to the world market through international shipping companies. In total, the 
official stated, these circles constituted the entirety of the Ghanaian commodity chain of cocoa. Cocoa 
was in this way produced and moved along the chain towards the foreign customers, and in return 
money came to Ghana and was distributed to each link of the chain all the way back to the farming 
communities. After finishing his walkthrough, the senior official reclined back in his chair again, 
Farm 
society 
Export LBC QCC Transport 
Port 
depot 
QCC CMC QCC 
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exhaled heavily, and gave me a pensive look before asking: “Was there anything more you needed to 
know?” 
I still had several more questions in mind regarding the intricacies of this Ghanaian cocoa 
business, yet none of my further efforts to expand the topic of our conversation succeeded beyond 
somewhat terse replies by the official that all pointed back to various parts of the chain imagery already 
pencilled onto the paper on the work desk. The unilinear flow of cocoa in one direction and money in 
another was how this system prescribed things to be, and to the probing questions of a curious foreign 
visitor, such as myself, everything that took place in the Ghanaian cocoa business, I was assured, indeed 
happened in full accordance with the links of this very system.  
Of course, the actual practices of the Ghanaian cocoa business were in fact quite more 
complex than that, and, to recall, as a resident of Topman village had previously explained, any society 
would always have a few people breaking the rules while the majority abided the law (see Chapter 1, 
p.37). I shall however leave aside the topic of cheating and corruption for the latter part of this thesis 
(Chapter 5) and for the time being focus on the ubiquitousness of this ‘commodity chain’ imagery itself, 
and the implications of this system which purportedly renders a near perfect abstracted overview of the 
types of activities carried out across the Ghanaian cocoa business.   
First, what I wrote in my fieldnotes later that same day was that it had been with a 
distinct sense of disappointment that I had taken my leave from the office of the senior PBC 
representative. The official’s usage of the commodity chain terminology along with his stringent and 
categorical explanation of the Ghanaian cocoa sector had appeared already so familiar to me that I at 
first thought that I had learned nothing new about the country’s cocoa business that I had not already 
encountered before in the literature13 as well as during previous fieldwork interviews. Similar general 
overviews had already been outlined to me when I had met with both deputy administrators of the 
governmental COCOBOD agency in Accra as well as with a manager of the Maersk shipping company 
in the port of Tema. One thing these people shared in common was responsibilities for large-scale 
logistics and issues concerning people, cocoa, and profitability, and similar to much of the scholarly 
literature they based their understandings on an application of certain levels of generalizations and 
abstractions.  
                                                                 
13 Detailed commodity chain analyses of  the Ghanaian cocoa sector could for instance be found in Mohammed 
et al. (2011); World Bank (2011); UNCTAD (2008), and numerous other academic or business stakeholder 
publications. 
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The term ‘commodity chains’ and its various related expressions as ‘supply chains’ or 
‘value chains’ has become mainstays of a wide range of academic as well as business oriented literature 
since the middle of the 1980s. One of the earliest academic theorizations of this “chain imagery” was in 
Hopkins and Wallerstein’s concept of ‘commodity chains’ in World Systems Theory as a “network of 
labour and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity” (1986: 159). The 1990s had 
brought along various further attempts at developing commodity chain analyses, including the widely 
used addition of the ‘global’ term, emphasizing a more ambitious – if not even an implied holistic – 
scope of analysis. Before the turn of the millennium further arguments were advanced in favour of 
replacing the ‘commodity’ term with ‘value’, the idea being that ‘global value chains’ constituted a more 
inclusive term for interdisciplinary collaboration across different studies of production networks (Bair 
2008: 12). Some authors even suggested that ‘global commodity chains’ and ‘global value chains’ could 
by and large even be treated as interchangeable terms (Daviron & Ponte 2005: 28), whereas the ‘supply 
chain’ imagery tended to remain most widely used in applied commercial settings (and of course as part 
of analyses of such proscribed settings, see for example Tsing (2009, 2015)). Regardless of prefix terms, 
since the late twentieth century researchers as well as political and business based decision makers alike 
have made frequent recourse to concepts involving imagery of ‘chains’ or ‘networks’ in order to 
describe the processes by which goods and services are produced, moved, and consumed over 
distances in time and space. Academic disciplines particularly inclined to adopt these theoretical 
approaches include among others sociology, geography, and development studies, while popular uses 
outside academia, as mentioned, include business management and government administrations.  
For cocoa, as for many other types of goods, the geographical distances involved – from 
tropical growth origins to consumption typically in places of more temperate climates – necessitate 
movement of the commodified goods across numerous boundaries as it is repeatedly transacted 
between different institutional and commercial entities and not least passed along between different 
people. One thing that the chain concept, from its early expression in World Systems Theory and 
onward, recognises is that while the commodity moved remains recognisable as the same object type, 
the segmentations along the way signify the delimited experiential horizons of any individual or group 
of people engaged in the handling and processing of the same object. Rarely will any one actor be 
capable of following a good all the way, especially if it is a commercial good requiring movement over 
long distances and/or several steps of processing, which each requires specialized knowledge to 
perform. The formal overview presentation I was given in the PBC logistics office stood to me as a 
logical, typical, and on the whole quite predictable representation of the Ghanaian cocoa sector 
circumscribed into the form of a ‘commodity chain’; One clearly defined good, cocoa, gradually 
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accumulates value as it is moved through a predefined series of transactions between predefined groups 
of actors, each of the latter obtaining parts of the monetary profits generated through each act of 
exchange. What a commodity chain depiction thus intends to show is, literally, “business as usual”.  
 
Caution against Self-enclosing Systems for Analytical Purposes 
*** 
To merely reproduce such already familiar commodity chain perspectives on the 
Ghanaian cocoa sector was, however, not at all what had enticed me to return to this West African 
nation for ethnographic PhD fieldwork. Rather, what had spurred me on had been a gradually growing 
impression that a kind of conceptual gridlock had somehow come to stifle the engagements of several 
major foreign donors, development stakeholders, business agents, international bodies, or what have 
you, in the ways in which these actors engaged themselves in their interactions with the Ghanaian and 
larger West African region and societies14. From my previous engagements with the foreign 
development sector in Ghana over the course of the first decade of the 2000s15 I experienced first-hand 
how certain systems of engagements had become hegemonic for the ways in which initially the funding 
providers/investors, and subsequently the funding recipients, envisaged and engaged each other. 
Primary among these hegemonic insistencies, from a Danish institutional perspective, was the universal 
application of the so-called ‘Logical Framework Approach’ (LFA). The LFA system had since 1989 
formed the mandatory framework for all development interventions to be funded through the Danish 
government’s international development institution, Danida (Danida 1996). This particular tool for 
designing and managing development projects (among other forms of use) works by setting up lists of 
goals to be achieved within given timeframes, along with listings of required inputs, expected outputs, 
means of verification, as well as delegation of responsibilities among all involved partners. Through the 
application of the LFA-system, a particular sort of perspective is forcefully projected onto the targeted 
societies and into the present time as well as an imagined near future; people become uniformly recast 
                                                                 
14
 Of  course, this sort of  swathing critical claim is likely to ruffle the feathers of  many a professional who relies 
on any well-established concepts or systems as part of  their own work-applied toolsets. If  one finds adequate 
utility within a given framework it may, obviously, not seem stifled or gridlocked at all. In the present context I 
still hope the reader will bear with me as I continue to develop this chapter’s argument in favour of  not 
precluding any tools for academic analysis from the critical scrutiny of  the analysis itself. 
15
 First as a six-year part time volunteer with a Danish government supported grassroots NGO (The Ghana 
Friendship Groups) implementing various development projects in northern Ghana, and then later on as a 
student intern with the Danish embassy in Accra from 2008-09. 
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as populations of stakeholders and beneficiaries, and their physical environment becomes organized 
and subdivided into boxes of resources and recipients, actions and results, dates and deadlines. 
Surprisingly to me, despite the purported clarity of such systematized development 
efforts, which since the early 2000s have included politically charged buzzwords of ‘transparency’, 
‘accountability’, and ‘good governance’, etc., the means of verification as to whether such ephemeral 
target goals have been achieved only rarely include funding mechanisms for post implementation 
impact assessments placed years into the future where the largest effects would have become more fully 
evident. Instead, all too often success criteria are based on measurements of immediately quantifiable 
outputs, allowing more lofty overall project ambitions of “society developments” that are to become 
considered as achieved by way of plausible extrapolations from the intended effects of the specific 
interventions. For instance, if more rural school classrooms being built mean that more girls could 
attend school, then more girls attending school would mean that more girls on average would achieve 
higher levels of education, and more highly educated girls would presumably in turn seek to participate 
more actively in public decision making, which would then mean that a project funder’s overall aim of 
creating a more gender-equal society could be presumed to have been achieved. Similarly to the 
suppositions of the commodity chain imagery, an interconnected series of interactions are envisaged 
through the LFA system as proceeding from a specified starting point to a desired end point with 
intermediate stages consisting of distinctive, clearly definable steps, a causal chain of cumulative 
processes that lead invariably towards a predefined overall goal. In the Ghanaian development 
intervention landscape of the 1990s and 2000s a multitude of four to five year projects followed each 
other like products on a conveyor belt while limited time contracted development professionals shifted 
job positions with a similar or faster rhythm16. At every turnover point, in my experience, much 
knowledge and many learned lessons were lost, especially those forms of personal experiences that did 
not fit into the pre-defined systematic frameworks of documentation. As anthropologists Katy Gardner 
and David Lewis have sharply pointed out (2006), the development industry’s emphasis on 
compartmentalized structures has reached a degree by which even critique of the existing system has to 
be formulated within the framework established by that very system, in order to stand a chance of 
being perceived as valid and potentially relevant by the system’s practitioners.  How might it be possible 
to advance beyond such a self-enclosed system that inadvertently – perhaps – has become resistant 
even to change intended as self-improvement?  
                                                                 
16
 As for the many non-professional development volunteers the rhythm was typically even faster as one of  
months rather than years. 
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Exacerbating the confinements I experienced at the time of my own involvements in the 
development business in Ghana was a sense of insufficiency in at least parts of mainstream humanistic 
and social scientific theories towards coming up with compelling alternative visions of ways to advance 
development efforts beyond the consolidated constraints of the present systems. Among the 
administrators of governmental and non-governmental development interventions I interacted with, 
several presented the significance of their own current work practices through concepts and terms 
based on their own educational backgrounds in Western academic environments of the 1980s and 
1990s, including influences by scholars such as Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault, to mention two 
of the more recurrent names. As an academic researcher of the early 21st century doing fieldwork in the 
wake of decades of university student throughputs in, say, the Foucauldian tradition, I frequently found 
myself encountering academically educated informants who fashioned themselves as fellow academics 
and who habitually referred to concepts such as ‘habitus’ and ‘discourse analysis’ as part of their own 
post-academic everyday work. Both of these approaches have earned high degrees of recognition and 
appreciation across much of the academic world, and both have indeed enabled researchers to generate 
far reaching and nuanced insights into human sociality. Yet, for instance, with Caldwell’s (2007) critical 
discussion of the limits of Foucault’s ‘discourse’ term in mind, I pondered whether I – as a 
contemporary researcher – should then proceed with an ouroboros of a “discourse analysis of 
discourse analyses”, or, perhaps, for this very reason, instead take pause and wonder whether 
'discourse' itself might at this point have become a thought-hampering conceptual totality in need of 
new critical academic attention? All due respect to the original and impactful works of Foucault, 
Hopkins and Wallerstein, and other once radical refreshers of academic lines of thinking, but if World 
Systems Theory, commodity chain analysis, or discourse analysis were each to be considered as be-all, 
end-all academic toolsets through which one might explore the human condition, the works of scholars 
would soon become partially comparable to the works of franchise restaurant chefs repeating already 
fixed recipes. On the contrary, I find that characteristically for each generation of academic researchers 
have been unceasing pursuits of ever new and refined methods for knowledge creation more so than 
complacent custodianship of the existing. After all, the idealised research metaphor is to strive to stand 
atop the shoulders of giants rather than remaining on the ground, supporting oneself by latching onto a 
giant’s hand.  
To specify, the criticism I am raising here is not intended as a blanket rejection of the 
works of the abovementioned academic theorists nor of ‘commodity chains’ neither in its various 
theoretic nor applied forms. The ‘chain’ imagery offers great utility for a number of purposes, whether 
logistical or analytical, which its ubiquitous applications across the contemporary human world is quite 
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a testament to. However, what I am cautioning against is any case where the wide ranging utility of any 
particular toolset for purposes of analysis precludes that very toolset from becoming an object of 
analysis itself. 
My initial impression of disappointment as I had left the PBC logistics office in Tema, 
caused by the already familiar information I was given during the interview, was soon replaced by a 
dawning realisation that it was becoming necessary for me in this fieldwork  to relegate my existing 
notions of a ‘commodity chain’ of cocoa (and its variant expressions of ‘value‘ and ‘supply‘) to the same 
mental spot as I had already phased the concepts of LFAs and the theoretical terms of some, arguably, 
rather entrenched academic schools of thought; as – by necessity – objects of analysis more so than 
tools for analysis. 
Approaching the commodity chain instead as an analytical object, as something that 
shapes perceptions of reality rather than merely describing reality immediately offers a pathway to a 
different analytical perspective: To the senior PBC official and his fellow logistics department 
colleagues, the institutionalized cocoa commodity chain description apparently constitutes the primary 
way in which this type of natural good becomes expressed in their line of work. Rarely – if ever – 
would an actual bag of cocoa need to be brought into their office building, but cocoa transcribed into 
the forms of transport waybills, lot numbers, and depot allocations are nevertheless integral parts of 
their work days. The linked categorical units of an abstracted commodity chain system would, 
peculiarly, seem to stand out in this place as the real material component, whereas the cocoa on the 
other hand comes to constitute an ephemeral, perpetually moving flow. The flow of cocoa through this 
system is premised on the serialized positioning of multiple boundaries – the linkages of the chain – 
where the nominally increased value of the commercial good in each subsequent section entices each 
actor to pass the good to the next one in order to reap the value difference, the profits. Meanwhile the 
formalized collaboration structure between the chain participants presents a closed-off unidirectional 
system that precludes outside others from partaking in the processes and from gaining parts of these 
profits. 
The advantage for business purposes of self-representation through a chain-like 
organisation structure over an appearance as an unsegmented uniform entity reflects certain basic 
conceptual qualities. Anthropologist Tim Ingold has pointed out how a terminology of connection 
based around imagery of a chain differs importantly from one based on a continuous line: “Chains are 
articulated from rigid elements or links, and retain their connections even when tension is released. Yet 
they have no memory of their formation. Knots, by contrast, are not articulated and do not connect. 
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They have no links. Nevertheless they retain within their constitution a memory of the process of their 
formation.” (Ingold 2015: 15). Through Ingold’s disambiguation it shows that a particular quality of a 
chain is its capability to represent interdependent connectedness while each link nevertheless retains its 
independence from any permanent memory-inducing events that might otherwise affect it through the 
causing of stress elsewhere, as could happen through such actions as knotting or pulling of a rope. 
Connecting Ingold’s suggestion of the conceptual qualities of chains with, for instance, anthropologist 
Hannah Appel’s (2012a, 2012b) analyses of corporate commercial ideas of modular business units and 
ongoing efforts toward legal and perceptual disassociation from outside local surroundings further 
underscores the basic attractiveness of the chain metaphor over one of lines for commercial business 
practices. Not only are large-scale business endeavours organized into components each managed by 
specialized groups of people for work task optimization purposes, but furthermore do such forms of 
legal, formalised, organizationally compartmentalized responsibilities help prevent negative events (for 
instance, certain product manufacturing failures or legal consequences of exposed illegal activities) from 
impacting the commercial organisation as a whole – as would more likely have been the case if 
collaborating business entities were imagined through a rope metaphor.  
The practices of the various commodity/value/supply chain approaches likewise appear 
either like prescriptions for what ought to take place, as in theorizations of economically optimized 
business practices, or as theorizations of more overall national, international or global social processes, 
as initially envisioned in World Systems sociology and later on in development studies. Designations of 
a single product (whether a “simple” natural good, like cocoa, tea, gold, or apples, or another one 
combined of multiple components from multiple sources, like, say, a cell phone or a car) a s the focal 
point of a so-called ‘–chain’ analysis perspective has several consequences: Not only does the object of 
study become reified as a singular type of commodity in the world, but furthermore does this view 
entail that the envisaged chain from production to consumption gains focal and analytical primacy, 
becoming in effect a ‘core’ to which the rest of the surroundings (immediate as well as distant) will 
stand as ‘periphery’. One way of understanding this effect can perhaps be done through the use of the 
term ‘virtualism’ (Carrier & Miller 1998), designating instances where the abstract (economic) theory 
becomes the deciding factor, to which reality is sought to conform and people’s behaviour is shaped to 
fit. As a profound consequence of such persistent efforts by business actors to shape, enact, and 
‘optimize’ commodity chain systems, this ‘core//periphery’ perspective comes to appear as an oddly 
inverted reflection of the World Systems approach that once offered us an imagery of a world separated 
into ‘metropoles’ and ‘periphery’, into ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’. Instead, through the singular focus on 
the essentialized chain and the optimization of monetary profits, one may no longer be dealing so much 
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with social and material inequality among people, as one may be dealing with a situation where, through 
the established production systems, the flows of commercial goods increasingly constitute the centre 
and humans the periphery. 
As participant in the enactment of an applied commodity chain of cocoa the senior 
official of the Ghanaian portside logistics office described the transport of this good largely as a one-
step linear process of movement from one storage unit to another. His department’s electronic (or, as 
of 2014, still quite often telephonic) issuance of a waybill (i.e. an invoice ordering a delivery of a 
specified amount of goods from one place to another) results days later in the confirmation of the 
arrival of a cocoa-laden truck at another warehouse. To the Ghanaian logistics personnel the indication 
of one distinct ‘transport’ link of the cocoa commodity chain serves as a convenient circumscription of 
any and all processes actually involved in this so-called ‘secondary evacuation’ of cocoa, as it is also 
termed17. Alternatively, not only is the perceptual vantage point of those people involved in the actual 
movement of such invoiced cocoa through the landscape entirely different, but in fact none of the 
truck workers I travelled with even considered themselves as participants in a commodity chain – nor 
did they express any knowledge of such a concept at all. Since my fieldwork involved enquiries into 
both the administrative and the menial parts of this Ghanaian cocoa transport business, my notes 
accordingly came to include very different accounts of the significance ascribed to the – purportedly 
same – volumes of cocoa, by these people formally working together18.  
To anticipate the discussion in the latter third part of this present chapter, this finding has 
prompted me to look for works of academic theory useful for analysis of how all these people 
collaborated around the movement of cocoa, despite seemingly incommensurable perspectives on the 
very nature of what was at stake. The search prompts a discussion of different academic approaches to 
value generation, which I will engage as perspectives revolving around value understood as related 
primarily to either spatial dimensions and essences on the one hand, or boundaries and transaction 
processes on the other. In order to explore these matters more closely I shall, however, first return to a 
more detailed look into the cocoa truck ride-along case, with which I opened this chapter.  
 
                                                                 
17
 i.e. the movement of  cocoa between rural and portside warehouses. The ‘primary evacuation’ is in turn defined 
as taking place from farm communities to rural LBC depots and is usually undertaken by LBC affiliates such as 
purchasing clerks or depot boys. More on this in Chapter 5. 
18
 ’formally’ here as partaking in activities within the same cocoa commodity chain link described as ’transport’. 
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Image 4: Cocoa truck laden with 600 bags has been prepared for departure outside a PBC company depot in the 
town of Bonsu Nkwanta, Western Region, Ghana. March 2014. 
 
Travelling along a Link in the Chain 
*** 
With a loud roar the engine of the heavy DAF truck burst back into action, spewing 
billowing black clouds of exhaust fumes across the dusty courtyard outside the cocoa depot. Standing 
beside the parked truck, I scampered to drag my backpack out of the immediate path of the smoke 
while my future road companions yelled loud commands to each other in their hurried efforts to 
stabilize the engine. From the open cab door the driver, Mohammed, held on to the steering wheel with 
one hand as he leaned out, looking back towards the rear end of the parked truck where the fitter, 
Prince, squatted on the chassis and relayed information to and from the mechanic, Ali, who had 
squeezed himself halfway into the narrow confines of the engine compartment in order to adjust the 
machinery within. Weeks of inactivity were finally at an end as the team of three truckers readied 
themselves to take a cargo of more than 38 tonnes of cocoa beans on a roughly 500km journey from 
Bonsu Nkwanta to the Ghanaian port city of Tema.  
Ali was the most senior of the group, having worked in the business for about 11 years 
already. He was 30 years old, married and had a wife, a young daughter, and an infant son who lived 
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with him in a rented house in Ashaiman, a sprawling suburban town just inland of Tema that primarily 
housed labourers and functionaries who worked in the port city’s various industries. He would stay 
with them during portside downtimes between jobs, but most of the time he would be travelling on the 
roads of Ghana, either as a call-upon mechanic hired to fix broken down trucks, or as a crewmember 
on certain trucks, such as the current one. Ali furthermore had some relatives living near Bonsu 
Nkwanta, and thus, as he had lately been waiting around for this particular truck’s departure, he had 
passed the time helping the family on their cocoa farm.  
Muhammed was in his late twenties, also married, and had recently come from Tamale in 
Northern Region of Ghana in search of employment as a truck driver. A recommendation from 
another driver had brought him to the owner of this haulage company, who had assigned him to this 
particular truck. Muhammed viewed cocoa as just another type of good to be transported and no 
different from, say if he was bringing a load of cement or tiles inland from the ports.  In the northern 
savannah areas where he grew up, he explained, there were no cocoa trees around due to the drier 
climate of the region, so beforehand he only knew of cocoa’s importance to the country through the 
talks of other Ghanaians, as well as through various commercial ads shown on national television, 
radio, and in major newspapers (e.g.: “Asaase Wura19 – Harvest more cocoa – Earn more money”, as a 
well-known slogan went for a widely advertised brand of cocoa fertilizer). 
Prince was a 24 year old guy from the inland area of Accra, unmarried, and who had 
recently started out in the haulage business as a fitter and truck-mate, handling some of the more 
physically demanding tasks on the way, such as the changing of spare tyres, fixings of cargo, and 
handling of spare parts and tools. Like Ali, Prince had family living near Bonsu Nkwanta, and so he was 
used to spending downtime between transport jobs helping out on his relatives’ cocoa farm. 
In the commercial port city of Tema the owner of the truck, a Ghanaian independent 
business man, who the team addressed as ‘Mr. Sammy’, now waited for them to deliver the cargo of 
cocoa beans, for which he had finally obtained a haulage contract with the PBC. The business of 
transporting cocoa in Ghana fluctuated a lot with the seasons. Most Licenced Buying Companies 
maintained their own permanent truck fleet that throughout the year transported steady flows of cocoa 
from their rural depots to the ports, in accordance with the orders issued by the governmental CMC 
                                                                 
19 Twi expression that can be translated roughly as: ”The gold of  the soil”. At the time of  writing the Asaase 
Wura brand is owned and marketed by the Yara International company, a subsidiary of  the Norsk Hydro 
corporation. 
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(Cocoa Marketing Company) that handled all sales and exports. In the peak production periods known 
as the ‘main crop’ from approximately October to March and the ‘light crop’ from around June to 
August the need for additional truck rides rose accordingly and thereby provided job opportunities for 
independent haulage contractors, such as Mr. Sammy and this team of truckers. The competition 
among such private contractors in Ghana was quite fierce, I learned, and therefore it was not unusual 
for trucks to wait in line for months at a time outside rural cocoa depots in order to secure a single 
contract for a cargo haul to the coast. Later, when I met Mr. Sammy, he explained to me that such 
cocoa contracts were lucrative enough that just making 2-3 hauls per season made it worth the wait 
compared to seeking other haulage jobs in the mean time – and in fact, getting an early spot in line at a 
depot ahead of the main season’s start made a huge difference, since otherwise you might not be able 
to return quickly enough to the line of waiting trucks to get a third contract before the end of the 
season20. For this reason, being a worker in the Ghanaian cocoa transport business typically involved 
long periods of downtime as the driver and his mate (or in this case, the driver, fitter, and mechanic) 
camped in the vicinity of the parked truck for weeks or months at a time in between jobs. During these 
times the driver in particular would be expected to sleep in or by the truck to deter potential thieves 
from attempting to steal it, and for his service the truck owner would pay him so-called ‘sitting money’, 
typically some 10 GH₵ per day to cover his basic expenses for water, food, and soap. 
On this day, as the engine of the truck settled into a stable humming, the team of three 
young men all expressed relief that their moment of departure had finally arrived. Although they were 
all used to the often lengthy downtimes around rural cocoa depots while parked in line for the next job, 
a technical problem with their truck had this time added an additional two unanticipated days to their 
wait. Ali related with the detailed words of a specialist how our transport vehicle for this trip, a chestnut 
coloured DAF 95XF truck, had originally been manufactured in the Netherlands in 1998 for use in 
Great Britain, but around 2010 it had been resold to Mr. Sammy who had it shipped to Ghana. Here 
the truck had been extensively retrofitted for the Ghanaian roads, including a complete shift of its 
steering components from the right hand side of the cab to the left. Ali added how he had in fact done 
that entire procedure by himself over the course of a week, and so by now he felt fully attuned to every 
sound coming from this very machine. DAF trucks, he said, were very popular in Ghana since spare 
parts were easy to come by and maintenance of the trucks required fewer specialized tools than, for 
instance, MAN or Scania type trucks. Practically all privately owned trucks on the Ghanaian roads were 
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 For a closer discussion of  these and other matters related to the Ghanaian independent cocoa haulage 
business, see Chapter 5.  
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second-hand vehicles, imported primarily from Europe, Ali explained. The particular delay on our 
current departure had happened because the slightly battered truck had now stood still for about three 
months or so outside the rural depot, enduring both harsh sunlight and torrential rains, which had 
caused the improvised tape-wrapped insulation around the truck’s external positioned battery wiring to 
fail and the batteries to de-charge. Therefore, the moment the team had finally managed to spark the 
engine again had been the first important obstacle overcome on the journey, while still ahead laid the 
long and likely arduous way to the port. 
Here at the departure point in the rural frontier town of Bonsu Nkwanta, a local team of 
menial depot workers – so-called ‘depot boys’ – had beforehand loaded the entire cargo in place on the 
truck trailer, each worker carrying one 64 kg bag on his head at a time. These 600 bags had 
subsequently been covered with a waterproof tarpaulin, which had finally been fixed in place with 
crisscrossing lengths of rope which were carefully tied down to the trailer deck. This measure was 
officially required of all Ghanaian cocoa transports in order to prevent any additional moisture from 
entering the hygroscopic beans, in addition to keeping other potential pollutants from the outside 
environment from mixing with the goods (e.g. rainwater, fuel spillage, smoke, or dust) , and of course 
also in order to prevent human or animal pilfering of contents enroute. The standard government-
issued cocoa haulage contracts held the contractor liable for any wet, contaminated, or missing bags, 
which would be checked for by the receiving officials at the portside depot, so the team took care to 
check the integrity of the tarpaulin coverage before we left. With the cargo thus sealed off, the waybill 
signed for, and the engine running our cocoa truck was now all ready for departure. This moment, I 
had to remind myself, corresponded somehow to the beginning of the transport link of the PBC 
official’s commodity chain presentation. 
Interestingly, about two days into the future, when we were currently scheduled to reach 
our destination, our cargo would be considered worth substantially more than it was right now. At the 
moment each of the 600 bags on board was registered by a value of 212 GH₵21, which was the official 
government ordinated purchasing price offered by all LBCs to farmers. However, once a truck arrived 
at a portside warehouse the value of a carried bag would instead be considered equivalent to 320 GH₵. 
As a Ghanaian COCOBOD employee had explained to me, this increase reflected the estimated 
replacement costs of a bag that incidentally got damaged or lost during transport to the coast. From a 
                                                                 
21 To note, this was contemporary 2013-14 season prices. Official domestic purchasing prices were subsequently 
adjusted up for the 2014-15 season, in part to reflect significant exchange value losses of  the Ghanaian Cedi to 
the US Dollar over the same period. 
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commodity chain perspective, the value added here appears logical, as it follows as a consequence of 
the cocoa being moved one link further along the chain towards the ultimate endpoint as a consumable 
commercial product. On the other hand, from the perspective of a person working on the truck that 
carried the actual cocoa, this value increase made much less sense. I was told by the truck team that 
only few people in Ghana paid real attention to this particular value increase, since all cocoa was 
technically already considered government property once it left the rural depot, and also it would only 
truly be exchanged for money later, once it was sold to foreign purchasers.  Even then, the money 
earned befell to the national government, which would use it to pay back the billion-dollar short-term 
international banking loans they annually obtained in order to be able to pay the country’s cocoa 
farmers up front for their produce22. To the truckers the high replacement cost of cocoa bags lost 
during domestic transport served instead primarily as a discrete warning for trucking teams to handle 
their cargo with care lest they jeopardise their profits. The cocoa bags themselves, the team assured me, 
were stored safely under the tarpaulin and should by all means remain in exactly the same condition 
when they were offloaded as they had been when they were put on the trailer in Bonsu Nkwanta. Still, 
on the offhand chance that a bag would somehow become lost or spoiled despite all of these measures, 
the team was confident that they could simply arrange to replace it with another 212 GH₵ bag from a 
rural depot. None of the three truckers could remember having heard of someone actually paying the 
320 GH₵ replacement cost at the port, and when I later posed the same question to one of the officials 
at the PBC logistics office in Tema the official replied that he believed that out of the 3.500 or so 
commercial (and hence, non-PBC) truckloads that he and his colleagues procured every year, no more 
than 10 to 20 of them would likely experience such an issue where a bag of cocoa needed replacement 
– and even so, only few if any of those cases actually resulted in the haulage contractors paying the 
official replacement cost to the government rather than simply delivering another bag instead. So, 
despite the clear formality of the price increase mandated by the transaction of the cocoa between the 
rural and the portside commodity chain links, in practical application much more flexibility remained. 
Another practical difference, as already briefly mentioned, was that unlike the 
presentation by the senior PBC logistics official, none of the truckers I travelled with characterised 
themselves as working within a particular link in a commodity chain, nor did they even express any 
knowledge of or interest in the concept of a ‘chain’ of goods. Instead, these truck workers emphasized 
entirely the significance of their hands-on everyday challenges involved in making a livelihood through 
                                                                 
22 For instance, in the 2014-15 cocoa season the Ghanaian government had borrowed a total of  1.7 billion USD 
to finance their domestic cocoa purchases (The Daily Graphic, September 2nd 2015).  
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the long-distance movement of cocoa. All three young men on this day knew the route to the coast by 
heart, albeit none of them expressed strong confidence from the onset that our task of driving there 
would be a simple routine undertaking. Instead, each of them said short prayers for smooth and 
uneventful travels before all four of us squeezed into the cab and rolled out from the rural depot 
courtyard. Our journey began easily and without further delaying incidents, and with an average speed 
rarely exceeding 20 km/h we made it about 10 km onto the countryside dirt roads before the sudden 
burst of a rear trailer tyre heralded the first of numerous setbacks that would soon come to confront us.  
 
 
Image 5: I had strong doubts about the durability of this particular tyre as the cocoa truck started its approx. 500 
km journey. Luckily, this one lasted all the way to the port without puncturing. Rural Sefwi, March 2014. 
 
Aboard the cocoa carrying truck it quickly became evident that the cocoa’s passive 
presence hardly ever seemed to benefit the persons whose job was to move it, and instead this cargo 
listlessly resisted all their attempts at both accelerating and decelerating the truck. The heavy weight of 
the cocoa also strained the wheel suspensions to their near maximal capacity whenever a deep pothole 
was hit or a speed ramp was crossed, with the resulting counterforces from the suspensions shaking the 
whole cab violently, flinging people against their seatbelts, and jostling loose lying items around inside. 
Additionally, carrying the heavy cargo through the decrepit road network was very tough on the wheels, 
and burst tyres were not uncommon incidents – as we had so soon been reminded on our own journey. 
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The truck’s owner, Mr. Sammy, would later explain to me how it was common practice among 
independent haulage contractors in Ghana to only replace worn down tyres when they actually burst, 
since the profit margins of their business were already slim and even a single replacement tyre could 
easily cost the same as the net amount of money profited from one single cocoa haulage contract. 
Instead, Mr. Sammy said, the teams would gradually shift their most worn down tyres back onto the 
rear axles of the cargo trailer to minimize the risk that a blowout would cause the moving truck to 
crash, and beyond this one safety measure, he added, “We just go and pray that nothing breaks”. 
 
 
Image 6: A depot boy takes a nap on the back of a small truck as it returns from a ‘primary evacuation’ of cocoa 
from a handful of farming societies. Rural feeder road near Juaboso, September 2015. 
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Rhythms of the Road 
*** 
The road network of contemporary rural Ghana consists to a large part of rough dirt and 
gravel roads. Main roads between provincial town centres and larger cities are paved, but only few 
sections offer more than one lane in either direction23. Additionally, the frequent torrential rains cause 
rapid deteriorations of the asphalt with consequent emergence of potholes, all exacerbated by decades 
of insufficient allocations of public funds for maintenance work 24. Then, as common rumours have it, 
the road problems are made worse by the recurrent application of inferior qualities of asphalt due to 
illicit cost-cutting practices among contracted roadwork entrepreneurs enabled by lack of government 
oversight. Thus, decrepit road quality alone makes the driving of a 53.8 tonnes fully loaded truck 
through the Ghanaian road network no simple task. In addition, all travellers have to deal with the 
casual, opportunistic driving styles very commonly observable among drivers on Ghanaian roads: This 
includes vehicles being manoeuvred in broad zigzags through the least pothole-ridden path on the road 
rather than staying in one’s own designated lane to safely avoid opposing traffic. Overtaking just before 
hilltops or sharp curves happens frequently too – drivers often relying on the interpreted hand signals 
of slower drivers in front motioning them forward or gesturing them to keep back. The horns of the 
vehicles are also extensively used by practically all drivers; as communication devices towards other 
drivers, to propose rides to potential taxi or trotro clients, and as warning signals for pedestrians or the 
commonly encountered free-roaming farm animals. With an annual road accident fatality rate of 26.2 
persons per 100.000 inhabitants Ghana has been ranked as the nation with the 32nd most dangerous 
traffic conditions in the world (WHO 2015), a ranking which has in all likelihood resulted from a 
combination of many of the factors mentioned above. 
Travellers also have to deal with the significant pollution encountered around the 
Ghanaian roads, cities, and landscapes in general. Along the largest roads are deep rainwater ditches or 
open gutters floating with raw sewage. On our cocoa truck we also repeatedly drove choking and 
sputtering through clouds of road dust, smoke of badly filtered exhaust fumes from vehicles in front, 
                                                                 
23 The few exceptions as of  late 2015 are parts of  the main road between Kumasi and Accra, as well as the 
30kms or so of  highway between Accra and Tema, both where two lanes are available in either direction. 
24
 Anthropologist Gina Porter notes that while road maintenance across several West African nations since the 
1980s has suffered due to the impositions of  structural adjustment programs, in Ghana these negative effects on 
the roads have been even more severe due to years of  economic recession before the initial governmental 
adoption of  structural adjustment policies (Porter 2002: 286). 
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roadside coal pot cooking fires, or bonfires of piled up trash that frequently contained significant 
quantities of plastic. Inside the truck cab all such particles would confront the senses of the truckers, to 
which my experienced road companions had nevertheless grown more accustomed than I. The hot and 
humid tropical climate and the insufficient ventilation system meant that often during daytime it 
seemed unbearably hot to keep the windows closed beyond any more than the worst dusty road 
stretches or the foulest looking smog screens we were about to traverse. At least while moving forward 
the constant breeze of air kept the resident smells of leaking diesel fuel, engine oil, and human body 
sweat at tolerable levels. Meanwhile, the cocoa behind our backs was sheltered from all of this, wrapped 
up as it was in jute sacks underneath the tarpaulin. During daytime stops, though, the sunlight heat 
projected onto the cargo trailer still brought forth a densely permeating sour-sweet smell of the cocoa 
within. I find this rather unique type of olfactory impression quite difficult to describe, but the closest 
comparison I can give would probably be the – admittedly very contrived – example of the mixed smell 
that one might imagine would arise by squeezing a volume of viscous sweet sugary cake frosting 
through the fabric of a very smelly used sports sock. This particular composition of acidic and sweet 
odours is an inherent characteristic of all fermented cocoa beans and will only later on disappear during 
the processing of the beans at cocoa roasteries, grinderies, and chocolate factories elsewhere. In the 
cocoa business of Ghana, from forest plantations to portside warehouses, it is a smell recognised by 
just about everyone. 
My fellow road companions all remained quite unfazed by the imposing sensuous 
intensity of the Ghanaian road networks. Each of them travelled just with a small bag or backpack 
containing some few personal belongings including a spare pair of jeans and a t-shirt that they would 
change into upon arrival, and along the way they shared a plastic wash bucket and a piece of soap 
which enabled each of us to clean up a bit once we made stops at places with access to water, whether 
at filling stations, villages with boreholes, or at rural streams.  
As our truck prodded its way first east and then south we continuously passed along 
stretches of road where hawkers from improvised stalls or by running alongside the slow-moving 
vehicles would tout perishable products such as fruits and vegetables, bread, or sometimes bush meat 
such as fish and river crabs, giant land snails, or grass cutters. Sometimes we would stop to buy travel 
supplies such as plastic satchel bags of filtered water, a cluster of bananas, a few fried plantains, or 
some roasted groundnuts. The team made sure to buy most of their food supplies for the next days 
early on during the journey, since they considered prices in the rural areas to be much cheaper than 
closer to the towns and cities. 
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Image 7: Nighttime stop of a cocoa carrying truck at a Kumasi filling station. Time for vehicle maintenance and a 
few hours of sleep before continuing onwards again before sunrise. March 2014. 
 
A loaded cargo truck journey from Bonsu Nkwanta to Tema normally takes about a day 
and a half to two days, depending on traffic, mechanical issues, and other unforeseeable causes of 
delays, and for this reason most truck teams will make stops somewhere for the night, except if they are 
in a particular rush to meet a delivery deadline or if they have two or more drivers taking turns behind 
the steering wheel. The finding of safe places to rest was a great concern to all the truckers I travelled 
with. Persistent rumours had warned about highway bandits lurking in some of the sparsely inhabited 
forest areas around the first third of the way, and so the teams of truckers placed a priority on driving 
at least as far as Kumasi, Ghana’s second largest city, before making an overnight stop. Parking at larger 
filling stations was a favoured choice in that area, since there would be well illuminated open areas 
around such places and usually one or more armed watchmen present too. When stopping for sleep the 
driver would commonly sleep inside the truck, while the mate, mechanic, or other passengers would 
camp on the ground outdoors, either in the open or sheltered underneath the cargo trailer in case of 
light rains. During heavy night rains everyone would huddle up inside the truck cab instead. 
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Towards the end of the journey our truck passed along a particular stretch of road by the 
town of Ofankor situated at the northern outskirts of Accra in the direction of Kumasi. The everyday 
life conditions of resident street hawkers of this very town have in recent years been analysed by 
anthropologist Gabriel Klaeger who has highlighted the local population’s use of terms they call ‘rush’ 
and ‘relax’ (Klaeger 2015). From the positions of these people trying to generate monetary incomes by 
selling products along the side lines of this busy Ghanaian road the changing intensity in the numbers 
and speeds of vehicles appear as a changing flow between times of ‘rush’ and times of ‘relax’. Business 
opportunities present themselves best during ‘rush’ times when the traffic is dense and slow so that the 
hawkers can move in between the cars and sell goods to travellers through the windows of the vehicles. 
Alternately, when the traffic chokes completely and cars stand still, new potential customers will take 
longer time to approach and pass by the hawkers, meaning their business will slow down and eventually 
force them to sit and ‘relax’. The same mode of reduced business opportunities w ill happen during 
times of light traffic, which means that vehicles would pass by too quickly for the hawkers to effectively 
tout their goods.  
Klaeger refers to French sociologist Henri Lefebvre’s term of ‘rhythmanalysis’ as he 
makes the suggestion that the hawkers’ daily work becomes defined through their bodily rhythmic 
enactments as those change between states of activity and states of idleness (ibid: 92). Lefebvre’s essay 
on the social study of rhythms (Lefebvre 2014 [1992]) is based on his prior work titled The Production of 
Space (1991 [1974]). In this earlier work Lefebvre calls critical attention to the importance of the social 
dynamics between people for their perceptions of spatial surroundings, thus making space more than a 
matter of strictly geographical or architectural features. Lefebvre’s insights have over the subsequent 
decades been influential for what has been called ‘the spatial turn’ in many academic disciplines, 
including Africa studies (Engel & Nugent 2010: 2-3). 
While still maintaining a strict regional focus on this transport route between Accra and 
Kumasi I have noticed a historical precedent for this form of tension between spatial distances 
perceived as either socially enacted or as geographically measured. As the 18th to 19th Century European 
explorers and colonizers along the coastline of what today is called Ghana had gradually sought to 
expand and consolidate their colonial territorial claims inland they had encountered numerous 
difficulties in their efforts to obtain clear information from natives in order to systematically organise 
and delineate areas of indigenous political authority along with indications of travel distances and even 
time reckoning. According to historian and Africanist Ivor Wilks one challenge for the colonial powers 
lay in the different pre-colonial African conception of political space that was mapped mentally rather 
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than geographically and still operated from a logic of power centres with ambiguous outer bounds 
(Wilks 1993, 1992). This approach, for instance, meant that the pre-colonial extent of Greater Asante 
sovereignty was expressed as twenty-one days of travel in either direction from the centre at Kumasi, 
and even so, such travel days could vary in practice, since traditional beliefs held that certain da ys were 
more auspicious than others, and on certain days no travel was advisable at all (Wilks 1992: 181-83; 
McCaskie 1995: 155). For this reason the territorial claims of Asante were in praxis quite loose and 
ambiguous along the outermost reaches of the kingdom, in effect corresponding more closely to the 
term of ‘marches’ than distinct borders25. Further confounding the early European colonizers was that 
highly different answers were provided by Asante travellers as to how many days of travel lay  between 
Accra and Kumasi. To the pre-colonial Asante the correct answer was contingent on the context of the 
time when the question was asked and the issue of whether any days of ill luck (and hence no travel) 
were considered to lay between the present day as a departure day and a later arrival day in Kumasi, all 
coupled with different individual expectations toward what was considered a reasonable traveling pace 
and parts of a travel day one would devote to actually walking (ibid). In effect, the pre-colonial Akan 
reckoning of distance measurements and territorial dimensions relied on shared common knowledge 
(i.e. the Greater Asante kingdom extended over a territorial claim of twenty-one days of travel in either 
direction from Kumasi), while the practical application of this knowledge and its division into units was 
left largely up to the judgment of each traveller (i.e. how far would a person actually move over the 
course of twenty-one consecutive travel days). Wilks argues that “[i]t is virtually impossible to convert 
Asante measures of distance into absolute (Newtonian) space and time – into miles per hour” (ibid: 
181), yet as a rough approximation Wilks suggests that an Asante courier on a long journey would 
probably have averaged about ten miles a day (ibid). These flexible spatial categories based on 
‘anthropometric distance reckoning’ (ibid: 189) were not compatible with the increasing European 
colonial insistence on objectively measuring and classifying distances as well as the fixed mapping of 
the geographical and political features of the interior African continent. For some time, European 
colonizers had attempted to use the registration of inland pathways as cartographic references and 
boundary indicators, an approach that they however largely abandoned again as it became understood 
that such paths were also mobile and dynamically being changed by travellers (Boni 1999: 62). 
The crux of these different conceptualizations of spaces and boundaries in this region, I 
will suggest, can also be understood as revolving around the question of whether the spatial dimensions 
afforded a given totality should be approached through reference to measurements of absolute 
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 For a discussion of  this term, see for instance Zartman (1965), as well as this thesis Chapter 3, p.105-106. 
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quantitative specificity, or rather instead as a qualitative conceptual whole divisible into qualitative parts 
(say, 21 days of travel – or, as I will discuss in Chapter 3, farm produce divisions of 1/3 or 2/3), a latter 
approach which leaves the absolute dimensions of the given totality underdetermined and open for 
ongoing interpretations and negotiations. Philosopher of science, Helen Verran, has likewise 
demonstrated how the cultural preference among the Yoruba in Nigeria for a logic of parts/wholes 
makes mathematics there culturally relational rather than a universal matter (Verran 2001), something 
which I also recognise in my own present fieldwork materials from Ghana. Similarly, for this thesis’ 
overarching ambition of analysing the significance of cocoa through the many boundaries set around it, 
the encounters between two such differently founded concepts of space are highly relevant, since they 
point to a growing tension over time between an increasing European preference for entities defined 
categorically and unambiguously through numerical specificity and encompassing spatial boundary lines 
in opposition to an ongoing West African emphasis on entities that emanate dynamically outward in 
space from central conceptual points (the latter which could be spatially founded, such as the Asante 
capital of Kumasi or conversely all conceptually based such as ‘these are my ancestral lands’) and 
remain enumerable first and foremost as relative parts/wholes. 
Returning here again to Klaeger’s use of Lefebvre’s ‘rhythmanalysis’ term, I w ill add how 
this concept may also enable other insights on the spatial enactments of the surroundings among 
contemporary age working people along this Accra-Kumasi route. To the roadside hawkers the 
rhythms of their working days were characterised by the changing intensities of the passing traffic, 
while they limited their own pedestrian movements to going back and forth along a limited section of 
road in front of their hometown. In comparison, the truckers I travelled with had not long ago 
experienced a long period of downtime while parked outside a rural cocoa depot, but were now 
engaged in their own ‘rush’ period that demanded near constant activity and attention. Upon arrival in 
Tema the team expected that another period of downtime would face them; first while waiting in line 
outside a warehouse to offload the cargo, and then another still unknown period of time as they would 
wait for their boss’ next haulage contract to be approved. For the travelling cocoa truckers I went with, 
as for the roadside hawkers described through Klaeger’s text, their changing repertoires of temporal 
rhythms took place within largely fixed geographical spaces. The hawkers would not venture too far 
away in either direction from their hometown, since their prospective customers would pass by this 
place anyway, and they only needed to walk or jog alongside each vehicle long enough for a quick 
exchange of money and goods to take place. In other words, their experiences of ‘rush’ and ‘relax’ 
played out all within a certain radius of the town of Ofankor, which remained their fixed reference 
point. The truckers, meanwhile, experienced their work livelihood largely as recurrent movement 
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between two points of reference, which were the frontier town of Bonsu Nkwanta and the port city of 
Tema, with often prolonged periods of inactivity in either place. Lefebvre has also made a mark of such 
notions of boundedness that seem integral for senses of rhythm to develop: “Rhythms always need a 
reference; the initial moment persists through other perceived givens (Lefebvre 2014 [1992]: 46). Such 
necessary reference points, as I read Lefebvre’s essay, could appear as both temporal and spatial 
markers, say a melodic rhythm played out in time while bound as written keys on paper, or equally as a 
daily job routine expressed through hours of activity that includes recurrent movement of the 
individual person between a place of home and a place of work. In such a perspective, the concept of a 
commodity chain might appear as the abstracted conglomeration of numerous individual rhythms of 
activities, each bounded in time and space. Whereas the monetary value associated with a commercial 
good transported through a commodity chain is pre-set to increase only at each specific turnover point 
as it crosses the boundaries between chain-links, in the socially enacted spaces a different boundary 
dynamic takes place, which I will attempt to exemplify in the following. 
*** 
At one point Muhammed pulled our truck over along a rural roadside so that Ali could 
make a few tyre pressure checks. Meanwhile the rest of us took the opportunity to stretch our legs and 
backs outside by the truck. As we stood there three young barefooted guys dressed in dirty ragged 
clothes stepped out from the cover of the foliage flanking the road. Holding up fresh coconuts in their 
hands they asked us whether we were interested in buying some. At an initial offering price of merely 
one Cedi a piece none of my truck companions saw any reason for further bargaining before 
immediately agreeing to the deal, buying four coconuts on the spot so that there would be one for each 
of us. The swift transaction seemed to please everyone, and the three young guys soon after retreated 
with smiles and waving arms back into the roadside bushes, four Cedis richer, while my fellow travellers 
with equally big smiles lifted their opened coconuts up to share in an impromptu toast of coconut 
water. As a long-time foreign visitor to Ghana the differences in monetary incomes and purchasing 
prices was usually no longer something that caught my attention. The absolute majority of people here 
earned significantly less money than did most people in, say, Europe or North America, but prices of 
everyday necessities were of course also (somewhat) comparatively lower. What however stuck with me 
from this short random encounter by the roadside was the profound cheerfulness that all six Ghanaians 
in front of me had expressed, even though the total transaction sum – four coconuts for four Ghana 
Cedis – was quite minuscule even by Ghanaian standards. As any researcher from the economics field 
would be able to attest to, I am sure, is that this interaction could be said to represent a boringly basic 
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example of the forces of supply and demand. Something that a curiously minded anthropologist might 
still linger on, though, was the mutual expressions of happiness that resulted on both sides of the 
exchange. Lefebvre’s concept of rhythms could add some nuance to this scenery, considering how 
either party to the exchange evidently met with somewhat dissimilar reference points in mind. The 
work of the trucking team entailed movement between the rural frontier areas and the country’s 
primary port city, and so the reference points for the rhythms of their work lives enabled them to have  
insights into common coconut prices across the ranges of this space. Evidently, what the young 
roadside guys deemed to be the fair price for coconuts referred not to the higher town or city prices 
that the truckers were used to, but were in all likelihood based on their own more limited movements 
by foot around these farmlands, or in other words, another daily rhythm based on differently oriented 
reference points. All of this can of course still be brushed off as very basic stuff from an economic 
perspective, but the crucial point which I seek to elucidate here, and which I will continue to explore in 
the following, is the seemingly intrinsic way in which notions of space intermingle with notions of 
value. 
 
Image 8: In the centre of the image a ‘Call to Glory’ poster announces the death of a local woman at the age of 
103 years. On either side stand signboards pointing towards two different Christian church congregations 
situated nearby. Roadside at the town of Sefwi Asafo, Western Region, October 2014.  
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Hard and Soft Numbers 
*** 
From inside the cab of a slow moving cocoa truck there was usually ample time to take in 
the scenery along the route. In many places signboards and billboards had been put up alongside the 
roads to advertise local businesses, religious congregations, or to announce particular social events. One 
common use of numbers in this public sphere of especially rural southwest Ghana was on the printed 
funerary posters and commemorative billboards placed prominently by the roadsides in or near the 
communities of the deceased. Typically for such billboards would be the showing of photos of the 
departed family member in question with the indication of their names and notes of the age at which 
they had passed on. Frequently, though, such signs would include very high claims of the dead person’s 
age, such as for instance 105, 120, or even older (the oldest example I put into my fieldnotes was an 
ɔpanyin26 of the town of Bibiani who was announced to have had passed away in 2013 after living to 
the impressive full age of 150 years). According to medical anthropologist Sjaak van der Geest, the age 
of old people in Ghana is frequently exaggerated to add to their honour and prestige (van der Geest 
2006: 494), and as such numerical age indications of especially elderly people should not be presumed 
to always correspond to objective records of time. I find that this praxis of inflating numbers of years 
of age with estimations of social affectation and recognition points to a peculiar conflation of the 
qualitative and quantitative aspects of value27. A human lifetime in Ghana might be as long as a human 
lifetime anywhere else in the world, yet if expressed in numbers it might easily be even more. 
I had also noticed how another way in which numerical use across Ghana could be seen 
to differ had to do with what in economic terms might be called “price memory”. In 2007 Ghana had 
carried out a revaluation of its currency, as the old Cedi had gradually become inflated to a point where 
the bank notes and coins carried an impractically large number of zeroes, and where purchases of 
expensive consumer items, such as vehicles or landed property required the handing over of several 
sports bag sized volumes of bundled cash notes, just as maximal ATM withdrawals were practically 
limited by the amounts of money notes that could physically fit through the dispenser of the machines 
                                                                 
26 ɔpanyin is an Akan honorary title for elders who were considered wise and had lived a very respectable life. 
The precise spelling of  this, as of  many other Akan terms, tends to differ across the South Ghanaian regions. 
27
 As a further note, Boni (2010) likewise details the crucial importance of  social reputation for matters of  
numerical value calculations in regards to donations offered by family and kin at Sefwi-Akan funerals. De Witte 
has also presented an analysis of  the quite complex social considerations involved in the budgeting of  Asante 
funerary expenses including the anticipated monetary donations from mourners of  the deceased (de Witte 2003). 
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at once, rather than the daily withdrawal limits set by banks or credit card companies. The National 
Bank of Ghana had chosen to solve this problem by officially slashing four zeroes from the old 
denominations and by replacing old notes and coins with new ones. This change, of course, resulted in 
profound confusion for some time, as people habitually spoke of prices in the old terms, even as the 
transactions would take place with the new Cedis. As I spent in total about one year in Ghana between 
2007 and 2009, I recall witnessing many encounters among Ghanaians and visiting foreigners, as well as 
even among Ghanaians themselves, where one party to a shopping transaction would express initial 
shock at hearing the price quoted to them, e.g. “What, ten thousand!?! – But a tea bread should only 
cost one Cedi!” 
 
 
Image 9: A funeral announcement poster pasted onto the outer wall of a private household in the town of Bonsu 
Nkwanta. Of particular note the age of the deceased ɔpanyin is listed as 125 years. September 2015. 
 
I still occasionally heard such references to the old currency terms during my later 2014-
15 fieldworks, even as price indications according to the new Cedi denominations had finally become 
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standard everyday use. For instance, one day in 2014 I asked to purchase a small plastic satchel bag of 
pure water from a very young boy who sold a bowl full of these by the roadside in the rural town of 
Bonsu Nkwanta. To my surprise the boy asked me to pay him a “thousand” for the satchel, when what 
it turned out that he in fact expected to receive was a 10 Pesewa coin (that is, 0.10 GH₵). As this boy 
had surely not even been born back in 2007 when the old currency was removed from circulation, I 
imagine that his choice of word was likely one he had learned from his older family members or from 
other adults at the town market place. Arithmetically it made little sense to me how someone would 
find it preferable to quote and calculate prices in terms of numbers four figures higher than the 
amounts they really expected to see transacted, so instead I wonder if this linkage was more of a 
qualitative nature. As it had once been the established norm in Bonsu Nkwanta (and across many other 
parts of Ghana) that the fair price for a small satchel bag of purified water was 1.000 (old GH₵), then 
the verbal or written combination of these two particular entities (1.000 GH₵ and 1 pure water satchel) 
might in this context indicate that the correct proportions between the price number and the 
commercial item was being respected and therefore that the seller’s offer was given in earnest. Even as 
the official currency was revaluated, I believe that continued reference to the old currency price could 
therefore both present a matter of recalcitrant habit (from those old enough to have formed such) as 
well as a normative expression of sincerity from either participant in the new transaction. Furthermore, 
I suggest that price memory could represent another cause for this persistent association between a 
specific yet obsolete numerical price indication and a particular volume of a good. In this way, 
especially the prices of common locally produced and consumed staple goods would tend to remain 
more resilient to price increases caused by value inflation of the currency than would imported 
products. Since a very specific nominal price was already firmly associated with an equally specific 
volume of a particular good, both the sellers and the buyers could then continue reproducing the 
already established verbal price point between them, even as other products increased in price relative 
to these local staples.  
At this point a further comparison can be made to the Ghanaian fixed prices on domestic 
standard sized cocoa bags. The governmentally decreed farm gate purchasing price of cocoa ha s 
remained unchanged at 212 GH₵ per 64kg bag between October 12 th 2012 and October 3rd 201428. 
Over the course of the same approximately two years the currency inflation rates in Ghana have 
averaged slightly above 16% per year29. Since the world market transactions of cocoa are settled in US 
                                                                 
28 Ghana Ministry of  Finance (2012, 2014). 
29 Ghana Statistical Service (2015). 
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Dollars while Ghana pays its domestic cocoa producers in GH₵, this means that for the Ghanaian 
government authorities mere continuation of the same purchasing price over the course of this period 
has become increasingly profitable on its own. What to a Ghanaian smallholder cocoa farmer looks like 
a condition of stability (one bag of cocoa is still worth 212 GH₵, just like it has been for the past two 
years), is from the point of view of Ghana’s Ministry of Finance (under which the entire COCOBOD 
organisation is a subsidiary) and the country’s political elite a condition of remarkable year-over-year 
growth of profitability. Both cocoa farmers and domestic LBC purchasers on the other hand have the 
effective value generation from their mutual business efforts eroded, as the purchasing power from 
their cocoa sales are gradually reduced relative to other, especially non-local goods. While nominal price 
value of the good has remained the same, the exchange value of the same good has shifted. In other 
words, maintenance of one sort of fixed boundary in the form of a specific farm gate purchasing price 
takes place concurrently with expansionary processes of the economic value of the cocoa once it 
becomes possessed by the Ghanaian state authorities30. The field of economics, of course, has pursued 
all such dynamics to a much higher level of analytical sophistication than what is possible to explore in 
this context, but I wish to emphasize at this point how the case described here already indicates the 
dual tension at stake in value theorization. Value can be understood as something generated through a 
transaction, just as value can be understood as an essential quality of a good.  
I have wondered how to analyse the valuations of cocoa in Ghana anthropologically, 
both considering the many ways in which this natural good was described to me and engaged with by 
many people there, and furthermore considering the situational tendency towards conflation of 
qualitative and quantitative expressions of value in the common usage of numbers among members of 
the population. As I have observed in the Ghanaian transport sector as well as in the border village of 
Topman and the surrounding areas cocoa is continuously being reconstituted through a number of 
different activities, of which only some become expressed in numerical forms. At the same time people 
describe cocoa as most of all a cash crop, a means to obtain other ends rather than an end in itself, and 
once sold and out of physical sight it loses all relevance to them. In the government logistics office of 
the port city of Tema, cocoa is visualized as an abstract unidirectional flow through the solidly outlined 
links of a commodity chain, while the material cocoa is kept out of sight and appears instead through 
                                                                 
30
 As a note, Adebayo (2007) discusses parallels in local currency monetary inflation and devaluation processes 
between Ghana and Nigeria from the 1970s and onward. Adebayo finds that a number of  his study informants 
reported their experiences of  a ”shrinking” of  the middle class, whereby some managed to keep up with the 
relative income levels of  the nations’ elites (steadied by access to international currencies), whereas others found 
themselves drifting into poverty (ibid: 103). 
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numerical abstractions. On the cocoa truck through Ghana the cocoa stands as immanently close – yet 
hidden from direct view – and is instead most vividly present as weight, mass, and smell. Although 
engagements with cocoa in all of these settings revolve around issues of money-making and the idea of 
cocoa as purely a cash crop, it is clearly also entangled in many other conceptualisations of life, 
personhood, nationality, social norms, and more. The question I am most curious about is how one 
might understand the value of cocoa in this fieldwork setting in concurrently a cultural as well as 
economical sense of the word? 31 An important aspect is that, although the ways that cocoa is being 
valued in Ghana seem largely disconnected from the use value it is primarily associated with among 
consumers of chocolate elsewhere, its significance for the livelihoods of a major part of the Ghanaian 
population goes beyond what could be termed only a matter of exchange value. I have already briefly 
considered how Lefebvre’s concepts of rhythms and socially enacted spaces can be applied to show a 
linkage between people’s perceptions of space and their perceptions of value. In order to further 
develop this line of enquiry I will now seek to expand it through a discussion of other anthropological 
approaches to value and spatiality. 
 
 
Value Theory between Society and Individuals, Units and Relations 
*** 
 There may not be one all-encompassing anthropological theory of value to be found in 
the humanities and social sciences, if one is to believe anthropologist David Graeber (2001), despite his 
own attempts at establishing a basis for the same. There may also never be such a theory, if one is to 
believe one of the arguments upheld among the editors of a special issue on ‘value’ in the ethnographic 
journal HAU (Otto & Willerslev 2013). Regardless, the present conditions have not been for a lack of 
trying. Depending on how widely one casts the net there have been numerous attempts at explaining 
why some people tend to find it more worthwhile to do one thing rather than another or hold 
something in higher esteem than another, both interpretable as expressions of value. Graeber, again, 
starts his own (2001) exploration of the topic by listing three overall ways, in which he finds that 
                                                                 
31 Here, of  course, one might also consider the assertion by anthropologist Marshall Sahlins that the field of  
economics should be considered a subfield of  the cultural studies of  the humanities (Sahlins 2013: 161-62). 
What I am trying to get at here is the identification of  an analytical approach to cocoa that can concurrently 
acknowledge the widespread numerical circumscription of  this natural good, while still remaining capable of  
exploring the deeply a-numerical forms of  significance that the same cocoa also holds according to the people 
interacting with it. 
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scholars have tended to talk about value. First there is plural ‘values’ in the sociological sense that deals 
with ideas of what is considered proper and desirable in order for people to live a good life. Then there 
is ‘value’ in the economic sense of the word, as expression of the desirability of something over another 
and thereby as a representation of the resources one would need to give up in order to obtain such. 
Finally, Graeber also points to the way that ‘value’ has been used in the linguistic sense, especially in the 
structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure, who saw value as an expression of ‘meaningful 
difference’ (de Saussure 1959 [1916]). De Saussure posited that each word becomes meaningful only in 
contrast to other words in the same language, and thus the value of any single word is relative as it 
consists of the ‘meaningful difference’ between it and others.  
Hearkening back to terms originating in the influential (1944) work by economist Karl 
Polanyi, several mid-twentieth century anthropologists’ efforts to explore notions of ‘value’ have tended 
to become split into two camps of ‘substantivists’ on the one side and ‘formalists’ on the other. 
Substantivists started from a concept of a given society and from there sought to identify and classify 
various social principles and components that guided the actions of its individual members. Formalists, 
meanwhile, based their explorations on the motivations and behaviours of individual society members 
and from there sought to identify how such added up to a social whole. Despite some attempts to 
bridge this principled divide (for instance Barth’s Transactionalism, which I’ll return to shortly), the 
rather entrenched debate between substantivists and formalists faded from the academic foreground in 
the late 1960s and early 70s, as first Leví-Strauss’ Structuralism and soon also the revived scholarly 
interest in Marxism, along with new perspectives of Feminism, Post-Colonial studies, Practice Theory, 
World Systems Theory, Symbolic anthropology, etc. came to the fore of the academic world (Barnard 
& Spencer 2002 [1996]; Ortner 1984). According to Graeber (2001: 12), though, the old divisions of the 
formalist//substantivist academic camps had still not really been resolved and at the time of Graeber’s 
writing he considered these to still linger on in subsumed forms through later academic theorizations 
since the early 1970s. In Graeber’s view, this meant that especially the formalist emphasis on individual 
agency, and particularly assumptions of self-interested motivations had shaped the arguments of 
influential later scholars, including notably Pierre Bourdieu and Arjun Appadurai (ibid: 27-33).  
Another aspect that runs through much of the value theory literature is the question of 
the degrees to which value should be deemed as something that is essential; that is, contained in goods 
or objects, or entirely relational; that is, only identifiable as valuable to someone or something else. The 
recurrent oscillations between emphasis on individual agency, social structure, objects , and actions have 
over time resulted in quite different theorizations of the term of value across the humanities and social 
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sciences. Before attempting to engage further with the question of value in relation to Ghanaian cocoa, 
I will therefore first devote a few more pages to consider the merits of some of the significant existing 
contributions to the field. 
 
Value as Essence and Exchange 
*** 
The imagery invoked by the chain metaphor, whether coupled with terms of 
‘commodity’, ‘value’, or ‘supply’ is one that lends itself easily to views of value as  increasing 
progressively as a commodified good is moved from a site of origin to a site of consumption. The 
linear accumulation of value is in this perspective inseparable from the essence of the commodity itself, 
something which corresponds well with the analytical approach of Arjun Appadurai, who argues that 
“Economic exchange creates value. Value is embodied in commodities that are exchanged.” (Appadurai 
1986: 3). The two core premises of Appadurai’s approach to value both appear explicitly through this 
quote. First, Appadurai follows in the tradition of Georg Simmel’s (1978 [1907]) conceptualization of 
money that sees value as something that arises solely through acts of exchange. Secondly, though, 
Appadurai goes on to take the idea of that emergent exchange value and immediately ‘embody’ it as  
some kind of stored essence within the very commodity that is exchanged. The effect is that as a 
commodified good successively changes hands, increasing value accumulates within it, almost like a 
battery would storage the electricity transferred to it. The end point, the moment of discharge, of 
course, follows when the commodity is eventually consumed, upon encountering a person who deems 
its use value higher than its continued exchange value. Appadurai’s approach aligns very well with the 
commodity chain thinking that likewise operates with a concept of gradual value increases of 
commodities where each linking handover moment – exchange – increases the value of the good in 
question. While on some level a Marxist legacy was still evident through Hopkins & Wallerstein’s 
reliance on the terms of ‘labour’ and ‘production processes’ in their initial 1986 formulation of 
commodity chains, their concept of the structured separate-yet-linked entities also expresses stepwise 
value increases through acts of exchange – the links of the chain – that align their concept closely with 
both Simmel and Appadurai.  
Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu likewise deserves mentioning here as another impactful social 
scientist whose theorizations align fairly well with ideas of value as such have becomes expressed 
through the commodity chain concept and more generally through the presumed self-centred interests 
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as the driving motivation of individual actors, not least as imagined throughout neoliberal economics. A 
central thought in Bourdieu’s theorizations has been the idea that even if actors are not always 
rationally or even consciously calculative in their choices of action, then they should at least always be 
presumed to be engaged in processes of optimizing something for their own benefits, whether that 
something is explainable in forms of economic or symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1990: 11, 60-61). Thus, 
Bourdieu's explanations of social change appear to rest soundly on a rather economistic assumption of 
individual agency that is always geared towards personal gain in the form of ‘capital’ (whether economic 
or symbolic), or in other ways aiming towards competition and getting ahead of others (hence perhaps 
his numerous references to sports and gaming32). This idea of social science on economic terms seems 
further evident in the comparisons and arguments Bourdieu presents in his essay on ”The Interest of 
the Sociologist”, where by the end of it, the major difference between symbolic and economic capital 
appears, through Bourdieu's analysis, to be little more than the instability of the former's value ( ibid: 
93). Somewhat clarifying in this regard are Bourdieu's comments on his sources of inspiration behind 
the development of his theoretical approach, in particular his ambition of escaping the Structuralism of 
Claude Leví-Strauss (ibid: 9, 62) by way of a practice-oriented approach, for which Bourdieu found 
resonance in the works of Max Weber (ibid:76). The result of this could perhaps be interpreted, as 
Graeber elsewhere argues (2001: 27-29), as a social theory presenting substantivist explanations by way 
of formalist arguments; or stated differently, that Bourdieu's alternative to the notions of social 
structures takes its basis in terms originating closer to the field of economics, in particular through his 
deliberate coupling of the individual actor with the term of 'capital'.  
The linkages between capital and value have perhaps most famously been explored by 
Karl Marx, whose 19 th Century socio-political writings and criticisms have become foundationally 
influential for later generations of social-scientific theorists. The Marxist tradition holds that value 
constitutes the creative work efforts that people put into the products they make – a value which in 
turn, however, is all too often subsequently removed from the workers by the owners of the applied 
means of production, owners who then only pass some of this value back to those who produced it. 
The value of a product seen as the creative output of the worker is then typically forgotten once it is 
sold and translated into monetary value terms, an act of disconnection and essentializing which Marx 
denounced as ‘fetishism’ (Marx 1990 [1867]: 165).  
                                                                 
32 For instance, in the previously quoted career retrospective work by Bourdieu I took notice of  his tendency to 
explain the soundness of  his prior theorizations through competitive gaming and sports metaphors, as seen on 
the following pages: (Bourdieu 1990: 9, 11, 60-61, 63, 73, 76, 78, 80-81, 89).  
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Here, it appears to me that the classical Marxist way of looking at value as corresponding 
to the amount of energy individuals put into their work, in the case of Ghanaian cocoa production 
would lead to a particular conclusion, given how the government there dictates all official buying prices. 
No matter how much or how little work the farmers put into working their farm, nor how arduous a 
journey turns out for the truckers, their monetary compensation is almost solely dictated by the weight 
of their produce or cargo. Likewise, the licenced buying companies and their purchasing clerks only 
seem to have limited wiggle room, as all official buying prices are fixed at the state level and their 
commissions and bonuses are therefore very tight too. Across the range of domestic primary 
producers, merchants, and workers, I heard people very consistently complain that they each received 
too little, yet lack of alternative income options seemed to keep them at it. Thus, for the classical 
Marxist image of the exploitative capitalist factory owner to make sense in the contemporary cocoa 
business of Ghana, it would seem that the role of that actor would need to be assigned to the state 
itself, since its export monopoly makes the government the de-facto owner of all the cocoa products as 
well as the ultimate employer of the workers producing them.  
Still, a Marxist analysis holds far greater potential than this one particular comparison. 
Anthropologist and geographer Neil Smith has attempted to develop Marx’ theoretical insights on 
value beyond its original context amid the heyday of 19 th Century European industrialization and social 
upheavals (Smith 2008 [1984], 2007, 1996). Centrally, Smith identifies the formalized creation of 
conceptual and geographical spaces as the defining characteristic of value creation in late stage 
capitalism. Since Marx wrote of value as the outcome of labour processes, and since such value 
according to Marx could subsequently become detached and extracted from the contexts of its 
production, then to Smith it follows that the creation of more production contexts allows for more 
opportunities for capitalist value extraction and accumulation. In other words,  Smith argues that a 
ceaseless proliferation of human-made spatial and conceptual categories, each with limitless potential 
for sub-spatial divisions, has become a central feature of late stage capitalism’s relentless hunt for profit 
(Smith 2008 [1984]). The concept of ‘Nature’ itself serves as one such major category, and goods of 
Nature (whether organic or not) can become valuable through extraction and insertion into human 
society - itself another overall category. Smith’s identification of a close interdependency between 
creation of spaces and creation of value resonates very well with the concept of commodity chains, 
ownership of plots of farmland, national boundaries, etc., and I shall return to discuss his insights at 
certain points over the course of the present and the following chapters. Still, I have one particular 
caveat about Smith’s theory, and this concerns his focus on the hegemonic ways in which late stage 
capitalism brings about ever more fine grained geographical spaces, from which valuable resources can 
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be extracted. Through Smith’s writing (ibid.) such spaces appear largely solid, fixed, and effectively 
undisputed once past their initial moment of creation, almost like the way European colonial powers 
may once have negotiated among each other and drawn geometric lines across a map of the entire 
African continent33. Rarely, in the Ghanaian and Ivoirian ethnographic materials that form the basis of 
my own work, have I encountered spatial categorizations that appeared absolutely fixed and 
uncontested. Rather, as I have already discussed in connection with the Ghanaian cocoa transport 
industry, notions of value and spatiality appear much more relative, multiple, and overlapping, once 
livelihoods and agency of individual people are also taken into accounts. I have already touched upon 
the potential of Lefebvre’s works for an understanding of such heterogeneous spaces and value 
creation, but several other theorists have likewise contributed with important insights that treat spatial 
perceptions and value creation as relational and contingent matters rather than essential and absolute. I 
will for this reason now proceed to discuss the attempts of others to build on particularly the Maussean 
tradition of value which emphasizes value exchanges as ongoing relations instead of detachable 
moments of transaction. 
 
Relational Values 
*** 
Graeber draws in part upon the Saussurean approach to value in his (2001) attempt to 
develop a theory of value that can encompass both the economic and the social applications of the 
term. Value, in de Saussure’s linguistic formulation, appears basically as a negatively charged aspect of 
comparison; that what something (i.e. a word) is, is defined by what it is not; it is the difference that 
remains after comparison has taken place (for instance, the value of the colour ‘red’ depends on the 
number of other colour words in the same language that this word is compared to; if only yellow and 
blue, then ‘redness’ is permitted a larger potential range of meaning than if it, say, had also been 
compared to colours of auburn or brown, or any other larger array of colour words) .34  
By including a number of additional sources, including Marilyn Strathern’s developments 
of Marcel Mauss’ relational approach to value, as well as a founding influence in Karl Marx’s writings 
on the topic, Graeber seeks to follow up on the alternative view of value as something that concerns 
ongoing relations (between people as well as other entities in their surroundings) rather than 
                                                                 
33 More on this in the following chapter of  this thesis. 
34
 For other examples, see for instance de Saussure (1959 [1916]: 114-120). 
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disconnecting moments of exchange. A central point of Marcel Mauss’ (2001 [1925]) work on gifts and 
gift-giving is that the ‘spirit of the gift’, the social obligation of a gift receiver to present a counter gift, 
shows how objects should not be treated as fully detachable from their owners, but rather that gift-
giving acts extend parts of the giver into relations with the receiver and the wider society. In this regard 
Mauss followed the prior insights of Emile Durkheim, who had demonstrated the inherent non-
contractual elements in contracts, i.e. the morals, customs, and history that make monetary transactions 
matters of much more than strictly technical processes regulated by law (Durkheim 1960 [1893]). 
Mauss, like Durkheim and Marx before him, points to a concept of value as an expression of the 
activities and relationships that take place between people and their material surroundings, but Mauss’ 
material does not support the view of Marx that the value of an object can subsequently become 
alienated to a point where it appears as fully severed from the relations of its production and with an 
essentialized (or, fetishized) value of its own. As anthropologist Christopher Gregory has suggested 
(1982), a key difference between gift economies (the topic of Mauss’ work) and industrialized capitalist 
societies (the topic of Marx’ works) is that whereas the former tend to emphasize qualitatively 
expressed exchanges of objects as ways to increase social relations among people, the latter tend to 
emphasize quantitatively expressed exchanges of objects as ways to increase individual accumulation. 
This oppositional presentation constitutes a significant simplification, of course, but I believe that it 
also highlights some of the multiplicities that prevent a simple exploration of questions pertaining to 
the value of cocoa in a setting like that of contemporary Ghana. As a country shaped on a background 
of both European colonial era influences35 coupled with indigenous West African cultural traditions, 
there are certain interactions observable in the current cocoa production, which hearken back to 
legacies of either and which conjoin to a particular mixing of value notions in the present. All of this 
will be the topics of the following chapters.  
At the current juncture I would like to emphasize the point how, in my understanding, 
the crux of contention between the works of the multiple value theorists presented so far in this 
chapter concerns the issue of whether value ought to be approached as a practically essential quality of 
any given entity, or instead whether value ought to be treated as a dynamic process between multiple 
entities, and hence a temporal relation. Secondarily follows another strong contention between several 
of these theorists whether the emergence of value recognized among any population of people ought to 
                                                                 
35 And, of  course, post-colonial foreign political, cultural, and economic influences as well, whether such are 
attributable to ”The West” understood primarily as Europe and North America, or, increasingly over the recent 
decades also to parts of  Asia – primarily through Chinese business investments. 
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be analysed foremost as the outcome of individual or social agency.  Is the value of cocoa embedded in 
the good itself or is the value only an expression of the processes of its transaction? Where does one 
locate the value of a good inside a commodity chain? – Does the monetary value of a bag of cocoa 
correspond to its nominal price tag whilst it is moved through each single commodity chain link, for 
instance on a truck or inside an LBC warehouse? Or does the monetary value only emerge at the 
contact points between two commodity chain links, for instance as a bag leaves the farm gate, or right 
as the coastal depot workers offload the cocoa truck while their manager signs the waybill presented by 
the driver? And what of the qualitative processes that enable such quantitatively expressed value 
increases? Is it the convenient presence of cocoa near the African container port that makes such 
320GH₵ cocoa bags more valuable than otherwise identical 212GH₵ cocoa bags inland? Or, rather, is 
it the temporary relation between truckers and cocoa and the productive work effort to move both to 
the port that generates the value increase? In other words, should value be treated as a spatially 
embedded quality or as a quality of movement from one space to another? Principally, is the value of a 
good best defined statically by its boundaries in relation to other presently surrounding spaces, or is it 
preferable to approach the value of a good as the dynamic changes of its boundaries towards other 
spaces? 
What I aim to suggest here is that something all of the abovementioned value theorists 
share in common, albeit quite implicitly, and despite often profound disagreements regarding other 
aspects, is a general conviction that to the human mind notions of value are easily associable with 
spatial dimensions. There is perhaps only little novel in such a thought, and it could be argued that any 
perception of value as something that is potentially describable as essences, e.g. in the form of 
commercial goods or heirlooms, already proceeds from a conceptual premise of spatially bounded 
objects of certain dimensions. Even thoroughly process based approaches to value, such as those 
following the Marxist tradition, call attention to the thought that value to people may easily appear as 
three-dimensional and tangibly enclosed in material goods, although such perceived qualities in this 
tradition would however be deemed false and a fetish. Stated differently, an expression of ephemeral 
spatiality could appear to emerge through approaches such as those by Marx and by Mauss that locate 
value first and foremost in the interplay between people and objects, even as these, unlike later 
approaches such as those of Appadurai, Bourdieu, or Smith, seek less to re-situate the value inside 
neither absolute geographical spaces, nor the commodity objects themselves, nor into individualized 
capital forms. As already indicated through my prior mentioning of Lefebvre’s approach to rhythms 
earlier in this chapter, I find it analytically promising to treat value as an inherently dynamic expression 
of spatiality. I have therefore in the following tried to outline an analytical approach that I have termed 
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‘spatialized value’. This approach, I contend, is more suitable for an analysis of value generation across 
the contemporary Ghanaian cocoa business, given how actors of this business conduct their activities 
through a multitude of space and value reckoning influences from both West Africa and afar. 
 
Spatialized Value –Theorizing an Approach to Boundaries and Value Generation 
*** 
In my fieldwork context, both space and value are concepts that frequently become 
expressed as emergent and dynamic, while numbers in turn may refer to a logic of parts/wholes rather 
than universal mathematical units of measurement, and numbers may even at times serve as 
expressions of entirely qualitative norms and considerations of interpersonal sociality. Consequently, a 
strictly quantitative value analysis of the Ghanaian cocoa business becomes severely hampered by both 
the difficulty of obtaining exact numbers and figures, as well as further challenged by the unreliability 
and contestable nature of many number indications once such are obtained. 
I suggest instead that both notions of value and space can be gainfully analysed as 
continuous dynamic co-performances of meaningful difference, and that such a combined perspective 
enables important insights into value generation all across the contemporary Ghanaian cocoa business. 
The starting point for this ‘spatialized value’ approach, as I have termed it, is the idea that 
to understand value necessitates first an identification of significant boundaries that enable something 
to stand out. What boundaries produce, in the most general term, are expressions of meaningful 
difference, designations of something as different from something else. My argument goes that through 
difference, (at the most basic between what could be termed inside//outside, self//other, here//there, 
this//that, before//after, etc.) emerge concurrent notions of value and space. In other words, an 
implicit spatiality extending outward from any boundary-making moment into a fuzzily dimensioned, 
ambiguously delimited space, inherently value-charged through its difference from that which it is not – 
i.e. its neighbour or neighbours. For instance, the basic differentiation of a particular entity as being 
‘cocoa’ separates it conceptually from all other ‘non-cocoa’ entities, in effect affording it a huge 
unbounded range of space for potential “cocoa-ness” given the lack of further differentiating 
encounters of comparison that delimit it as different from others (e.g., cocoa is the seed from a type of 
fruit, cocoa grows on certain trees, cocoa is something that is bought by foreign people, cocoa is made 
into chocolate, etc.). Each differentiating moment where cocoa brushes up against other entities 
81 
 
(whether or not such are materially conceptualized) actualizes boundaries of meaningful difference, and 
all such forms of actualization dynamically redefine what cocoa is and becomes.  
 
For another illustration of this concept I would like to point to the intentionally rough 
line drawing of a cocoa pod shown here above as well as on the front cover of the present thesis. If one 
imagines that each single line on this drawing represents one spatio-temporal enactment of a boundary 
of meaningful difference between cocoa and a given non-cocoa entity, then with each additional 
encounter the dimensions of cocoa gets further fleshed out (or reigned in, if one prefers). Each 
difference-enacting encounter contributes towards increased specificity of meaning of cocoa, to the 
views of those actors engaging themselves with it. While each actor may even agree that the cocoa 
holds value, the basic point of transactional value, however, hinges upon the notion that some level of 
incommensurability (meaningful difference) remains between the perceptions of different actors, or 
else they would see little point in pursuing an exchange at all. With the increased number of boundary 
enactments, however, the potential ranges of remaining incommensurability decrease, thereby 
delimiting the potentials for ‘marginal gains’ whereby one actor may profit from the implicit differences 
between the spatial dimensions of their own engagements with cocoa as compared to the points of 
view of a transactional partner. 
This formulation also aligns the idea of spatialized value with a central tenet of STS 
analysis that likewise approaches meaning as emerging from and remaining contingent upon encounters 
between entities, such as people and objects (for example as argued in Henare et al. 2007; de Laet & 
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Mol 2000). Efforts like these place actions at the forefront of value creation and are part of what has 
been described as a more recent tendency in social science to write ‘Ethnographies of Encounter’ (Faier 
and Rofel 2014). By emphasizing the encounter rather than entities, I see a way to effectively avoid the 
categorical opposition between value as something produced through individual agency as opposed to 
value produced by collective society. Instead neither individual nor social entities should be presumed 
as absolute from the onset, but rather as always emergent, contingent, ephemeral invocations of 
meaningful differences whose dimensions, bounds and significance are always in the midst of being 
permutated, reinforced, or reconfigured through encounters with that which appears different. Stated in 
yet other ways both concepts of individuals and social groupings are approachable as specific categories 
that all emerge from encounters that actualize meaningful difference, and hence produce both space 
and value, yet never precede either.  
Once any single boundary of meaningful difference has been actualized, what lies on 
either side appears with a form of basic spatial dimension, prone to further honing and refinement 
through other subsequent boundary enacting encounters. Value, at this ini tial moment may be treated 
as both that which is contained by a boundary, and which may also in turn be moved across a boundary 
(or by the movement of the boundary itself, for the same outcome). From this particular viewpoint, 
perceptions of value as either inherent to a space or an object, or value as a transactional process, can 
be recast as matters of perspective and choices of emphasis – and thus not mutually exclusive at all.  
Therefore, in the context of my analytical endeavours, when I focus on the value 
generating potential of any given cocoa related space or object, I employ one of a few synonymic terms 
of ‘spaces of value’, ‘spaces for value creation’, and ‘value spaces’. On the other hand, when I attempt 
to emphasize transactions and the relative difference in value potential between different spaces or 
objects, I instead employ the term of ‘spatialized value’. Both sets of terms always refer to the same 
notion of boundary enactments as encountered in the present cocoa fieldwork context; spaces of value 
(etc.) refer to the dimensions of places or objects enabling value creation, whereas spatialized value refers 
instead to the relative dimensions of transaction processes of value – and furthermore as my overall 
choice of label for this approach. 
Moving on, all of this presses forth the next question of who – or what – are to be 
treated as the actors who evoke such meaningful differences and in turn spatialized value, and how to 
find them? Considering how I am at the moment still discussing the concept of spatialized value in a 
very general sense, I will at first try to open this question up to a grand scale: Sociologist and 
philosopher of science, Bruno Latour, in his Gaia-lectures (2013), suggests to approach the question of 
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social actors through a revisit to the ‘Gaia-theory’ first proposed in the 1970s by chemist James 
Lovelock and microbiologist Lynn Margulis. This theory puts forth that the world is teeming with 
innumerable actors, ever brushing up against each other, ever in the midst of transgressing upon or 
yielding to one another, ever in moments of dynamic tensions between insides and outsides. Latour 
states that: “This coupling of one neighbour actively manipulating its neighbours and being 
manipulated by all others defines waves of action that do not respect any traditional borderlines and, 
more importantly, that are not happening at a fixed scale. Those waves […] are the real actors which 
should be followed all the way, wherever they lead, without sticking to the internal boundary of an 
isolated agent considered as an individual inside an environment.” (Latour 2013). Latour’s emphasis on 
the ‘waves of action’ as the desirable unit for analysis, I think, is largely analogous with the focus on 
encounters that actualize difference, since all emerge by way of meetings. Entities become entities in, 
and through, recurrent processes of differentiation, and, following Graeber’s (2001) arguments based 
on the semiotics of de Saussure (1959 [1916]), so does ‘value’ emerge as well.  
While Latour’s discussion of Gaia-theory in principal ways opens up the floodgates of 
potential difference-enacting, value-creating entities to the practically infinite, this does not render the 
actual scope of any ethnographic enquiry (such as the present one into cocoa) impossibly large, since – 
of course – nowhere near anything would be considered equally present or relevant by anyone at any 
particular time36. Anthropologist Fredrik Barth, I believe, emphasized as much with his (1969) proposal 
that anthropologists should attempt to identify limited sets of cultural values that members of a given 
society were tending to reproduce through their individual agency, an ambition which also reflects 
earlier studies of cultural values by led by anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn (1961). Still, both Barth’s 
and Kluckhohn’s works emerged out of predominant expectations among academics of the mid 
twentieth century that anthropology’s ultimate aim as a science was to uncover sets of objective, 
perpetually valid truths about the human condition. For this reason both of these scholars, like so many 
of their contemporaries, based their research on analytical terms of individuals, societies, and cultures as 
firmly pre-given categories rather than emergent ones.  
What I find imperative for a spatialized value approach is to take note of which words, 
concepts, and actors emerge as present and significant in each particular fieldwork encounter, all 
                                                                 
36 And, one may add, as anthropologist Clifford Geertz once noted in defence of  the anthropological science, “it 
is not necessary to know everything in order to understand something” (1973: 20). 
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according to the people involved37. Each such recognised entity constitutes an expression of a value 
space that, following my thoughts inspired by both Latour’s discussion of Gaia-theory and Graeber’s 
use of de Saussure’s linguistics, could be seen as a  conceptualized entity that brushes up against, 
transgresses upon, yields to, overlaps, or is delimited by other entities. What cocoa is and becomes in 
Ghana can be seen as a spatialized expression of value (value in both a social and economic sense of 
the word), a spatial affordance that is continuously enabled, shaped, and delimited by all other entities 
that are presently acknowledged as different (i.e. “non-cocoa”) by those people who engage themselves 
with what both they and I (the researcher) recognise as cocoa in a given setting or encounter. 
In sum, I suggest that for spatialized value analysis the encounter should be treated as 
paramount: value emerges from difference, difference alone gives rise to value. No mutual 
understanding needs to be present for encounters that actualize difference to take place. Thus, value is 
relative and multifarious, overlapping while diverse. The analytical focal point is therefore to look at the 
emergent moments where ‘difference’ appears, where actors become actors; the differentiations of 
something from something else, and most importantly the notions of space (pre-existing as emergent) 
that contextualize and define what gets to become recognised as an entity . 
 
 
                                                                 
37 I emphasize ’people’ here, since unlike the all-inclusive grand scope of  all biological actors according to Gaia-
theory, my own work is still bounded in anthropology. Still, recognising as relevant any actor or concept that my 
human informants designate as relevant to them, can be a daunting handful for most analytical purposes. 
85 
 
 
Image 10: A cocoa truck enters through the front gate of its destination warehouse in Tema after a two-day 
journey from Bonsu Nkwanta. April 2014. 
 
Linking Up, Letting Go 
*** 
The very different ways in which the – purportedly same – cocoa was described to me in 
the logistics office and by the truckers on the road provide an opportunity for an analysis of how the 
cocoa becomes meaningful and valuable through these different spatial associations. The rhythms and 
spatio-temporal ranges of movement that frame the work lives of the cocoa truckers shape the ways in 
which the cocoa comes to stand as meaningful and valuable to them. Cocoa on the road is first and 
foremost present as a perceived solid mass, massive weight, and with an emanating smell that only in 
certain ways becomes expressible in numerical forms, such as the waybill’s statement that we have 
carried a cargo of 600 bags totalling 38.4 tonnes. While the cocoa to the truck workers emerged as 
continuously meaningful from the trees of the rural farmlands to the port,38 the cocoa effectively left 
their views again once they saw portside depot boys carry the last of their transported cargo bags from 
                                                                 
38
 Where, as previously described, Ali and Prince each worked on their families’ farms while Muhammed spent 
his downtime days by the truck interacting with local cocoa depot workers, all while physically surrounded by 
cocoa plantations in each direction. 
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their arrived truck trailer into a coastal warehouse building. I propose that this range of meaning of the 
cocoa as it appears from the views of the truckers can be approached as an expression of such a ‘space 
for value creation’. Likewise, in the portside logistics office the cocoa emerged with a certain spatial 
range of meaning through its representation in a commodity chain, the outer bounds of which 
appeared as the farming communities on one side and the export of the cocoa inside shipping 
containers and bulk carriers on the other side. This commodity chain representation on its own would 
come to imbue the cocoa with a certain spatialized value to the views of the logistics officials working 
with it, abstracted, delimited, and channelled through the modularized segments of the system. 
The concept of commodity chains attempts in a way already to encompass and represent 
a superior overview of all horizons of engagements that are evoked by people in different commercial 
settings along the way from a point of origin to a point of consumption. But what the present case of 
the Ghanaian cocoa transport reveals is that the chain imagery’s formulation of linkages based around 
formalized moments of transaction, where the cocoa passes from one designated actor or business 
entity to another, fails to acknowledge the full dimensions of meaningfulness of the good to each 
person engaging themselves with it. To Ali, Prince, and Muhammed – along with many other Ghanaian 
transport workers, their own engagements and insights spanned across multiple links of the chain – 
such as farm work and transport (and even so while they did not acknowledge any chain imagery views 
as such in their own lives). Meanwhile the consequences of other formally instated commodity chain 
links, such as the price increases of cocoa bags caused by the transport from countryside to port, were 
in most practical cases circumvented or outright ignored. Also, what I found that the commodity chain 
imagery far too often fails to include are the expressions of value in the form of meaningful relations 
that emerge along the way as people engage themselves and each other with the commercial good. Such 
relations are often non-numerically expressed and emerge as spaces of possibility afforded by all the 
other entities perceived as present at any given point.   
Finally, what the commodity chain approach along with other purportedly universal 
systems of explanations fail to fully represent, is how this system by its own gives rise to a spatialized 
expression of meaning that shapes a certain value space, even as it through its own conceptualization of 
such space seeks to organise and represent the ways that others engage with the commercial goods in 
question. In particular, the commodity chain approach, once defined, treats its depiction of linked 
spaces as static and absolute rather than dynamic and relative. Likewise, the boundaries between 
commodity chain links are considered connections that facilitate the extraction of something from one 
spatial context and the insertion of the same into another. In such a system, boundaries which encroach 
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upon or overlap collaboratively defined or contested spaces, or boundaries which facilitate extractions 
through interactions with other entities not formally recognized as part of the chain, remain either 
unacknowledged or, if acknowledged, become recast as problems to be solved in order to protect  the 
integrity of the chain as already defined. In applied settings, such as government or business 
administrations, it might easily make sense to try and coerce unruly actors into complying with the 
boundaries already insisted upon through the system (e.g., as similarly argued through the term of 
‘virtualism’ (Carrier & Miller 1998)). In academic settings, I believe, however, theoretical systems must 
necessarily remain subservient to empiric observation. 
My point with this chapter’s criticism of theoretica lly structured concepts such as those 
of ‘logic framework analyses’ and ‘supply/value/commodity chains’ has not been to attempt to 
discredit such approaches as merely false or insufficient, but rather to highlight some implications of 
the inherently perspectival insights such models are capable of offering for academic analyses. The 
concept of the ‘commodity chain’, for instance, serves conveniently as an applied framework for 
expanding the limited experiential perspectives and horizons of individual actors handling a commodity 
into a more general perspective by way of dividing the emergence, movement, change, and 
consumption of cocoa into linked units. This specific “thingification” of processes of movement and 
exchange, however, is only one among several possible ones, and for the present purposes I have 
sought to discover alternative ways to elucidate how cocoa continuously emerges and re-emerges as a 
both particular and recognisable – yet also continuously differently valued – entity among different 
people engaging it in different ways. 
While the physical cocoa remained present to those involved in the trucking business, 
each person’s perception of taking part in a global commodity chain – let alone that person’s 
knowledge of the concept of a ‘commodity chain’ itself – was largely absent. Only in certain places and 
among certain people did the ‘–chain’ concept become evident, as it did in the logistics office of the 
PBC. In each setting the ways in which cocoa became described, treated, and associated with value took 
different forms, of which a unilinear ‘–chain’ imagery was but one. Among other people more directly 
handling this natural good various material characteristics of cocoa took prevalence over the notions of 
the cocoa as abstracted flows through links in a system. Utilizing the analytical concept of a ‘chain’ to 
explain these particular differences in bodily perception of, physical engagement with, and mental 
conceptualization of the cocoa in relation to the Ghanaian truckers appears only partially adequate to 
me – especially considering my other observation that ‘-chain’ imageries was already prevalently applied 
among certain other actors working with cocoa for a living. So, instead of arguing in favour of utilizing 
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a commodity chain analysis as a tool for obtaining insights into an objective relation between people 
and cocoa, I am attempting to go a step further by following Henare et al.’s (2007) call to approach 
each encounter between people and a material good as mutually constitutive. In this conceptualization 
there would be no room for presumptions of a universal cocoa ontology wreathed in innumerable 
networks of human epistemological meaning-making. Rather, and thus also in keeping with much STS 
scholarship, there would be no cocoa that is not also in a relation to something else. Whatever cocoa 
can be, it will always be so in relation to some other entity. In yet other words, every time a ‘chain’ view 
of cocoa is invoked by certain actors in certain settings, the combined meaning of cocoa and chain is 
also made anew. 
To sum up the present case, the thousands of tonnes of cocoa that people are year after 
year working to produce and move through Ghana – at some times and in some places – take on the 
appearance of a flow of numbers through a chain-like system. At other times and places the cocoa 
appears instead as a heavy odorous mass. On one level the cocoa described in the transport link 
presentation in the portside logistics office and the cocoa on the trailer of the truck can be seen as 
referencing the same material thing. However, the ways in which the cocoa emerges as a valuable 
commercial good in each one setting is almost remarkably inverse of the other; either as an abstract 
flow transported through a firmly bounded systemic structure - or as a firmly bounded material 
structure transported through a largely abstract flow – the latter abstract in the sense of the constant 
uncertainty and risk that faces every future moment of a truck team’s journey, as well as abstract due to 
the largely unknown future facing the cargo from the point of view of the truckers. In both cases I have 
argued that cocoa emerges as recognisable and valuable through dynamic interplays between differently 
balanced – yet mutually constitutive – expressions of structures and processes. 
If cocoa around contemporary southern Ghana appears to people by way of certain 
common associations of value, then the various perceived boundaries that frame the activities of the 
cocoa business there will each serve to expand, delimit, and channel what this cocoa can be. An 
exhaustive description of all such boundaries will of course not be realistic to pursue, given the highly 
idiosyncratic perceptions of individuals towards the cocoa that forms their livelihoods. Instead, pre-
conditional acceptance of the unavoidable partiality of any obtainable insights and the necessarily 
perspectival truth claims that all emerge through ethnographic fieldwork stands as exactly the reason 
for my ambition in this chapter to outline an approach to cocoa as ‘spatialized value’. By presuming 
only that cocoa holds some kind of relational meaning to any number of people who engage 
themselves with it, and that cocoa to the researcher from the onset represents just a fuzzily bounded 
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conceptual space, then sort of like the way a sculptor would chisel into a block of rock, so would an 
enquiry into the ranges and boundaries of significance of cocoa in this way at first present a crudely 
outlined shape, and then later on, desirably, also more intricate nuance.  
In the remaining chapters of this thesis I will therefore proceed to identify and explore 
some of the tendencies towards boundary expressions that significantly enable, delimit, and ultimately 
shape the spaces through which cocoa emerges as a valuable natural good across my main fieldwork 
area in the rural cocoa frontier zone of the southwestern Ghanaian borderlands toward Côte d’Ivoire. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
BOUNDARY WORK IN A LANDSCAPE OF COCOA 
*** 
In the first chapter of this thesis I explored how the borderland village of Topman has 
somehow become stuck in a position of a marginal community relative to various national authorities, 
within an area that elsewhere has been described as Ghana’s “final cocoa frontier” (Knudsen & Fold 
2011). The continuing perception of this geographical area by both national and regional authorities as 
a somewhat unruly frontier zone serves the Topman community as both a delimiting and enabling 
factor for purposes of creating profits from their cocoa cultivation. This means, for instance, that the 
lack of public services to the village are at least partially counterbalanced by largely absent government 
law enforcement that elsewhere more actively prevents border region residents from engaging 
themselves in lucrative cocoa smuggling. As I have ended the initial analysis of cocoa’s significance for 
Topman community, my argument has been that cocoa there serves as a complex figure that is 
concurrently connected to people’s reproduction of physical and conceptual boundaries, at the same 
time as cocoa is centrally connected to people’s acts of transgressions across those same boundaries. 
Additionally, the ongoing disputed legal status of Topman and the surrounding lands and communities 
have pointed to another dimension where such notional boundaries and spaces overlap each other, and 
where cocoa can simultaneously emerge as a legal and illegal natural good. 
Proceeding now from the second chapter’s establishment of the analytical approach I 
have called ‘spatialized value’, the commonly recognised frontier designation represents to me one out 
of numerous conceptual boundary making distinctions which altogether contribute to the outline of a 
particular spatial range of potential meaning and value attributions that cocoa may attain among the 
populations of people living around Topman and many other places in the surrounding region. In 
effect, multiple boundaries together enable cocoa production across this area to emerge with a 
combined appearance of potential meaning and value, which I characterize as ‘spatialized value’. These 
boundaries are furthermore being expressed each with various qualities of solidity, permeability, or of 
being overlaid atop others. The topic of the chapter at hand will now be to engage more closely with 
these different aspects of boundaries, which physically and conceptually serve to shape the spaces for 
value creation affordable to cocoa among people in this part of Ghana. What I will argue is that the 
contemporary experience of multiple boundaries around Topman as well as the larger Ghanaian-
Ivoirian borderlands are the outcomes of multiple diverse cultural and historical legacies that in 
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different ways influence the present constitution of this place. Over the course of this chapter I will 
seek to identify a number of such conditions and discuss the significance of these for the ways in which 
cocoa attains value today. In order to facilitate this exploration I will first shift the attention of my 
ethnographic enquiry to the description of a brief encounter that happened at a Ghanaian roadside 
immigrations checkpoint, situated about 15 km to the north of Topman village. 
 
The Issue of the Usual Suspects of Dichotomous Categorizations 
*** 
 
“Is it true that white people pay different prices for cocoa as a conspiracy to keep black men fighting against each other?”  
– Ghanaian officer stationed near the Ghana – Côte d’Ivoire border 2014 
The question posed to me by the immigration officer had caught me quite by surprise, 
and my impulsive attempt to make some sort of nuanced reply undoubtedly fell short of alleviating his 
suspicions and convincing him that what he asked about, to the best of my knowledge, was likely more 
complicated than what could be summarized as a conspiracy based around notions of skin colour. This 
exchange of words took place one day while I was travelling with a trotro along the Ghanaian side of 
the border. Moments before our minibus had been stopped at an immigrations checkpoint, apparently 
so that I – the only white person on the bus – could exit to have my travel papers scrutinised by the 
authorities present. The officers meanwhile showed no interest in checking the papers of the remaining 
15 or so passengers who all appeared to be locals. These were instead all left to sit with quiet 
impatience inside the crammed sun-baked bus, while they watched a routine passport check outside 
somehow digress into a full discussion between the Kwasi Oburoni 39 and the Ghanaian officer in 
charge. Mercifully for them, the officer and his colleagues soon after grew tired of my rambling 
exposition and handed me back my passport with a motioning gesture for all of us to continue on our 
way. 
                                                                 
39 Twi/Sefwi expression for ‘white person’ and in Southern Ghana a label any person with light to fair coloured 
skin is likely to hear applied to them. Kwasi means ”Sunday-born” – I have been told that it is an old humorous 
Ghanaian presumption that all white people are born on Sundays, a weekday associated with luck. Oburoni in turn 
can be translated as: ”Those that came over the horizon” and is commonly used in the Akan areas of  Ghana as a 
collective term for foreigners. 
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The inquisitive words of the officer, however, still resonated through my mind as our 
trotro once again bumped along the Ghanaian country roads, and so I jotted his question into my 
notebook. The implied categories seemed very sensible, coming from what I took to be the point of 
view of a person whose job it was to enforce the national sovereignty at the borders of the country. 
“White people” purchase cocoa. Cocoa is the primary export crop of both Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, 
and on either side of the tropical boundary line between the two countries “black men” – farmers of 
often the same ethnic origins and similar tribal affiliations, frequently even direct family relations – are 
utilising most of their available farmlands to cultivate it.  However, farm gate purchasing prices of cocoa 
are most of the time significantly different between the two countries40, and with Ghanaian prices 
tending to be the lowest41 the country’s government has for long prohibited exports of the crop to Côte 
d’Ivoire. This puts the Ghanaian immigrations and customs officials in a situation where they are 
obligated to prevent their fellow countrymen from seeking to gain monetary profits by moving cocoa 
across the border – cocoa that for all practical matters appears indistinguishable from that already 
grown on the other side. Frustrated farmers will continuously express antagonism towards dutiful 
border officials, whereas officials sympathising with would-be cocoa smugglers will on the contrary risk 
the ire of their superior officers as well as the larger Ghanaian public if their complicity were to be 
exposed.42 It seemed plausible to me that an impression of “black men fighting against each other” 
could become prevalent among border personnel in this place, leading to the obvious next question of 
how come cocoa beans, these otherwise innocuous looking generic products of nature, could possibly 
have become such a pivoting point for tension. In this perspective, I surmised, a look towards “white 
people” – the label commonly applied as a collective category for all foreign purchasers of West 
African cocoa – as the suspected culprits behind the problem did not appear all that farfetched.   
The same type of general comment of “white people” as the ultimate customers and 
therefore presumed instigators behind all the activities related to cocoa production in this part of the 
world had also been hinted to me during another happenstance exchange of words that took place on 
another day. During a random roadside stop for urgent repairs on one of my ride-along journeys with a 
cocoa truck headed for the Ghanaian coast, I had walked over to chat a bit with a cocoa farmer living 
                                                                 
40 For further details on the reasons for these price discrepancies, please see Chapter 1 of  this thesis. 
41 According to comparisons between the cocoa purchasing prices of  Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana measured 
annually from 1994 to 2011 (World Bank 2011: 42). 
42 As the repercussions from the aforementioned 2010 exposures by the Ghanaian undercover journalist Anas 
Aremeyaw Anas had already demonstrated. See for instance The Daily Graphic 2014. 
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at the nearest farmhouse while the trucking team worked on fixing the problem. The farmer had been 
puzzled to see me exit the cocoa truck right outside his farm gate and had immediately asked me, while 
pointing to the trailer of the truck: “White man – is this your cocoa?” Again, an idea of a sort of skin 
colour or racially based divide between present black cocoa producers and absent white cocoa 
consumers seemed implied by these words; an idea which I subsequently learned was to be even further 
exacerbated by the members of the trucking team I travelled with. As these truckers later told me, they 
had for fun told many other people the very same thing during other stops along our way; that I, the 
white guy, had purchased all the many tonnes of cocoa on their truck, and that I was now personally 
bringing it back to my home place. Of course, these truckers knew fully well that I had in fact done no 
such thing, but they still found it amusing to teasingly tell others that this was the case, and besides, as 
they said, it was close enough to the truth anyway, since the cocoa was going to end up with my fellow 
white people after all. It goes to say that a white people // black people categorical divide was 
something that I had commonly encountered throughout years of travel around Ghana as well as at the 
border posts. I have found this tendency further confirmed in the works of other ethnographic 
researchers in Ghana, among these anthropologist Brenda Chalfin. Based on her fieldwork in 2001 
Chalfin relates how customs officials at Kotoka International Airport in Accra expressed much higher 
levels of suspicion towards arriving non-white travellers, and consequently inspected the luggage of this 
type of travellers more often. This, according to Chalfin, meant that: “It was no secret that the Red and 
Green channels were used to enforce a divide between Ghanaian and non-Ghanaian travellers and, 
more generally, between Africans and non-Africans, a distinction described by Customs officers as one 
between ‘black’ and ‘white’.” (Chalfin 2008: 526). The Customs officers of Chalfin’s study had 
explained as one of their reasons for this differentiation that: “The integrity of the Ghanaian should not 
be relied on. Out of 10 blacks only three will tell the truth about themselves and vice versa for the 
white traders that we already know, we only narrow them down and the principle of selectivity comes 
in here.” (ibid). Evidently, Chalfin’s airport informants as well as their public servant colleagues in both 
the Customs and Immigration Services that I interacted with along the inland border to the west shared 
a mutual perception of Ghanaian travellers as particularly likely to attempt to smuggle goods past the 
authorities.  
Smuggling activities had already for a long period of time been recorded as taking place 
throughout Ghana. Historian E. O. Saffu wrote how one consequence of the official boundary creation 
between Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana in the late nineteenth century and the establishments of different 
systems of authority and taxation etc. between the two colonies – and later countries – had soon led to 
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widespread practices of smuggling that have continued ever since (Saffu 1970: 300)43. Still within living 
memory among people in Ghana, the Acheampong military regime that had seized power in Ghana in 
1972 saw cocoa smuggling across the borders to Côte d’Ivoire and Togo as one of the major causes of 
the country’s financial woes and in response scaled up the military border patrols and retaliated against 
those who engaged themselves in smuggling (Mikell 1992: 198). Nevertheless, researchers still later 
recount how in the 1980s smugglers in Ghana could earn as much as eight times the official rate by 
bringing cocoa into Côte d’Ivoire instead (Deardorff & Stolper 1990: 138; see also Boni 2005: 32-33), 
an ongoing issue which according to COCOBOD estimates mean that the amount of cocoa smuggled 
out of Ghana constitutes between 5-10% of the total officially registered annual output of the nation, a 
smuggled amount which is further speculated to have been even higher in the border regions during the 
late 1970s and early 1980s (IMF 1998: 8). At other periods in time, the smuggled cocoa flows had 
temporarily reversed when the fixed purchasing prices on the Ghanaian side had remained higher amid 
deflated world market prices, which Ivoirian cocoa producers were more directly subjected to. In such 
cases, as for instance reported over the 2010-11 season, an estimated 100.000 metric tonnes of cocoa 
were supposedly smuggled the other way from Côte d’Ivoire to Ghana (World Bank 2011: 28).  
Still, the question that the concerned Ghanaian Immigration Officer had asked me went 
one step further than the common public framing of the smuggling issue as something that concerned 
individual Ghanaian or Ivoirian citizens acting in opposition to the laws of each nation and society as a 
whole. I have generally found that categorical assumptions of ‘black people’ as producers of cocoa and 
‘white people’ as consumers remains a common understanding shared among people in many parts of 
Ghana. However, the fact that this question was posed to me on that day had likely been provoked in 
part by my sudden and unannounced appearance there at the checkpoint as an obvious foreigner (if not 
already obvious from my physical appearance alone then definitely confirmed by my foreign issued 
passport that the officer inspected). Perhaps my travels there at the remote rural checkpoint had made 
me appear as a sort of odd representative from that opposite side of the cocoa business, of purchasers 
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 It could be further added, however, that smuggling as a concept had already since at least the 19th Century 
been recognised and addressed by both the Asante Kingdom and the British Gold Coast Colony. The Asante 
had long sought to prevent people from bypassing the taxes levied on travelling merchants along the Asante 
great-roads, whereas, for instance, issues of  weapons smuggled into the Asante region through the Keta lagoon 
to the East or the French controlled coastal towns around Assini to the West had posed a concern to the Gold 
Coast Colony military officials (Wilks 1993: 172; 1973: 48, 55, 617). Thus, smuggling has remained a pre-colonial, 
a colonial, as well as a post-colonial problem to the different powers in charge. 
95 
 
and consumers, that people in these borderlands would however not normally meet face to face.44 More 
generally, perhaps, as Africanist scholar Paul Nugent comments in regard to Ghanaian officials’ 
habitual practices of boundary enforcements along the Ghana-Togo border, “the greater the distance 
people have come from, the more weight is attached to their presence” (Nugent 2011: 367). Regardless 
of motivating factors, as willing as I had been to try to discuss the officer’s succinct question with him, 
the matter seemed to me nowhere near as clear-cut as the black//white categorical clarity by which he 
had phrased his inquiry. 
 
Muddled Colonial Cocoa Legacies 
*** 
The contemporary conditions of cocoa production in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire are in 
many ways profoundly shaped by the colonial pasts of either nation. The cocoa tree itself is originally 
native to the Amazon but was in colonial times spread by European explorers and colonialists across 
the equatorial tropics of the world (Clarence-Smith & Ruf 1996). Thus, the world’s largest producers of 
cocoa today include countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, Brazil, Peru, and 
Indonesia - notably all nations formerly subjugated European colonial rule. A familiar argument voiced 
in connection with post-colonial studies is how the former colonial structures of economic exploitation 
still seem to persist to this day, where raw natural goods continuously become extracted cheaply from 
the former colonies and are brought to the former colonizing nations, where the materials are 
subsequently processed into more refined – and vastly more valuable – products of consumption. 
Cocoa does indeed seem to follow this pattern, whereby the harvested and fermented beans are in most 
cases exported whole and only turned into chocolate products after their arrival at European and North 
American roasteries, grinderies and chocolate factories (Fold 2002, 2001). 
As a foreign visitor taking a stroll today through some of the various supermarkets in the 
Ghanaian capital of Accra or the inland metropolis of Kumasi, it is evident to me how the 
confectionary shelves are stocked with colourfully wrapped chocolate products carrying familiar logos 
of big international corporate brands such as Mars, Cadbury, Nestlé, and Hershey’s. As the fine prints 
on the backs of such product wrappers most often reveal, these chocolates have been manufactured in 
facilities situated in countries abroad and imported into Ghana. A glance at the price labels on the 
                                                                 
44 To note, during my 2014-15 fieldworks in this region, I frequently went around for three weeks or more 
without seeing any other ’white people’ – and when I did occasionally meet such visibly non-local people it 
happened only in the larger towns and not once in the rural borderlands. 
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shelves further add the detail to the story that these chocolates are now offered at prices either 
matching or exceeding the levels the same products can be found at in European or North American 
retail stores. Moving from the big cities of Ghana (or Côte d’Ivoire for that matter) and into the rural 
areas, only few types of chocolate products remain available for purchase at stores or among market 
traders. Among such in Ghana in 2014 and 2015 I found a single Nestlé brand by the name of ‘Milo’, a 
powdered chocolate drink manufactured in Accra (but, around that time at least, according to its labels, 
canned in Thailand) and heavily promoted via commercials throughout Ghana. I also found various 
chocolate bars of the ‘Golden Tree’ brand, a former Ghanaian government-owned chocolate 
manufacturing company in Tema that has in recent decades been partially privatized. Although the two 
mentioned products were both priced lower than imported chocolates, they still tend to be perceived as 
costly luxury goods among the people I spoke with in the rural cocoa growing regions.  
Despite such international connections, I find that a noticeable characteristic of the 
contemporary cocoa cultivation in Ghana is that local perceptions of this agricultural sector appear 
largely disconnected from peoples’ memories or awareness of their nation’s colonial past. Ghanaian 
independence may have been achieved in 1957, but with a national average lifespan currently just short 
of 66 years (CIA 2013), only the oldest percentages of the current population still hold personal 
memories of the late colonial times as well as the first decade or so of their country’s fledgling 
sovereignty. Adding to this, most Ghanaians I discussed this topic with, young as old, tended to 
emphasize the purportedly indigenous origin of the nation’s cocoa farming enterprise. It was to many 
of these people a familiar tale how a native man named Tetteh Quarshie a long time ago had brought 
the first cocoa seeds back with him from a journey to the island of Fernando Po in the Bight of 
Guinea45. He then went on to plant these seeds on his plot of land on the Akwapim Ridge some twenty 
kilometres north of the coastal capital of Accra46. Over the following century or so generations of 
Ghanaian cocoa pioneers followed suit and spread the cultivation of the crop across the rest of the 
nation’s tropical forest belt, spurred on by increasing demand for confectionary products outside the 
country.  
                                                                 
45 Cocoa seeds had previously been brought to this island in 1855 from São Tome, a place to which it had 
beforehand been brought in 1822 from Bahia in Brazil (Wood & Lass 1989 [1955]: 4). Tetteh Quarshie was 
credited with bringing the cocoa seeds with him to the West African mainland in 1879. 
46 Today there is a small cocoa plantation museum located on what was allegedly once part of  Tetteh Quarshie’s 
original farm plot. 
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Over the past few decades academic research into the driving factors of migration among 
cocoa farmers has been dominated by the ‘forest rent’ approach (Ruf 1995; Clarence-Smith 1995, 2000; 
Clarence-Smith & Ruf 1996; Woods 2004). These “basic ‘laws’ of cocoa supply”, as Ruf (1995) phrased 
it, hypothesizes that the prospect of high profit from the cultivation of young cocoa trees on virgin soil 
has been the primary motivating factor behind the steady movement of cocoa pioneer fronts over the 
twentieth century. As soil fertility of a cocoa cultivation area is gradually depleted, cocoa farmers are 
increasingly enticed to leave their current lands in favour of new land elsewhere, resulting in cycles of 
‘boom and bust’ periods as cocoa frontiers gradually shift across regions. Migrant labour47 is 
continuously attracted to the new frontiers due to their higher profitability, whereas the old frontiers 
instead fall into recession and become characterised by family labour on lower yielding long-established 
farms. The ‘forest rent’ approach has subsequently been criticized for placing too strong an emphasis 
on individual and household centred rational-economic estimations of profitability to the detriment of 
other significant factors including labour, state, and quality concerns (Leiter & Harding 2004), and for 
operating with too simplified presumptions of the forms of livelihood ambitions that motivate cocoa 
migrants (Knudsen & Agergaard 2015). Furthermore, in Ghana the contemporary lack of additional 
undeveloped forest lands suitable for cocoa, raises doubt as to the future applicability of the ‘forest 
rent’ approach in this nation, where rehabilitation and intensification of existing areas of cocoa 
cultivation now constitute the recognised primary pathway to additional output growth48.  
From the historical onset of cocoa cultivation in mainland West Africa indigenous 
farmers had been at the very forefront of the innovation and propagation of the crop, and especially in 
the final decades of the 19th century, these farmers were even ahead of the colonial system in 
recognising the crop’s potential. The Aburi Botanical Gardens at the Akwapim Ridge of inland Accra 
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 In Ghana seasonal migrant labour for the cocoa sector has long come from the northern parts of  the country, 
especially the areas north of  the Volta Rivers (Beals & Menezes 1970). My own limited interview notes of  2014-
15 showed a stronger presence of  migrants from Upper West and Upper East than from Northern Region per 
se. As a further note, prior to the foreign labourer expulsions from Ghana caused by the ’Aliens Compliance Act’ 
of  1969, many seasonal migrant workers in the Ghanaian cocoa business had even come from other countries of  
the region (Amanor 2006).  
48
 Rehabilitation and intensification are currently the two main focus points for future cocoa sector growth, 
according to the COCOBOD representatives I have spoken with in 2014-15. At CRIG (Cocoa Research Institute 
of  Ghana) I was furthermore informed that research is currently being done into the development of  more 
drought resistant varieties of  cocoa, which in time hopefully will enable Ghanaian cocoa cultivation to expand 
further north into the transitional forest zone of  Brong Ahafo, thus potentially opening up yet another pioneer 
front. 
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were established by the British administration of the Gold Coast colony in 1888 to introduce new crops 
into the colony through local growing and distribution of seeds. The colonial botanists at Aburi had 
been experimenting with cocoa cultivation as early as 1890, but had failed due to initially planting the 
seeds on an exposed hillside with no shade cover (Green & Hymer 1966: 306). Meanwhile, less than 
10km away along the same Akwapim Ridge a number of indigenous farmers were already successfully 
growing cocoa, following the example started by Tetteh Quarshie about one decade prior49. 
Furthermore, the Basel missionaries in same region had experimented with cocoa cul tivation as well 
already since 1859, but without persistent success, and the Basel Mission’s claim to the title of earliest 
successful cocoa cultivators in the area therefore remains debatable (see Dickson 1969: 165). Similarly 
to the initial failures of the European experts at the Basel Mission and at the Aburi Botanical Gardens 
to fully realise the suitability and potential of cocoa in the region, the later colonial attempts at 
organizing and optimizing the cocoa cultivation through European-style large plantations failed as well 
to generate profits competitive with those already made by the family-run indigenous farms (Austin 
1996). 
From the turn of the 20th century the steadily increasing importance of agricultural 
exports such as cocoa from the Gold Coast and other colonies in West Africa and elsewhere meant that 
the colonial governments became increasingly invested in the continued expansion and wellbeing of the 
business. CRIG (Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana) was established in 1937 by the British colonial 
administration near the village of Akim [New] Tafo in Eastern Region, some 75km inland of Accra (see 
Hodge 2009: 207). The place was initially chosen since a local farmer had contacted the colonial 
authorities with an issue of some hitherto unknown plant disease troubling his farm in this place, and 
the study of this disease50 close to the environment where it was first observed was the practical reason 
behind this location choice. This research institution put in place early on by the British colonial 
government was then in 1947 made part of the CMB (Cocoa Marketing Board)51, the newly formed 
government institution charged with overseeing the production and exports of cocoa. The CMB was 
                                                                 
49
 In fact at least some of  this cocoa was already being exported by the time that the Aburi botanists started 
experimenting, since cocoa had first appeared on the Gold Coast colony export list in 1885 (Dickson 1969: 165). 
50 Later classified as ’black pod’, a form of  contagious fungal mould that necrotizes the infected plant tissue. 
51
 As a note, the CMB was between 1940-46 preceded by The West African Produce Control Board, an 
institution set in place by the colonial government, in response to protests and boycotts in 1937 across the Gold 
Coast Colony by cocoa farmers rallying against what they perceived as unreasonably low purchasing prices of  
cocoa. 
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later on in 1979 restructured and renamed COCOBOD (Cocoa Board of Ghana), the name currently in 
use. Since the achievement of national independence in 1957 this government agency has been fully 
controlled by the Ghanaian state and still holds monopolistic power over all of the country’s cocoa 
exports52. Furthermore, all foreign cocoa buying companies were expulsed from Ghana in 1959 when 
the two year old independent nation at the time nationalised the cocoa business sector (Mikell 1992: 
176), a purge which consolidated the control already exercised by the CMB – the later COCOBOD – 
over the sector as a whole. 
These factors mean that for the average Ghanaian farmer today, cocoa production 
remains an entirely indigenous affair. The farmer obtains his or her farmland through negotiations with 
other farmers as well as the traditional area chiefs, is offered assistance by Ghanaian seasonal migrant 
farm labourers, and sells the crops of the farm only to Ghanaian purchasers licenced by the Ghanaian 
national cocoa authorities, which also decide the official seasonal purchasing prices. The Ghanaian 
authorities then take it upon themselves to sell the farmers’ cocoa on the world market. Thus – to 
practically all Ghanaian cocoa farmers I have interviewed, not only do they consider their craft an 
indigenous invention, but their experiences of success or failure rest most of all on interactions with 
other Ghanaians, while their perceptions of chocolate consumers elsewhere in the world remain elusive 
at best. Dissatisfaction with low official cocoa prices is for this reason among farmers aimed almost 
solely at their own authorities, who in public media and opinions are persistently being accused of 
unfair redistributions of public funds, if not outright corruption. 
Likewise, several Ghanaian agricultural experts I spoke with in 2014 and 2015 at the 
CRIG institute at Akim Tafo, as well as the governmental Seedling Station at Sefwi Akurofu (part of 
the SPD – Seed Production Division), along with the governmental CHED (Cocoa Health and 
Extension Division) department of Juaboso expressed various forms of frustrations and concerns 
regarding the wellbeing of the Ghanaian cocoa sector, frustrations that these professionals directed at 
the country’s farmers rather than towards international entities. The concerns of the experts were 
typically revolving around the ostensibly “stubborn” and “backwards” practices of many of the nation’s 
cocoa farmers, practices that to these experts’ views were detrimental to the continued development 
and optimisation goals of the Ghanaian cocoa sector.  
                                                                 
52 As a further testament to the perennial importance of  cocoa for the economy of  the Ghanaian state, 
COCOBOD is today a government institution working under the auspices of  the Ministry of  Finance rather 
than the Ministry of  Agriculture, as might otherwise have been presumed given the nature of  their work. 
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One such problem according to these experts concerns the plantings of cocoa seedlings. 
All government approved cocoa seedlings promoted for planting around Southern Ghana today are 
genetically identical clones sprouted from hybrid seeds that have been developed by CRIG53. Such 
seeds have been optimized for high yields and shorter initial fruiting maturity times (about 2-3 years of 
initial tree growth compared to the 5-7 years of some of the originally planted cocoa types (Boahene et 
al 1999)) and are mass-produced through artificial pollination and focused cultivation at presently 23 
government-run seedling nurseries around the regions, and subsequently offered for free to farmers 
(Gockowski 2011: iv). In the Sefwi area one such long-serving seedling station is situated at Sefwi 
Akurofu, and in the Autumn of 2014 CHED representatives from Juaboso were additionally organising 
the establishment of new seedling nurseries at a couple of locations further west near the village of 
Nkwanta at the Krokosua Hills and at the nearby village of Proso. Another way of disbursing the 
government approved high yielding cocoa seedlings has long been to hand out fresh cocoa pods to 
privately run independent plant nurseries that will later sell the young seedlings to farmers for small 
profits. Still, many farmers I talked with in 2014-15 simply preferred to replace their old cocoa trees 
with seedlings sprouting naturally on their own farm plots, as these people found the promises of 
higher yields from the government seedlings not worth the trouble of travelling sometimes quite long 
distances to obtain them.  
Staff members of CHED in Juaboso also explained to me how it remains difficult for 
them to convince farmers to plant new government promoted hybrid cocoa trees on their farms. Older 
farmers in general often do not see how they might live long enough to benefit from planting new 
trees, and sometimes their traditions, habits, and feelings of seniority experience-wise make them 
sceptical towards listening to the advice of younger AEOs (Agricultural Extension Officers). Likewise, 
sheer laziness and lack of knowledge and ambition was explained to me by CHED staff members as 
other typical reasons why some cocoa farmers continually choose to keep old low-productive trees in 
place or to just replant their old or dying trees with whatever randomly sprouted seedlings they find 
available on their own farms rather than investing further ahead in government promoted high yielding 
hybrid sorts.  
Bearing these comments in mind I was later surprised to read how much the statements I 
had gathered from contemporary Ghanaian agricultural experts mirrored statements made by British 
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 The hybrid cocoa propagation effort originally started as part of  the Cocoa Rehabilitation Project launched in 
1971 as a collaboration between the Ghanaian government and the World Bank (Amanor 1999: 35). See also 
Gockowski (2011). 
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colonial experts almost a century earlier. In 1916-17 the Gold Coast Agriculture Department had 
severely criticised the practices of the colony’s indigenous cocoa farmers, which the colonial experts at 
that time found inefficient and lazy:  
“[T]he producers of cocoa in this colony and Ashanti are natives in a most elementary state of civilization 
whose sole aim, as yet, appears to be the attainment of a maximum amount of money with a minimum 
expenditure of energy, however uneconomical the system, and whose lack of foresight f or the future welfare of the 
industry – and consequently of themselves – has not yet been compensated by adequate legislative measures…”  
 (Sessional Paper II of 1916-17, quoted in Green & Hymer 1966: 312). 
Views by governmental representatives such as those voiced here were likely part of the presumptions 
that anthropologist Polly Hill responded against in her influential monograph from 1963, wherein she 
argued that the craftiness of the Ghanaian Akwapim Ridge farmers towards reinvesting their monetary 
returns from cocoa farming into the acquisition and cultivation of more cocoa farming lands elsewhere 
would make it far more suitable to characterize these people as rural capitalists than as primitive 
peasants. Hill’s detailed research opposed simplistic labels of Ghanaian cocoa farmers as lazy and 
primitive natives who were labelled in opposition to civilized industrious colonizers. Likewise, the 
continued oppositional views of Ghanaian farmers and agricultural experts half a century later have left 
me hesitant towards characterising these conflicts as first and foremost a matter of colonial 
perspectives versus indigenous ones. Rather, based on my research, the issue seems more like a matter 
of formally educated agricultural experts versus farmers with habits formed by practical experience. 
Even though Ghanaian cocoa can likely neither historically nor currently be classified 
entirely as a crop borne as a result of European colonial engagements in West Africa, in the wake of 
colonialism several factors from those times still influence and delimit the activities of people in the 
area today. The rather muddled perspectives emerging out of my materials have not only made it 
difficult for me to reply with definitively clear answers to the puzzled Immigration Officer’s “black vs. 
white” question, but it has furthermore kept me hesitant about the suitability of applying any explicitly 
‘post-colonial’ academic perspective on the case of the contemporary Ghanaian cocoa business. 
In other words, I find the whole question of ‘natives’ versus ‘outsiders’ and the ‘colonial’ 
versus the ‘post-colonial’, etc. to represent approaches to the topic of experiences of differences that all 
too quickly risk becoming bogged down in unproductive dichotomous essentialized categories based 
around all too stiff á priori terms applied from afar. Even more radical ideas, such as that of a decidedly 
‘de-colonial’ analytical perspective (see for instance Mignolo 2009), I find suffers from this risk, as yet 
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another label emerging from attempts at escaping the throes of prior ones. Research by Yarrow (2008) 
further shows how the term of ‘indigenous knowledge’ has in Ghana quickly become appropriated by 
local development workers, traditional chiefs, and media alike, and as such this term is now employed 
in ways that confuse the distinctions between ‘indigenous’ and ‘western’ perspectives originally 
intended by foreign development actors and academic analysts. As it is, shaping the present analytical 
inquiries through these perspectives would thus likely lead to me towards the creation of yet another 
particularly framed ‘representational space’ (Lefebvre 1991 [1974]: 41) that legitimizes itself more 
through academic analytical abstraction than empirical references. 
At this point, following my discussions of value theory in Chapter 2, it should not be very 
difficult to glean my present stance on issues of the post-colonial term. Instead of attempting to obtain 
an understanding of the conditions surrounding the contemporary cocoa production in my fieldwork 
area through the application of an academic analysis focused explicitly on ‘post-colonial’ issues, on 
native agency despite attempted subjugation by outside forces, I have instead chosen to approach such 
concepts as yet other expressions of ‘meaningful difference’, of conceptual boundaries that only at 
specific times and places emerge into significance and thereby form spatialized values. Like other classic 
essentializing dualistic presumptions as us//them, developed//developing, Western World//Africa, 
North//South, Occident//Orient, etc., the question posed to me by the Ghanaian border official 
evoked at that time and place a dichotomous categorical distinction between so-called ‘black’ and 
‘white’ people that re-cast the significance of cocoa as a differently valued entity. Meanwhile, among 
other Ghanaians, cocoa cultivation remained much less a matter of white people versus black, than one 
of indigenous smugglers versus government officials, farmers versus agricultural experts, or even the 
general public against corrupt elites. Of course, many other forms of perceived conceptual boundaries 
concurrently shape the different forms of significance associated with cocoa around the southwestern 
borderlands of Ghana and not all of them as clearly binary as the examples above.  
I will henceforth proceed with the focus on the multiple boundaries – material as 
conceptual – that together contribute to make cocoa emerge as a particular form of natural good 
throughout my fieldwork area. In some cases boundary forms can be traced back to colonial era 
influences, while in other cases indigenous boundary concepts are evident instead. While I will attempt 
to trace the background of each, my ambition is to reach an understanding of the rather complexly 
constituted and value-charged spaces that emerge out of the combined recognitions of multiple such 
boundaries among the contemporary people inhabiting this area. Cultivation of cocoa within this area 
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as a whole has come to take place under a particular combination of enabling and delimiting factors 
that all influence what the cocoa may come to mean and represent to the people here.  
For my purpose of approaching cocoa as a particular expression combining notions of 
space and value, it follows that its spatial value – its potential “cocoaness” – is bounded by the ways in 
which its existence here brushes up against, is limited by, and overflows the enacted boundaries of 
other entities recognized as present. Again, proceeding from de Saussure’s conceptualization of value as 
meaningful difference, as something that emerges out of comparison with any and all of that which it is  
not, I pursue an analysis of the cocoa here as an emergent entity that attains value to people through 
the many ways in which it travels, all the while it remains a dynamic co-constituting part of the spaces 
around it. 
 
The Emergence of a Territorial Boundary Line 
*** 
At the rural border road immigrations checkpoint – as has also been the case in Topman 
village and the town of Akaatiso – the Ghanaian-Ivoirian boundary line appears as solidified into a 
form that is explicitly recognised yet does not make that much sense to the people living there, an 
experience commonly shared among people living in borderlands in many parts of the world (see for 
instance Donnan & Wilson 2010; Sandberg 2009; Griffiths 1986; Plessz 1968). To some locals in this 
part of Ghana the national demarcation line can most days be largely ignored, unless they carry 
contraband goods – most frequently cocoa – which in those cases demand extra discretion. For the 
border officials, on the other hand, enforcement of the line is an explicit part of their assigned duties 
and therefore not something that can be easily ignored or forgotten, even when its purpose does not 
make complete sense to them. With the boundary line as an imposing fact, it does not seem far-fetched 
to me that a border official would express puzzlement as to why this demarcation of difference has 
come to be exactly so. The question piqued my curiosity too, but during my fieldworks in this border 
region I met no locally residing persons who could enlighten me much on the historical reasons for the 
placement of the border line exactly here. Not that I had in fact expected anyone to do so, since here as 
elsewhere knowledge of the reasons for the establishment of a given barrier is in no way a necessary 
precondition for someone to become affected by it. Still, whatever the reasons for the geographical 
placement of the Ghanaian-Ivoirian boundary line, the matter had apparently been decided before the 
living memory of even the eldest of my informants.  
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Regarding the location of the boundary line most often the people I spoke with have 
replied simply that it must have been “made by white people in the olden days”, relegating the precise 
reasons and timeframe for the contemporary condition to some sort of undifferentiated historical past , 
and again by reference to some uniform grouping of “white people”. Such verbal acts of brushing off 
historical matters are fairly common among Ghanaians (Berry 2001: 50), and it is only during later 
deskwork studies that I have learned more in depth about the historical reasons for the positioning of 
the contemporary border. The circumstances that once led to the establishment of this boundary line, I 
find, are relevant for an understanding of the wider dynamics between structures and possibilities that 
all together shape the valuations of spaces and living conditions of people in this region today, along 
with their primary source of income in the form of cocoa cultivation.  
The historical origins of the contemporary international boundary line between Ghana 
and Côte d’Ivoire is not to be found here inland among the tropical forests and cocoa farms but rather 
at a very particular spot along the coastline directly to the south. In 1872 the British had officially taken 
over all interests of the Dutch Appolonia colony and incorporated that territory into their own Gold 
Coast colony (Saffu 1970). This westward expansion brought the areas now controlled by the British 
into direct contact with the French colonial territories at the small coastal village of Newtown, which 
had been described in the British – Dutch deal as the westernmost point of the Dutch sphere of 
interest on the Coast of Guinea. The little Newtown fisherman’s village soon after became the focal 
point for the negotiations of the first specific border agreements made between the two remaining 
European colonial rivals in the area. According to historian E. O. Saffu the outcome of these 
negotiations resulted in the following: “The British boundary started from the coast at Newtown, at a 
distance of five-eighths of a mile to the west of the house occupied by the British Commissioners in 
1884” (ibid: 293). Evidently, the first demarcation of this later national boundary line started out from a 
quite remarkable combination of geographical specificity and seeming arbitrariness on a background of 
diplomatic negotiations between two European colonial powers. The placement of the boundary at 
exactly five-eighths of a mile west of one particular coastal village house seemed to have been based 
most of all on a British desire at the time not to risk splitting the growing Newtown settlement itself 
between the two powers (ibid: 292). 
This initial boundary demarcation was gradually expanded inland over the next decades 
through further agreements made between the British and the French based on various trade 
expeditions and treaties entered with indigenous rulers. From the initial point west of Newtown the 
border was extended straight north across the Tano lagoon and then followed the Tano River upstream 
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until five miles past the river town of Nugua, from where it went northwest until it reached the Boi 
River. The thalweg of this river then constituted the border line northwards until the latitude of Yau at 
5° 44’N. Then the boundary continued north along the Lonsdale Road (a suggested trade route 
surveyed by the British Captain Lonsdale in 1881-82 as part of an attempt to strengthen ties between 
the Gold Coast colony and the indigenous inland state of Gyaman, in the region that is now divided 
between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire (See Dumett 1971: 92, Dickson 1969: 215 -17)) up to Bontuku at 
8°N, and finally from thereon along the thalweg of the Black Volta river up to 9°N (Saffu 1970: 297). 
This definition of the Gold Coast – Côte d’Ivoire border was finally decided upon by the British and 
the French governments in 1893 after a preceding series of negotiations and demarcation missions had 
been conducted between 1883-84 and 1889-93 by representatives of these colonizing nations. Later 
ratifications and establishments of geographical beacons took place in 1905 and again with adjustments 
in 1925-26 (ibid). The technical specificity described through this boundary demarcation made it 
different from the more loosely bounded forms of territorial divisions previously pursued among the 
European powers around coastal Africa, as exemplified by the preceding British-Dutch deal’s emphasis 
on ‘spheres of interest’. 
The form of boundaries expressed by the Europeans during the early colonial times 
corresponded quite well with I. W. Zartman’s characterization of the pre-colonial boundary concept in 
North and West Africa as one of frontier marches rather than border lines (Zartman 1965: 160). The 
term ‘marches’ has today lost much of its original European medieval meaning which was that of an 
unaligned border zone or a neutral buffer area between two centres of power (from the Indo-European 
root merg-)54. Such frontier marches could sometimes be characterised as entities of power in their own 
right, as exemplified by the European titles of nobility, such as ‘Marquis’/’Markgreve’/’Markgraf’ for 
recognised rulers of such places, but most importantly for this context marches were defined most of all 
by their positions and distance relative to other recognised centres of power. A. I. Asiwaju likewise 
emphasizes how pre-colonial African states were characterised by dynamic frontier zones rather than 
specific boundaries (Asiwaju 1983). Other researchers have similarly described the Akan cosmology as 
based on perceptions of human power and order as something that is emanating or “rippling” outward 
from the centre of their community (Wilks 1993: 200) and which stands in perpetually uneasy 
opposition to the powerful spirit world of the surrounding forest (Boni 2007; McCaskie 1986). The 
                                                                 
54 American Heritage® Dictionary of  the English Language, Fifth Edition. S.v. "Indo-European root merg-." 
Retrieved January 27 2016 from http://www.thefreedictionary.com/_/roots.aspx?type=Indo-
European&root=merg- 
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human focal point thus rests on the allegiance of people rather than control of specific areas of 
geography, and as such these frontier marches remained highly changeable over time as populations 
developed and moved and as power centres shifted. In the pre- and early colonial West African context 
this concept of flexible territorial spaces described quite well both the dynamics of the indigenous tribal 
based groups as well as the European ambitions towards establishing beachheads of trading posts along 
the African coastline. Along the Bight of Guinea the first several centuries of European engagements 
were characterised primarily by desires of trade relations with the coastal ethnic groups, and the power 
and significance of the individual European forts and trading posts waxed and waned through shifting 
local alliances, inland trade route changes, and changes in each European power holder’s supply lines of 
ships, people, and trade goods, along with recurrent incidents of hostile takeovers conducted by other 
colonial or indigenous powers (Dickson 1969).  
Through the end of the 18th Century the presence and control exercised by the various 
European powers along the West African coast was largely limited to the areas immediately 
surrounding their forts and trading posts, and to the Europeans the interior continent beyond the 
major river estuaries remained mostly unknown. The geographical knowledge concerning the entire 
coastal outline was however quickly established, and already by the late middle of the 17th Century (see 
for instance John Seller’s 1671 map) the appearance of the African continent to the Europeans took on 
that of a continuous frontier zone between what could be described as the known and the unknown, 
between a thin line of European rule (or at least access to, knowledge of, and influence on) and the un-
ruled wildness beyond. The European imagination of the African interior as a vast untapped space of 
valuable resources had soon turned the coastal and river areas into frontier zones, or in other words 
what I will suggest to call ‘boundaries of meaningful difference’ through which goods attained increased 
value through their movement from one space into another. The initial extractive efforts of various 
competing European powers escalated into what has subsequently been known as the ‘European 
scramble for Africa’ that culminated in the years leading up to the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 
(Katzenellenbogen 1996; Griffiths 1986; Hargreaves 1985), mirroring similar logics that had gradually 
led to increased consolidation into national and imperial territories throughout Europe itself. The 
European view of Africa consequently changed from one of frontier marches surrounding locally held 
centres of power into one of formally divided territorial lines instead, signifying a break from the 
concept of rulership still practiced by the indigenous groups.  
Over several centuries the European colonial powers had encountered ongoing troubles 
with the ascertainment of the pre-existing extents and boundaries of various indigenous West African 
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kingdoms and ethnic tribal areas (see also Chapter 2, p.63-64). The increasing European insistence on 
measured geographic specificity also contributed to the colonizers’ eventual sharp territorial divisions 
of otherwise fuzzily bounded indigenous conceptual groups such as the Kingdom of Gyaman or the 
Asante55 state, along with the subdivision of African rivers along their thalwegs and other sections of 
landscape according to geometric lines imposed from afar. Again, a driving factor here was the way that 
European efforts toward classification over the course of the 19th Century had changed from a basis on 
‘spheres of interest’ to geographically defined territorial ‘boundary lines’. The previously discussed 
decade or so between the British 1872 takeover of the Dutch sphere of interest on the West African 
coast and the later British-French negotiations of boundary lines between their colonies would appear 
to exemplify this rather paradigmatic change in the ways in which the European powers envisaged the 
dimensions of their African engagements.  
Considerations towards the conservation of various indigenous tribal  groups and lands 
had featured as part of the late 19th Century British-French negotiations of territorial lines, but mostly 
as part of claims presented by either party of prior treaties of trade or allegiances entered between 
indigenous tribal chiefs and European agents acting on behalf of the colonial powers. Documentation 
of the exact extents of tribal domains had not proven easy for either of the colonial authorities, as 
various European missions had come to different conclusions concerning the reach and extent of 
allegiances of various tribal communities towards one ethnic group or chief elsewhere. As a 
compromise between contestant French-British claims some tribal territories were eventually split 
between the colonial powers, which included the large indigenous states of Gyaman, Aowin, and 
Nzima (Saffu 1970: 298), or, according to Asiwaju (1985: 257) Sanwi, Afema, and Lobi, in addition to a 
number of smaller societies. 
With the consolidation of European territorial claims along the African coastline had 
followed the gradual further specification of geographical boundaries between them, and from such 
boundaries the gazes of the colonizers had increasingly sought inland to the as-yet undivided interior of 
the continent. From there, processes of secondary differentiations continued subdividing the African 
continent into smaller administrative territories, inside each of which the ruling colonial power could 
map out their own subsections of frontiers and regulated categories of spaces. Geographer Neil Smith 
has described these kinds of parcellations driven by colonial and capitalistic ambitions as conversions of 
‘relative space’ into ‘absolute space’ (Smith 1984: 85) . This terminology further supports the view that 
                                                                 
55
 I use the older term Asante here, although the more typically encountered spelling today is Ashanti. 
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the organizing principle among the European colonizers over time changed from spheres of interest 
emanating from centres of power to a principle of clearly bounded territories encapsulating the same .   
Returning now once again to the question posed by the Ghanaian border official, both 
the actual national boundary line along with the principles that inform it have indeed come about 
through the imposition of European decisions rather than locally supported initiatives. The two 
contemporary nations of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire are themselves outcomes of European politics, and 
had the British and the French not negotiated a territorial split of the kingdom of Gyaman among 
themselves in the late 1800s, then neither would today’s national boundary line have come to run 
exactly as it does now. It could perhaps still be debated whether this historical division of Gyaman had 
constituted a “conspiracy between white people to keep black men fighting against each other”, since 
the original division had indeed served to settle British-French rivalries in the area at the expense of 
dividing the indigenous population. As for the border officer’s specific question of whether different 
national cocoa prices could be said to constitute a conspiracy for the purpose of pitting indigenous 
people against each other, I find that the answer should in all likelihood be considered in the negative, 
given how the contemporary Ghanaian cocoa pricing system remains different from the Ivoirian one 
primarily due to the opposition upheld by the Ghanaian state against deregulation initiatives 
championed by the World Bank and IMF in the late 1980s and forward (Kolavalli & Vigneri 2011; Fold 
2004; Gilbert & Varangis 2003), initiatives which were ultimately implemented in Côte d’Ivoire . 
As alluded to in the opening description of my short interaction with the conspiracy 
concerned border official, I had left the encounter again fairly convinced that my words had done little 
to dissuade his suspicions that his own role as a border-stationed official was somehow part of a larger 
set of struggles artificially orchestrated by powerful others elsewhere. The longer I spent time around 
the communities in the vicinity of the Ghanaian – Ivoirian boundary line, the more clearly I came to 
sense that boundaries to the population here took on a quite complex appearance of being concurrently 
solid, permeable, and overlapping.  
Many sorts of boundaries encountered around this region today have originally been put 
in place primarily due to particular desires and influences of foreign powers and stakeholders, whose 
approaches to the concept of boundary demarcations, ownership, and classifications of territory differ 
significantly from the boundary approaches of the indigenous Sefwi-Akan traditions. The colonial 
efforts towards organising and classifying the West African landscapes by distinctive geographical 
features, political powers, or simply geometric lines based on compass directions or longitude/latitude 
have only been partially successful. Despite overall colonial efforts towards the establishments of 
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mutually recognized formal divisions of African territories among themselves, the colonizers’ 
subsequent attempts to also organise and rule the populations inside each of such sharply demarcated 
territories proved much less straight forward. The combined influence of these different approaches, as 
I will argue, constitutes one of the key reasons why contemporary cocoa farming throughout this 
region constitutes a quite complexly dimensioned and highly dynamic value space.  
In order to develop this argument further I will now continue with the exploration of 
another non-indigenous form of regional boundary establishment that likewise significantly influences 
the ways in which cocoa is cultivated and emerges as meaningful and valuable throughout my fieldwork 
area in rural southwestern Ghana. 
 
The Boundaries of Three Nature Preserves 
*** 
The national boundary line towards Côte d’Ivoire is not the only enforced geographic 
boundary line encountered in the contemporary Sefwi area where I did most of my 2014-15 fieldwork. 
In fact this part of Western Region of Ghana includes multiple areas of land that over the second half 
of the 20th Century have become hotbeds of contestant claims to land rights, between not only 
individual farm land tenants and local traditional authorities, but also involving the national authorities 
as well. Merely a few kilometres to the northeast of the border town of Akaatiso one encounters the 
southwestern angular tip of the Bia National Park/Bia Resource Reserve and further to the east is situated 
Krokosua Hills Forest Reserve, another area claimed by the Ghanaian national government. Furthermore, 
the westernmost half of the geographical area situated directly between the district capital town of 
Juaboso and the Ivoirian border lies within what to the national authorities remains classified as ‘Bia 
Tawya Forest Reserve’, an area which however since the late 1960s has been so heavily encroached 
upon by cocoa farming settlers that the original forest vegetation is now practically gone (Edusah 2011; 
IUCN 2010; England 1993). Consequently, references to this area by the abovementioned name are 
only seldomly encountered today.56 Instead, as previously mentioned in relation to the village of 
Topman – which is also situated within Bia Tawya – this entire area can to some degree be compared 
                                                                 
56 The name of  the local Bia-Torya Community Bank Ltd. was the only publicly displayed reference I encountered 
in the area during fieldworks in 2014-2015, albeit with a slightly different spelling – a common occurrence since 
an authoritative Sefwi dictionary or grammar book has not yet been published (see also Boni (2007) regarding 
Sefwi spellings, as well as Austin (2005: xix) for a similar disclaimer regarding spelling practices of  the 
neighbouring Asante place names). 
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to a ‘frontier’ or ‘march’-land, an ambiguously positioned zone between power centres situated 
elsewhere, contested and orphaned at times, object of overlapping yet incommensurable claims 
expressed by different actors who base their claims on different criteria of validity and from different 
points of view. 
These three nature preserves have each been claimed by the Ghanaian government as off 
bounds for agricultural purposes, which in effect constitute them as particular valuable spaces in their 
own right. Still, the various ways in which cocoa farming has come to lead up to, become delimited by, 
and encroaching upon the boundaries of such areas, offer insights into cocoa as a spatially bound value 
generating activity in contemporary Sefwi. Both the Bia and the Krokosua were initially demarcated as 
protected forest reserve areas in 1935 by the now former British Gold Coast Colony administration 
(UNESCO 2013).57 The reasons for the establishment of these and similar areas within the colonial 
territory were at the time explained as being for the purposes of safeguarding watersheds and “to assist 
in the well-being of the forest and agricultural crops grown on the said lands or in the vicinity thereof” 
(Hawthorne & Abu-Juam 1995: 5, citing a colonial Forest Ordinance of 1927). At the time most of the 
far southwestern parts of the Gold Coast colonial territory lay as sparsely populated so-called 'virgin' 
tropical forest, so the demarcations of hundreds of square kilometres of Reserve Forests could be 
drawn on geographical survey maps in the capital of Accra with apparently little to no practical 
consideration or immediate consequences for the people and the wildlife whose existing livelihoods in 
the areas did not conform to the geometric boundary delineations imposed from afar.  
 
                                                                 
57 References to the initial demarcation of  Bia Tawya are in turn more scarce, but according to UNEP-WCMC 
(United Nations Environment Programme – World Conservation Monitoring Centre) Bia Tawya had been 
classified as a forest reserve in 1965 (UNEP-WCMC 2016a). 
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Image 11: The three major designated nature preserves of the westernmost half of the Sefwi traditional area, as 
classified by the Ghanaian government. Bia National Park & Resource Reserve is for most parts considered the 
same administrative unit. Krokosua Hills has since the late 20th century been heavily encroached upon. Bia 
Tawya now exists only by name; the entire area has been parcelled out into cocoa farm properties. The entire 
depicted area east of the yellow national boundary line is furthermore classified as Sefwi traditional tribal lands. 
Map designations drawn by this text’s author based on data from UNEP-WCMC (2016a) overlaid on satellite 
imagery accessed through Google Earth™. 
 
 
Particularly the 1960s and 70s influx of migrant cocoa farmers brought to the fore the 
conflicting definition of these lands as concurrently Sefwi tribal lands under the traditional stewardship 
of the Boinzanhene (and to some degree also disputed as belonging to the Ɔmanhene of Wiawso - see 
Boni 2008; England 1993) and as national forest reserves governed by the state. In consequence, this 
meant that the presence of the pioneering cocoa farmers here were simultaneously approved by the 
local chiefs, who leased out or sold land rights to them, while these same farmers were also considered 
illegal trespassers, who were repeatedly threatened with eviction by state representatives (England 
1993). Between the 1960s and the early 1980s especially the chief of Boinzan leased out (or sold, 
depending on who one asks) parcels of land to numerous prospective cocoa farmers who had come to 
petition him for such. These land plots were in most cases situated within the Bia-Tawya Forest 
Reserve area. Leaving aside the question of legality of ownership/stewardship for the moment, the 
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prospective landholders offered the Boinzan chief traditional symbolic gifts as well as money in 
exchange for plots of these lands, transactions for which far from all of them received written paper 
deeds as documentation. 
Although active government boundary enforcements were largely absent from the 
forested frontiers of western Sefwi during these hectic mid-twentieth century years of migrations, the 
Bia Forest Reserve area came to form one exception. Since the 1960s this area had gained the attention 
of international nature preservationists due to reports indicating a presence here of a diverse and rare 
wildlife, including rare species of monkeys (red colobus monkeys) and forest elephants. Successful 
lobbying efforts with the Ghanaian government led to the upgrade of Bia to National Park status in 
1974, and with its higher ranked status the area was now also assigned a permanent staff of park 
rangers to patrol and preserve the integrity of its borders against poachers, mining prospectors, 
encroaching farmsteaders, timber loggers, and other potential trespassers. Anthropologist and primate 
specialist John F. Oates followed the lobbying process at the time and later wrote the following 
retrospective remark regarding the deliberations that informed the upgrade of Bia from Forest Reserve 
to National Park:  
“The Bia Tributaries South Forest Reserve was eventually chosen, in part because Peace Corps volunteer Michael 
Rucks, working with the Department of Game and Wildlife, reported that red colobus monkeys were relatively 
abundant here but were no longer found in the nearby Krokosua Hills Forest Reserve, the first are a considered for 
park status.” (Oates 1999: 182)  
Despite the official designation in 1974, the Bia National Park got off to an uncertain start over the 
next few years under the administration of the Acheampong military regime, which had come to power 
in Ghana through a coup in 1972. By 1977 the regime granted a major concession to the timber 
industry by redefining the southern app. 70% of the Bia National Park area as a so-called ‘Game 
Production Reserve’, allowing commercial logging activities to be licensed in the area (ibid.). These 
boundary lines between Bia as both a national park and as a forest reserve have since that time 
remained in place up until today, while Krokosua Hills throughout the entire period has maintained its 
status as forest reserve, with consequent commercial logging activities taking place.  Bia Tawya, 
meanwhile, became fully parcelled out and taken over by cocoa pioneers during the latter half of the 
20th century, despite recurrent eviction warnings by the state against prospective settlers and various 
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resolution attempts pursued through political committees, the national court systems, and at times 
through direct military intervention58 (England 1993). 
The red colobus monkeys that had been described above as the main reason for the 
establishment of Bia National Park belonged to a particular West African subspecies known as ‘Miss 
Waldron’s red colobus monkey’59. The consideration for these monkeys which influenced the decision 
to switch around the National Park status from Krokosua Hills to Bia, seem in hindsight to have been 
in vain. No further confirmed sightings of Miss Waldron’s red colobus were made anywhere in Ghana 
after 1978, and in the year 2000 an article by the aforementioned professor Oates together with other 
regional experts announced the probable extinction of this particular primate subspecies (Oates et al. 
2000). Although a few years later one of the same article’s co-authors presented some new evidence 
that a small isolated population of red colobus monkeys might still survive in a remote southeast part of 
Côte d’Ivoire (Ohio State University 2004), the subspecies seems to have vanished altogether from its 
former Ghanaian habitats, including both of its intended refuge areas of Bia and the nearby Krokosua 
Hills. 
The disappearance of the Miss Waldron’s red colobus monkey constitutes one example 
of the massive environmental changes caused by the influx of human settlers who have gradually cut 
down much of the region’s existing vegetation and instead turned the mixed tropical forests into 
monocrop cocoa landscapes. While the original Forest Ordinance of 1935 had formed the Bia and the 
Krokosua reserves partially based on the argument of supporting and protecting the nea rby agricultural 
activities, less than half a century later these very reserves instead appeared as isolated pockets of 
wilderness amid a sea of intensive cocoa cultivation, prompting alarmed nature preservationists to call 
for a changed focus on the reserves as the real places in need of support and protection instead (Oates 
1999). Despite decades of government licensed (along with illegal) logging activities inside both forest 
reserves, as well as numerous stories of illegal ‘galamsey’ gold mining expeditions and poaching 
activities, and finally also examples of attempted gradual land encroachments from neighbouring farms, 
                                                                 
58 The frontier village of  Bonsu Nkwanta, situated within the Bia Tawya area, was reportedly at some point in the 
mid- 1970s burnt to the ground by the Ghanaian army as part of  the anti-encroachment efforts by the 
authorities at the time (see England 1993: 166). However, the village was soon rebuilt by its pioneer inhabitants 
and exists today as a bustling cocoa frontier town. 
59 Procolobus badius waldroni - The name refers to one Miss F. Waldron, of  whom little is recorded to this day apart 
from the fact that she worked as a field assistant to the British museums collector, Willoughby P. Lowe, who shot 
and collected the first eight specimens in 1933 (Oates et al 2000: 1527). 
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it might seem remarkable how both the Bia and the Krokosua Hills still exist to this day with formal 
outlines largely matching those originally drawn about eighty years ago. Tighter government 
enforcements of the boundaries since the 1990ies may be part of the reasons for this, and although 
preservationist concerns for the wellbeing of the forest wildlife came into force too late to secure the 
continued livelihood of the Miss Waldron’s red colobus, other animal species such as the forest 
elephant have still managed to not only survive but also thrive in the Bia area, an aspect with relevance 
for the cocoa cultivation of this area, which I will return to again later in this chapter. 
First, in order to fully set up for a discussion of the complexities surrounding the many 
boundaries of the Sefwi area cocoa farming today, I will in the following present some of the key 
characteristics of the traditional Sefwi-Akan history and customary approaches to ownership and 
distribution of land rights, and in turn also the forms of divisions of that which such land spaces may 
produce.  
 
Radiant Spaces: The Fuzzy Boundaries of Sefwi-Akan Tradition 
*** 
I have carried out most of my 2014-15 fieldworks around parts of the cocoa producing 
regions of southwestern Ghana that comprise the governmental administrative districts of Sefwi 
Wiawso, Juaboso, Bodi, and Bia. These districts are all traditionally considered part of the Sefwi tribal 
lands, but detailed historical records pertaining to this overall geographical region and its people do not 
extend back much further than the middle of the 19th Century (Boni 2005, 2001; Ofori 2004; Daaku 
1971). Pre-colonial human presence and activities in these interior regions of the southern borderlands 
between contemporary Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire have in general only been sporadically documented, 
and most knowledge of the times before the 19 th Century has been preserved solely in oral history and 
traditions. Since early colonial times, from the arrival of the first Europeans on the coasts near the turn 
of the 15th Century, people living in what was later to be recognised as the Sefwi area found themselves 
cushioned from direct European contact by a number of other indigenous groups, such as the Aowin, 
Wassa, Nzima, Ahanta and Fante to the South, the Asante (and before the 1700s the Denkyira) to the 
East, and the Gyaman to the North. One of the first written mentions of ‘Sefwi’ appeared in the British 
traveller T.E. Bowdich’ account from 1819, where there he indicated a state called ‘Sauee’ in the lands 
to the west of Kumasi (Daaku 1971: 33)60. Another reason that the ‘Sefwi’ ethnic name only started 
                                                                 
60 See Bowdich (1819: ii). Bowdich’ map itself  was printed with a year marker of  1817. 
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appearing in early 19th Century sources, has been hypothesised by anthropologist Stefano Boni to be 
partially the result of increasing autonomy of local tribal leaderships in this area, as the region’s people 
came to serve as vassals under Asante rule, following the decline of Aowin and Denkyira powers over 
the area around the closing decades of the 18th Century (Boni 2001). Over the 18th and 19th Centuries 
the Sefwi area also became increasingly part of a system of trade routes linked to the Asante  capital of 
Kumasi, and at some point during the same period the Ansantehene (the paramount chief of the 
Asante) enforced a continual presence at his Kumasi court, of members of the Sefwi royal family that 
had based their own seat of rule in the town of Sefwi Wiawso (ibid: 33-34). This description of Sefwi as 
a loosely defined geographical area and tribal designation that gradually came to emerge as a recognized 
entity on its own resonates, in my interpretation, with the view of the historical Sefwi region as a sort of 
marchland zone between other power centres (from Aowin and Denkyira to subsequently Gyaman and 
Asante). 
In the latter part of the 19th Century the British colonial administration had as an overall 
strategy sought to expand and secure their rule of the interior Gold Coast colony through the 
establishment of formal alliances with indigenous tribal groups. The continued rights of these groups to 
handle local matters were recognised by the colonizers in return for their acceptance of British overall 
supremacy - and accordingly acceptance of their own positions as colonial subjects in the British 
Empire. The Sefwi became embroiled in these colonial ambitions as tension gradually increased 
between the British colonial state at the coast and the inland Asante kingdom. As a result of the British 
military invasion of Asante in 1874, Kwaku Kye, who at that time was the Sefwi ruler of Wiawso, 
contemplated the shifting power relations in the region and eventually in 1879 he formally withdrew the 
Sefwi from their century-long allegiance to the Asante and sought British colonial protection instead. 
The Sefwi then actively participated on British side in the later violent conflicts against the Asante 
(Boni 2001: 37-38). The British in turn officially recognised the Wiawso ɔman [kingdom] as a British 
Protectorate in 1887, and from 1896 they stationed a District Commissioner there as direct 
representative of the colonial rule.  
Already in 1900 the commissioner at the time, Hobart, found it necessary to intervene in 
the tribal stool61 succession and impose the candidate who appeared most loyal to British colonial 
interests (ibid: 39), essentially marking the end of a short period of absolute Sefwi tribal autonomy in 
the area. This incident was but one of numerous that hinted at the problems that confronted the British 
                                                                 
61 [i.e. chiefly jurisdiction] 
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colonizers in their ambitions of solidifying their control of the area by imposing clearly organized rules 
and regulations. Anthropologist Sara Berry has emphasized another aspect that made colonial efforts 
towards administration so difficult in both the Ghanaian as well as the larger West African context: 
“Historical boundaries between chiefly jurisdictions or lands occupied or used by different groups of 
people were often vague or undefined; authority over land did not necessarily coincide with authority 
over people; and people were disconcertingly ready to vote with their feet against unpopular chiefs or 
headmen” (Berry 2002: 644). Again, Berry’s arguments parallel both Zartman’s (1965) and Wilks’ (1993, 
1992) discussions of indigenous West African groups and boundaries as units constituted primarily by 
the allegiances of people to certain political power centres rather than statically defined geographical 
spaces as such. 
Questions pertaining to the administration of land rights in particular proved persistently 
troublesome in the British Gold Coast Colony as well as in the later independent Ghanaian state, as 
multiple researchers have documented (see for instance Nugent 2010, 2002; Lentz 2003; Berry 2002, 
2001; Crook 1986). Political scientist Richard Crook wrote for example that: “By the time of the 1927 
NJO [Native Jurisdiction Ordinance], the British had come to interpret community ownership of land 
as meaning that the Stool particularly the Paramount Stool should be viewed as a public corporate 
body, holding community resources in trust, as it were, and quite distinct from the ‘private’ interests of 
families or individuals” (Crook 1986: 90). This amalgamation of British law traditions and Akan 
customary leadership proved very difficult to implement in praxis, given the foundational differences in 
the underlying logics and philosophies informing the two sets of traditions. As Berry explains, “Indirect 
rule was based on a premise of timeless custom, but the chiefs, elders and others who were presumed 
to “know custom” often told conflicting stories. “Custom” itself was imagined, simultaneously, as an 
enduring body of constitutional principles and an on-going practice of historical interpretation and 
debate” (Berry 2002: 645). Therefore, despite the European colonial efforts to regulate and enforce 
firm geographical boundaries and legal frameworks, the indigenous pre-colonial views aligned to other 
logics of boundaries persisted to a wide degree. As Berry, however, also notes, the experiences of 
profound differences did not deter the organisational efforts of the colonizers: “Colonial administrators 
devoted considerable time and attention to demarcating boundaries – administrative boundaries to 
define their own jurisdictions; territorial boundaries to resolve competing claims to land and office; and 
social boundaries to define arenas of authority and obligations for chiefs and commoners alike.” (Berry 
2001: 7).  
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The Ghanaian system of customary law operates with the principle that land rights are 
held in a three-tier structure (Takane 2002). In the most primordial tier are rights to land held by whole 
ethnic groups and held in custody by the paramount chief who in turn entrusts divisions to local area 
chiefs. On the secondary tier one finds the rights to utilize certain areas of land held by certain 
individuals or lineages. Finally, on the third tier comes various usufruct rights obtained by way of 
contracts between tenants and rights holders on the preceding tiers. This means that contrary to 
Western legal tradition of individual ownership of land, in Ghana multiple individuals as well as groups 
of people can simultaneously maintain legally recognised claims to the same piece of land. This 
principled feature is likewise summed up in the Akan maxim that “The farm is mine but the soil 
belongs to the stool” (Amanor 2001: 25; see also Wilks 1993: 9962). In the following section I will first 
look closer at the two primary tiers of customary land rights, since these both concern the concept of 
ownership of land itself. The third tier concerning the rights to what the land produces will be analysed 
subsequently. 
The first tier of customary land rights concerns whole ethnic groups, and the Sefwi had 
gained recognition as one such group through their treaty with the British colonizers and their uprising 
against the Asante in the closing decades of the 19th Century. The Sefwi traditional area, following the 
1879 independence from its role of vassal to the Asantehene of Kumasi, became considered as 
composed of three different kingdoms, each kingdom [ɔman] ruled by a paramount chief residing in 
one of the three towns of Anhwiaso, Sefwi Bekwai, and Sefwi Wiawso (Boni 1999: 50). The kingdom 
of Sefwi Wiawso, situated furthermost west and covering the largest part of the Sefwi territory, forms 
the primary focus for the present analytical purposes, since most of my contemporary ethnographic 
fieldwork studies took place within this area. The paramount chief [ɔmanhene] of Sefwi Wiawso rules 
over deputized local area chiefs in the towns of Boinzan and Debiso, a particular power structure that 
had been formalised early on under British colonial rule (Boni 2000: 575). The chiefs of Boinzan and 
Debiso, due to the geographical locations of their towns, administer large areas of land in the 
westernmost part of the region which lead directly up to the Ivoirian border, which itself had been 
established not long before the British recognition of the Sefwi tribe itself. These lands include the later 
designated Bia National Park, and the forest reserve areas of Krokosua Hills and Bia Tawya.63 With the 
                                                                 
62
 Wilks presents a slightly different translation that goes: “The farm is my property, the land is the king’s.” (Wilks 
1993: 99).  
63 Included – but beyond my immediate empirical fieldwork area – was also the Forest Reserve area of  Sukusuku 
which lay nested between Bia and the Ivoirian boundary line, and, which like Bia Tawya, also became completely 
encroached by cocoa farms over the latter half  of  the twentieth century (see Edusah 2011, UNER-WCMC 
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increasing number of people moving to these remote areas and with such migrants’ petitions for access 
to farmland, the paramount chief in Wiawso along with the two sub-chiefs in Boinzan and Debiso soon 
actively parcelled out and sold – or leased – farming rights to immigrant cocoa farmers over a period of 
time roughly from the late 1950s to the early 1980s, after which no more uncultivated lands remained 
accessible (England 1993, Awanyo 1998).  
The second tier beneath the collective land rights of entire ethnic groups include both 
land plots owned by ‘citizens’ (indigenous Sefwi family lineages) and lands sold or leased out by  chiefs 
to ‘strangers’ (migrants) (Takane 2002: 36). In the second instance, land rights are not automatically 
possible to hand over to others through later inheritance or gifts, but are in principle to be returned to 
tribal control after the death of the lease taker. The latter instance is however an issue which is generally 
considered renegotiable, according to the migrant farmers I interviewed in 2014-15. Several such 
farmers, however, do often not possess formal written contracts, deeds, or other notarized land lease 
papers documenting their claims, partially since some of the original grants of farming plots by Sefwi 
chiefs had been carried out in the traditional Sefwi-Akan manner through physical demarcations of 
simple boundaries on the spot, or by verbal reference to various visible features in the terrain, all 
supported solely by eye witnesses present during each demarcation event. As Awanyo writes of such 
approaches: “The [system] called doko (cultivate onwards) involved the granter escorting the farmer into 
the forests, indicating the lands, showing a stream or valley as a baseline, and then asking the farmer to 
continue cultivating till he/she meets the next stream or valley. Thus, boundaries of the land were not 
demarcated.” (Awanyo 1998: 522). According to Dickson (1969) cocoa farmers traditionally made the 
width of such individually assigned strip farms (at least in the Krobo and Shai areas of south eastern 
Ghana) correspond to one ‘rope’, a unit of measurement defined as twelve lengths of a man’s 
outstretched arms (Dickson 1969: 303 – see also Wilks 1993: 196). Apart from the doko approach at 
other times a customary method called twama [carve out] is used instead, which involves a walk around 
an area to fully indicate the boundary outlines of the land plot about to be granted (Awanyo 1998: 522). 
This latter approach in particular became more commonly utilized as unclaimed potential farmland 
became increasingly scarce throughout the Sefwi area over the second half of the 20th Century. In 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
2016b.). Author’s note: it appears that the Ghana Forestry Commission sourced Forest Reserve size data table 
presented in Edusah (2011: 13) as pertaining to Sukusuku instead might erroneously refer to Bia Tawya instead, 
since such would match the 678.58km2 registered by UNER-WCMC 2016a. Of  further minor note, UNER-
WCMC 2016b utilizes a spelling of  Sukusuki Forest Reserve instead of  Sukusuku Forest Reserve favoured by the 
Ghanaian sources I have found.  
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principle this approach is furthermore also more easily aligned with the form of land registration 
recognised by the British colonial administration and subsequently by the independent Ghanaian sta te64. 
Several researchers (Berry 2009, 2002, 2001; Boni 2008, 2005; Austin 2005; Takane 2002; 
England 1993) have described examples from the Sefwi, the Asante, and the larger Akan areas where 
complex disputes over land have arisen with all parties involved basing their claims to ownership on 
customary law’s recognition of oral narratives and histories referring to times before current living 
memory, as well as before any preserved written historical records. Disputes of such kinds have been 
persistently difficult to resolve, and Boni, a long-time researcher of the Sefwi traditional area, has 
estimated that in effect “almost every stool in Sefwi has been involved in some sort of land dispute 
lasting decades rather than years” (Boni 2008: 91)65. According to law professor Philippa England one 
cause of such chiefly disputes in the Sefwi area of the mid-late 20th Century is due to the fact that 
“[l]ocal customary law was unclear as to whether sub-chiefs were entitled to act independently of the 
Ɔmanhene66 in the grant of land” (England 1993: 166). Consequently, multiple chiefs would on 
occasion sell rights to the same (or differently parcelled) piece of land to different people, most of all to 
the frustration of the buyers and the court system. With the customary law’s emphasis on inalienable 
tribal rights to ancestral lands, newcomers, i.e. ‘strangers’ to a given area – which includes the large 
majority of pioneering cocoa farmers throughout the Sefwi traditional area (Knudsen & Fold 2011) – 
are placed at an initial legal disadvantage if contestant claims to ownership of the same piece of land 
were to go before the Native Courts. Yet, according to Takane (2002: 49), the planting and 
maintenance of cocoa farms constitutes one of the most effective strategies that migrant purchasers of 
farming rights in Sefwi can pursue in order to defend their claims to rightfully possess the farming 
rights over a specific piece of land against potential later contestations.67  
During my fieldwork numerous cocoa farmers have related to me how some of the first 
migrant farmers that came to Sefwi had managed to obtain their farmlands very cheaply or even free of 
                                                                 
64 Still, as discussed in Yeboah & Shaw (2013: 24), apparently around 80% of  all contemporary property 
developments in Ghana take place without the involvement of  the officially designated planning authorities.  
65
 See also Austin (2005: 441-42) for a similar observation regarding land ownership litigation procedures in 
Asante during the colonial era. 
66 [i.e. paramount chief] 
67
 In effect a claim of  use-right superiority similar to what, as mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, p.28, has also 
become enshrined as the official standard in mid- 20th Century Côte d’Ivoire under president Hophouët-Boigny. 
120 
 
charge, since undeveloped land was abundant back then, and the traditional chiefs placed a much lower 
value on it than what would later become the case. The most famous example of this, among my 
informants, is the case of the “Danger-mu” farm, a single family owned cocoa farm that today stretches 
over a vast area of land south of the Bia National Park and Resource Reserve. According to several 
people living in this western part of Juaboso District, the owners of this land had been granted it all 
decades ago by the traditional Sefwi chief of Boinzan as a showing of appreciation for a new three-
storey house in Accra which the farm petitioner had constructed and gifted to the chief. This land grant 
took place at a time when many migrants had already started to move into the Bia -Tawya forest reserve 
lands (in which the gifted land is also situated), and so the new owners rushed to put up some sort of 
boundary demarcation around their entire freshly obtained property to defend it from other would-be 
cocoa farmers. The most practical material they could immediately find for this purpose was large rolls 
of plastic band with the word “DANGER” printed on them, and so to the nearby other migrant 
farmers this vast outlined twama area of the forest quickly came to be locally known as ‘Danger-mu’, 
which is roughly translatable as “There is danger inside”.68 Today, the annual output of cocoa from this 
particular farm could undoubtedly finance the building of many three-storey city houses. I visited the 
Danger-mu farm in 2014 and spoke with the current owners, two brothers named Ampadu and George 
who have inherited the farm from their uncle, the man who had initially obtained it. The brothers 
spoke proudly of their success with cocoa farming at this place and related to me how their father had 
even won the Ghanaian national prize for Best Cocoa Farmer of the Year in 1996, an award which each 
the two brothers had also subsequently won in 2006 and 2012. Their farm currently produces a massive 
output of 8 to 9.000 bags of cocoa each year, and they have many workers employed to make all of this 
happen. The Danger-mu farm brothers also told me how the large size of their farm business has even 
enabled them to successfully lobby the national authorities so that their property has now become 
connected to the national electricity grid even years before any of the neighbouring villages or towns 
closest to them.  
The Danger-mu farm, to my knowledge, represents quite an anomaly in the Ghanaian 
cocoa sector, since its geographical dimensions and reliance on hired labour has more in common with 
the sizes and styles of large-scale cocoa plantations more frequently encountered on the Ivoirian side of 
the border. The typical Ghanaian cocoa farm is instead a smallholder family enterprise, either where 
one family has developed their own plot of land or alternatively taken up residence as the daily 
caretakers of a plantation established by members of another family.  
                                                                 
68 The [–mu] suffix in Sefwi refers to something beyond or on the inside of  something else. 
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Cocoa Farming on Contestable Lands 
*** 
The traditional Ghanaian custom also features a conceptual separation between 
ownership of land and ownership of what grows upon it (Amanor 2007: 218, 1999: 68-69; Awanyo 
1998: 519). Thus, while Sefwi chiefs have parcelled out sections of virgin forests to migrant cocoa 
farmers, the same chiefs still retained the ownership and rights to the timber of any major tropical 
hardwood trees that already grew there69. Cocoa farmers, in turn were expected to leave such trees 
alone when clearing the forest and only plant their cocoa trees around them. The chiefs would then on 
their own accord sell off timber concessions to lumber companies70. Farmers I interviewed in the Sefwi 
area uniformly expressed dissatisfaction with this form of arrangement and with the continual presence 
of tropical hardwood trees on their cocoa plots. These trees represent constant causes for concern, 
according to cocoa farmers, as lumber companies’ eventual felling of large trees and subsequent timber 
extractions would undoubtedly cause damage to the cocoa trees surrounding them71. Around the Sefwi 
area of 2014-15 I recurrently observed cocoa farms with tropical hardwood trees towering above the 
cocoa canopies, hardwood trees, however, that all appeared completely withered and dead. As I 
learned, it has apparently become a practice among some worried cocoa farmers to kill such trees on 
their farms through the use of arboricides or by hammering copper nails into the trunks, consequently 
rendering the tree trunks worthless to future loggers (see also Amanor (2007, 1999, 1996) for more 
details on such practices). Depending on the methods utilized farmers could subsequently avoid 
responsibility by claiming their innocence towards the various authorities. Logging rights aside, as 
discussed, the same principle of separate rights to what grows on an area of land to some degree also 
works to protect the farmers as well, since their own investments in the planting of cocoa trees mean 
that they retain strong arguments for the defence of their usufruct rights to the fruits of the trees on the 
land plot, even if contestant claims to the ownership of the particular area of land itself were to become 
successfully challenged by others in the traditional courts. 
                                                                 
69 Such as baobab, kapok, mahogany, teak, cedar, and many other types. 
70 Officially speaking, timber concessions are still exclusively issued by the Ghanaian government’s Forestry 
Commission with the traditional chiefs merely receiving royalties from such sales in recognition of  their roles as 
tribal stewards of  the forest land. In reality, I was told, chiefs frequently act on their own and arrange 
concessions without involving the government. See also Teye (2013) for a discussion of  practices of  corruption 
as yet another complicating factor in the contemporary Ghanaian logging business. 
71
 Notably, other current research likewise points to conflicts arising from lack of  policy integration between 
forestry and agricultural practices in both Ghana and Nigeria (Agbeja & Derkyi 2011). 
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While questions of ownership of a certain piece of land relates to the first and second tier 
of customary land rights, the question of the applied usage of the land for farming purposes in turn 
concerns the third tier. In Sefwi, as in most other parts of southern Ghana, the practical management 
of farmland typically involves either so-called abunu or abusa share contracts. Abunu literally means ‘that 
which is divided into two’, while abusa in turn means ‘that which is divided into three’ (see Takane 
2002: 14). Both of these concepts refer to forms of practical arrangements that are entered between 
landowners and tenants or caretakers and specifically in regards to the types of divisions by which the 
future agricultural produce of a piece of land shall be split between the parties involved. Frequently the 
owner of a piece of land suitable for future cocoa farming will seek to hire others to initially establish 
and develop it by cutting down the existing vegetation and replanting the area with cocoa seedlings,  
which will start growing fruits after about three to five years (or, up to seven years for some of the 
original cocoa varieties planted there). In other cases the land owner will more simply seek someone to 
maintain an already established cocoa farm plot. As has been documented by Hill (1997 [1963]), it has 
long been a popular strategy among Ghanaian cocoa farmers to reinvest their profits from cocoa 
farming in the acquisition of more farming lands, resulting in both a rapid expansion of the total cocoa 
cultivation area across the tropical southern half of the country, as well a historical tendency towards a 
shortage of labour for the development and maintenance of such farms. The latter has already been a 
long-running issue, since especially the harvesting and processing of cocoa beans requires intensive 
manual work efforts. Family members of Ghanaian farmers have historically been the primary 
providers of such cocoa farm labour, and low costs of family labour was one reason why household 
driven cocoa farms flourished in Ghana in the early 20 th Century while European colonial attempts with 
large-scale cocoa plantations during the same time period failed to generate sustainable profits (Austin 
1996). Still, cocoa farmers’ reinvestments in ever more land would at certain points exceed the labour 
capabilities of their own family households and extended family networks, something that has become 
steadily evident as additional farmlands were purchased in locations increasingly far away from the 
owner’s original properties. Owners of Ghanaian cocoa farms therefore frequently sought to find 
tenants to either develop newly acquired land plots for cocoa farming, or to work as caretakers on 
already developed plots. The choice between abunu and abusa styles of shareholder arrangements will 
vary widely depending upon the amount of labour required in order to produce an output of cocoa 
from a particular piece of land, all coupled with variations in the relative negotiating strengths between 
the individual landowner and the work seeker (Takane 2002: 29-30). In some cases either party will 
even find it preferable to simply postpone the formal decision whether to enter one sort of contract or 
the other until after the tenant labourer has established the initial cocoa farm on the owner’s land (ibid: 
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22). For a land owner such contract postponements enables them to first estimate the tenant’s 
trustworthiness and dedication to working the farm, whereas for the prospective tenant their successful 
planting of a perennial crop such as cocoa on the land places them in a stronger position to maintain 
their usufruct right claims to this very plot of land in case of future land disputes that are to be solved 
in accordance with customary laws (ibid: 49). 
Sharecropping through the abusa system has reportedly gained rapid popularity among 
cocoa labourers already from the 1930s and onward in the Gold Coast Colony and Asante, following 
the world market economic downturns of the decade that made it harder for farm owners to attract 
long term wage labourers. Similar tendencies towards proliferation of abusa-style tenancy appeared in 
Côte d’Ivoire in the 1950s as well (Austin 1987: 276-77). In Ghana cocoa farming had spread gradually 
across the country over the 20th Century from the origins in the inland area of Accra, first to the Volta 
and Ashanti regions, then the Brong Ahafo region and finally to the farthest reaches of Sefwi in the 
Western Region. Many contemporary cocoa farmers in the Sefwi area originally came from other parts 
of Ghana – frequently the relatively more resource and opportunity deprived regions such as Upper 
West or Upper East – and started out as migrant labourers for other owners of cocoa farms before 
obtaining their own plots of land. Since the 1980s the lack of further undeveloped lands suitable for 
cocoa farming coupled with continued Ghanaian population growth has meant that the tendency 
through recent decades has been towards a further fragmentation of existing cocoa plots into smaller 
sections as children inherit parts of their parents’ cocoa landholdings (Takane 2002: 109). Furthermore, 
increasingly exorbitant land prices have contributed to channel farmers’ cocoa profits into other 
directions, including the development of properties or businesses in the nearby towns (Knudsen 2010) 
or larger cities, the latter also connected with the increasing number of city-dwelling absentee cocoa 
landlords (Takane 2002: 109), and at times such cocoa profits have also been reinvested into other parts 
of the same business, such as cocoa trucks (Mikell 1992: 93). 
Recurrent re-acknowledgements of the ancestral land rights are also expected from the 
farmers by the recognized rights holders of these lands. Therefore, owners of a cocoa farm plot in the 
Sefwi area will commonly have to pay annual tributes of 1-2 bags of cocoa as royalty to the palace 
household of the chief, on whose tribal lands the farm is situated. Tenant farmers (abunu) who have 
established or co-established cocoa farms on another owner’s plot will need to share half their annual 
cocoa harvest with the land owner. Finally, caretakers of cocoa farms owned and developed by others 
(abusa) will need to give two-thirds of their annual cocoa harvests to their landlords and only keep the 
last third for themselves. Consequently, for most cocoa farmers, sizeable tributes and expenses (e.g. 
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fertilizers, pesticides, etc.) have to be paid out every year only in order to maintain their claim of having 
rightful control over the farm plot as a particularly bounded space, and thereby defend the rights to 
retain parts of the value generated from the sales of the produce grown there. Therefore, it constitutes 
a significant burden for smallholder and sharecropping farmers that they need to produce and sell 
considerable volumes of cocoa before profits can be generated for their own households. According to 
law and development researcher, Janine Ubink, 80% of land in Ghana is still regulated through 
customary law (Ubink 2008: 266), indicating a persistently strong dominance exercised by the 
traditional authorities. 
Summing up, the Ghanaian customary approach to both land ownership and 
sharecropping contracts is based on principles that maintain high degrees of flexibility by leaving 
numerous aspects loosely defined. The abunu and abusa types of agreements both operate through 
general part-whole divisions of future farm produce that do not directly seek to enumerate targeted 
volumes of cocoa outputs or expected incomes from later sales. Likewise, in many cases the bounds of 
individual farm plots remain vague, while ownership of the land may reside concurrently with different 
people. Both of these customary approaches to land rights and farming practices differ profoundly 
from the legal and general administrative systems otherwise championed by first the colonial and later 
the national state powers, resulting in Ghana in a particular mixture of traditions regarding management 
of geographical spaces. Coupled with this, the traditional view also operates with a conceptual 
distinction between ownership of land itself and ownership of that which grows upon it. 
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Image 12: A group of farmers are in the process of cracking a pile of harvested cocoa pods. Photo taken on a 
farm south of the Bia National Park/Resource Reserve. October 2014. 
 
The Labours of Cocoa Farming 
*** 
Cocoa farming is a characteristically labour intensive undertaking, something I came to 
learn and feel over several weeks of volunteering as a harvest worker on various family-run cocoa farms 
across the rural western Sefwi area. The ripe cocoa pods seldom fall from the trees on their own and 
will need to be cut down one by one with cutlasses or pole-mounted knives. Furthermore, cocoa pods 
often grow directly from the stems and trunks of the trees, and as the bark of these places can be quite 
fragile this means that miscuts risk causing the affected areas to wither and in worst case lead to the 
death of the entire tree. Hence, cocoa farming in general has proven difficult to mechanize and remains 
a largely manual profession requiring time consuming efforts.  
Plant diseases constitute one potential downside to the planting of cloned cocoa trees in a 
landscape already heavily devoted to this particular monocrop cultivation, but fortunately West Africa 
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has until now largely escaped diseases such as the witch’s broom that had devastated the Brazilian 
cocoa business in the 1970s. Still, though, a number of pests and diseases persistently threaten the 
cocoa production of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. Nkrapan [mistletoe] thrives on cocoa and branches with 
such growths need to be cut down, or else the affected trees will gradually lose the ability to bear fruits. 
Swollen shoot disease is a viral infection that causes swellings of tree stems and smaller fruit pods. 
Insects called akaté and mealy bugs will bite the growing cocoa pods on the trees, halting the ripening 
processes. Black pod disease is condition of contagious mouldy rot enabled by too high humidity levels 
among densely grown cocoa pods and canopies.  
The cocoa trees steadily produce flowers from both branches and trunks which become 
pollinated by insects and subsequently develop into pods. Among those a few grow into voluminous 
fruit pods that turn into deep yellow or at times red-orange hues as they ripen. Some of the fruit pods 
growing on the trees at low heights can easily be cut down through the use of machetes. Other pods, 
though, grow on branches up to about four metres high up in the tree canopy, so those ones the 
farmers need to harvest with the use of pole-mounted curved blades. Harvesting cocoa pods can be a 
laborious undertaking, so often the entire farm household helps out with the work. The men typically 
cut the pods down while the women and children gather them in baskets and bring them over to a 
designated spot on the farm, where they pile them on the ground in a forest clearing called an aboyé in 
Sefwi. The aboyé is typically filled up with pods over a few days of work until it consists of a few 
hundreds to a few thousands of cocoa pods. Once a sizeable pile has been made the head of the 
household will call on nearby neighbours, family members, friends, and sometimes hired hands to come 
and help out with the process of cracking the pods. The inviting farmer will in turn also help the others, 
and especially in the peak main crop season farmers often go out for several days in a row visiting the 
farms of their neighbours or other members of their local collaborative farming societies.  The process 
of cracking a pile of cocoa pods takes anywhere from a couple of hours to the major part of a day, 
depending on the size of the pile and the number of workers. The farmers gather around the aboyé in a 
circle, each sitting on his or her own little wooden stool and with a basket or bucket beside them. Using 
machetes or cutlasses the farmers open each pod one at a time and scrape out the fresh beans 
(technically seeds, but beans has become the common term) surrounded by thin creamy-white pulp. 
There are typically some 20 to 40 beans inside each pod, and all are scraped into baskets while the 
empty husks are tossed aside on the forest floor.  
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Image 13: A cluster of pulpy cocoa seeds about to be removed from a freshly opened pod at a rural Sefwi area 
cocoa farm, October 2014. 
 
Typically the wife of the host farmer will prepare some food and drinks to share with the 
workers as a form of gratitude for their help. This often takes the form of classical Ghanaian dishes, 
such as fufu (mashed yam mixed with cassawa), kenkey (boiled rice and maize wrapped in banana 
leaves), jollof rice, or other kinds, supplemented with water or in some cases purchased drinks such as 
juice or locally manufactured spirits. 
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Image 14: A pile of freshly extracted cocoa seeds lies ready to be covered with plantain leaves on a farm south of 
the Bia National Park/Resource Reserve. October 2014. 
 
During the pod-cracking sessions I took part in the hosting farmer would usually walk 
around among the circle of seated helpers and pick up each of the baskets as they became filled with 
fresh cocoa seeds. The hosting farmer would then carry these over to another nearby spot where some 
fresh banana or plantain leaves had been cut and placed in a pattern to cover a flat part of the ground 
that had beforehand been swept clear of fallen leaves and other materials. There the cocoa is 
subsequently left to ferment in a pile over the next five to seven days under an outside cover of 
additional leaves held down with sticks and stones. The fermentation process is done so in order to kill 
off the sprouting ability of the seeds and to break down the toxins that otherwise give a bitter taste, 
replacing it with the more rounded taste consumers commonly associate with cocoa. The fermentation 
works in the way that the deteriorating pulpy juices produce heat upwards of 50°C, while the oxygen-
deprived interior of the pile keeps it from rotting (Schwan & Wheals 2004). The farmer will typically 
check to the pile and stir it every few days to ensure that all the beans ferment equally, and especially so 
that the innermost beans will not receive too much of the heat generated by the process, and likewise 
that the surface layers are mixed into the depths of the pile to ferment properly too. During the 
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fermentation the pile is freely visited by the numerous types of insects living in the forest. Caterpillars, 
ants, spiders, and others take part in the feast, as do typically too various fungi and moulds, that reveal 
themselves in splotchy patches of growth on the pile when it is later uncovered. 
 
 
Image 15: Two farmers are spreading freshly fermented cocoa beans out atop a raised bamboo platform. There 
the cocoa will remain for about five days to dry in the sunlight, covered with a plastic sheet at night and during 
rainfalls. Rural Sefwi a few kilometres from the Côte d’Ivoire border, April 2014. 
 
After the farmer estimates that the necessary fermentation process has taken place, the 
pile is split apart and the odorous, brown slimy beans are placed into baskets again and carried over to 
drying tables in a nearby sunny clearing typically next to the main farm house. These raised drying 
tables are most often made in the way that wooden poles are put into the ground and connected with 
other rafters to form a raised platform about 1 - 1.5 metres above the ground. On these platforms mats 
of tied together bamboo strips are unfurled which provides a flat surface on which the cocoa can be 
spread. The drying process takes about 4-7 days depending on the weather and the degree of sunshine 
and humidity, and during this time the farmer keeps some waterproof canvas strips or plastic bags 
handy, so that the drying mats and their contents can quickly be rolled together and covered in case of 
rain or to prevent morning or evening dew from forming on them. After the beans have dried 
sufficiently the farmer will contact a nearby licenced purchasing clerk in order to proceed with a sale of 
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the cocoa. The handover point where the farmer and the purchasing clerk seal up the jute bag full of 
cocoa beans and puts it on his transport vehicle is usually the last moment the farmer sees the physical 
goods. Cocoa farmers I interviewed were familiar with the subsequent storage conditions of the cocoa 
at larger rural and coastal depots, but none of them expressed any further interest in the future of the 
cocoa once they had sold it and received their money in hand. 
 
Tempting Foods beyond the Forest Boundaries 
*** 
A cocoa pod cracking session typically involves five to ten people sitting around in a 
circle for a number of hours until the entire gathered pile of pods has been opened and emptied. I 
joined in on several such events, something which provided ample opportunities for engaging with the 
farmers and talking with them about matters of their livelihoods, cocoa farming, or simply listening in 
on the social chatter of the day while we all worked. During one such session on a farm by the very 
southern edge of the Bia National Park, an old man whom the other farmers simply referred to as 
‘Senior’, entertained everyone with jokes and songs poking fun at people from different tribal 
affiliations in various parts of Ghana. During a lull in this entertainment I asked everyone present what 
they thought about the protected forest area just beyond their farms. Senior quickly spoke up that it 
was all too strictly enforced – and continued by saying that years ago he had even experienced being 
detained for two weeks by forest rangers, just because they happened to find him while he was cooking 
and eating a tortoise inside the protected area. This comment immediately spurred an outburst of 
reactions from the rest of the farmers. Some of them laughed loudly at Senior’s story and called it 
typical for him to get caught up in such an unlucky situation. Meanwhile others shook their heads and 
complained about the unjustness of government regulations that seemed to care more for the lives of 
forest animals than for the nation’s own hungry population. The voices around the cocoa pod pile 
eventually converged again with all the farmers agreeing that, regardless of all, ‘bush meat’ indeed tasted 
better than meat from domesticated farm animals, but it was too bad that it was largely unavailable 
these days. 
On another occasion I got a chance to talk with the chief of a farmer society also located 
near the southern edge of the Bia National Park, in a place not far from where the farmer called Senior 
had told his story.  The chief, Mr. Anane, shared with me some of the frustrations felt by himself and 
his community in their roles as cocoa farmers trying to secure their living next to the official forest park 
perimeter. According to him, forest elephants from the Bia frequently went foraging on the cocoa 
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farming plots outside, especially in the relatively dry months between November and March where 
water resources tended to be scarce inside the reserve. Elephant raids also still occurred well into the 
early parts of the rainy season between April and June before fruit availability had been fully 
replenished in the forest. Visits from the elephants typically resulted in toppled over cocoa trees and 
broken branches as they went about their foraging, and Mr. Anane told me that unless the elephants 
were disturbed, they would most likely stay around until their bellies were filled and a whole farm plot 
had been wrecked. The farmers tried to prevent such situations from happening by camping out among 
their trees during the periods of particular risk and by yelling loudly and beating sticks on the ground 
whenever they noticed elephants approaching. The farmers couldn’t hurt the elephants, the chief 
emphasized to me, so they instead had to try and scare them off with loud sounds, something which 
only worked to a limited degree. 
As my initial conversation with the society chief came to a close, he added a pensive 
remark about how I was the third white person over the years to come to this place and ask him about 
the elephants. He couldn’t recall the names of the previous visitors nor the exact years of their visits 72, 
but he found it peculiar how “white people” seemed to care so much more about the lives of the 
elephants than the plight of the farmers suffering these big animals’ raids.  At first I didn’t give much 
thought to this comment, as my own motivation for coming there had centred on questions of cocoa 
farming practices and the topic of the elephant raids had emerged rather incidentally during the 
conversation. However, Mr. Anane’s remark still stuck with me later on due to its similarity to the other 
recent laments of some Senior’s peers regarding the Ghanaian government’s alleged preference for 
wildlife over humans. Both of these two accounts seemed to express a desire from the farmers’ points 
of view of becoming acknowledged and protected as stakeholders as well, to have their rights to make a 
living in this place respected by decision-making stakeholders elsewhere. As it was, the farmers here 
found themselves in a position where they were expected to respect the sanctity of this manmade 
nature-culture boundary line when the intended animal beneficiaries of said boundary were not held to 
the same standard and could transgress it at will whenever tempted by attractive foodstuffs beyond.  
In Ghana, I have found that people’s trust in their government’s ability to solve problems 
is generally low after more than half a century of post-colonial independence that has been marred by 
                                                                 
72
 I believe that Mr. Anane may likely have referred to researchers from the group of  Harich et. al. (2013), who 
reported drastically increased numbers of  conflict incidents between human cocoa farmers and forest elephants, 
based on 100 interviews conducted across 10 communities surrounding the Bia National Park. Possibly, the 
reference may have been to Oppong et al., whose work on crop-raiding elephants of  Bia were published in 2008. 
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decades of political turmoil and practices of corruption that according to many Ghanaians are worse 
today than ever before. Instead, loyalty and trust extend primarily among affinal and religious networks, 
as well as occasionally to informal or semi-formal small groups of local people who share similar work 
occupations like for instance cocoa farming. The regular day to day practices of members of these 
farming groups serve to reproduce what I suggest to term as multiple expressions of spatialized value, 
one larger one of the group of cocoa farmers, and several smaller ones of individual households, but 
both of them framed outwardly in contrast to the uncultivated National Park forest as well as other 
nearby farmers not included in the group. Within the cocoa farmers’ society and separate households 
the shared space for value creation takes the form of a mutual aim to optimize the growth and fruit 
outputs of the planted cocoa trees, whilst ongoing manual weeding practices coupled with the 
application of herbicides and pesticides work to keep unwanted outside plant and animal life from 
encroaching upon the land plots of the group members. Still , the communality of the farming group is 
ultimately limited insofar as each family household is seen as the primary unit of trust and 
collaboration. As a Ghanaian proverb goes, “if you do not accompany your uncle to the farm, the 
boundary (of the farm) will be crooked.” (as quoted in van der Geest 1997: 550), meaning that people 
who do not take care to continuously maintain their claim over a certain space of land suffer the risk 
that others will gradually encroach upon it. To Mr. Anane and his neighbours, however, their most 
immanent problem of encroachment has to do neither with opportunistic farmers coming from outside 
their group nor with the growth of common invasive weeds or insects; rather the problem is the 
elephant incursions coming from Bia National Park. Unlike the voices of nature conservationists, to the 
nearby cocoa farmers the sharply enforced (yet unfenced) boundary line towards the National Park 
represents not a fragile space in need of protection, but rather what appears to be an adversarial space 
with animals that constantly threaten to encroach upon the spaces of the cocoa farms outside. In other 
words, each space is constituted by different value expressions, emphasizing human cocoa agriculture 
business on the one side and a non-human West African original tropical forest biosphere on the other.  
With the laments of Mr. Anane and his fellow border zone cocoa farmers in mind I went 
the 30kms or so north to the official entrance to Bia National Park, hoping to gain another perspective 
on the situation from the officials working there. Like the cocoa farmers, Mr. Oteng, a Wildlife Ranger 
in the Bia National Park, also expresses some frustration with the current situation. Both he and his 
fellow park rangers are repeatedly confronted with the transgressive exploits of especially the inhabitant 
elephants. Oftentimes nearby farmers come to the park offices to complain about elephant incursions 
that have left devastated cocoa farms in their wake. The park officials are rarely capable of alleviating 
these farmers’ frustrations, since strict nature preservation laws prohibit either party from performing 
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actions that may prove harmful to the elephants themselves. As Mr. Oteng explained, the park 
administration has neither access to funds to compensate the farmers for their losses, nor hope of ever 
finding the immense resources needed for the building of an elephant-proof fence around the entire 
563 km² park and resource reserve. Thus, there is little left for the rangers to offer beyond volunteering 
in their spare time to help the affected farmers in replanting their toppled cocoa trees with new 
seedlings.  
Additionally, Mr. Oteng added, the foraging raids of the elephants cause ongoing 
problems inside the park as well, since the dung they drop on the forest floor after their outside 
excursions often contain live cocoa seeds, which subsequently sprout in their new fertile surroundings. 
Since cocoa is classified as a non-indigenous plant species – originating in the Amazon – the park 
rangers have to continually work to uproot such seedlings whenever they find them on their patrols; a 
quite Sisyphean task given the large area of the park and the density of the tropica l forest, combined 
with the near complete lack of motorable roads and the unrestricted and unmonitored roaming of the 
elephants. Thus, maintaining the National Park as a distinctly bound categorical entity requires constant 
human efforts as well. Such activities appear quite paradoxical, however, when compared to the defined 
purpose of the nature preserve as a place of indigenous nature that retains its particular value by virtue 
of being perpetually untouched by human interference, in contrast to the surrounding agricultural areas. 
 The human establishment and insistence on a boundary line that sharply distinguishes 
the two types of areas enables value to emerge both from subsequently extractable commercial goods 
as well as value in the form of the preservation of a particular diversity of animal and plant life. The 
elephants have here been classified by humans as belonging to the second type of category, but these 
creatures themselves have not limited their movements and eating preferences to fit inside the 
boundaries of the categorised space thus provided to them. Instead, through their own actions the 
elephants repeatedly cause frustrations for the people who have attempted to impose such 
differentiating boundaries of value creation upon this geographical terrain. 
The case of the cocoa farmers’ woes with crop raiding elephants serve to illustrate how 
their efforts to maintain and grow their individual cocoa farms and family households are all framed as 
taking place through persistent opposition against outside forces that otherwise threaten to delimit or 
defeat their efforts. Through the ongoing encounters with these other entities a boundary becomes 
reproduced that in turn frames these cocoa farms as particular expressions of spatialized value, 
different from their surroundings. These boundary-making activities are likewise matched by human 
efforts from the inside of the Bia National Park border, where forest rangers also seek to maintain the 
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perceived value of the place through their efforts to mitigate the effects of the excursions by the park 
elephants, in addition to continuously patrolling the borders of the park to defend it against 
encroachments by outsiders. 
 
 
Image 16: At the sharp boundary between farmland and nature preserve. The green foliage visible on the left side 
of the picture is part of the southern edge of the Bia National Park/Resource Reserve, whereas the area to the 
right is part of a private cocoa farm. March 2014. 
 
Spiritual Boundaries 
*** 
To this day the Sefwi area of southwestern Ghana remains rife with the observance of 
traditional Akan spiritual beliefs, which among other aspects become expressed through local people’s 
ascriptions of names and personalities to landscape features such as rivers and streams. For instance, 
when travelling between Topman village and the town of Akaatiso the uneven dirt roads twist for 
several kilometres through a slightly hilly landscape flanked by evergreen cocoa plantations. Along the 
way travellers will cross a crude log bridge that has been laid down across a small stream. According to 
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one of my local guides this stream did not yet have a name when the first people came here to establish 
farms in the late 1970s. To solve this situation the chief of Boinzan at the time sent an oracle to ask the 
stream what its name was. The oracle performed the proper rites, and when he returned he told the 
chief that the stream’s name was ‘Do-or-die’. And so it came to be known as this. Continuing a bit 
further north along the same road one will cross another smaller stream that locally goes by the name 
of ‘Mpensem’, which I was told means “He doesn’t want trouble himself”, an expression which my 
local guide did not know the historical origin of, but he suggested that it had to do with the fact that 
this particular stream was known to be very well behaved since it never caused flooding even in the 
rainy season. In the opening ethnographic case of the thesis concerning the incident between the 
Akaatiso truck driver and the border official I have already referred briefly to the belief in the spiritual 
power of the River Bia, the largest river of the region. As a spiritual entity the River Bia is also 
commonly believed in Sefwi tradition to hold an antagonistic relationship with the other major river of 
the area, the River Tano, which flows further to the east. The land in the area of least distance between 
these two rivers is in turn believed to contain high spiritual tension, and superstitious voices around 
Sefwi warn cocoa farmers to remain careful and alert when farming there.  
Belief in spiritual entities inhabiting the environment is commonly encountered in many 
places across contemporary Ghana, and as I have learned the Sefwi traditional tribal area is no 
exception to this. Several Ghanaians I have spoken with, locally as well as afar, have even characterized 
the Sefwi region as rather exceptionally traditionalist when it comes to such matters. Although the 
majority of the cocoa farming pioneers who settled here decades ago came from other parts of Ghana, 
they often brought with them similar concepts of deities and religious practices largely identical to those 
of the Sefwi due to the common Akan cultural heritage shared across most of the southern and central 
parts of Ghana. Adaption to established Sefwi traditions along with recognition of particular local 
places of spiritual significance was thus, apparently, merely a small step for many newcomers.  
Akan spirituality distinguishes between two basic dimensions of existence, called ‘nea 
wonhu’ [that which you do not see] and ‘nea wohu’ [that which you see], ruled over by the Supreme 
Being ‘Nyankopɔn’ who fulfils the role of a kind of overarching third dimension encompassing all of 
creation (McCaskie 1995; Minkus 1980; Meyerowitz 1951). Many West African agriculturalists, it has 
furthermore been argued, “generally regard the earth as an indivisible spiritual entity and often explicitly 
taboo the “showing” of boundaries.” (Lentz (2003: 275; see also Fanso 1986: 64). In effect, the concept 
of boundaries seems primarily to be a matter of separation between material and spiritual dimensions, 
co-present on the same terrain. Boundary observance, in turn, would be a matter of communication 
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across from ‘nea wonhu’ to ‘nea wohu’ rather than across geographically differentiated spaces. The 
powers of the spirits enable them to maintain a dynamic relationship between the physical and the 
spiritual realms, and to humans the spirits will therefore often manifest themselves materially in earthly 
places, such as rivers and streams, rocks, or trees (Graveling 2010: 42). Cocoa farmers around rural 
Western Region of Ghana have frequently built and maintain shrines of sorts somewhere on their farm, 
something which can take a variety of forms in accordance with regional and tribal backgrounds along 
with expressions of family traditions or personal preferences. One farmer I interviewed had set a 
pattern of seashells into a small concrete slab on the ground, at which spot he would offer prayers 
while pouring libations to the forest spirits. The seashells, he told me, he had brought from the beaches 
near the home of his family lineage in the Fante areas of the coast to the south. Another farmer I 
interviewed had built a round stone well-casing in his compound yard (without digging an actual well 
hole inside it) into which he would from time to time pour libations and offer prayers to the nearby 
spirits. This form of shrine, the elderly farmer explained to me, he had built to resemble a similar shrine 
that his father had originally kept on their family’s cocoa farm in the Eastern Region of Ghana, where 
he himself had grown up in the mid-1950s. 
Mr. Anane, one of the elephant-troubled cocoa farmers living next to Bia National Park, 
is also acutely attentive to the significance of the spirit world and even characterizes himself as a full 
voodoo priest, a practitioner of obeáh. For this purpose he has built a small shrine on his cocoa farm in 
a nook formed by the large sheltering roots of a massive kapok tree. At this spot he regularly pours 
libations, makes small animal sacrifices of chickens or goats and offers prayers to the spirits of the 
forest and the earth, in order to secure their protection of him, his family, and his farm. This protection 
also includes protection against potentially envious neighbours who are secretly “backbiters”, as Mr. 
Anane phrases it, and who would keep secret shrines inside their homes where they make sacrifices to 
the spirits in order to bring misfortune and diseases upon other people and their cocoa trees. Such 
malicious deeds Mr. Anane trusts that he can usually ward against by procuring the protection of the 
spirits at his own shrine. The problem with the invading elephants, though, as he explains, is that these 
beings are spirits too with their own agendas, and spirits to his view cannot be brought to fight against 
other spirits, but only to assist people in matters of the material realm [nea wohu]. Discerning the spirit 
world [nea wonhu] from the material world is not always easy, he adds; some animals are spirited and 
some are just animals. If you shoot at an animal and it just keeps on going then you will know that it is 
being controlled by a spirit and cannot be harmed. Another thing complicating the particular issue of 
the crop raiding elephants, Mr. Anane goes on, is that the Bia elephants are in fact being led into the 
farmlands by dwarves [mmoatia], half-sized humans that are both men and spirits and who live inside 
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the forests. As dwarves are considerably smaller than the elephants they are very difficult to see and 
most often people will only see the crop raiding elephants. Summing up, Mr. Anane states, it is very 
difficult, and at times impossible, for people to influence or overcome such forest  spirits, since these 
beings are so strong. Barring the possibility of physical action against these spirited elephants or their 
dwarven shepherds he finds himself in a precarious situation when it comes to defending the 
boundaries his cocoa farm and his family’s livelihood against such outside intrusions. 
 
 
Image 17: Mr. Anane sits beside his shrine on his cocoa farm near the Bia National Park/Resource Reserve. 
September 2015. 
 
Mr. Anane and his neighbouring farmers express a different categorization of their 
surroundings by referring to a distinction between the material and the spiritual realm that supersedes a 
distinction between what – for instance – nature conservationists may choose to call “pure natural 
nature” and “human agricultural nature”. Instead, these Ghanaians emphasize the importance of the 
unseen spiritual dimension that encompasses the forests as well as the farms. With this underlying 
spiritual realm being vastly more powerful than the material one inhabited by humans, the outcome of 
any human endeavour will thus remain largely dependent upon either the support – or the indifference 
– of the spiritual entities. To these cocoa farmers, then, the insistence of wildlife rangers and nature 
conservationists on the sanctity of the sharply delineated National Park boundary seems mostly 
pointless, since the spiritual boundaries for permissible human activity follow entirely diffe rent 
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ephemeral thresholds that are not definable as lines in a geographical terrain, but which have to be 
ascertained on a case-by-case basis, e.g. Mr. Anane’s view that some animals and not others are spirited, 
but that this cannot be known before attempting to shoot them. Going into the National Park forest to 
hunt or forage is thus not by itself a transgression upon the spirit realm, since the success of any such 
venture will depend on the benevolence of the spirits – hence the shrine and the prayers and offerings 
to remain on good terms with them. The elephants along with their dwarven [mmoatia]73 shepherds 
remain highly troublesome to Mr. Anane, though, since their activities are harmful to his material 
livelihood, while their spiritual provenience keeps them outside the control of both material and other 
spiritual entities. His shrine serves as a communicative medium, through which he attempts to maintain 
positive relations with the spirit realm that will permit him and his household to obtain success as 
cocoa farmers in the material realm. In keeping with the analytical scope of the present thesis, it is my 
suggestion that this kind of bifurcation of the Akan world into material and spiritual dimensions can be 
further approached as a form of boundary that distinguishes two different spaces for value creation that 
at times clash or overlap with those categories borne out of different traditions which insist on the 
geographically demarcated boundaries between agricultural lands and protected wild nature, as well as 
on politically founded boundary lines between nations.  
Back inside the Bia National Park, the staff also recognizes the importance of the spiritual 
beliefs shared by many of the region’s people of Akan origin. During my visit there the aforementioned 
forest ranger, Mr. Oteng, guided me to a place at about an hour’s walking distance along narrow foot 
paths from the official entrance at the north-eastern corner. Here the dense tropical forest yielded quite 
abruptly to lighter bushes and grassy vegetation across a massive, uneven rock formation rising 
gradually some ten meters from the forest floor and measuring roughly a hundred meters or so in 
diameter. A few shallow brackwater pools could be found here inside the pockmarked rock, and I 
noticed dozens of empty bottles scattered around; some of plastic, some of glass, some green, some 
clear, some whole, some broken. Most of them with their paper labels long since washed off, leaving 
only the characteristic shapes of the containers as hints that these most likely once held types of locally 
manufactured alcoholic beverages. Mr. Oteng explained how these rock pools are considered sacred 
homes to forest spirits according to the local Sefwi lore. Because of this people living outside the 
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 Sing. aboatia. Also variously referred to as: ”the little people of  the forest” (Minkus 1980) or ”the original 
denizens of  the forest”, ”fairylike”, and ”gnomes” (Wilks 1993: 44, 83 n.16). McCaskie reports furthermore that 
in the Asante understanding mmoatia occupy a categorical space somewhere between man and monkey, very small 
with quicksilver movements, and that they function as messengers between the corporeal and the spirit realm 
(McCaskie 1995: 119, 300). 
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National Park area frequently venture here to pour libations and pray for favours from the residing 
spirits, typically in the hopes of curing illnesses or for assistance ahead of expected challenges in life. 
The park rangers stationed around here respect this traffic of locals and consider the discarded bottles 
part of the gift offerings, and thus not something meant for them to remove.  Such activities are 
furthermore tacitly endorsed by the park management, not least since it helps them maintain positive 
relations with the surrounding communities, and also since the spiritual petitioners share interests with 
the park staff in the continued preservation of the place74. Other types of activities the rangers, 
however, retaliate strongly against, which include timber logging, hunting of animals,  gold prospecting, 
and gradual boundary encroachments by neighbouring farms. The neighbouring farmers, Mr. Oteng 
added, are these years largely respecting the geographically delineated limits, but the Bia park rangers 
still routinely need to make patrols along the outer boundary of the park to keep them all in check. 
Considering these materials it appears to me that it would not be tenable with a simple 
view of this area as comprised of vast cocoa agricultural activities that neatly border a few forest 
preserves understood as places of ‘pure nature’, encircled yet uncontaminated by and devoid of all 
human influence. While people and wildlife have continuously interacted in each other’s lives, it would 
appear that the establishment of the protected forest areas including Bia and Krokosua Hills has instead 
almost exclusively affected human behaviour, particularly that of nearby farming settlers. The forest 
elephants of Bia do not outwardly seem to care much about such formal boundaries, and their 
interactions with the cocoa trees on the outside farms would appear to be characterized more by the 
elephants’ appreciation of the fruit pods as sources of nutrients, than awareness of neither humans’ 
private ownership concepts nor of the cocoa tree as a supposedly problematic non-indigenous plant 
species. From an governmental mapping table in Accra or elsewhere the drawing of boundary lines on 
a survey chart may have led to some expectations of subsequent clear categorical distinctions, but in the 
day to day enactments of these boundaries, in meetings between entities used to continuity of the 
material terrain, practical enactments of opposition, negotiation, or concession are instead taking place. 
So, while farmers’ planting of cocoa trees and hunting of bush meat were at some point no longer 
pursuable beyond the official forest boundary line, practical concessions were made for the ongoing 
worship of spirits believed to reside within. Similarly, while imposing limits on the elephants’ behaviour 
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 The establishment of  formal collaborations between nature conservationist efforts and practitioners of  local 
religious beliefs have in recent decades been advocated as one promising way to protect local West African 
biospheres, turning sacred groves into pockets of  biodiversity preservation amid increasing outside population 
density (Sarfo-Mensah et al. 2010; Fairhead & Leach 1997; Ntiamoa-Baidu 1995). 
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to make them conform to regulations remains unrealistic as a practical option, the local officials still do 
their best to mitigate the effects of the elephants’ transgressions, both inside and outside the park.  
Characteristically for the population of the Sefwi traditional area is the widespread belief 
in the existence of an overarching spiritual realm, coupled with traditional Sefwi-Akan approaches to 
concepts of land ownership and shareholder arrangements. Together this means that the official 
decrees of ruler-sharp delineations between permitted agricultural and residential lands on the one side 
and off-bounds protected reserve lands on the other as claimed by the national government remain 
quite foreign and nonsensical to both indigenous Sefwi and migrant farmers. For a long period of time 
the various ways of categorizing these forest areas by first colonial and subsequently national 
government authorities in the distant capital of Accra has only resulted in negligible practical impacts 
on the everyday lives of the people here. Experts from afar could at times express alarm at witnessing 
local populations’ widespread lack of respect for the borders of officially designated nature preservation 
zones75, but except in those cases where external sources of funding have been found for the physical 
enforcement of such boundaries, little is seemingly done to maintain their absolute integrity.  
In the following section I will now finally turn to look at some of the contemporary 
efforts undertaken by certain outside actors towards the future transformation of some of these 
predominant Sefwi region boundaries into differently bounded forms. 
 
Future Boundary Configurations of a Multi-Layered Cocoa Frontier 
*** 
In the contemporary Sefwi area several forms of activities are pursued by various 
stakeholders with aims towards changing or developing the shape of the established boundaries along 
with the activities of the actors within. One such stakeholder is the international NGO, Rainforest 
Alliance, which since about 2010 has focused a development intervention on the agricultural area 
situated directly between the Bia National Park/Resource Reserve and the Krokosua Hills Forest 
Reserve. The NGO has designated this expanse of terrain as a particular ‘project landscape’ for a four-
year nature restoration project undertaken by themselves in collaboration with a commercial 
agribusiness partner. This project attempts to link up the two nature preserves by way of what 
                                                                 
75 See for instance Oates (1999: 196), in regard to Ankasa Resource Reserve situated further south in the Western 
Region of  Ghana. 
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Rainforest Alliance calls a ‘green corridor’ of shade trees and undergrowth through what is currently a 
mosaic of small farming communities and family households focused almost exclusively on cocoa 
cultivation76. It is hoped that with the support of these farmers in the creation and maintenance of such 
a corridor wildlife will in the future become able to roam more freely between their habitats in the Bia 
and the Krokosua forest preserves. 
 
Image 18: The project landscape as defined by the Rainforest Alliance NGO. The farmland inside the yellow 
encircled area is the target of their development intervention. Picture provided courtesy of Rainforest Alliance 
Juaboso Office, Ghana, March 2014. 
 
The Rainforest Alliance NGO’s focus is foremost on the greening of the selected 
environment, but in order to get first financial donors – and then, crucially, the landscape’s farmers on 
board, they have found it necessary to add economic incentives as well in the form of a certification 
scheme. In return for the monetary bonus from the certification, the participating farmers will be 
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 In this regard Rainforest Alliance aligns their efforts with aspects of  both local Bia-Krokosua wildlife corridor 
proposals (Asare et al. 2014) as well as another larger scale proposal to link up the Bia forest area with the 
Ivoirian Bossematié area through the creation of  an international wildlife corridor, enabling especially elephants 
to roam freely between the two forest zones (Parren et al. 2002). 
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obligated to adhere to a number of requirements for the management and development of their 
farmlands, including strict control with the use of fertilizers and pesticides, the planting of shade trees, 
attendance at environmental awareness courses, and firm pledges to abstain from hunting or harming 
any wildlife on their properties. The organization’s deliberate coupling of commercial and 
environmental ambitions has, however, proved difficult to pursue in practice, and keeping track of all 
these requirements involves the creation and upkeep of a sizeable body of paperwork. The shelves in 
the small Rainforest Alliance office in Juaboso were in 2015 bulging with piles of folders documenting 
both collective farmer societies as well as single households, tracking in total about 2.800 cocoa farmers 
in the project area, as I was told. The documentation in each of these files is seen as indispensable 
components for obtaining the official certifications for the cocoa farmers. External auditors will also be 
called upon every three years to approve - or reapprove - them all. The cocoa beans produced on the 
project area’s certified farms will then go on to be collected and sold on the world market at premium 
prices via Rainforest Alliance’s commercial partner, the licenced cocoa purchasing company, Olam 
International Ltd. The premium sales price obtained on top of the Ghanaian state’s officially fixed 
minimum price is arranged to be disbursed to the certified farmers as lump sums once per year.  
In order to fulfil their ambitions of re-connecting the Bia National Park forest with the 
Krokosua Hills Forest Reserve by way of a continuity of tall trees the Rainforest Alliance has strived to 
include in their project as many cocoa farming households as possible from the area in between. 
However, as one of Rainforest Alliance’s staff members in Juaboso told me, the NGO has encountered 
a particular problem in this regard, since a total of 31 cocoa farms on the Krokosua Hills side of the 
project are found out to have been established inside the official boundaries of that Forest Reserve. 
Since the NGO remains unable to obtain a legal mandate to offer project participation to farms that 
encroach on government lands, they are now in effect forced to preclude these farms from the 
intervention. Awkwardly, this means that the eastern-most side of the hoped-for green wildlife corridor 
can only partially connect up to the remaining Krokosua Hills area, even if successful everywhere else. 
In effect this leaves another thin sliver of inhabited cocoa farmlands in place that again remain caught 
in a marginalized position outside the purview of authorities, not unlike the previously discussed case of 
Topman village. 
On a couple of occasions I accompanied some of the Rainforest Alliance representatives 
on their fieldtrips around this area to regularly meet with and monitor the efforts of the cocoa farmers 
participating in their project. One such trip in 2014 had the purpose of notifying the heads of the local 
collaborating cocoa farmer societies that the much anticipated disbursements of last season’s earned 
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premiums were now ready to take place a few days later. Unfortunately, what made these news a 
somewhat mixed affair, was the accompanying detail that these disbursements would consist of 
significantly smaller amounts of money than anticipated. The contract with Rainforest Alliance’s 
commercial partner only obligated the latter to provide bonus payments for the certified cocoa once it 
had actually been sold, and despite the fact that the 2013/14 cocoa season registered record demands 
for cocoa beans across the world market, the demand for the more expensive certified cocoa had 
instead turned out to be smaller than the actual volumes produced. For this reason, premiums were 
only ready to be disbursed for 67% of the previous year’s harvest as the rest was still held in storage, 
and furthermore, these premiums would now only amount to 7 GH₵ per 64 kg standard bag rather 
than the 8-10 GH₵ per bag that had previously been announced. As could be expected, the cocoa 
farmers expressed disappointment to receive this set of news, and in each of the eight communities we 
visited on the fieldtrip, the Rainforest Alliance representative needed to spend considerable time 
explaining the reasons behind the deviation and reinsuring the farmers of the organization’s sincerity on 
the matter. Compounding the frustrations of everyone, in only one of the visited communities had all 
the mandatory certification records been kept properly up to date, and the Rainforest Alliance 
representative therefore found it necessary to also repeatedly stress that unless the farmers brought 
their paperwork in order within the next few days, no premium payments would be disbursed to them 
at all. As we neared the end of this fieldtrip the representative summed up the experiences of our day 
by telling me that: “I think you can see how the coupling of commercial and environmental ambitions  
can be a bit of an awkward match. But - I think it is still better than doing nothing”. 
The Rainforest Alliance NGO has taken an ambitious task on itself by trying to mediate 
between the many different entities and interests at play within this particular ‘landscape’, as they have 
labelled it. Recognizing the problems inherent in the existing sharp categorical delineations between 
farmland and nature preserves, their believed solution entails a softening of these boundaries through a 
general ‘greening’ of the farm areas beyond the forest, as mentioned in the form of a green corridor 
linking the Bia National Park area up with the Krokosua Hills Forest Reserve. The NGO additionally 
recognizes the entrenched systemic complexity of land rights in Ghana and works to create maps 
outlining the exact dimensions of farm plots of their collaborating cocoa farmers, all in order to help 
these strengthen their positions against potential future boundary disputes or against other contestant 
claims for rights to the same lands. 
Rainforest Alliance, I found, showed high ambitions in their goals of bringing people into 
collaborations to merge this previously distinctly bounded, yet also contested and fragmented landscape 
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into one large unified whole for the benefit of animal and plant life of the area – an ambition that 
concurrently sought to respect both strong interests of commercial agricultural enterprises and 
traditional spiritual beliefs.  However, to me it appears that the Rainforest Alliance NGO’s ambitions of 
achieving developments beyond the confines of old defensive nature preservation categories has come 
at the cost of subjugating themselves and their collaborating cocoa farmers to other sets of artificial 
frameworks with differently configured boundaries; namely those of bureaucratic certification schemes 
and commercial world market forces. The permitted ranges of activities for the cocoa farmers are 
consequentially being shifted from primarily local geographical boundaries to other internationally 
based and largely conceptual ones. The forest plants and wildlife will now increasingly be invited back 
onto the cocoa farmlands, while the farmers themselves will be self-reporting their farming activities 
within narrower parameters of freedom, since unlike before these cocoa farmers now also have to 
devote time and care to maintain paperwork documenting details of their farming efforts,  all in 
exchange for increased financial compensation, the exact amount of which will, however, vary 
independently of the farmers’ own actions. The negative trade-offs of this pursuit of environmental 
concerns through commercially oriented certifications schemes are, however complicated, in the words 
of the Rainforest Alliance representative, “still better than doing nothing”.  
 
 
Image 19: Cocoa at an advanced stage of drying lies atop a drying mat outside a household in rural Sefwi. Within 
one to two more days the farmer will consider this cocoa ready for sale. March 2014. 
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Completing the Circumference of Bounded Spaces in the Cocoa Borderlands  
*** 
Over the course of this chapter I have explored some of the multiple kinds of boundaries 
that in various ways enable and delimit the physical and ephemeral dimensions, within which people 
pursue cocoa production as a meaningful, value-generating occupation. Some contemporarily 
observable boundaries refer back to historical events, ranging from a mythical past to documented 
occurrences within recent centuries or decades, while yet others again point forward to attempts to 
imaginatively redefine the future boundaries of this space. Oftentimes spatially imposed boundary 
designations have proven partial and contingent; championed by some stakeholders whilst contested by 
the differently aligned views and actions of others. My point of focus through all of these interplays 
between possibilities and limitations throughout this region has been the question of cocoa cultivation 
and how this particular activity has become shaped by all such factors. I find that approaching cocoa, 
here, as a field of potential, an intentionally under-defined spatialized value expression, sets the basis 
for an analysis whereby the ranges of meaning and value that cocoa may potentially come to emerge 
with here, is limited in turn by the boundary impositions of other recognized co-present entities, each 
vying to affect the same possibility space. 
Through the exploration of the historical materials I have found evidence that the 
establishment of clearly demarcated boundary lines in this region of West Africa has to a large part 
been an outcome of European ambitions, yet not fully so, since indigenous groups of people have kept 
organizing themselves through more dynamic and flexible ways. Following Zartman (1965) and Wilks 
(1993, 1992) these ways might better be characterized as being based on power centres gradually 
extending into ambiguously influenced frontier marches without any outwardly definable boundary 
lines. In African borderland studies one key approach has been to distinguish between margins and 
centres, since African governments have tended to focus their efforts on central nation building and 
authority, leaving borderland communities in the margins (Coplan 2010:2). Consequently, African 
borderland populations have been described as responding to their marginal status by reproducing their 
own cross-border society that does not emphasize the citizenship of either nation (Coplan 2010, Flynn 
1997), by some researchers a process also described as ‘micro-regionalism’ (Söderbaum & Taylor 2008). 
Such micro-regions or cross-border societies, I suggest, may likewise be treated as contemporary forms 
of ‘marches’ in Zartman’s (1965) use of the term, whereby margina l zones in between other power 
centres come into shape as smaller power centres of their own. Importantly, such currently emergent 
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social configurations appear to mirror key principles of social organisation historically ascribed to pre-
colonial Africa. 
The analysis of the present chapter indicate how the different categories imposed upon 
the contemporary fieldwork landscape of this ‘final cocoa frontier’ in these rural southwestern 
borderlands between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire appear as simultaneously shaped through as well as in 
spite of European colonial influences. The resultant mixture, I believe, is perhaps most clearly 
exemplified in the two aforementioned Sefwi-Akan terms of ‘doko’ and ‘twama’ that express different 
ways of assigning land rights to people. As discussed, ‘doko’ signifies an emergent approach whereby a 
person receives the right to cultivate land from a specific starting point and proceeding onward in one 
direction until a certain limitation is met (i.e. a hill or a stream is encountered as in Awanyo’s (1998) 
account, or in an expanded interpretation, until twenty-one days of travel has been done as in Wilks’ 
(1993, 1992) accounts77). Likewise, the alternate approach of ‘twama’ signifies an encirculation of a 
specific area within which cultivation can be carried out, a principle that corresponds to the dominant 
approach to classificatory divisions of African spatial territories pursued by European colonizers, 
especially from the closing decades of the 19th Century and thereafter. 
In contemporary Ghana the legal enshrinement of both colonial and traditional 
approaches to land rights has perpetuated a situation of ambiguity where set boundary lines remain less 
than absolute and across time and space have variously taken on appearances of solidity, movability, 
permeability, or transposition, all depending on the actions or inactions of people  observing them. 
Within my delimited fieldwork area in what is currently classified as the Ghanaian government 
administrative districts of Juaboso, Bia, Bodi, Sefwi Wiawso, and Dadieso I found it evident how this 
overall geographical region retains its designation as Ghana’s ‘final cocoa frontier’ at least in part 
through these classificatory ambiguities, which mean that contestations of land rights can remain 
chronically unresolved, since the same area of land can remain legally claimed by different actors 
referring to different authorities. Such contestations make it difficult for this perceived unruly ‘frontier’ 
to fully transition from imagined unregulated wilderness78 and into regulated, civilized, and firmly 
ordered spaces.  
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 See Chapter 2, p.63-64 for the historical Asante claim that their kingdom extended out to a radius of  21 days 
of  travel from the centre at Kumasi. 
78 Again, as in the characterization of  ‘frontiers’ according to Tsing (2005), which I have first briefly discussed in 
Chapter 1 of  this thesis. 
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The previously described three different nature preservation zones situated in this area 
exemplify three different outcomes from the multiple boundaries and contested spaces encountered 
here. The large area of the Bia Tawya Forest Reserve showcases how independent land distributions by 
Sefwi chiefs have enabled whole towns and villages to sprout up within an area that according to the 
national government still retains a status of Forest Reserve on which no human habitation is 
permissible. This area today contains little to no original tropical forest cover and has become 
completely encroached by the activities of cocoa cultivating farmers. In comparison, the Krokosua Hills 
Forest Reserve has over several decades also been subjected to extensive encroachments of farmlands 
beyond the officially designated boundary lines, to the point where sections of the original boundaries 
are now hardly discernible on satellite images let alone from human eye level on the ground (see for 
instance Gockowski 2011: 31). Continued permission for commercial logging ventures and lax 
boundary enforcements have served to blur the perception of Krokosua Hills as an area firmly off-
limits to private initiatives, and the cumulative effects of uncontested gradual incursions have led to the 
point where opportunistic cocoa farmers hardly fear repercussions, and where locals openly discuss 
cases of clandestine logging or gold-mining ventures taking place within these reserve lands. Still, 
despite all these factors the Krokosua Hills have only become partially overtaken by human extractive 
commercial activities, and patches of this land remain to this day more or less in the condition 
stipulated by its original government classification. Finally, in contrast to the former two areas, the Bia 
National Park has largely retained its originally drawn linear boundary from its date of official 
establishment in 1974 up until today, something which according to the interviewed park personnel is 
solely due to their own vigilant patrols, whereby they continually check the integrity of the outer 
boundary and take action against would-be encroaching farmers, poachers, miners, and loggers.  
In effect, the suggestion of this chapter is that the multitude of boundaries imposed upon 
the cocoa farming landscape of my fieldwork area (itself of course another imposition, this time 
academically based) gives rise to a multitude of spaces for value creation (for instance a person’s 
specified plot of land meant for cocoa farming, or a National Park to preserve a threatened diversity of 
animal and plant life, or, a nation state to secure the benefits and sovereignty of the people living 
within). The many instances where one conceptualized space overlaps or encroaches upon another 
open up margins of additional opportunities in some cases (for instance, access to cocoa smuggling 
across border posts or unguarded boundary lines, or, say, deliberate farm encroachments on a forest 
reserve or a neighbours’ lands), or else presented as threats of losses of what one has already made 
claims to (for instance, the vigilant boundary patrols by Bia park rangers, the public debate calls for 
government justice against corrupted border protection personnel, or the prayers and pouring of 
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libations to gain the protection of forest spirits against potentially malignant intrusions on one’s farm).  
At other times, still, the incommensurability arising from differently defined boundaries result in 
frictions in the forms of frustrations and lack of understandings (for instance, the cocoa farmers’ lack 
of understanding for the strict protection of Bia National Park wildlife, or, the boundary divisions of 
nations or other territories through the thalwegs of streams or rivers such as the French-British colonial 
era splitting of the Tano and the Boi Rivers, which in the traditional Sefwi-Akan understanding each 
constitute indivisible spiritual entities on their own). 
In the second chapter of this thesis I discussed how cocoa emerges as a valuable good 
through its organized movement across boundaries between spaces and how such concepts of spaces 
emerge concurrently through the rhythms of the work lives of people in the cocoa transport business, 
along with the boundaries assigned to, as well as perceived and enacted by them. In this third chapter I 
have proceeded to explore some of the different ways in which cocoa cultivation in the Sefwi region of 
Ghana can be treated analytically as an emergent spatial value expression, under the enabling and 
constraining conditions and spatial impositions of other influential factors there , expressed in the form 
of both material and immaterial boundaries. In the fourth and fifth chapters I shall continue to explore 
how the creation and accumulation of value across the Ghanaian cocoa frontier can be understood as 
also taking place through temporal dimensions that represent ambiguities and opportunities 
comparable to those brought about through the spatial boundaries and marginal spaces discussed here.   
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CHAPTER 4: 
COUNTING ON COCOA:  
MIRACULOUS SHORTCUTS TO A PROSPEROUS FUTURE 
*** 
 Up until this point I have explored ways in which Ghanaian cocoa becomes valuable 
through boundaries in spaces of marginality (Chapter 1), boundaries framing actions of movement 
(Chapter 2) as well as through different perceptions of boundaries as either static or dynamic forms of 
impositions upon a landscape (Chapter 3). In the present chapter I will go on to analyse how certain 
notions of movement towards perceived boundaries between present and future spaces likewise 
influence the ways in which cocoa attains significance to people living in this region of southwestern 
Ghana in the early 21st Century. I have here chosen to focus primarily on the frontier town of Bonsu 
Nkwanta, since this particular place in many ways has come to serve as a sort of central hub for people 
seeking opportunities in the cocoa business of the westernmost Sefwi area, as well as a base for various 
institutions thriving on the desires and ingenuity of such people. In the latter half of this chapter, as 
well as in the next one, I will expand the discussion of this topic to include perspectives towards future-
oriented agency as such relates to the Ghanaian cocoa business as a whole. 
First, in the cocoa frontier town of Bonsu Nkwanta I had found it remarkable how the 
churches and the banks are two types of buildings that stand clearly out from the rest. Unlike the mud 
brick walls and corroded tin roofs characteristic of the hundreds of private dwellings, the churches and 
banks not only take up much larger spaces but also showcase superior quality in the building materials 
used and stand with much more finished and well-maintained looks. Furthermore, the constructions of 
these buildings have typically proceeded through shorter, less interrupted periods of time from start to 
conclusion due to more ready access to funding and materials, something which often lacks in the local 
inhabitants’ private building endeavours.  
In this part of rural southwestern Ghana I have learned that commonly expressed desires 
among people towards obtaining future material wealth are to large extents also reflected through the 
many different activities conducted by the numerous churches, banks, traditional spiritualists, as well as 
by the perennially popular lottery ticket business. The general public here seems to be noticeably 
preoccupied with questions concerning the various ways in which individuals might become able to 
move ahead in life and reach personal goals of success, defined by increases in social status and in 
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material wealth. This public focus likewise connects itself to the ever circulating rumours of cheating 
and corruption that ostensibly take place throughout the entire Ghanaian cocoa business. Such 
rumours, in other words, concern the ways in which other people have reputedly made illegal shortcuts 
that have enabled them to secure their own success in life. The making of creative - albeit illicit - gains 
from one’s involvements in the cocoa business is recognised as one potential way to become successful, 
whereas other ways typically rely on hopes for turns of events of a more miraculous nature. One thing 
remained certain to the farmers I spent time with; cocoa cultivation on its own does ultimately not 
provide anyone with a significant monetary surplus, unless one is already fortunate enough to be among 
the small elite of the region’s very largest cocoa plantation owners. For the ambitious person residing in 
this place the lack of viable perspectives towards gradually obtaining material wealth through hard 
honest farm work and a prudent lifestyle instead leaves only two options; either one prays for a divine 
windfall - or one cheats.  
The chapter title of ‘Counting on cocoa’ is meant as a reference to the centrality of this 
particular natural good for the continued livelihood and future ambitions of the people of Bonsu 
Nkwanta, and the way in which the cocoa farming provides not only a recurrent source of monetary 
income for the households, but also how the cocoa becomes invested with people’s hopes and desires 
to someday achieve a better life; by way of commercial cocoa farming and the grace of God - or 
through opportunistic individual acts. Cocoa, in other words, stands at the centre of the question of 
how to close the gap between one’s current experience of poverty and one’s desires for a wealthier 
future. 
Accordingly, this chapter explores the different ways in which cocoa serves as a tool for 
people’s attempts to secure their livelihoods in the present as well as potentially obtain imagined better 
future lives. The perspectives enabled by such pursuits, I will argue, entail the application of particular 
conceptual categories of the future, and in turn various perceived boundaries surrounding a vacuous 
interim time between a ‘now’ and an imagined future ‘then’. Taking a cue from anthropologist Jane 
Guyer’s term of an ‘evacuated near-future’ (2007), and works of others, I will propose that notions of 
evangelical and economical time frames can be seen to intermingle with the seasonal cycles of cocoa 
farming and individual farmers’ hopes and dreams for their own better futures. I will suggest that visual 
expressions of wealth among the rural churches and banks in my fieldwork area can be understood as 
characteristics that are reproduced through the continued support of impoverished farmers who live 
with the experience of a slowly progressing present time, yet yearn to somehow close the ‘evacuated’ 
near-future gap separating them from the rewards of a visible, yet perpetually distant wealthier future .  
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Image 20: The view along the main road towards central Bonsu Nkwanta from the western outskirts of the town. 
November 2014. 
 
The Cocoa Frontier Town of Bonsu Nkwanta 
*** 
In 2014 a Bonsu Nkwanta resident told me that a humorous saying heard around this 
town goes that: “If someone today wants to build a house, that person will first need to cut down some 
cocoa trees”. This burgeoning rural town is indeed closely surrounded by cocoa plantations in all 
directions, a visible testament to cocoa’s paramount influence on this region since the initial influx of 
migrating farmers settled here back around 1970. People still migrate here today in search of income 
opportunities, either as seasonal or permanent labourers in the cocoa farming business, or increasingly 
to set up small businesses selling non-farm goods to those already living here (Knudsen 2007, 2010). 
This still continual increase of the Bonsu Nkwanta town population means that the cocoa farm plots in 
the immediate vicinity of the town are steadily being converted into household dwelling areas. 
According to the national population census in 2008 Bonsu Nkwanta had 6.788 inhabitants; a number 
that the same census estimates would have increased by about 10% come 201179. The popular opinion 
                                                                 
79 Information courtesy of  the Development Planning Office of  the District Assembly of  Juaboso, 2014. 
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among people I talked with in Bonsu Nkwanta in 2014 and 2015 was that the number of people living 
here has kept growing year-over-year for the past several decades, a sentiment not only confirmed by 
prior census data80 but also supported by the many new private housing projects in various degrees of 
completion that during the time of my own fieldwork could be seen emerging around the outer edges 
of the town. 
 
Image 21: Former cocoa farming plot now in the process of being converted into a residential area on the 
outskirts of Bonsu Nkwanta. In the central middle ground a few cut-off cocoa tree stumps can still be seen. 
Likewise, the two trees closest to the foreground are both cocoa, remnants of the plantation that used to be here. 
September 2015. 
 
Bonsu Nkwanta is situated some 10kms east of the border to Côte d’Ivoire along the 
main road transecting the northern part of the former Bia Tawya Forest Reserve area. One reason for 
this town’s rise to prominence as the largest settlement here is its geographical position at a well-
trafficked road junction81 that has made the place a convenient spot for the hosting of weekly local 
markets and for it to serve as a temporary gathering point and storage hub for cocoa beans transported 
                                                                 
80
 According to the 2002 Population and Housing Census, Bonsu Nkwanta had 2.308 inhabitants in the year 2000 – a 
drastic increase from merely 69 people in 1970, the first recorded year of  the town’s existence (Ghana Statistical 
Service 2002). 
81 The word ‘nkwanta’ in Sefwi and Twi translates literally as ‘junction’. 
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from the surrounding villages and homesteads to the ports. The geographically remote location of 
Bonsu Nkwanta at one of the outermost tail ends of the Ghanaian cocoa farmlands relative to the 
country’s coastal ports also makes this town a popular place for various private haulage contractors to 
seek out work, since the long distance places it among the highest-ranking categories when it concerns 
the amounts of money offered by COCOBOD for cocoa haulage contracts82. The number of trucks 
waiting in line around cocoa depots here seems always quite significant whenever I have spent time in 
town during fieldworks, although I have so far not managed to find any locals who have felt 
comfortable about estimating the average number of trucks present on a given day83. 
Speaking with recent newcomers, as well as elderly cocoa pioneers, their children, or their 
grandchildren in and around Bonsu Nkwanta or elsewhere in Sefwi has given me the impression that 
cocoa farming as an activity rarely, if ever, appears to be a personal passion. Instead, what has 
motivated most of these people to make their homes and livelihoods here, often far from their 
ancestral regions, are personal desires for improved wealth and social status, to earn sufficient money to 
leave poverty behind and to attain more materially pleasant ways of life, either for themselves or else, 
failing that, for their children and grandchildren. Today, about 45 years after the initial settlement of 
Bonsu Nkwanta, only few members of the present population seem to have managed to make such a 
transition. Those few settlers who have prospered considerably are those who had originally arrived 
early and with sufficient resources to secure themselves large sections of undeveloped forest land and 
who had family help or could hire farm workers to assist them. Some still live around here, while others 
have since returned to their home regions or moved to the larger cities of the country and left the daily 
work on their farms in the hands of caretakers. Such caretakers were typically late-coming migrants 
who now work the farms through abusa sharecropping (earning them one third of the harvested cocoa 
– see Chapter 3), and who in turn typically hope to be able to obtain their own farms sometime in the 
future.  
Geographers Knudsen & Agergaard have suggested that immigrants coming to Bonsu 
Nkwanta (along with the neighbouring settlement of Kefass) can be loosely classified according to the 
following four categories: pioneer settlers (arriving 1966-1979); migrant cocoa farmers (arriving 1980-
                                                                 
82 Possibly only the district around Debiso some 50km to the North of  Bonsu Nkwanta would be registered as 
offering higher transport compensation contracts for cocoa, according to insiders in the business.  
83 Typical replies I have received included objections based either on large numbers: ”Ah! – But they are too 
many!”, or travel frequency: ”Who knows - They come and they go all the time!”. What remains certain is that 
the cocoa business in and around Bonsu Nkwanta during these years appears to be absolutely thriving. 
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1989); cocoa labourers (arriving 1990-1999); and non-farm migrants (arriving 2000-2006) (Knudsen & 
Agergaard 2015: 331). Over time newly arrived immigrants have encountered steadily increased 
difficulties of obtaining their own plots of land for cocoa farming, and consequently, as the suggested 
categories show, later immigrants have been forced to take up less profitable jobs as cocoa farm 
labourers, or seek their livelihoods in non-farm activities, for instance through various forms of skilled 
or unskilled labour in the frontier towns. In all, for the majority of migrants who have arrived since 
approximately the late 1980s, and who have been unable to gain access to cheap farmland from either 
traditional Sefwi chiefs or other indigenous or early settlement farmers84, progress has been difficult.  
I gained the impression that to most of the current population of Bonsu Nkwanta the 
prospect of a wealthier future remains both near and far. The town has been founded within living 
memory by pioneers seeking their fortunes in cocoa farming, and the ongoing influx of opportunity 
seeking immigrants mean that an entrepreneurial atmosphere still dominates this place as of 2014-15. 
Some young people have recently succeeded in establishing business career paths. For instance, Isaac, a 
young man in his early twenties proudly indicated to me how his own name was now printed beside the 
Vodafone logo on a signboard atop a small town store in Bonsu Nkwanta. He had recently succeeded 
in opening his own local franchise shop of the national telecommunications service provider, enabled 
by his own money savings from years of selling phone credit scratch cards on the town streets 
combined with investment money from his father, a former pioneering cocoa farmer who had since 
successfully transitioned into running his own pharmacy in town. Another example is the case of Benny 
and Tess, two twenty-something year old daughters of the town’s largest distributor of bottled 
beverages, who since mid-2014 have been running their aptly named “BennyTess Lodge”, a sizeable 
appx. 30 room newly constructed guesthouse compound, all financed by their father as a way to set up 
his daughters with a future source of income. 
                                                                 
84
 Typically such later forms of  land acquisition would take place through abunu arrangements, whereby the 
labourer eventually takes over ownership of  half  the total farm plot area after about three years of  cultivating it. 
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Image 22: The telephone service store recently opened by local young entrepreneur, Isaac Adjei. Bonsu Nkwanta 
September 2015. 
 
Image 23: BennyTess Lodge in Bonsu Nkwanta. Opened in spring 2014. Pictured here in September 2015. 
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Meanwhile, many other local youths are less fortunate, as they are unable to rely on 
family resources to support their ambitions toward specialized educations, jobs and careers, or start-up 
business ventures. Latif, a teenaged son of a Muslim migrant father from Northern Ghana and a 
Christian mother native to the Western Region, is among these. The limited income generated by his 
father’s primary job as a cocoa depot worker and his parents’ additional work as abusa caretakers of a 
nearby small cocoa farm plot has so far kept Latif from accessing the funds necessary to pay for the 
business school education in Kumasi that he desires, and for which he, as he told me, had already even 
passed the admissions test. Instead, Latif struggles to save up money on his own through different 
small time jobs assisting shopkeepers in town and by helping out friends on their families’ cocoa farms. 
According to Latif he considers himself a Christian, but his upbringing by parents with different 
religious backgrounds has so far kept him from feeling particular attachments to any one of the town’s 
multiple religious congregations. Unlike him, many of his age-mates devote a lot of their energy and 
attention to these religious centres, where many of them volunteer in their spare time when not 
assisting their families with farming or small-scale business work. 
 All across the contemporary Akan-speaking southern Ghana religion constitutes very 
important parts of most people’s lives, and Bonsu Nkwanta and the general Sefwi traditional area I 
have found to be no exception from this. With its largely migrant population background this final 
cocoa frontier area may perhaps even be considered home to a more diverse patchwork of religious 
observances than most other areas of Ghana. Most communities here host multiple Christian church 
congregations in addition to at least one mosque and several practitioners of traditional beliefs. Even 
for non-practicing members of the population the influence of the religious movements is impossible 
to overlook. Christian families dressed in their finest clothes walk along the streets and roads to and 
from churches on Sunday mornings and afternoons (and now increasingly also other days of the week, 
as different churches establish different religious service routines), leaving the town streets largely 
deserted for several hours at a time and temporarily supplanting the noise of motorized vehicle traffic 
with the loud sounds of chorus singing and music instruments coming out from the church halls. 
Mosques meanwhile follow their own daily rhythms, recurrently calling for prayers from loudspeakers 
mounted atop the minarets.  
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Image 24: At the central town road junction in Bonsu Nkwanta on a busy market day in September 2015. In the 
background lies the building of Asawinso Rural Bank Ltd. 
 
In this bustling environment it is easy to witness both poverty and relative wealth. On 
weekly market days farmers in simple clothes travel to town by foot, with shared taxis, or with trotros, 
coming in to trade or to buy necessities for use at their villages or hinterland homesteads, necessities 
such as rice, salt, or farming tools, and also often to charge their cell-phones, if electricity is available in 
the unstable regional grid85. Local government officials, business owners, bank functionaries, church 
representatives, big farmers, and occasionally traditional community chiefs with their entourages either 
stop by or pass through in privately owned pick-up trucks, on weekdays as on market days. Many small-
scale business owners either operate out of padlocked single-room stores that open up their front doors 
along the main road through town, or alternatively by setting up their portable shop inventories along 
the road sides during daytimes. 
                                                                 
85 For instance, during a 14 day period in early September 2015 I took note of  59 instances of  power outages (in 
Ghana events known as ”lights-out” or “dumsor”) in the electrical grid servicing Bonsu Nkwanta, each outage 
lasting between a few minutes and in a few cases entire days. An electrical substation is reportedly approved for 
construction at Juaboso in order to mitigate the stability problems of  this region’s worn down and overextended 
power infrastructure. Still, even the unstable power supply in Bonsu Nkwanta is seen as a boon to market day 
visitors coming in from surrounding communities with no access to electricity at all. Generator supported 
individual cell-phone towers likewise mean that telecommunications services can often be maintained through 
lights-outs. 
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Image 25: The main road through central Bonsu Nkwanta on a calm day in September 2015. 
 
Image 26: Cell phones being recharged at a roadside stall while their owners attend the weekly market. Bonsu 
Nkwanta serves as a regional hub in more than one sense. September 2015. 
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Image 27: Bonsu Nkwanta residential neighbourhood, September 2015. 
 
Image 28: Central Bonsu Nkwanta alley. Example of the commonly occurring soil erosion due to a lack of town 
sewage pipes to handle precipitation and household waste water. September 2015. 
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Most town buildings in Bonsu Nkwanta are small tin-roofed compound huts made of 
wood and mud bricks, interspersed here and there with larger brick-and-mortar constructions that 
house predominantly local bank branches and church congregations, each with its plastered walls 
painted in bright combinations of colours. The wealth displayed by the material appearances of these 
institutions seems in large part to have been enabled through the popular support they each enjoy 
among members of the population here. The banks conduct a thriving business offering savings and 
loans services to clients among the town’s commercial enterprises along with some cocoa farmers86, as 
well as by enticing all farmers to save their cash or Akuafo cheque87 payments for cocoa in the banks. 
The churches meanwhile collect money donations from the devout members of their congregations, 
both over the course of each year as well as through intensified donation drives that the churches call 
‘harvestings’, which take place during the peak cocoa production seasons in November to December. 
In the following section I will look closer at the presence of these institutions as well as the important 
roles they play for the cocoa farming community of Bonsu Nkwanta and the area around this place.  
                                                                 
86 As is common not only in Ghanaian commercial banking, offers of  loans would be largely dependent on 
whether potential loan-takers could provide additional security in the form of  personal or family property. As a 
further note, Porter (2002: 290) remarks on a negative correlation between the geographical remoteness of  
farmers’ locations and their abilities to obtain credit with Ghanaian rural banks. 
87 The Akuafo cheque is a specific type of  government-backed payment cheque for cocoa purchases, redeemable 
for cash at any Ghanaian bank. It was introduced around 1982 as a means to combat corruption in the cocoa 
business and soon attained a high degree of  popularity with farmers, before being pushed largely out again in 
favour of  cash payments following the partial liberalisations of  the sector in the 1990s (GhanaWeb September 
20th 2012). 
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Image 29: The approach to Bonsu Nkwanta viewed from the east in September 2015. 
   
Image 30: Billboards next to the Eastern entryway into Bonsu Nkwanta, September 2015. 
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A Closer Look at the Churches and Banks 
*** 
Travellers approaching Bonsu Nkwanta in 2014-15 from the east side along the main 
countryside road will likely first come to notice how the previously dominant rural landscape of dense 
green cocoa plantations gives way to a view of first several large cocoa depot buildings belonging to 
various Licenced Buying Companies (LBCs) operating in the area88. Then, one will come to see a dense 
cluster of private tin-roofed mud brick huts and aerated concrete bricks compounds, next to a single 
cell phone tower clinging to the hillside. The town itself is sprawled across the hilltop area behind. On 
the left hillside as one enters the town stand two billboards, one proclaiming the presence of the 
Seventh-Day Adventist Church and the other advertising the local branch of the Church of Christ. 
These churches are two out of the fifteen or so different religious congregations that practice their 
beliefs in this town, all ranging from Christian and Islamic groups to traditional Akan spiritualism. On 
the direct opposite side of the road from the two Christian billboards stands another large billboard 
announcing in bold capital letters that “Bia-Torya Community Bank Welcomes You – Head Office 
Bonsu Nkwanta”. This rural bank franchise is one out of four financial institutions represented in the 
town, and it is situated in a colourful green painted new building in the town centre, surrounded by 
purple-painted concrete pillars upholding a fence of brown painted metal bars, its combined colour 
scheme thereby granting it a very distinct visual appearance that sets it apart from the other institutions 
there. One of Bia-Torya Community Bank’s competitors in this town is Midland Savings and Loans 
Ltd., a rural bank that operates out of a nearby smaller town building painted white atop a dark blue 
bottom colour along its foundation, this building further characterised by darkened window panes to 
filter out the harsh sunlight. As of 2015 Midland Savings and Loans Ltd. is also the only bank in town 
with an ATM machine inset into its outside wall, which accepts local and nationally issued debit cards, a 
service that however remains subject to the unstable electrical supply of the region. Situated right at the 
central market junction next to the dusty combined trotro and taxi station is another bank building, the 
local branch of Asawinso Rural Bank. This bank is housed in a recently completed house with red-
painted zinc roof, stained-glass windows and freshly painted light yellow walls. Finally, a few hundred 
                                                                 
88 In September 2015 I counted a total of  19 cocoa depot buildings situated either in or immediately surrounding 
Bonsu Nkwanta, all registered as belonging to 14 different LBCs. These depots were marked as representing the 
following Licenced Buying Companies: PBC (The Produce Buying Company; three depots labelled A+B+C), 
Armajaro (three depots; A+B+C), Olam, Kuapa Kokoo (two depots; A+B), TransRoyal, RoyCo, Unicom, Sika 
Apa, Cocoa Merchants, FedCo (Federated Commodities), Akaufo Adamfo, Nyonkopa Cocoa, Abrempong 
Commodities Limited, and Liberty. 
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metres down the road the local branch of ADB (Agricultural Development Bank) has their 
characteristic green and white painted building behind a green wooden picket fence surrounding a small 
courtyard. ADB additionally has an electrically backlit plexi-glass encased company logo sign by the 
roadside that often shines a prominent yet lonesome greenish light after nightfall, due to the lack of 
competition from public street lamps or strong private light sources nearby.  
   
Image 31: Bia-Torya Community Bank Ltd. in central Bonsu Nkwanta, September 2015. 
 
Image 32: Midland Savings and Loans Ltd. Bonsu Nkwanta, September 2015. 
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Image 33: Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) in Bonsu Nkwanta, September 2015. 
 
The only other sizable buildings around the town that seem capable of matching these 
banks in their size, colourfulness, and quality of construction materials are (apart from the major cocoa 
depot warehouses of the leading LBCs) those buildings belonging to the churches. For instance, atop 
the hill and immediately to the right as one enters the town, an ambitious large church building project 
dominates the view by way of a raw reinforced concrete framework that surrounds an already built 
much smaller church hall inside. As a signpost on the smaller inner building indicates, this church 
building project is an expansion of the local branch of the Presbyterian Church of Ghana. Several other 
sizeable church halls are dispersed throughout the town, almost each of them painted in vivid colours 
and with clearly signposted fronts. These religious congregations include names such as The Seventh-
Day Adventist Church, The Church of Christ, The Assemblies of God, The Church of Pentecost (very 
popular here with three different church halls active as of 2015), The Apostolic Church of Ghana, 
Bethel Methodist Chapel, Kingdom Hall of Jehovah’s Witnesses, The Roman-Catholic Church, and an 
Islamic mosque. In addition to these the town also hosts a bunch of other smaller and less visibly 
advertised religious groups. The latter includes multiple individual spiritualist practitioners, some 
adhering to various traditions said to be of purely West African origins, while others declare that they 
combine their traditional religious practices with powerful aspects of Christian or Islamic religions. 
According to some residents of Bonsu Nkwanta I spoke with, local distinctions between these 
spiritualist practitioners include titles of ‘Nana’ (also a commonly used Ghanaian title of chiefly honour) 
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or ‘Jujuman’ both for various fetish priests and other traditional spiritualist practitioners, while 
spiritualists with Islamic leanings are titled ‘Mallams’, and spiritualists with Christian leanings are 
frequently called ‘Prophets’.  
 
Image 34: Bonsu Nkwanta, September 2015: The Church of Pentecost – Bonsu Nkwanta Assembly hall. 
 
 
Image 35: Bonsu Nkwanta, September 2015: The Church of Pentecost – Adamase Central Assembly hall. 
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Image 36: The Roman Catholic Church of Bonsu Nkwanta, September 2015. 
 
 
Image 37: Bethel Methodist Chapel. Bonsu Nkwanta, September 2015. 
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Image 38: Kingdom Hall of Jehovah’s Witnesses. Bonsu Nkwanta, September 2015. 
 
Image 39: The Seventh Day Adventist Church Assembly hall. Bonsu Nkwanta, September 2015. 
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Image 40: The central town mosque of Bonsu Nkwanta, September 2015. 
 
Image 41: The Presbyterian Church of Ghana, Bonsu Nkwanta. Existing assembly hall stands with an expanded 
church building construction site initiated around it. September 2015. 
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Image 42: The Apostolic Church of Ghana building project. Bonsu Nkwanta, September 2015. 
 
Image 43: The Church of Christ building project. Bonsu Nkwanta, September 2015. 
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In addition to the already described religious and banking-sponsored billboards flanking 
the eastern entryway into Bonsu Nkwanta, further publicly displayed signage could be seen around the 
town. Along the main road through the town in late 2014 there stood a prominently placed large 
billboard rising above the nearby rooftops and which featured a colourful picture of two young black 
children of the kindergarten-attending age coupled with a corporate logo belonging to one of Ghana’s 
large commercial banks and a short text encouraging parents to start saving up money for their 
children’s future educational needs. As an extra incentive this advertisement promised that parents 
opening savings accounts with this specific bank would become eligible to enter into a lottery drawing 
where a random contestant would win a genuine solid gold bar – a shiny image of such likewise 
pictured on the billboard89.  
At the central town junction in 2014-15, next to a colourful sign again advertising the 
Bia-Torya Community Bank Ltd, a colourful canvas poster is suspended from a utility pole, showcasing 
an ad for “Powerful Nana Kwadwo Herbal & Spiritual Center”. This poster represents a private 
practitioner of traditional spiritual remedies who offers to provide people with supernatural aid to their 
problems. According to the text on the lower part of the poster these remedies could include solutions 
to: “sickness, travelling, jobs, money, marriage problems , duabɔ”90.  
Finally, in Bonsu Nkwanta as in many other communities across Ghana one can also find 
numerous small wooden concessional stands, each painted in the characteristic red-yellow-green striped 
pattern, and often with an added black star painted atop the yellow middle part to complete the 
resemblance to the country’s national flag. From such stalls clerks sell lotto coupons and announce the 
latest winning number combinations, all as part of ongoing nationwide lotto games91. 
                                                                 
89 At the time I failed to secure a photograph of  this particular billboard. In my fieldnotes I attributed the ad to 
Fidelity Bank, a large Ghanaian banking company. This bank ran a repeated nationwide ad campaign between 
2014-16 with multiple gold bar prizes given out to lucky contestants. Fidelity Bank’s official slogan for their 
campaign was: “Fidelity - Save for Gold Promo: Win a 1kg 24 carat gold bar and change your life!!” (Citi 97.3 
FM online 2016; Fidelity Bank 2015). 
90 The full sentence reads: “Come for your spiritual solutions such as sickness, travelling, jobs, money, marriage 
problems, duabɔ”. The latter word is a Twi term designating acts of  cursing. See also photos on the next page as 
well as the case discussion of  one particular curse incident in Akaatiso in the introduction chapter of  this thesis. 
91 Apart from the state owned national lottery scheme there have for decades also been about ten other privately 
operating lotto companies in Ghana (see Van der Geest 1997: 542). 
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Image 44: A lotto coupon seller sits inside his stall in Bonsu Nkwanta. September 2015. 
 
Image 45: Central Bonsu Nkwanta advertisements: Bia-Torya Community Bank Ltd. green framed sign post on 
the central left and spiritualist Nana Kwadwo canvas banner ad on the right. September 2015. 
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Image 46: Enhanced image of spiritualist Nana Kwadwo’s canvas ad. The image collage appears to depict the 
spiritualist practitioner himself dressed in white in the centre with piles of cash notes stacked in front of him and 
surrounded by illustrations of two Hindu deities to his upper left and right as well as four Ghanaian men wearing 
ritual face paints. The man on the left wears a traditional North Ghanaian smog coat, while one of the men on 
the right wears a Pentecostal style church robe. Bonsu Nkwanta, September 2015. 
 
 The ubiquitous usage of public commercial signage and specific colour combinations on 
buildings is a method commonly used by the religious groups, banks, lotto sellers, along with the LBCs 
around Bonsu Nkwanta92 that enable each party to stand apart from their peers or competitors in 
visually prominent ways. Not least the many Pentecostal-charismatic churches have in this manner 
proven themselves very well suited for the contemporary climate of millennial capitalism, as argued by 
Comaroff & Comaroff (2000) and Meyer (2007). I will suggest, though, that such attention drawing 
material displays indicate further commonalities between the commercial and religious entities that go 
well beyond parallel adaptations towards increasingly capitalistic preferences across societies, let alone 
beyond simple mutual appreciations of the benefits of clear branding. Also characteristic for all of them 
is their focus on future material gains that they each outline in the shape of enticing potential rewards 
                                                                 
92
 Also a method of  visual recognisability used throughout the rest of  the nation, to be precise. 
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that may be obtained by lucky individuals among their supporters. These perspectives are explicitly 
stated in some cases, such as the previously described bank billboard’s gold bar prize, the national 
lottery service, or as in the case of the town spiritualist who amongst other services offers ritual aid for 
clients’ money problems93. The churches of Bonsu Nkwanta likewise share a comparable focus on 
prospective material gains that may become obtainable to fortunate members of their clientele by way 
of divine bestowments.  
In the academic literature it has been argued that a common denominator among modern 
African Pentecostal churches is exactly this kind of preferential attention paid to this-worldly material 
matters over those concerning the afterlife (Meyer 2015, 2004; Gifford 2015). In the words of 
professor of Religious Studies, Paul Gifford, “All Africa’s Pentecostal churches originate from the same 
idea: a Christian is destined for victory in every aspect of life, which includes material prosperity.” 
(Gifford 2015: 29) 94. However, what might commonly prevent such a personal destiny from 
materialising is interference from external spiritual forces, which in turn can be defeated through 
proper religious devotion (ibid). While the Catholic Church through history has already established a 
precedent for obtaining and holding material property, the Pentecostal Christian movements that have 
emerged during the 20th Century and rapidly spread across Africa also reflect this institutional tradition, 
while concurrently promising their believers potential rewards that can be obtainable already in this life 
rather than solely after death: “Your miracle is on its way”, as a popular slogan goes among African 
Pentecostal churches, according to Meyer (2004: 460). The outward expressions of material wealth 
shown both through the physical church facilities as well as the personal appearances of their main 
pastors, and all financed by the support of the believers, should, according to Gifford (2015: 9), be 
considered instantiations of the same form of clientelism that is already recognized as highly 
characteristic for African politics. For examples of such clientelism in religious settings Gifford refers, 
                                                                 
93 ’Money rituals’ – the supernatural conjuration of  physical money - is a commonly known concept across 
Ghana and advertised by spiritual practitioners on roadside billboards, in newspaper ads, and even through 
commercial television spots. I spoke with several cocoa farmers who swore to such rituals’ effectiveness – 
although they also cautioned that long-term negative effects exceeding the immediate positive gains should be 
expected as the ultimate outcome of  all such spiritual dabbling, and responsible persons should therefore know 
to stay away. 
94 To note, Gifford specifies his deliberate use of  ”Pentecostalism” as a collective term for most non-Catholic 
denominations of  Christianity encountered in Africa (ibid:6). His quoted argument is therefore not limited to 
The Church of  Pentecost per se, but related to an overall tendency shared among emergent Twentieth Century 
Christian movements across the African continent. Meyer (2004) instead refers to ‘Pentecostal-Charismatic 
Churches’ as a collective term for the same. 
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among other sources, to the work of anthropologist Katrien Pype, who has explored relations among 
pasteurs and their followers in Kinshasa, the capital of The Democratic Republic of Congo. Pype writes 
that: “The pastor is the ultimate ‘strong man’ in contemporary Kinshasa. Pasteurs acquire material goods 
such as cell phones, luxurious cars and designer clothes from their followers and show off their 
opulence in public, and semi-public spaces. The wealthier the pastor, the more he is believed to be in 
touch with God since his life of luxury is due to gifts of appreciation from satisfied followers”  (Pype 
2012: 80). Similarly, in the setting of Southern Ghana, sociologist Karen Lauterbach has researched 
young people’s pursuits of Pentecostal pastorship as career choices. Lauterbach finds that such 
aspirations entail both personal desires of ascending religious as well as social hierarchies, along with 
desires towards becoming a ‘big man’ through the gradually increased access to the accumulation and 
redistribution of wealth through the activities of the church networks (Lauterbach 2010, 2008). For a 
recent comment nuancing the degree of desirability and approval of Ghanaian Pentecostal pastorship, 
though, anthropologist Girish Daswani has pointed to the public voicings of scepticism and ethical 
critique aimed at the ‘characters’ of pastors who appear to focus more on their own attainment of 
power than on the good of their followers (Daswani 2015). Similarly, Meyer has discussed how 
Ghanaian Pentecostal churches find themselves continuously grappling with maintenance of the proper 
balance between superficiality and depth (Meyer 2015, 2006), an issue which in popular video-movies 
has also been exemplified through the common trope of born-again pastors lead astray by power and 
wealth (Meyer 2004). Such concerns over excessive accumulation and consumption furthermore link 
Pentecostals with practices and imaginaries of contemporary Akan witchcraft, through which similar 
types of critique are being expressed (Parish 1999). 
Still, displays of power by those in office follow a well-established tradition. As described 
by McCaskie (1995), traditional Asante chiefs in Ghana also frequently rely on public performances of 
stately wealth to reproduce their power. These indications that wealth attracts wealth also resonate with 
theorizations by Graeber through the terms of ‘action’ and ‘reflection’, based on his ethnographic 
materials from Madagascar (2001). There, according to Graeber, public displays of wealth by tribal 
chiefs serve to attract more of the same through donations from their subjects. The wealth generated 
thus comes about through combinations of the chiefs’ actions towards others, combined with other 
people’s reflections regarding the chiefs’ physical appearances and behaviours, which thereby function 
as prescriptions for how the chiefs expect other people to treat them in turn. In effect, Graeber argues 
that these authority figures dress and act like wealthy persons in order to make others continually treat 
them as such. All these materials, I believe, provide a potential explanation of the reasons for the 
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remarkable material wealth openly showcased by banks and bank managers, as well as churches and 
church leaders in Bonsu Nkwanta. By expressing the successful accumulation of money and imported 
material goods these institutions and their leading representatives craft their own images of success 
while concurrently holding out enticing prospects to would-be followers. These prospects are based on 
the idea that by supporting these institutions one gains the chance to personally obtain part of this 
wealth too. As faithful followers continuously donate parts of their small incomes and volunteer their 
services in support of these institutions, they also contribute towards even further accumulations of 
such wealth and expressions of material success. Additionally, the pooled funds and resources of 
devout followers often enable sizeable investments to be made in the name of the institution, providing 
still more tangible signs of success. For instance, in the district capital of Juaboso, about one hour’s 
drive from Bonsu Nkwanta, the Church of Pentecost has a few years ago successfully established its 
own commercial potable water factory, paid for through donations by its followers. This way the local 
branch of the church is now marketing and selling its own brand of purified satchel water to people of 
the area, thereby earning additional income for the church’s other activities. This case, to my view, also 
exemplifies how churches and banks of this Ghanaian region to a wide degree express strikingly similar 
methods of channelling their economic resources into investments in commercially viable enterprises, a 
point which again corroborates the findings of Gifford, Meyer, Pype, and Lauterbach regarding the 
strong materialistic leanings of contemporary African Pentecostal churches. Beyond this point, I find 
further similarities in the temporal aspects of the relationships between Bonsu Nkwanta’s primarily 
cocoa farming population and the town’s churches and banks, which I will now go on to discuss in the 
following. 
 
A Wealthy Future both Near and Far 
*** 
The prospects of obtaining future material wealth among people of Bonsu Nkwanta, 
young as old, appears both immanently close while also often elusively far. Examples of individuals’ 
and institutions’ extraordinary successes and public expressions of material wealth both contrast and 
intermingle with the efforts of many people here to secure themselves and their dependants a basic way 
of living. According to Meyer’s research in contemporary south-eastern Ghana, “Pentecostalist 
churches cannot offer efficient remedies against economic misery on a large scale and most members 
definitely are not rich. Rather, Pentecostalism provides an imaginary space in which people may address 
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their longing for a modern, individual and prosperous way of life” (Meyer 2003 [1999]: 163). Thus, 
people’s day-to-day struggles in the present coupled with desires for a wealthier future seem to leave 
questions of the interim – the near future – as a sort of vaguely bounded imaginary space. 
Characteristic for my own conversations with entrepreneurially minded yet resource lacking people in 
Bonsu Nkwanta (as well as elsewhere throughout the Sefwi area) is that hardly any of such people have 
expressed any clear plans as to exactly how or by when they expect to be able to obtain that material 
wealth that they so strongly desire. Instead, the peculiar way in which their views of the near future 
remain dominated by the unknown has led me to look at one particular theorisation made by Jane 
Guyer.  
Guyer argues in a 2007 article that she finds a certain temporal shift has taken place in the 
contemporary public culture of the United States, which mirrors changes she has witnessed in Nigeria 
in the 1990s. In both cases she finds that the rhetoric of the governmental economic policies is 
increasingly being oriented towards concepts of long-term growth that leave little leeway for reasoning 
in the short run. Guyer calls this apparent shift an “evacuation of the near future” (Guyer 2007 : 409), a 
tendency which she finds most vividly expressed through the contemporary rhetoric of macroeconomic 
monetarism as well as Christian evangelical teachings. Both of these perspectives on society emphasi ze 
long-term goals placed in a distant undefined future, to be approached by the submission of the 
individual to certain frameworks of perception and certain ways of living in the present as well as the 
near future. In Guyer’s terms this evacuation of the near-future does however not empty that zone of 
meaning, since it is instead being re-inhabited by a kind of punctuated, dated time (ibid: 409, 417). She 
argues that although the general shift towards long-term future goals leaves people with fewer 
possibilities for reasoning about their decisions in the short term, their decision-making is instead 
becoming based around responses to punctuated events (ibid: 416).  
The long-term nature of the goals shared among many people on the Ghanaian cocoa 
frontier, I believe, corresponds quite well with the concept of an evacuated, punctuated near-future 
presented by Guyer. The rural banks and the churches of Bonsu Nkwanta offer images of a materially 
wealthier future, purportedly attainable by their supporters through each individual’s adherence to 
certain forms of behaviour that include recurrent relinquishing of money in the present. Each Sunday 
service donation or instance of a money deposit at a bank can thus be interpreted as a punctuating 
moment, one of a series of stepping-stones, so to speak, towards a desired end-goal, the exact distance 
to which, however, remains perpetually unclear to the majority of those people striving for it. Likewise, 
the continued acts of giving parts of one’s limited surplus wealth to bankers or pastors who already 
177 
 
display abundant material possessions may in this perspective go beyond Pype’s argument that such 
people’s wealth serve as confirmation of connectedness to a higher entity (God, in case of Pype’s 
informants as well as the Ghanaian churchgoers, and the non-local financial markets to the Ghanaian 
bank clients). Following Guyer, there would likely be a temporal aspect at stake here too – whereby 
repeated donations to people who outwardly display that they have personally managed to close the gap 
between the experience of poverty in the present and a desired wealthier future, effectively serve to 
enhance each follower’s feeling of personal connectedness to such a better future, a sense of 
approaching one’s goals through affiliation with others who have already achieved the same.  
I will here furthermore like to point out how anthropologist Nancy Munn’s (1986) 
concept of ‘intersubjective space-time’ – of giving resources away as a way to enhance one’s personal 
space-time – in the case of these Ghanaian bank savings and church donations,  can similarly be 
interpreted to serve as methods by which individuals attempt to speed up their perceived passage 
through such an ‘evacuated’, emptied near-future and thereby approach the achievement of their 
envisioned ulterior goals. Munn notes how, on the Pacific island of Gawa, people view acts of sharing 
one’s resources as not only laudable, but also as ways of energizing and expanding one’s time, whereas 
the opposite trait, of consuming or saving resources for oneself leads to laziness and contraction of 
one’s time. The ultimate aim of the idealised expansion of self through the connectedness to the 
surroundings is expressed as ‘fame’; to have others you don’t know of still know of you. In a sense, this 
means to expand your own existence beyond your own personal horizon of awareness. Certain 
materials, kula in Munn’s ethnography, are particularly suitable for such ambitions, since some of these 
items may be recognisable heirlooms and famous of their own, and by obtaining these and adorning 
yourself with these for a while may serve to entangle your own personal network and history with those 
of the items, in effect enhancing your own fame, and thus expanding your space-time. I find it 
furthermore relevant to compare this ideal of growing connectedness, of expanding oneself into the 
world, to the work of anthropologists John and Joan Comaroff on notions of selfhood among the 
Tswana people in colonial South Africa (2001). Again, similarly to Munn’s materials from Gawa, ideals 
of high personal connectivity and networking with others are found prevalent in Tswana society, and 
together these materials indicate that in certain settings across the world there are examples where 
people do not make the same foundational emphasis on the conceptual separateness of the individual 
from his or her surroundings, as has been the case in most post-Heraclitean Western philosophical 
traditions and societies. Instead, the boundaries that differentiate any individual from their 
surroundings do not appear rigidly framed by the person’s own physical body, but fluctuate in spatio-
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temporal dimensions through the agency of that actor and the boundaries actual ized through the 
relations between them and others. 
If time and space are not treated as universally pre-given external dimensions to human 
life, despite our many mechanical systems created in order to objectively measure them as such, then 
my suggestion is the following: That the ultimate value of gift giving among people in Ghana, as on 
Gawa, constitutes the way in which gift giving acts entangle each individual materially and socially with 
other individuals, and in turn with the entanglements of those others with others yet again, thereby 
decreasing the perceived spatio-temporal distances between the valuable resources, objects, or forms of 
social recognition an individual may desire to experience in their life, yet do not currently have access 
to. By giving resources away one extends themselves outward in space and time, in other words, 
reducing the experience of relative distance and duration between one’s own conditions of life in the 
present and that future livelihood which one wants to achieve. In this perspective, in my analysis, 
donations to churches, participation in bank prize drawings, and purchases of lotto coupons all aim 
towards hopes of rapidly reducing the spatio-temporal distance between current poverty and future 
wealth. 
 
Cyclicality and Progression 
*** 
The unilinear progression of time according to European time reckoning traditions and 
the personal lifetimes of individuals are both accompanied by and to some degrees contrasted by cocoa 
farming as a largely cyclical endeavour. Although the tropical climate permits some level of ongoing 
harvests of fruits over the course of each year, there is still a recognisable main crop season running 
from October to March and a so-called light crop season running from June to August, the latter which 
follows the onset of the rainy season throughout the country, which starts in March to April95. The 
designation of crop seasons demonstrates how cocoa trees follow their own cycles too, annually as well 
as over the course of decades. Common knowledge in Ghana holds that cocoa seedlings normally 
require about five to seven years of growth before first bearing fruit96. On the other end of the scale, at 
                                                                 
95 However, citing ”climate change”, several Sefwi cocoa farmers have informed me that the onsets and endings 
of  these seasons are no longer as predictable as they were a decade or longer ago. 
96 A time period that through ongoing human attempts at optimizations for shorter growth periods has now 
been reduced to about three years for the latest types of  cloned hybrid trees promoted by the Ghanaian 
government. See chapter 3. 
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about thirty to thirty-five years of age97 the fruit outputs of most cocoa trees will have declined to a 
point where they are typically replaced with new ones, either directly or after the cocoa farm plot has 
lain fallow for a number years to enable the soil to recover lost nutrients – yet another cycle98. 
People who make their livelihood as cocoa farmers experience these cyclical conditions 
of their environment, which entail repeated peaks and lows in the necessary work tasks and their 
availability of income from cocoa sales. To most of the farmers I talked with, this awareness seems 
coupled with an awareness of another cycle; that of the human life and of successive family 
generations. Overwhelmingly, my talks with farmers on the topic of cocoa as a way of living turned to 
the topic of cocoa farming as a way towards a different future – if not for one self, then for one’s 
children or grandchildren. Here, time appears again as unidirectional progression which lends a larger 
purpose to the efforts of the individual person or household across the consecutive cycles of farming 
seasons. Work is done to not only ensure survival in the present, but also to accumulate different kinds 
of wealth in the hope of attaining better future living conditions. This ambition typically entails that 
surplus income from the agricultural activities is reinvested the children’s schooling, agrochemicals for 
the benefit of next season’s harvests, in the purchase of additional plots of farmlands, or used as 
remittances to help family households elsewhere. Furthermore, as mentioned, among many religious 
cocoa farmers substantial amounts of income from cocoa farming also tend to be donated to their local 
church congregations. In Bonsu Nkwanta, the annually recurrent donation drives by several churches, 
their ‘harvestings’ as they term them, are deliberately timed to coincide with the peaks of the main crop 
season of each year around late November to December where farmers harvest and sell off the largest 
volumes of their cocoa, and, accordingly, where such farmers also have the largest amounts of cash in 
their hands. Outside of this hectic season, small-scale business activities across Ghana’s southwestern 
cocoa cultivating areas gradually decrease, as farmers eventually run out of disposable cash. As the 
owner of a drinking spot in Juaboso lamented to me in March 2014, his business was very slow at this 
time, since “Nobody has any money now”. He went on to add that I should come back to visit him 
again in November that same year, since he expected that his place by then once more would be full of 
drinking and celebrating cocoa farmers each with wads of harvest money in their hands.  
                                                                 
97 As a note, repeated use of  fertilizers could extend this time frame by several years. 
98
 Each Ghanaian smallholder farm is traditionally considered to internally consist of  two to three alternating 
parts, i.e. the part currently under cultivation (afuwa), the part currently under fallow (mfufuwa), and occasionally 
also a part left long-term ”barren fallow” (mfufuwa-nini). See Wilks 1993: 44-46). 
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For some cocoa farmers, especially young or middle-aged males with few or no family 
dependants, this brief possibility for lavish expenditure, fuelled by the increased outside cash flows into 
the rural communities, appears like an annually anticipated goal on its own. In both Juaboso and Bonsu 
Nkwanta people recounted to me how these towns surge with travelling merchants, seasonal labourers, 
and other opportunity seeking strangers during the main crop season each year. In Juaboso, a local man 
even related to me how the money from the sale of one single full bag of cocoa (64 kg) would be 
enough to convince women of a certain disposition to cook for and bed a farmer for a whole week. 
Whereas some cocoa farmers (seasonal labourers, tenant caretakers, as well as land owners) in various 
ways seem to give up on long term ambitions of continual wealth accumulation in favour of recurrent 
short term pleasures, the cyclicality of life in the form of seasonal workloads, income opportunities, 
commercial expenditure options, the presence of strangers, and the intensity of social events, remain 
experiences evident to all. 
 
 
Image 47: “To be a man is not a day job”. Idiom painted on a signpost by the roadside in front of a small private 
cocoa farming household a few kilometres outside of Bonsu Nkwanta. October 2014. 
 
This cyclicality of cocoa farming seems especially difficult to young men desiring to 
pursue traditionally lauded Ghanaian life goals of entering marriage, having children, and becoming the 
head of a household and its primary provider. Not only does the present lack of available undeveloped 
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farmland force most of such young people into lower paid income positions as caretakers (abusa) of 
other older farmers’ existing cocoa plots, but furthermore do the prolonged periods of the year without 
significant monetary income opportunities make it more difficult to manage and save up for future 
investments. These near constant financial worries coupled with traditional norms that expect 
Ghanaian men to be the bread winners lend credence to the idiom that “To be a man is not a day job”, 
an expression similarly used in Nigeria (see Jordan Smith 2017). As a consequence of the poor 
prospects towards monetary income and property ownership, many young Ghanaians born in these 
rural areas look to the cities instead for their future opportunities. The low attractiveness of cocoa 
farming as a livelihood is a concern shared as well by several high level cocoa business stakeholders 
inside Ghana as well as internationally. For instance, at the World Cocoa Conference in Amsterdam in 
June 2014, which formed part of my fieldwork, this concern was emphasized not only in the 
presentations by the Ghanaian COCOBOD delegation, but it was also an issue repeated by 
representatives from other cocoa producing nations, NGOs, and agricultural produce companies. The 
latter included among others representative of Barry Callebaut Group and former Chairman of the 
World Cocoa Foundation (WCF), Mr. Nicko Debenham, who in his keynote speech referred to recent 
research data that had shown him that “not one out of 250 children asked wanted to be a cocoa farmer 
– although one did say he would like to do it – as a hobby”. 
The requirements of hard labour and widely acknowledged difficulties faced by small 
scale cocoa farmers and workers towards accumulating surplus income means that, consequently, cocoa 
farming to many contemporary Ghanaian youths appears largely as a profession to avoid rather than 
pursue (Vigneri 2007). Here, again, I will suggest that a reference to Lefebvre’s ‘rhythmanalysis’99 term 
is pertinent, since an aspect of rhythms is how such revolve around repeated returns to an initial outset, 
to variations within a limited range, the repetition, rather than the progression. Herein I think lies a hint 
as well of the despair and the sense of tragedy felt among many aging small-scale cocoa farmers in 
Ghana along with many African youths in general (including many who in a sole reckoning of years of 
age would already hardly count as youths anymore – e.g. persons in their late thirties to mid-late 
forties100). According to sociologist Jordanna Matlon (2015) for young men in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, 
the category of ‘youth’ – the time between childhood and adulthood – has similarly come to represent a 
                                                                 
99 See Chapter 2. 
100 See for instance Langevang (2004) for an analysis of  the life conditions of  Ghanaian males feeling stuck in 
youth in an Accra suburb. For a related discussion of  contemporary tensions between Ghanaian youth status and 
transitions into adulthood, see also Amanor (2001: 116-17). 
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“temporal borderland”, a place where according to one of her informants: “one does not live, one 
survives” (Matlon 2015: 151, original emphasis). In Côte d’Ivoire as in Ghana such sentiments are 
characterized by frustrations caused by absent experiences of progress, sensations of feeling perpetually 
stuck in a repetitive present moment and unable to generate and accumulate enough surplus income to 
move forward in life and to obtain access to the social status and material goods, which for generations 
have stood as milestone indicators of successful transitions to adulthood: family, material property, and 
steady income generating work.  
These conditions of rhythms, movement in circles or on the spot, as my argument goes, 
may furthermore be considered as closely linked with the widespread public support shown for the 
churches, the thriving businesses of banks, jujumen, mallams, prophets, and other spiritual mediums, 
along with the perennial popularity of lotto games as well. Motivating this support are profound desires 
for experiences of radical positive change in one’s personal life; hopes for near instantaneous 
advancement by help of outside forces into a better future life condition; a future which one’s own 
actions and rhythms in the everyday life have hitherto proven unable to achieve, let alone meaningfully 
advance one towards. Hence, I suggest, the material wealth displayed by the many churches and banks 
in Bonsu Nkwanta; their displays represent promises of what they claim themselves capable of 
delivering to their truly devoted supporters. Under such conditions where options for stepwise 
advancements to a desired betterment remain elusively hidden from view, the vying for a miraculous 
instantaneous reward presents an alluring alternative.  
The perspectives evoked by these institutions, whether religious or economic, are rife 
with fuzzily defined dimensions. Although their end goals may appear clear on one level – heavenly 
salvation on the Judgment Day – or personal economical wealth and freedom in your own future 
lifetime – the time interval in between remains characteristically oblique, and those persons recognised 
as having been materially rewarded in this life appear to have been so largely through circumstances of 
fateful luck, divine blessings, or quick-witted exploitations of fleeting opportunities. In this Ghanaian 
case, by following Guyer’s (2007) terms, I find that the obscured pathways from poverty to wealth not 
only leaves the experiences of the interim near-future zone remarkably evacuated of reasoned meaning, 
but in addition to the short-term punctuated events replacing larger linear progression (i.e. regular acts 
of praying, attending religious services, or of saving, investing, gambling, or donating resources) the 
blurry void in between poverty and wealth appears easily ascribable with notions of mysticism, secrecy, 
trickery, or cheating. 
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 These concealed aspects are what I will finally turn to in the next chapter. While the 
material wealth and success displayed by the Sefwi region’s churches, banks, spiritua lists, and lotto 
games all deal with prospective instantaneous rewards that may become obtainable through ludic or 
supernatural forces, another potentially viable pathway for someone to quickly experience success and 
amass material wealth involves individual agency in the form of practices of cheating.  
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CHAPTER 5: 
WEALTH THROUGH LEAPS AND BOUNDS:  
COCOA, CHEATING AND CORRUPTION 
*** 
“In Ghana, everywhere you go; corrupt, corrupt, corrupt!” 
- Depot Boy in Juaboso, March 2014 
“Everything about cocoa is cheating. You see, even Tetteh Quarshie, the first farmer, he stole the beans from a village on 
Fernando Po and took them to Ghana. Cheating is there in all of our h istory.” 
- Former cocoa merchant in Sefwi Wiawso, March 2014 
 
It is a commonly known story in Ghana how cocoa was reputedly first brought there a 
long time ago by Tetteh Quarshie, a man native to the inland area of Accra, who brought the seeds 
with him on his return from a journey to the island of Fernando Po in the Bay of Guinea101. Tetteh 
Quarshie is often recognised in historical and popular literature as the progenitor of cocoa cultivation in 
the area that is Ghana today. However, the coupling of the historical figure of Tetteh Quarshie  with 
practices of ‘cheating’ is one I have only encountered during my fieldwork conversations with 
Ghanaians. Although the Ghanaian cocoa business remains thoroughly regulated through the state 
monopoly on exports, rigorous quality controls, and officially fixed domestic purchase prices, actors 
within the national market still find creative ways of making additional, unregistered monetary profits 
for themselves.  
People I spoke with during my 2014-15 fieldworks used a number of different 
expressions to describe the general ways in which people across the nation seek to create special 
advantages for themselves. ‘Corruption’ and ‘cheating’ are two commonly used terms in this regard, but 
I have soon learned that the moral and ethical implications of actions referred to by such overall labels 
are not all that easy to infer. Coupled with other terms and concepts regarding acts of business dealings 
                                                                 
101 Specifically, according to information at the Tetteh Quarshie Cocoa Farm Museum situated today at 
Akwapim-Mampong, Tetteh Quarshie brought and planted the cocoa seeds on his return in 1879. 
185 
 
and interpersonal relations102, the immorality of such extra-legal activities cannot automatically be 
presumed beforehand but often requires additional information to ascertain.  
Anthropologist Jennifer Hasty has addressed the topic of corruption as it has been 
expressed through Ghanaian public media discourses around the turn of the millennium (Hasty 2005). 
By focusing on newspaper journalism in particular, Hasty points to a tendency among Ghanaian 
journalists to use metaphors likening the total resources of society to food on a household table or 
alternatively as the blood flow inside a human body. Perpetrators of corrupt activities are in these forms 
of imageries described as someone who consumes or leeches more than their fair share of the total 
goods of society. Consequently, Ghanaian media would at times describe successful anticorruption 
interventions as acts that force the guilty perpetrators to ‘vomit’ back up the funds they have illegally 
taken (ibid: 275). Similarly, where the circulation of money through society is compared to a blood flow 
through a body, Hasty finds that in the case of anticorruption efforts: “informal transactions of money 
are understood not as blood flow through the sociopolitical body but as blood loss streaming from it. 
Thus, government offices and businesses riven with corruption are said to be “haemorrhaging”, while 
those responsible may be portrayed as vampires” (ibid: 278). Hasty builds parts of her analysis on the 
work of political scientist Jean-François Bayart, who has characterised the political logics of post-
colonial African states as “the politics of the belly” (Bayart 1993 [1989]). According to Bayart, a shared 
logic of consumption links the day-to-day struggles of the African poor with the kleptocratic tendencies 
among the continent’s wealthy elites. Effectively, acts of eating come to occupy a range of meaning 
from nourishment for survival at one end to overeating, becoming fat, exploiting, accumulating, and 
attacking or killing by witchcraft at the extreme other end (ibid: 269-270). Where precisely any 
individual act of cheating or instance of corruption would seem to fall on such a scale appears therefore 
to be very much a matter of the voracity and greediness with which others perceive the perpetrator in 
question to have done so. In this type of metaphoric imagery where the total amount of resources of 
society is imagined as a shared household meal, small-scale acts of taking extra resources for oneself 
can easily become construed as a reasonable and fair matter of merely securing one’s own rightful 
portion of food before other more gluttonous table companions would otherwise take it. Likewise, 
through the imagery of a society’s money and resources likened to a blood flow inside a national body, 
small-scale acts of leeching can become justified as merely a personal survival strategy, since greedy 
vampiric others already work to suck the whole of society dry. Hasty sums up this issue succinctly as 
                                                                 
102 Such as ‘kick-backs’, ‘facilitation payments’, ‘petty corruption’, ‘grand corruption’, ‘top-offs’, ‘tributes’, ‘gifts’, 
and ‘dashes’. 
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she writes that: “Corruption is not understood by Ghanaians to be a problem of self-centered 
alienation and withdrawal from social relations of trust but a problem of hyperengagement in vital 
socio-political flows of desire and affect as well as materiality. […] Perpetra tors of corruption are thus 
not selfish, immoral sociopaths, but extroverted sociophiles, deeply engaged in the morally charged 
generation, transformation, and circulation of various forms of value (whether eating or sharing, 
bleeding or infusing, harming or helping).” (Hasty 2005: 284). Through this kind of gradient moral 
scale, my own suggestion follows; that it becomes possible to gauge parts of an outer boundary for 
each individual person’s socially acceptable space for value creation. Expansions of interpersonal 
networks and accumulation of material wealth for oneself constitute in principle socially encouraged 
ambitions and markers of success – up until the point where one’s activities of taking leave other 
people wanting. Following Bayart’s ‘politics of the belly’, eating until one’s own belly is full indicates 
success, whereas overeating to the detriment of others is bad103. A very similar principle for the 
freedom of individual agency exists in European and American legal and moral traditions, exemplified 
by the saying that “Your right to swing your arms ends just where the other man’s nose begins.” 
(Shapiro 2006: 141). In terms of spatialized value, as discussed in Chapter 2, I see this as the actualization 
of boundaries of otherness that limit the potential spatial dimensions any given entity can expand itself 
and its agency into. 
In Ghana other factors and traditions serve to complicate the whole matter further. Like 
the different West African traditions for the spatial distribution and definition of land rights,  as 
discussed in Chapter 3, I find that boundaries involved in transactions of goods and services likewise 
appear with more flexibility and persistent ambiguity than in typical contemporary Western world legal 
and economic approaches. For example, a young man in Bonsu Nkwanta mentioned to me how he 
wished to one day study to become a governmental cocoa QCO (Quality Control Officer), since this 
profession offered good money. When I asked him if this was because the government provided high 
salary levels for this type of job, the young man replied that the salary was good, but it was the extra 
“dashes” one could take that made it all very lucrative. A ‘dash’ is a commonly used expression across 
Ghana and other English speaking parts of West Africa describing a surplus quantitative or qualitative 
value added on top of an already agreed transaction total as a way to seal the deal (see for instance 
Guyer (2004: 59) regarding the use of this term in Nigeria). Another expression for the same in Ghana, 
                                                                 
103 Again, this logic operates as a zero-sum scenario, both if  one approaches the total resources of  society as 
sharable food on a table as well as a blood flow through a body; if  one person obtains more than they need, 
consequently that means that others have obtained less than they should. 
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at least, is the addition of a “top off” to sweeten a freshly settled deal. The difference between 
transactions involving a socially acceptable ‘dash’ or a ‘top off’ on the one side and a socially 
unacceptable ‘bribe’ or a ‘kickback’ on the other side appears also largely one of degree rather than 
categorical definition. As I learned through my conversation with the young man in Bonsu Nkwanta, 
for the Ghanaian cocoa business it has apparently become accepted custom for LBC depot keepers to 
pay QCOs a cash amount of 1 GH₵ for each bag the latter approve and seal up for exports. Specific 
information like this, however, proved generally difficult to access for outsiders like myself, since many 
such practices of the Ghanaian cocoa business are deliberately shrouded in layers of secrecy. I still 
found it imperative to learn more ethnographic details about precisely such off-bounds forms of 
activities, since these discrepancies between formally defined procedures and actual performances, I 
believe, furthermore open up spaces for something very similar to that which Guyer calls ‘marginal 
gains’ in her work on monetary transactions in Atlantic Africa (See also Chapter 1, p.41). Thus, by 
effectively creating or exploiting potential margins within the Ghanaian cocoa business, shrewd 
negotiators can generate sizeable monetary gains for themselves, consequently providing the cocoa 
business of the country with a reputation as both profitable and corrupt. This, in turn, serves to make 
its successful participants seen as both enviable entrepreneurs and greedy cheaters that are partially to 
blame for the continued experiences of poverty among others. 
 
Image 48: Cocoa bag with attached QCC approval seal awaits transport to the coast inside an LBC cocoa depot 
in rural Sefwi. September 2015. 
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Exploring the Deliberately Hidden 
*** 
Despite the readiness of practically any Ghanaian I interviewed to openly acknowledge 
that corruption remains rampant and that practices of cheating take place throughout all parts of the 
Ghanaian cocoa business, it proved much more difficult to gain insights into what specific kinds of 
practices these people alluded to104. Consider for example the following short cautionary statement that 
I was told during one of the very first interviews I carried out in Ghana as part of this thesis fieldwork: 
“There are many tricks that LBCs use to secure profits on cocoa, which they will never tell outsiders 
about”.  The interviewee in this case was a former district manager of a Licensed Buying Company 
somewhere in the Western Region of Ghana, who a few years before had abruptly left the cocoa 
business behind and fled under false identity to the Tamale metropolitan area of Ghana’s Northern 
Region. I met “Mr. Shani” (an alias he asked me to use) through some of my prior contacts from my 
NGO affiliated days in this area. Mr. Shani’s reason for going undercover, he admitted, had been in 
order for him to avoid facing legal responsibility for certain financial irregularities which had rendered 
his department of an LBC bankrupt – the precise details of which he, however, did not feel 
comfortable disclosing. While Mr. Shani stated that he personally had no intention of ever returning to 
the Ghanaian cocoa business again, he also maintained that he still remained loyal towards some of his 
former colleagues still working in the business, and this loyalty prevented him from speaking openly 
about certain aspects of their work. His words quoted above were part of an overall cautioning to me 
that I should not expect to gain ethnographic insights into certain practices of the Ghanaian cocoa 
business. 
 Right from the onset of the fieldwork I had been met with such warnings by Mr. Shani 
and soon also by others which indicated that the Ghanaian cocoa business is seemingly characterized 
by both a formal, publicly visible side, as well as an informal side, commonly recognized yet also 
carefully concealed from public scrutiny. This apparent duality constituted quite a conundrum to me 
during my early fieldwork, first of all because of the immediate methodological implications for my 
research. I had no intentions of making my larger work goal a question of public exposition, that is, to 
seek to reveal the perpetrators of potentially illegal business practices, such as those apparently “many 
                                                                 
104 The tendency towards public disapproval and official illegality of  many such practices meant that I only met 
few people who were willing to openly count themselves among those persons who truly ‘cheated’. On the other 
hand, I do not recall meeting one single person during my fieldworks in Ghana, who told me that they personally 
believed that the majority of  other people working in the country’s cocoa business were doing so honestly. 
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tricks that LBCs use to secure profits on cocoa”. My ambition was not to try and act like another 
journalistic ‘Anas’ character in relation to the Ghanaian cocoa business, a man who had brought 
numerous others into legal trouble105, but rather I sought to come closer to an understanding of how 
cocoa in multiple regards becomes associated with value through the many diverse ways in which 
people talk about and engage themselves with it. This academic ambition still kept me curious about 
the topic of corruption and cheating, delicate though it is, and over time and through many interactions 
with people familiar with the business I found an outline of understanding gradually emerge. Most 
often people I spoke with were only willing to allude to the topic of cheating through broad statements 
or intentionally vague replies. For instance, a cocoa purchasing clerk I interviewed in Juaboso stated 
cryptically about the management level positions of his profession that “District officers can prosper 
within a year, if they know their business well.” My follow-up question of whether one could prosper 
so quickly only through legal means was met with a wink and a broad smile and the reply that “Ehee - 
they have their ways. A man needs to be clever or he won’t last long in this business.” My further 
probes for examples of such prosperous ways of doing business gained me little beyond more evasive 
answers along the lines of “I couldn’t tell - this I couldn’t tell you…”  
 The people that proved most reluctant to meet and share information with me tended to 
be the ones directly involved at management levels of LBCs along with representatives from higher 
levels of Ghana’s national cocoa authorities. Mr. Shani’s initial warning to me turned out to have clear 
merit to it, although some depot keepers and LBC managers did not seem to mind my visits and were 
furthermore willing to talk quite openly about more innocuous aspects of their work. At other times the 
secrecy shrouding these parts of the Ghanaian cocoa business resulted in rather awkward fieldwork 
encounters. One interview I had to cut short, since the cocoa depot keeper started to visibly sweat and 
stutter more and more for each question I asked, until the point where I felt as if I was interrogating 
rather than conversing with the man. Luckily he recovered well enough to shake my hand and fluently 
wish me good luck with my further research, once we had left his office again and I said goodbye to 
him outside his depot building. At another rural depot the depot keeper first welcomed me into his 
office, yet soon after our interview began he excused himself to go talk for a moment with some 
colleagues outside. When he returned to his office again, he apologized and said that we unfortunately 
could not continue with our talk, since it had come to his attention that I had not presented his office 
with an official introduction letter from my country’s ambassador to Ghana, and it would of course be 
                                                                 
105 As first discussed in the Chapter 1, p.37-38. 
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impossible for him to make exceptions from proper procedures106. On a third occasion I had 
impulsively stopped by a roadside depot where I saw the keeper sitting at a work desk outside. From 
there he was overseeing some workers who were bringing out bags of cocoa from the inside of the 
warehouse to spread and re-dry their contents on tarpaulin covers in the sunny courtyard. The depot 
keeper at first invited me to take a seat with him, but after I had introduced myself as an academic 
researcher curious about cocoa, he subsequently outright refused to answer any further of my 
questions, no matter how harmless I thought they were107. After this third time in only a week it had 
happened that an attempted interview with a cocoa depot keeper had somehow gone awry, I asked 
Eric, my local field assistant at the time, what he thought I was doing wrong. His reply was that: 
“Ghanaians here [in the Sefwi traditional area] are very superstitious about white men and their abilities. 
They think that just by visiting, white people will have some secret tools that will detect what is really 
going on, and so they fear visits and are very suspicious of visitors.” My first thought upon hearing this 
explanation was one of surprised incredulity – I had not at all imagined that people of this region might 
think that I used secret work tools, when all across Ghana I had repeatedly been told that it was people 
working inside the cocoa business that used secret tricks and tools to accomplish their goals. Instantly 
these three awkward meetings between myself and the cocoa depot keepers now seemed to me almost 
like encounters between two strangers, where each one suspected the other of being a sleight-of-hand 
magician, and each one therefore warily conversed with the other while looking out for hints of trickery 
or deceit.  
                                                                 
106 To note, although I had worked as a student intern for two different Danish ambassadors to Ghana from 
2008-09, I had somehow never before heard of  any such expectations of  proper procedures prior to this 
meeting in question. Consequently, I had to leave the interview with this LBC depot keeper unfinished.  
107 For instance, the depot keeper would neither confirm nor deny whether his company had ever used public 
advertising on radio or in newspapers to market themselves to potential new farmer customers. When I asked 
whether his LBC had any promotional materials available that I could read to learn more information about 
them, he replied that he was not at liberty to tell me whether they had such items. When asked, he could 
confirm, though, that the name of  his company was in fact the very one we both could see painted in big letters 
on top of  the depot building we sat in front of, and furthermore that the company’s head office was situated in 
Kumasi. However, he refused to provide me with any sort of  contact information to the company’s 
headquarters. As I bid him farewell and good day after about two very awkward minutes of  me attempting to 
initiate conversation, the keeper finally volunteered, somewhat apologetically, as I interpreted the tone of  his 
voice, that he was really not allowed to share any information by his top management, ever since there had been 
this particular “incident”, which he was not able to talk about either. Puzzled, I left the place and never really did 
find out what sort of  “incident” it was that had apparently prompted such tight-lipped secrecy. 
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Only in hindsight have I realized how accurately these odd encounters match with 
Tsing’s insightful description that “Cultures are continually co-produced in the interactions I call 
“friction”: the awkward, unequal, unstable, and creative qualities of interconnection across difference.” 
(Tsing 2005: 4). Although I had initially considered these interviews as near complete failures on my 
part, they could indeed also be approached as culturally co-productive moments of friction, even if the 
co-production took forms unintended by each individual participant. Again, I will propose that another 
way to approach the emergent ‘friction’ of such unequal encounters could be along the lines of value 
theory and the idea of boundaries and ‘spatialized value’. My failed attempts to engage with, establish 
rapport, and interview the mentioned Ghanaian cocoa depot keepers could be treated as the 
enactments of boundaries of difference that each reproduced a number of ‘spatialized values’. One 
such actualization took the form of a notional boundary between ‘black’ and ‘white’ people. As 
previously discussed (in Chapter 3) this categorical divide had repeatedly come to the forefront of my 
interactions with people in rural Ghana. In the present context it immediately took a form where my 
mere physical appearance, coupled with my opening presentation of myself as a foreign academic 
researcher curious about cocoa, branded me as an outsider – doubly so. Still, the attempted interviews 
in question would likely have proven difficult to conduct for an indigenous academic researcher as well. 
As my earlier conversation with Mr. Shani had indicated, the actualized boundaries of difference 
between trust and distrust were not only observable and reproduced as a matter between black 
Ghanaians versus white Oborunis, but these types of barriers differentiating loyalty and lack of the 
same were also very much enacted between different Ghanaians in relation to this country’s cocoa 
business. While Mr. Shani had stated that his continued loyalty towards some of his former cocoa 
business colleagues still kept him from revealing to me their exact methods of cheating, his own sense 
of loyalty had evidently not extended to his now former Ghanaian employer, whose district department 
of a Licensed Buying Company he had left in financial disarray and abandoned overnight. Another 
point of comparison in this regard could again be made to the 2010 exposures by investigative 
journalist Anas Aremeyaw Anas, still infamously remembered among many people in the country’s 
cocoa business as of 2014-15. To further contextualize his work (first discussed in Chapter 1), Anas had 
secured his own access to record candid videos of acts of bribery and collusion by posing as an aspiring 
junior insider of the cocoa business seeking assistance to carry out an intended smuggling operation 
across the border from Ghana to Côte d’Ivoire. Instead, Anas published videos of border officials and 
cocoa business people asking for and taking monetary bribes in return for their help (Food Security 
Ghana, April 8th 2010; The Daily Graphic, September 26 th 2014)108.  
                                                                 
108 Anas’ documentary video that first exposed the illegal activities is titled ”Interest of  the State prt. 1” and was 
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Added together, these pieces of information indicate to me that while the commercial 
cocoa business of Ghana is commonly acknowledged as potentially very profitable, the enacted 
boundaries and applied methods for the realisation of such potential value do frequently not align with 
the formally linked institutional entities expressed in the forms of officially registered business partners 
or collaborators in a commodity chain. Sometimes barriers arise within single organizational units, 
while at other times unofficial collaborations effectively realign barriers across sections of multiple such 
units. Again, in keeping with Guyer’s (2004) concept of ‘marginal gains’,  I think a widespread cultural 
praxis can be observed that does not align well within the ‘-chain’ imagery of an isolated unilinear flow 
of commercial goods that accumulate value as they are moved stepwise from production to 
consumption. Instead, with the multiple different profit generating interactions with other people 
within as well as beyond what might be characterized as any single isolated chain link, perhaps the 
‘chain’ imagery as such is insufficient for capturing the multiplicity of cross-institutional and 
interpersonal loyalties, transactions, and betrayals that in turn frame the enactments of differently 
configured networks of meaning and value making activities. If insisting on a visual metaphor to 
accompany analyses of such, perhaps the image of a multidimensional mesh-work might be more 
fitting than one of a chain, to here borrow a term developed by Ingold (2011: 63-64). Likewise, if 
activities ideally intended to facilitate a lossless flow of commercial goods through a commodity chain 
in practice act more like a mesh-work that uncontrollably109 disperses value along the way, the similarity 
becomes quite striking too with the imagery of the ‘haemorrhaging national body’ invoked by the 
Ghanaian journalists of Hasty’s (2005) study.   
Another surprising perspective on this issue of entities and loyalties emerged when I later 
on met with a deputy administrator of COCOBOD at the government agency’s headquarters in the 
aptly named Cocoa House office building in central Accra. When I had first contacted this official by 
phone he had voiced scepticism towards my reasons for wishing to talk with him or any of his 
colleagues. However, he agreed to an interview after enquiring about my professional background and 
after finally becoming convinced, as he said, that I was neither a secret representative of a foreign cocoa 
purchaser or private chocolate company, nor an agent of Conceil Café Cacao, the competing government 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
initially presented to the Ghanaian public through various media outlets in early April 2010. This and subsequent 
videos were since uploaded by Anas to YouTube, where they have remained available for general viewing since 
October 6th 2012. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-auHOUrg1LI [page most recently accessed August 
4th 2018]. 
109 Or rather, beyond any one actor’s control. 
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agency of Côte d’Ivoire. With the boundaries of my formal affiliations thus sorted out, I was granted 
the opportunity to make a short interview with him the following day. During this interview I went on 
to ask the official what the COCOBOD agency thought about the widespread rumours of cheating and 
corruption throughout the Ghanaian cocoa business. His immediate reply was that “As long as they 
don’t cheat us, it is not really our concern”. The deputy administrator then went on to clarify that of 
course COCOBOD is aware of this cheating, however, such practices are no direct concern to them, as 
long as people in the domestic cocoa business only cheat each other, and so that the COCOBOD 
subsidiary, the CMC (Cocoa Marketing Company), always receives the full amounts and matching 
qualities stipulated in the contracts they issue to their LBC suppliers. Furthermore, as he continued, 
COCOBOD requires bank guarantees and security in collateral property of any prospective LBC 
applying for licence to work in Ghana. This way COCOBOD has the power to legally seize any LBC’s 
assets in addition to revoking their business licence, if an LBC cheats and fails to deliver the contracted 
volumes and qualities of cocoa, for which they have been paid. In conclusion, the administrator told 
me, “COCOBOD has proven itself to be a pillar of stability”, and, as he went on, both he and his 
colleagues were proud to be working there, and COCOBOD to them was “one big family”. These 
warm sentiments were eagerly backed up by two of the deputy administrator’s colleagues who 
happened to enter his office at this moment when my time slot for the interview was about to run out. 
As one of these co-workers specifically requested, I should furthermore remember to add to my 
interview notes that “COCOBOD is the shoulder on which all rests”. I have later pondered how much 
this last remark, quite like the two quoted before it, aligns with the kinds of African socio-political 
tendencies towards presenting social entities through bodily metaphors, as argued by Bayart 
(1993[1989]) and Hasty (2005). Of even greater significance there is something remarkable about these 
COCOBOD employees’ emphasis on likening their own workplace to that of a single stable family unit 
presented in apparent contrast to an also well-known but less stable and cheating society unit outside. 
Does this indicate that to the views of these governmental agency insiders, COCOBOD appears as a 
particular space for value creation, separate from the rest of society? In terms of formal organizational 
units COCOBOD encompasses multiple yet not all links of the Ghanaian cocoa commodity chain, but 
apparently do the reported acts of cheating and corruption throughout links outside of this agency’s 
own not really concern its representatives, as long as they themselves remain financially unaffected. 
Does such a reproduction of a conceptual boundary that limits responsibility furthermore signify an 
institutional focus on the generation of value from cocoa production neither through each and every 
singular national commodity chain link transaction, nor from the export transactions serving the whole 
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country of Ghana, but rather primarily for the benefit of an imagined institutional “family” unit of 
COCOBOD itself? 
My visit at the COCOBOD headquarters had also left me deeply puzzled about other 
aspects of the inner workings of the Ghanaian cocoa business. Especially the “many tricks” of the 
LBCs did afterwards seem more mysterious to me than ever. How can there reputedly be rampant 
cheating and corruption taking place all over the domestic commodity chain, if the numbers still 
somehow add up again once the cocoa is signed off and ready to leave the ports? How can officials 
working at COCOBOD, an institution they describe as the country’s “pillar of stability” and the 
“shoulder on which all rests”, remain seemingly unfazed by activities that Ghanaian media around the 
same time criticizes as causing “haemorrhaging” of the entire nation’s body? How can there be blood 
loss yet apparently no blood lost?  
I will return to discuss this seeming paradox in the closing sections of this chapter. 
However, to properly set the stage for that discussion, I find it imperative to first engage in a more 
ethnographically detailed exploration of the commercial activities inside the Ghanaian domestic cocoa 
business, and especially the interplays between the values of hidden hard numbers and the overall value 
of deliberately maintained numerical uncertainty. 
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Image 49: Ways for people to make extra money from cocoa. Sketches and fieldnotes by author. Information 
added gradually over the course of October 2014 during conversations with a number of cocoa farmers, depot 
boys, and one former purchasing clerk living in the area around Juaboso and Bonsu Nkwanta in Western Region, 
Ghana. 
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As the sketch on the preceding page shows, with the help of informants, it became 
possible for me to gradually assemble an overview over some forms of extraordinary money generating 
activities carried out among people in the domestic rural cocoa business of Ghana. However, I should 
add the caveat that while these movements of cocoa between types of stakeholders depicted here 
largely correspond with the formally organized categories of the rural parts of the Ghanaian cocoa 
commodity chain (see Chapter 2), this particular ordering was from the onset done so by me, the 
researcher, rather than by any of my informants. I had first sketched out these different units after 
spending a number of months in the field, for the purpose of using it as a visual aid for me and my 
local assistant during interviews with cocoa farmers, purchasing clerks, and depot boys who frequently 
did not speak English and who often were also illiterate. By pointing to each part of the drawing and 
asking “How can someone make extra money here?”, it became possible for me to gradually fill out the 
right-hand side of the paper with answers. Still, some people shared job tasks between multiple places 
or generated extra incomes through unrelated or tangentially related activities not depicted here. 
Therefore, I will not go so far as to suggest that the information presented should be considered as 
even close to exhaustive, even if it still manages to capture what I believe are some very significant 
examples of extra-legal money making trickery from the rural Ghanaian cocoa business.  
 
Cheating among Farmers and Purchasing Clerks 
*** 
 As discussed in Chapter 3, legal ownership of Ghanaian cocoa farm plots is often prone 
to dispute, especially due to the country’s dual constitutional recognition of traditional authorities’ 
rights to decide tribal matters on the one side and the national legal system based on British common 
law on the other. Especially immigrant cocoa farmers might easily find themselves on the losing sides 
of such cases, as national authorities, local rivalling chiefs, or other indigenous farmers might each and 
all claim to hold the true rights over land plots that a migrant farmer has already in good faith 
purchased or leased from others who have likewise claimed the ownership. Gradual land 
encroachments by other farmers or incursions by animals, plant diseases, or even malevolent nature 
spirits are other recognised perpetual threats to cocoa farms. Still, development and maintenance of a 
farm plot remains one of the strongest land claims that farmers can present in favour of their side. 
Therefore, as previously argued, the maintenance of a Ghanaian cocoa farm plot as a particular space 
for value creation involves ongoing attention to multiple factors of spatial reckoning, combined with 
vigilant acts of reaffirming its boundaries.  
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In regard to the issue of cheating and corruption in the Ghanaian cocoa business, my 
initial hypothesis has been that the cocoa farmers are most likely the ones who are being cheated the 
most. How else can stakeholders across subsequent commodity chain links generate their mysterious 
extra profits when all purchasing prices of cocoa are dictated by the government110 and publicized 
across the nation through radio, newspapers, television, and word-of-mouth? If everyone knows exactly 
how much any given volume of cocoa beans are supposed to be worth domestically, and if the national 
COCOBOD authorities claim themselves satisfied with the qualities and volumes they continuously 
receive - while also acknowledging that cheating and corruption takes place all through the business – 
then, surely, the farmers have to somehow be the ones losing out? 
It did however not take many interviews with farmers across the rural Sefwi area before a 
different and more nuanced pattern became apparent in the dynamics between farmers and Licenced 
Buying Company (LBC) purchasing clerks. Rather than being a matter of one actor exploiting the other 
there are often long-running business relations between individual farmers and specific Licenced 
Purchasing Clerks (LPCs), commonly spanning decades. Farmers can frequently rely on LPCs to 
provide them with advance cash payments for upcoming cocoa harvests, and these farmers are willing 
to provide extra volumes of cocoa in return as a form of approximated interest rate when the harvest is 
subsequently delivered111. Also, when I asked smallholder cocoa farmers if they ever suspected that they 
were being cheated by their LPCs, most replied with little more than a shrug that their chosen LPCs 
possibly or even likely cheated them a little, but not to a degree where it was really a problem. 
From the purchasing clerks’ point of view, the interviews revealed that acts of cheating 
are also something that can frequently be done by farmers, if a clerk is not careful. Some dishonest 
farmers will reportedly try and take advantage of the partial liberalization of the Ghanaian domestic 
cocoa market over the recent two decades, which now means that multiple LBCs112 compete for the 
purchase of the cocoa produced from farmers of the same communities. Opportunistic farmers can 
therefore try to seek cash advances from clerks of different competing LBCs for the same future cocoa 
harvest and then continuously stall their promised delivery to several of these LPCs as long as possible 
                                                                 
110 Specifically, the Producer Price Review Committee under COCOBOD including representatives from the Ministry 
of  Finance, Bank of  Ghana, along with a few other high-level cocoa business stakeholders. 
111 This is far from only a contemporary tendency, as historian Gareth Austin has noted evidence of  this practice 
as far back as the 1930s (Austin 1987: 270-71). See also Amanor (1999: 55). 
112 According to a PBC district manager I spoke with, 37 Licenced Buying Companies were already approved for 
business in Ghana in the 2014-15 season. This number he expected to increase further over the next few years.   
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and even beyond the season’s end (by repeatedly saying “I’ll bring it, I’ll bring it”, as one of my LPC 
informants voiced an example of a verbally heard excuse), and in general by making themselves difficult 
for the affected LPCs to meet again after taking the money advance.  
Both farmers and LPCs alike agreed that theft of cocoa at all stages of preparation, from 
ripe pods, over fermenting or drying beans, to break-ins at LPCs’ small pad-locked buying sheds, are 
other types of incidents that members of the rural populations have to ward themselves against. Since 
cocoa grown on one farm plot is practically impossible to tell apart from that of another, stolen 
volumes of such goods are rarely possible to reunite with their rightful owners, unless a thief has been 
actually caught in the act. Some farmers therefore sleep overnight on their farms to deter potential 
cocoa thieves during harvesting periods, and some town dwelling households even opt to move their 
freshly harvested cocoa to town to ferment and dry it outside their compounds there, since they 
consider this place more safely guarded than if they were to leave it largely unmonitored on their farms 
in the bush. Furthermore, once in town it is also more convenient to prepare the dried cocoa for sale. 
 
 
Image 50: Members of a Bonsu Nkwanta household are stirring through fermented cocoa to ensure it all dries 
evenly. The cocoa has been brought in from their farm plot in the bush. September 2015. 
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Likely, the first moment of numerical value appraisal of a given batch of cocoa will take 
place at the point when a farmer has estimated that their harvested and fermented cocoa has reached a 
point where it is now sufficiently dry to become sold. The farmer will then pour the beans from the 
drying mat into a ‘Ghana Cocoa Board – Produce of Ghana’-stamped jute sack that he has obtained 
from the locally operating LPC with whom he has decided to do business. Only very few among the 
cocoa farmers I visited throughout the Sefwi area were in possession of their own scales to measure the 
weights of their harvest with, so most of the time these sacks would simply be filled to capacity with 
the entire harvest batch and then subsequently weighed on the scale at the buying shed of the LPC. 
  
Image 51: An LPC weighs a bag of cocoa on the scale outside his buying shed. The weight indication of 84kg 
would entitle the farmer to receive an official payment of about 278 GH₵, but due to prior arrangements 
between the farmer and this purchasing clerk, including a cash advance some time ago, a lower actual pay-out is 
now about to be negotiated between them. Akaatiso, April 2014. 
Despite the officially fixed purchasing prices113 there remain still quite a few issues to be 
negotiated between a farmer and a clerk, before a final cash price can be determined. First of all the 
question of whether the contents of the weighed bag are sufficiently dried is of significant importance, 
most of all to the clerk. The purchasing clerks working for LBCs in Ghana are almost all paid on a 
commission basis, which means that they need to bring back certain numbers of full cocoa bags, for 
which the depot has beforehand provided them with money to buy. If the produce they buy later turn 
                                                                 
113
 Again, in the 2013-14 season this was 212 GH₵ per full 64 kg bag. 
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out to be too wet, say for example if a bag of cocoa contains 10% water instead of the official upper 
limit of 7.5%, then not only would the depot need to spend time and effort on re-drying these beans, 
but furthermore would they end up about 2.5% short on the final content side, once the excess water 
has been evaporated. Such losses the depot keeper will typically deduct from the clerk’s commission 
payment, so the latter has a strong incentive to make absolutely sure that the total volumes they obtain 
from the farmers do not risk shrinking below the official specifications. 
 
 
Image 52: An Aqua-Boy measurement tool issued to a governmental quality control officer. The metallic prongs 
are pushed through the fabric of each sealed cocoa bag and the moisture level percentages inside are indicated on 
the meter. Pieces of white chalk are then used to mark an ‘X’ on each bag that fails inspection. Cocoa depo t near 
Juaboso, September 2015. 
The Ghanaian governmental regulations stipulate that cocoa bags must contain no more 
than 7.5% water in order to receive approval for sale and export. However, to technically measure such 
moisture levels of a batch of cocoa beans requires specialized equipment. The governmental QCC 
officers have been supplied with so-called Aqua-Boys, small portable instruments that measure the 
electrical conductivity among cocoa beans inside bags to calculate the amounts of water present. Such 
tools are however very expensive (online prices I checked in 2016 tended to be around 1.600 USD or 
more per unit) and remain unavailable both price-wise and accessibility-wise to practically all Ghanaian 
farmers as well as LBCs. Instead, between farmers and purchasing clerks, the question of the moisture 
levels in the cocoa remains first and foremost a matter of visual and tactile estimation and negotiations. 
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Purchasing clerks will typically claim that the cocoa beans that farmers bring to them are uniformly too 
moist, and as such the clerks expect the farmers to add an extra “top-off” amount of cocoa to each bag 
to compensate for expected future shrinkage. Some LPCs handle the risk of shrinkage by straight up 
demanding that a full bag at the farm gate should contain as much as 66kg, while others I talked with 
spoke of 65.5kg or 64,5kg “with a top-off”. Another option for LPCs, as mentioned, is to offer the 
cash money to the farmers as a loan ahead of their harvest, which in turn gives the clerks extra leverage 
towards demanding additional “top-off” volumes to each delivered bag as a kind of interest rate 
payment once the beans are subsequently brought to them.  
One point that I heard many people of my fieldwork area agree on, is that cocoa farmers 
are very frequently short on cash, and expenses for their children’s schooling, agro-chemicals against 
sudden invasions of pests or diseases on the cocoa farm, let alone “shocks in the family” (e.g. deaths, 
serious illnesses, or other kinds of crisis) will often need to be covered urgently outside the harvest 
seasons. Especially tenant farmers and caretakers of cocoa farms suffer from no access to alternative 
sources for monetary loans, since their lack of permanent landed property ownership preclude them 
from securing loans at the rural banks. Such farmers both benefit from LPCs’ cash advances and yet 
remain in perpetually weak bargaining positions in relation to the calculations of fair interest rates on 
those loans, due to the lack of alternatives, as well as lack of legal regulation of this completely informal 
loans market114. Furthermore, since these rural workers also tend to come from the poorest social 
backgrounds with low to non-existing levels of schooling, they also frequently lack the skills to 
effectively calculate, budget, and save up newly earned cash towards future off-season expenses, just as 
they lack critical access to comparative knowledge of correct weighing scale indications. Finally, most 
farmers also lack effective ways to counter-argue an LPC’s claims that their offered cocoa supposedly 
contains much more than 7.5% water and that extra, large ‘top-off’ or ‘dash’ volumes of cocoa 
therefore ought to be added to the deal in order to compensate. 
                                                                 
114
 Such ’forward buying’ arrangements of  cocoa have been observed in the region since at least the 1930s, and 
Amanor (1999) refers to multiple surveys conducted between the 1930s and 1950s that indicate that between 25 
and 75 percent of  cocoa farmers pledged part of  their crop against money advances. Amanor further notes that: 
”The loan given was valued at half  the price of  the estimated cocoa yield at prevailing market prices” (ibid : 55). 
Austin (2005: 367-368) notes that before the establishment of  state level fixed prices of  cocoa in Ghana, the 
volatility of  world market prices constituted one reason why cocoa purchasers demanded such high interest rates 
on advance payments. Still, contemporary research by Knudsen & Fold indicates that cocoa farmers of  Juaboso 
District report wildly ranging interest rates between 0% to 100%, depending on the relationship between each 
individual purchasing clerk and farmer (Knudsen & Fold 2011: 385). 
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Other LPCs go even further in their efforts to ensure that they will not only avoid 
shortages on their final cocoa volumes but also come out ahead. The weighing scales provided by the 
buying companies at each LPC’s individual buying shed have to first be officially tested and approved 
by representatives of Ghana Standards Board (GSB). Commonly voiced rumours throughout the rural 
areas hold that some clerks pay so-called “moonlighting mechanics” to later adjust the approved scales 
so that these instruments instead indicate lower weights than what are actually placed on them. This 
way, cheating clerks can surreptitiously obtain additional amounts of cocoa without payment, with 
estimates I heard ranging anywhere from 2 to 9kg and typically around 5kg extra per bag. In contrast, at 
the larger town and district depots the weighing scales most often remain ‘free’ and untampered with, 
since unannounced scale test inspections by the authorities will more frequently occur there. At the 
local buying sheds out in the rural communities, though, no one I spoke with had yet heard of such 
GSB surprise inspections taking place.  
 
Image 53: A large cocoa weighing scale bears an official, although expired, certification sticker from Ghana 
Standards Board. Cocoa depot in Juaboso District. March 2014. 
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A licenced purchasing clerk who has adjusted his or her weighing scale can therefore 
often deliver the promised amount of full bags back to the depot while secretly making additional 
private profits. If, for instance, such a clerk has entered an agreement with a particular depot to bring 
back 20 bags of cocoa during the season, the depot will first provide the clerk with initial cash funds to 
make such a number of purchases, in this particular example around (212 Cedis x 20 bags) 4.240 
GH₵115. If this clerk has adjusted their issued weighing scale to be off by 5kg to their own advantage, 
they will then after each deal become able to add the extra obtained cocoa to another sack. As a result, 
after purchasing about 13 secretly overweight bags this way they will then in fact be in possession of 14 
correctly sized bags in their storage shed. Then, after purchasing only about 5.5 bags more, they will 
then become capable of delivering the contracted 20 bags of 64kg each to their home LBC depot. At 
this point it might look as if such cheating clerks could then quietly keep the remaining 318 GH₵ (212 
Cedis x 1.5 bags) of the LBC’s cash advance as their own private profit. However, I was told that all 
purchasing clerks actually have to deliver each bag to their depot with a weight of about 65 kg or more 
due to two reasons. First, the depots expect all received cocoa to automatically lose more weight from 
gradual moisture evaporation during the temporary storage at their warehouses, and they still need 
these cocoa bags to retain at least the officially required net weight by the time they ship them off. 
Second, the depots frequently experience that the farmers have rushed to sell their cocoa to the LPCs 
before it is sufficiently dry, so the depots will often need to empty and re-dry the contents of the bags 
arriving at their warehouses in order to bring the moisture levels down to the maximal 7.5% water limit. 
 The ex-LPC who described these practices to me justified such acts of cheating on the 
weighing scales by claiming that it has become a necessary thing to do in order to both survive and 
succeed as a Ghanaian cocoa purchasing clerk. First, he claimed, the depot keepers and their 
accountants will right from the start withhold about 2.0 kg cash value (i.e. about 6.60 GH₵) out of 
each bag they procure in order to cover general ‘depot expenses’. So from the onset the LPCs are sent 
out with smaller amounts of cash than what is sufficient to actually buy all the correct number of bags 
of the necessary weight and at the officially decreed price. Furthermore, LPCs also typically have to pay 
some small amounts of money to the people who help them transport the bags they obtain from the 
farms and village homesteads to their local buying sheds and later on again to the larger LBC depots. 
                                                                 
115 According to the LBC business people I interviewed, only clerks who have already proven themselves 
trustworthy will be granted such (or larger) amounts of  money in advance by a depot. Typically, LBC depots will 
first test out new prospective clerks by only providing them enough cash to buy 2-4 bags of  cocoa, and this only 
after securing collateral security from the junior clerk’s family. If  a new clerk proves trustworthy and capable of  
delivering, they can subsequently arrange to let them handle larger procurement volumes and cash amounts.  
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Finally, the clerks even have to cover both the ongoing rent of their local padlocked buying shed and 
their own living expenses throughout the harvest seasons, since the LBC depots will only pay them 
their commission – typically 6.00 GH₵ per bag – at the end of each season. Many clerks therefore have 
to spend parts of the already insufficient initial cocoa purchase cash they have been provided by the 
depots to just personally get by during the crop seasons. Consequently, in order to still deliver the 
correct number of bags despite having too little money for it, purchasing clerks have to get creative and 
cheat somehow. The former purchasing clerk that had explained these working conditions to me had 
added the comment that he personally had left the business again after only a few years, because this 
severe and constant pressure to make ends meet had become too much for him. 
As it was described to me, unless a purchasing clerk finds ways to be creative and cheat, 
they will almost certainly stand to lose rather than make money from taking up this type of job. Only 
those who are very clever find ways to beat the odds and make real profits for themselves. The former 
LPC who I interviewed claimed furthermore that all LBCs in Ghana are fully aware of these practices 
of cheating, and that their own businesses in fact depend on such activities, since they too need to 
obtain certain extra volumes of cocoa at little to no additional cost in order to secure their own profits 
in this overall corrupt business environment. 
If the LPCs’ working conditions are compared analytically to this thesis’ proposed 
combined concept of spatiality and value creation, it appears to me that the LBC depots have 
effectively succeeded in expanding their own boundaries for value generation onto areas formally 
outlined for the purchasing clerks, who in turn find themselves pressured for survival into encroaching 
upon the boundaries of the value generating spaces of the farmers by cheating them on the weighing 
scales and more. While some LPCs manage to react to the buying companies’ spatialized value-push by 
reclaiming the deficits elsewhere to a degree where they even profit, other LPCs, perhaps those feeling 
more morally inhibited in regards to intentionally overstepping the boundaries of others, experience 
such a pressure from their own effectively narrowed space for value generation in between the buying 
companies and the farmers that they find themselves forced to abandon this line of work entirely. 
 Quite peculiarly, still, the tough business conditions established between purchasing 
clerks and the LBCs they work for often appear to result in closer collaborations and loyalties between 
individual clerks and farmers. In order to make their jobs profitable each purchasing clerk depends on 
somehow ensuring the continued willingness of local farmers to not only sell their cocoa produce to 
them rather than to a clerk of another company, but furthermore each farmer somehow has to provide 
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the clerk with extra volumes of cocoa beyond what they are actually paid for. From the other side of 
this relation, farmers benefit from the improved off-season access to cash advances from the 
purchasing clerks, who thereby effectively serve as local loans financiers (see also Austin 2005: 361-
362). Still, despite the inequalities of their negotiating positions relative to each other, I have learned 
that individual purchasing clerks and cocoa farmers express widespread levels of mutual trust. Both 
tend to live in the same rural communities, often knowing each other and each other’s families for 
decades already. Purchasing clerks are also often cocoa farmers themselves, frequently young grownup 
children of local cocoa farming parents who attempt to supplement their current meagre options for 
tenant farming incomes with part time LPC jobs. Often an individual LPC is also already member of a 
local small society of neighbouring cocoa farmers, societies whose members have agreed to help each 
other and thereby effectively reproduce a form of mutually shared space for value generation as bound 
against the larger outside society. This way, when LPCs find themselves unable to make ends meet due 
to the harsh conditions imposed on them by the LBCs, the clerks can in many cases draw on the 
established solidarity between their fellow society farmers to obtain extra volumes of cocoa to 
compensate.  
This form of mutual collaboration is however not observable from the bounded units of 
typical organizational cocoa business flowcharts, which label such purchasing clerks as either ground 
level employees of specific LBCs or otherwise as seasonal contractors hired by them. Cocoa farmers, in 
turn, either appear as independent external purveyors of the company’s inputs of commercial goods, or 
may else likely not feature as formally related to the buying company at all. Likewise, cocoa commodity 
chain representations distinguish between LBCs and LPCs as comprising one particular stakeholder 
entity, directly linked to while also fully separate from the cocoa farmers who in turn are lumped all 
together into one separate uniform category of primary producers. Cynically speaking, the LBCs might 
very well have intentionally sought to bring about and exploit this very situation. By partially alienating 
the weakest rung of their own work force, the LBCs can abuse the widespread solidarity and mutual 
responsibility shared among many cocoa farming societies as a method to extract extra value from the 
farmers’ spaces into the LBCs’ own.  
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Image 54: A brown layer of cocoa lays strewn out for re-drying atop a large blue tarpaulin cover outside an LBC 
depot near Juaboso. Behind, another batch of bags is ready to be emptied for the same purpose. All of these 
bags have been freshly collected by depot boys who have used the white mini truck to fetch them from a 
number of LPCs’ buying sheds situated around the nearby countryside. September 2015. 
 
Cheating at the Rural Licenced Buying Company Depots 
*** 
After a farmer and an LPC have finished their transaction, the purchased cocoa will be 
put away somewhere safe – either in a room inside the local household of the clerk, or inside a separate 
nearby buying shed or storage room locked with one or more padlocks. Once an LPC has obtained a 
number of bags he or she will call the depot keeper of the affiliated LBC and request the ‘primary 
evacuation’, which means that transport will be arranged to bring the bags from the clerk’s local storage 
shed to the larger nearby buying company depot. At the depots the bags are first head-carried inside 
one by one by depot boys116. In return for their menial work these depot boys earn a small commission 
for each bag of cocoa that is eventually shipped out from the place. Until then they take care of all the 
lifting and carrying involved in the handling of the bags as these are picked from the bush, brought to 
                                                                 
116 ’Depot boys’ are almost exclusively young adult males, at least partially due to the tough physical requirements 
of  the job. Also, in Ghana the implied low hierarchical social status of  a ’boy’ is not incidental. 
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the depot, and often repeatedly emptied out onto tarpaulin in the front courtyard for daytime re -drying 
followed by re-bagging again at sunset and storage on pallets inside for the nights.  
 The partial liberalization of the Ghanaian domestic market for cocoa purchases has since 
the late 1990s attracted a number of private companies and investors. At the time of my fieldworks 
there were around 37 different Licenced Buying Companies operating in Ghana. The PBC (Produce 
Buying Company), the now privatized former state-run company, still holds a market dominance of 
about 40% of the total annual cocoa output of the nation, according to a COCOBOD representative I 
spoke with in 2014. Many cocoa farmers likewise explained to me that they still prefer to sell their 
cocoa to the PBC, since they believe the Ghanaian state to remain a major shareholder in this company, 
which to these farmers mean that it seems less likely to go bankrupt someday than some privately 
operating LBC owned by foreign companies. To compete with the PBC and other strongly established 
competitors many smaller LBCs therefore try to differentiate themselves through various business and 
payment structures, various partnerships, and various forms of incentives and promotions (Tetteh 
Anang 2011). Some LBCs offer subsidised farming tools or fertilizers to farmers who sell their produce 
to them, while others make external partnerships with international chocolate companies to bring 
developmental improvements such as boreholes or school teaching materials to local communities 117. 
Some LBCs team up with NGOs to offer bonus payments through various certification schemes 
supporting environmental protection efforts or improved labour and income conditions of farmers118. 
Still others base themselves as co-operative organizations owned by and working for the benefit of 
their cocoa farming shareholders119. Overall, the degree to which a farmer may receive cash directly in 
hand in return for the sale of their harvest has been shown to often constitute the primary factor for 
farmers’ choices of LBCs (Vigneri & Santos 2007).  
While the different LBCs in Ghana compete against each other in order to each obtain 
the largest possible share of the total volume of cocoa produced each season, the COCOBOD 
subsidiary, the CMC (Cocoa Marketing Company) meanwhile acts as the sole legal purchaser of cocoa 
                                                                 
117 For instance Armajaro Ltd. whose affiliated Source Trust NGO has implemented a number of  development 
efforts on behalf  of  foreign collaborating chocolate companies including Cadbury, Lindt, Toms, and others. 
118 e.g. Olam Ltd., collaborating with Rainforest Alliance NGO (see also chapter 3). Kuapa Kokoo Ltd. 
meanwhile collaborates with the Fairtrade certification brand. 
119 e.g. Kuapa Kokoo Ltd. (see Doherty & Tranchell 2005). 
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from all LBCs. From their basis in Accra the CMC employs five professional traders120, who handle all 
Ghanaian cocoa sales to the world market. The CMC keeps ongoing track of the volumes of cocoa 
obtained by the various LBCs and decide the timing for the secondary evacuations from the many LBC 
depots to the portside warehouses, matching these flows to the international order volumes. Most 
orders are exported via palleted bags inside shipping containers (through Tema and Takoradi) while a 
few are exported as bulk cargo (through Takoradi only121). 
 
Image 55: Cocoa depot belonging to the Armajaro Ltd. licenced buying company. Bonsu Nkwanta, March 2014. 
 
A rural LBC depot building in Ghana is typically built to hold anywhere from a few 
hundred up to a few thousand cocoa bags at a time. In the major hub towns of Juaboso District, which 
count the town of Juaboso itself along with Bonsu Nkwanta, the major buying companies have 
gradually expanded their storage capacity by building additional depots, leading to designations such as 
for instance PBC depot A, B, and C in order to differentiate between their local branches.  
 
                                                                 
120 This information according to a COCOBOD deputy administrator I interviewed in November 2014. 
121 As of  2015 only Takoradi has a bulking facility where previously prepared and QCC approved cocoa bags are 
emptied again for bulking purposes. Ghanaian bulking exports are overall limited, as most sales of  bulk cocoa 
take place from Côte d’Ivoire. 
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Similarly to the conditions at the rural farms, households, and LPC storage sheds, the 
very generic look of cocoa makes such goods attractive targets for theft from LBC depots, since cocoa 
can easily be transferred into other unmarked bags and resold or simply added to a competitor’s depot. 
Consequently, all the larger LBC depots employ round-the-clock watchmen to guard these places 
against intruders. One depot keeper I interviewed related how his own first year in this job had been a 
nightmare for him. During the peak of the main crop season, his depot had filled up faster than he 
could obtain the governmental QCC (Quality Control Company) approvals to send the bags forward to 
the port. This meant that he had been forced to temporarily storage piles of cocoa bags on tarpaulin 
covered pallets outdoors, and by the closing of the season he realised that someone had been able to 
steal hundreds of those bags from under the nose of himself and his depot watchman. The LBC main 
office held him responsible for this loss, so he would have been instantly bankrupted, if he had not 
been able to sell off a piece of family land to cover the cost of the many lost bags. Since then, the depot 
keeper told me, he had learned his lesson and become extra vigilant about the security of his depot, but 
it took him a long time to recover the amounts of money that the catastrophic first year had cost him.  
 
Image 56: Inside a cocoa depot building belonging to the Unicom Ltd. licenced buying company. The depot 
keeper (wearing a white polo shirt) inspects a list of the most recently arrived bags together with one of the 
depot boys. Juaboso, September 2015. 
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When a depot keeper estimates that a sufficient number of bags are ready for inspection 
he will contact the local branch of the QCC to book a visit by a Quality Control Officer (QCO). These 
government officials have been trained to perform a standardized series of tests to classify and ensure 
the quality of each single bag of cocoa that is bound for export.  
A QCO inspection, briefly put, involves the following consecutive steps: hygiene, 
moisture, purity, size, and then interior cocoa bean colour. First, the quality control officer will start out 
with a quick visual inspection of the conditions at the depot. Floors should be swept clean from trash 
and all cocoa bags should be positioned on pallets and with about half a metre of free space towards 
any lime-washed walls122. No signs of insects, reptiles, or rodents should be noticeable anywhere inside 
and vegetation outside the depot building should preferably have been cut back some distance to deter 
animals from approaching or entering123. If problems are spotted during these initial observations the 
QCO will call off the inspection and instruct the depot keeper to bring things in order and then call for 
another inspection visit on a different day. Next the QCO will use an Aqua-Boy to check the moisture 
levels inside every bag, marking off each bag with more than 7.5% water contents as ‘NTD’ 124 and 
thereby having failed inspection. Such bags will need to be emptied and their contents re-dried before 
another inspection can be attempted. After this the QCO will extract a volume of cocoa beans from 
different sections of each remaining bag through the use of a stab sampling tool, also commonly  called 
a ‘horn’. After inspecting each sample for potential impurities,  such as remaining cocoa pod husk 
fragments or ‘abinkye’125, the QCO will mix and prepare a randomized sampling of the extracted cocoa 
in order to determine the average number of beans per 100g. This resulting size indication will be 
marked on the specific batch registration of the tested bags and constitutes an important reason for the 
premium quality marker of Ghanaian cocoa on the world market126. Finally, the QCO will cut 100 
                                                                 
122 Cocoa is highly hygroscopic and will therefore easily absorb taste polluting contaminants from the 
surroundings, for instance from being placed too close to lime-washed walls or directly on cement floors. 
123 Particularly rodents and snakes. 
124 NTD: ”Not Totally Dry” as this condition is termed. 
125 Abinkye indicates cocoa beans that have germinated or rotted before fermentation, or in different ways 
become unsuitable for consumption. The farmers are supposed to remove such abinkyie cocoa before selling the 
harvested cocoa. Subsequently, though, this waste product can occasionally be sold separately at a lower price for 
use in lip balm and skin pomade industries. 
126 This is partially since uniform bean sizes make it easier to avoid under- or over-roasting batches of  cocoa 
beans at the grinderies and chocolate manufacturers elsewhere, which would else impact the taste negatively. 
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beans in half and inspect the colours of their insides. Dark brown colours indicate that an optimal 
fermentation process has taken place, whereas more purple hues indicate that under-fermentation has 
happened, and that the cocoa thus likely still contains some bitterness. The latter condition will not be a 
disqualifying factor per se but will help indicate what subsequent processing steps might be necessary 
for a purchaser and chocolate manufacturer to apply in order to adjust the taste to match the uniform 
quality standard which they desire of their end product.  
At the rural depots each pallet of 30 cocoa bags constitutes what is termed ‘one lot’, and 
each QCO is not supposed to grade more than 9 lots, i.e. 270 bags during one workday. In Juaboso I 
have learned that in 2015 there were a total of 23 QCOs employed127, meaning that in the main crop 
season the district’s maximum official grading capacity stood at 6.210 bags per day. However, as it was 
explained to me, QCOs are often willing to put in extra work beyond the official limit to handle the 
seasonal peak flows – especially since each official charges the depots an off-the-record fee of 1.00 
GH₵ per bag they approve. 
 
Image 57: A QCC officer prepares to count the average number of cocoa beans across three 100g random 
samples. Photo taken at an LBC depot near Juaboso, September 2015. 
 
                                                                 
127 This number was due to recent staff  reductions resulting from the administrative separation of  the nearby 
town of  Bodi into an independent political district in 2013, which had led to the transfer of  some QCC officials 
there. 
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LBC depot keepers and district managers (supervisors of a number of LBC depots) 
administrate a central early stage in the movements of Ghanaian cocoa from tree-growing natural good 
to packaged export commodity, and due to the mandatory quality control procedures at all rural depots, 
the depot keepers and QCOs need to work closely together. Both parties have a mutual interest in 
helping out each other, so that both LBCs and the QCC can fulfil their formal job obligations as 
smoothly as possible. However, the reported established practices of off-the-books monetary fees or 
‘dashes’ between them seem to indicate that their mutual understandings and collaborations are 
exercised on an even closer level than what would be indicated through either the formal organizational 
charts or the commodity chain indications. Rather, and similarly to the situation between LPCs and 
farmer societies, it seems to my view that LBCs and QCOs benefit from realigning the effective 
boundaries of their separate value generating spaces towards each other as well as against the other 
actors in the business. Quality control officers will in this analytical perspective on one level expand 
their boundaries for their value generating spaces onto the value spaces of the licenced buying 
companies by demanding extra ‘dash’ payments on top of what they already officially earn from the 
Ghanaian state for doing their jobs. However, LBCs have found ways to compensate for this value loss 
by withholding the aforementioned 6.60 GH₵ per bag for “depot expenses” from the cash they 
provide their LPCs for buying cocoa from farmers. Effectively, the LBCs have responded to, what I 
see, as the spatialized value encroachment into their respective territory from one side by doing their 
own expansionary encroachments in another direction. Furthermore, the collaborations between 
depots and quality control officers serve both parties well, as 500g out of every 64kg bag is officially 
reserved for quality control testing purposes. This amount is very generously defined compared to the 
actual testing needs, according to my own observations, so QCOs can easily complete their tasks with 
only minuscule actual losses of cocoa beans, and the remainder of all test-reserved cocoa can 
subsequently be added to different sacks and the profits of those quietly shared among LBC depot 
employees and QCC officials.  
In terms of spatialized value generation this condition means that quality control 
activities are afforded a larger dimension than what is strictly necessary for the performances of the 
assigned quality control workers, yet none of the these actors have any monetary incentive to suggest 
reductions of this space, since the margin between the official boundary of 500g per bag and the actual 
boundary of the extracted and destroyed cocoa samples creates a hidden profit margin sharable 
between LBC depots and QCOs. If the existence of this unacknowledged profit margin was to come to 
the critical attention of the overall Ghanaian cocoa authorities, both QCOs and LBC depots would 
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likely lose out, since national governmental actors would benefit from expanding their own formal 
boundary making claims into this marginal space, say, for instance by decreasing the volumes of quality 
control reserved cocoa from 500g to 250g per 64kg bag. As it stands, however, the silently kept profit 
margin space appears subject to a discretely negotiated division between LBC depot managers and 
QCOs. In 2014-15 the boundary set between them thus appears to have constituted a 1.00 to 1.50 
GH₵128 share per tested bag for the Quality Control Officer, while the depot keeps the rest of the value 
by effectively pouring the remaining extracted cocoa into other sacks, which in time become full 64kg 
bags as well, subjects to quality testing, etc.  
 
Image 58: Two cocoa stab samplers shown side by side. The top one is a Ghanaian government-issued version 
that an LBC depot, according to my source, had secretly purchased in the early 2000s from a Quality Control 
Officer who had then subsequently reported it lost and requisitioned a replacement. The lower one is a replica 
manufactured in 2015 by a blacksmith in a town in rural Western Region of Ghana. 
 
The stab sampling tool constitutes a remarkable item in this particular connection, one 
that deserves special attention on its own. Stab samplers – or ‘horns’ – are hollowed out pointed metal 
cones some 20cm long and 5 cm wide at the open base, and which open up along the midsection of 
one side. This means that once they are forcibly pushed through the woven fabric of a cocoa jute bag, 
                                                                 
128 A few times I heard that the amount was 1.00 GH₵ while on other occasions I heard that it was 1.50 GH₵. 
As I was unable to get either number confirmed by anyone directly involved in these transactions, this 
uncertainty persists in the present analysis. 
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cocoa beans will fall into the open side of the hollow stab sampler cone and exit the bag through the 
hole at the bottom of it. This procedure is commonly referred to as ‘horning’, and once a sample has 
been extracted this way, the stab sampler can easily be removed and the hole in the bag resealed by 
pushing the roughly woven fabric pattern back into place again. Properly done, it is practically invisible 
to the naked eye to see where an extraction has taken place from a bag.  
I have been informed that, officially speaking, only Quality Control Officers are allowed 
to be in possession of such stab samplers, but the usefulness of these types of tools mean that every 
single depot in effect wants to have at least one of them lying around somewhere. In some cases the 
depots have been able to acquire such original sampler units through illicit dealings with sources 
working inside the Quality Control Company, while in other cases replica tools have been obtainable 
either in the form of custom made creations by local blacksmiths or, as some say, from dealers of illegal 
goods in certain parts of the Kumasi metropolis. Some depots will generally try and keep their own stab 
samplers out of sight when not using them, while others remain more relaxed about it all. One time at 
an LBC depot I had noticed a stab sampler lying visible on a table, and so I asked the nearest depot 
worker at the place whether it would be a problem if a QCO came by and saw it? The worker replied 
that it would not be a problem if one of the regular quality control officers stopped by, since they 
already knew about it, and they appreciated that the depots had some extras of these tools around, so 
that the depot boys could help the officers do their sampling jobs more quickly. It would only become 
a problem, he added, if the manager of the QCC district office unexpectedly came by and personally 
noticed the stab sampler, since that man’s high position more or less obligated him to confiscate it. The 
depot worker who told me this added that he had once heard about this very thing happening. In that 
case the depot keeper had been forced to go to the QCC district manager’s private home and pay him a 
large bribe in order to get the horn back and to furthermore convince the district manager not to report 
the incident to the COCOBOD authorities, since doing so might otherwise have cost the LBC depot 
their business licence. 
The utility of the stab sampler tool to depot workers for legal purposes is that it allows a 
person to quickly and efficiently make adjustments to the contents of any cocoa bag by subtracting or 
adding beans without spending time removing and replacing the hand sewn string that is customarily 
used to seal close the top opening of each bag. Therefore, if, say, loss of humidity has led to the weight 
of a bag becoming lower than required, extra cocoa can with minimal effort be mixed in via stab 
sampler to fix the deficit. The illegal utility, from the perspective of the authorities, is that the same tool 
allows this very same type of activity to take place on bags that have already been officially quality 
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tested, approved, and sealed off with a metal tab on the sewn string. However, the quality of the cocoa 
contents later on added or replaced might not match what was initially inside the bag at the time of the 
testing. In other words the stab samplers enable a kind of tampering that effectively renders the 
Ghanaian government authorities’ certification of the contents worthless. Since the world market 
premium prices on Ghanaian cocoa depend on its ongoing reputation for higher quality due to these 
extensive quality control tests, general access to stab samplers is very problematic to the authorities. 
 
A Margin of 300 Grams  
*** 
One day I stopped by to say hello at a cocoa depot in Juaboso where I had happened to 
notice a bunch of depot boys who were preparing to load a large truck with bags of cocoa. These 
workers needed to transfer each bag manually from the warehouse to the truck. This loading procedure 
entails that two guys inside the depot lift one app. 64kg bag onto the head of another guy, who then 
carries the bag outdoors, walking via a wooden plank onto the trailer of the truck. There another guy 
helps the carrier drop the bag and then stack it among the others, placing them in an interlocking 
pattern to prevent them from shifting around, which could otherwise be hazardous for the balance of 
the truck. I have learned that during the hours-long loading of such a truck the local depot keeper or 
his deputy as well as the truck driver or his mate often stay around to keep count of the number of bags 
being carried onto the trailer of the truck. Afterwards they will both sign off on the accompanying 
waybill, which the driver will bring along in six differently coloured paper copies meant for various 
government institutions at the truck’s destination.  
However, as I entered the warehouse this day the depot keeper turned out to be 
momentarily absent, and instead I encountered only a group of depot boys at work. These five young 
men were busily using a stab sampler and an electronic scale to add 300 additional grams of cocoa 
beans to each of several hundred bags that were already sewn shut and which all carried the sealed 
metal tag approval signs of the QCC quality control. The depot boys readily explained to me that their 
employer had made them add this extra amount of cocoa to each of 600 bags as a pre-arranged bribe 
for officials at the Ghanaian port. The reason for this, as one of the depot boys explained to me, was 
simply that “In Ghana, everywhere you go; corrupt, corrupt, corrupt!” As the conversation continued I learned 
that while these depot workers expressed some level of annoyance with the illicit activities they had 
been ordered to carry out, their frustrations had less to do with corruption in general than it had to do 
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with the fact that they considered themselves to be badly underpaid for the work they did. According 
to them, the going rate they received from the LBC was only 70 Pesewas (0.70 GH₵) per full bag of 
cocoa they brought all the way from the scattered buying sheds out in the bush via the depot for 
storage, emptying, re-drying, and re-bagging, and finally onto the port-bound trucks. Meanwhile they 
were convinced that the money represented by the 300g of extra cocoa they now added to each bag 
would amount to much more money in total for whoever corrupted recipients would later extract it at 
the port. While an individual portion of 300g of cocoa beans could seem to represent a rather negligible 
potential sum of money, the insistence of these depot boys that this procedure was in fact part of a 
national business-wide scheme, consequently gave me cause to stop and try to establish an overview 
over the various numbers and discrepancies regarding the weight of the Ghanaian cocoa bags prior to 
export. 
The official standard net weight of an export-ready Ghanaian bag of cocoa is 62.5kg. 
This number has been chosen in order to ease later calculations of orders and deliveries on the world 
market, since it means that a standard 16 bag pallet will hold a total net weight of exactly 1.000kg of 
cocoa. Before the moment of export, this 62.5kg net weight target needs to be present after the final 
portside quality control inspections have removed the amounts necessary for them to perform their 
sampling tests. Since the QCC officially reserves 500g out of every bag for testing, this means that a 
given bag ought to contain 63.0 kg net weight when quality control officers arrive at the portside 
warehouse to carry out their inspections. 
Meanwhile, at rural Ghanaian LBC depots the official standard gross weight of each 
cocoa bag is defined as 64.0kg, since the empty jute sacks supplied by COCOBOD are declared to each 
weigh 1.0kg. This means that a truck packed with 600 bags will officially carry a total load of 38.4 
tonnes on board. However, since the rural depot workers are apparently making sure that each bag 
secretly contains some 300g of extra cocoa, the weight indications of the waybills of the cargo trucks no 
longer remain true. Rather, with each single bag placed on a port-bound truck weighing a gross weight 
of 64.3kg, this in total adds some 180kgs of unacknowledged weight to the actually carried cargo load 
of any full 600 bag capacity truck.  
According to the rural depot boys I talked with, there is no way for them to avoid adding 
these extra contents, since if they do not do so, the corrupted portside people will still extract 300g 
from each bag for their own profit, and then they will complain that too little contents were in the bags 
when they had left the rural depot, in effect forcing the LBC to compensate them for the deficit. By 
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adding the extras right away, at least the rural depot workers can save themselves the trouble of 
becoming forced to provide the same volumes later.  
 
 
Image 59: A depot boy carries a bag of cocoa onto a waiting truck outside an LBC depot in rural Western 
Region, Ghana. March 2014. 
 
This unofficial domestic shipping weight of 64.3kg is, notably, after extractions have been 
made for the rural QCC inspections and include, as mentioned, also the weight of the sack containing 
the beans. Since I have furthermore tested such empty jute sacks to weigh about 800g each – instead of 
the flat official 1.0kg weight definition129, the combined numbers do not add up. Considering the 
weight of the empty sack as well, each bag reaching the port should in fact contain a true net weight of 
either 63.3 or 63.5kg of cocoa, depending on which estimation of the empty sack weight one follows. 
With a portside QCC extraction of 100 to 500g of cocoa for testing, again depending on actually 
observed testing procedures versus officially stated numbers, what should remain in each tested bag is a 
net weight between 62.8 to 63.4kg of cocoa, which leaves a discrepancy of between 0.3 and 0.9kg of 
surplus cocoa beans out of each export grade cocoa bag. The lower 0.3kg discrepancy, it is worth to 
note, appears so even if presuming full correctness of the official government numbers for sack weights 
                                                                 
129 Again, I treat this as another marginal space for value generation available to those actors who can 
successfully encroach into and maintain control over it. 
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and maximally permitted quality control extraction volumes at the ports. The higher 0.9kg discrepancy, 
in turn would be contingent on my own small-scale fieldwork observations correlating more or less 
with average actual practices. Adding the numbers up, out of each exportable tonne of cocoa an 
additional 4.8 to 14.4kg would initially remain unaccounted for, having effectively disappeared from the 
cocoa bags between their arrival at the portside warehouses and the actual moments of export out of 
the country. In percentages this translates into between 0.48 and 1.44% that would have gone missing 
per recorded tonne. Of course, it would be unlikely to imagine that such missing cocoa volumes would 
simply cease to exist, once they were out of the bags. In praxis, the illicit surplus cocoa would in all 
likelihood be poured into other bags and resold to portside depots, thereby eventually becoming part of 
the total export volume after all. 
Scaling these discernible parts of the cocoa volumes up to a national scale, Ghana is 
estimated to have produced about 740.000 tonnes of cocoa in the 2014/15 season (ICCO 2016), almost 
all of it for exports. I assume that this final export figure includes any previously missing cocoa 
volumes, and I also assume that no further cocoa disappearances would have happened again after 
previously siphoned-off cocoa had been reintroduced into other bags at the ports. Given these factors 
it seems likely that between 3.552 and 10.656 tonnes have in one year been temporarily rerouted out of 
the official system and back into it again – all of this, remarkably, only around the portside warehouse 
links of the Ghanaian cocoa commodity chain. At a fixed purchasing price during the same season 
standing at 7.03 GH₵ per kilo of cocoa (if sold in a full bag, as is the case here)130, this leads to a 
possible annual income of between 24.970.560 and 74.911.680 GH₵ – or in the rough USD equivalent 
of the time131 between about 7.8 and 23.4 million USD. The lower number includes only the value 
generated by the off-the-books extra 300g per bag shipped to the coast, whereas the higher one 
includes a scenario where excess cocoa beans reserved for sampling by the QCC – but ultimately not 
destroyed by their cut tests - eventually become part of the total exported volume too. It would of 
course be an interesting question to learn more about where and to which people these substantial 
funds go, but the widespread practices of secrecy, especially among the higher ranks of the Ghanaian 
                                                                 
130
 For this particular calculation I have relied on the updated domestic purchasing prices of  cocoa as they stood 
during the 2014/15 season, rather than the older domestic prices of  the 2012-14 seasons that I have referred to 
in the rest of  this thesis. If  I had made the same calculation based on the older numbers, the monetary 
discrepancy would have been even larger than what is the case in the presentation here, since the inflation of  the 
Ghanaian Cedi between 2012 and 2014 had then led to a larger difference between domestic purchases and 
international sales in US Dollars. 
131 3.20 GH₵/1.00USD. 
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cocoa business representatives, have prevented me from obtaining further insights on this matter. 
Where such extra profits ultimately go would appear to be mostly towards downstream stakeholders 
relative to all the LBC depots, since the enforced unofficial demand of 300g extra cocoa per bag means 
that an effective boundary encroachment has likewise been pushed into the spaces for value creation 
formally outlined for the activities of the LBCs. 
All Ghanaian cocoa exports are handled through the governmental Cocoa Marketing 
Company, but there is a general lack of transparency as to the total amount of revenue generated 
through these exports and the distribution of these funds between farmers and the state system. The 
Ghanaian government formally guarantees that at least 70% of the income returns to the farmers, but 
the exact circumstances of this remain somewhat unclear – for instance, does the calculation of this 
number include only cash payments for cocoa purchases, or does it include other government 
investments in services supposedly meant to benefit cocoa farmers, e.g. local health clinics, scholarships 
for children of farmers, or even other parts of the today quite diversified COCOBOD portfolio? Most 
cocoa farmers I interviewed expressed profound scepticism towards the truthfulness of their own 
government’s 70% repayment guarantee. Persistent rumours across the countryside districts hold 
instead that Ghanaian politicians and high-placed officials in COCOBOD systematically embezzle large 
amounts of funds for their own benefits – perhaps by hiding parts of such activities under the official 
70% farmer repayment guarantee through token personal ownership of cocoa farms (which in everyday 
praxis would be managed by low-paid abusa caretakers), thus technically counting themselves among 
those farmers receiving parts of the 70% repayments. 
Illicit value generating activities through cocoa do however not only happen at 
countryside buying sheds, rural depots, portside warehouses, or amongst corrupt elites. Additionally, 
the estimated calculation in the sections above would only account for those cases where the number 
of bags on each truck precisely corresponds with what is officially stated on the transport waybills. 
Notably, on a ride-along with a different cocoa trucking team than the one described in Chapter 2, I 
took advantage of comparing the axle load figures tested along the route 132 with prior obtained 
knowledge of the weight of the empty truck with trailer. The number I ended up with contained a 
                                                                 
132 Trucks would need to stop at a Road Axle Weighing Station along their route to the coast for the calculation of  
road taxes due to be paid to the national transport authorities. Maximum weight allowance of  trucks driving on 
Ghanaian roads was these years 60 tonnes total weight distributed across no more than 10 tonnes on each axle. 
Although concerns for rising fuel costs made it increasingly attractive for truck owners to try and fit as many 
cocoa bags as possible onto each truck, these upper weight limits meant that even the largest of  cocoa trucks 
could realistically not carry more than maximally 650-660 bags total per haul. 
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discrepancy of about 250kg overweight on the current cargo load, even when allowing for 0.3kg of 
illicit extra cocoa per bag, as well as the combined weight of our crew, current fuel tank contents, and 
all non-cocoa personal luggage brought on board. Unfortunately, as I failed to establish full rapport 
with the team of that particular cocoa transport, and since cautious warehouse personnel did not permit 
me to remain present during the actual on- and offloading of the cargo, the cause of this unaccounted 
extra weight remained unknown to me. What I found evident from this, though, is that the officially 
mandated tarpaulin cover holds the potential to work not only as a way to preserve the pure quality of 
the cocoa beans during the transport, but also as a way to keep prying eyes away from the actual cargo 
contents underneath, whether those eyes belong to road policemen, customs officers, or nosy 
anthropologists. 
 
Image 60: The approach to a police and revenue/customs checkpoint as viewed through the front window of a 
cocoa carrying truck. Near Bibiani, Western Region of Ghana, October 2014. 
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Back on the Roads 
*** 
For a closer look into more of the unregistered value generating practices of the cocoa 
transport sector, I will now once again return to some of the ethnographic materials gathered on the 
truck journey I undertook together with the truckers Ali, Muhammed, and Prince. As previously 
discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis the decrepit state of many Ghanaian rural feeder roads and 
regional main roads makes such transport journeys a physically taxing and somewhat dangerous and 
unhealthy line of work. I found that perhaps the only times that the mass of cargo seemed to work to 
the benefit of the cocoa truckers were whenever they passed various permanent and temporary police 
stops and revenue/customs barriers, of which I in late October 2014 counted 18 along the main route 
between Bonsu Nkwanta and Tema via Kumasi133. Since cocoa at this point was considered 
government property due to the Ghanaian state monopoly on exports, the police and revenue 
authorities were instructed not to inspect vehicles carrying such goods. This meant that unlike most 
other cargo carrying travellers, our truck could most times just drive slowly past these types of barriers 
without stopping, while one of the truck guys would yell “kokoo-kokoo” or “eyé kokoo” [“it is cocoa!”] 
out of the window to the uniformed officers standing there. In the majority of cases the officers would 
wave the truck right by, or else just stop it briefly to allow them to inspect the waybill  for confirmation. 
But in no case did I ever witness the tarpaulin cover being loosened for an inspection of the actual 
goods, and instead our truck was every time allowed to continue onwards. To the truckers, this was a 
considerable reprieve from the usual experiences they had when transporting other types of goods 
through Ghana. In such cases, they said, the officers “They will trouble you so much” by demanding to 
see papers, receipts, and spend time inspecting the vehicles for any faults or irregularities. In short, 
according to the truckers, zealous officers would always find something to blame one for, with the 
purpose of pressuring the truckers into paying bribes in order to be permitted to continue their journey, 
or else they could be detained for hours or even days.  
During one incident on the previously described cocoa truck journey a group of 
uniformed officers had motioned for our truck to pull over at a police barrier that had been placed 
across the road. A young officer opened the passenger side door and asked to see our registration 
papers and the transport waybill. As he noticed me, a white passenger inside the cab, he looked at me 
                                                                 
133
 These inspection practices have since changed due to a declaration by the Ghanaian government on May 18th 
2017 that all Ghanaian roadside customs barriers would have to be removed, effectively September 1st the same 
year. (Ghana News Agency, May 18th 2017). 
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with an expression of surprise for a second before specifying that one of the Ghanaian truckers should 
actually exit the truck with the documentation in hand and walk along with him to the back of the 
cargo trailer. Ali quickly obliged and left the truck, making sure to close the passenger side door after 
him as he went. This enabled me to discretely view the events that followed through the side view 
mirror as Ali and the officer went to stand and talk by the road side at the far end of the trailer, out of 
earshot from the rest of us. After quickly leafing through the documents the officer asked something of 
Ali, who replied with headshakes and a few words. The officer spoke again now with more agitated 
body movements, and moments later Ali suddenly sat down on his knees on the road in front of the 
officer, folded his hands as in prayer and raised his arms upwards to him as if begging for something. 
The officer looked silently at Ali for a moment before waving him to get up. As Ali stood up again the 
officer tossed back the paperwork to him and gestured for him to go back to the truck. With Ali back 
inside Muhammed started up the engine and turned us back out on the road again. Ali was visibly 
agitated as we left the police barrier behind and immediately asked me whether I had seen what 
happened. I nodded and asked what he and the police officer had talked about. Ali replied that the 
policeman had first told him to walk to the back of the truck, because he – like other corrupt officials – 
did not want any white foreigner to witness him make demands for bribes. According to Ali the police 
officer had argued that this truck team must surely have made quite a lot of money from carrying such 
a sizeable cargo of cocoa, and so they ought to share some of it with him. Ali said that he had replied to 
this that it was still early in the season and they had just gotten back on the road again, so they had not 
earned any money yet to give to the officer. The officer had then asked whether the Oburoni [white 
person] passenger had paid the team anything for the transport opportunity, to which Ali had replied – 
truthfully – that they had invited their white passenger along free of charge, and so again he did not 
have any money to give to the policeman. The young policeman had remained sceptical and asked for 
at least some symbolic amount of 5 GH₵, but in the end Ali had sat down on his knees and begged the 
officer to simply let us continue for free, which finally had frustrated the police officer to the point 
where he relented his demands. Back again here in the truck Ali added his headshaking disgust to his 
descriptions of the event by repeatedly referring to the young policeman with the derogatory terms of 
“that small boy… smaall small boy!” 
After the moods in the cab had cooled down a bit again I convinced Ali to elaborate 
some more on the relationship between Ghanaian roadside officials and truckers working on the roads. 
Demands for bribes were very common, he told me, and even if you managed to keep your truck, 
cargo, and your paperwork in perfect order this would be no guarantee that you would be spared from 
such troubles. Officers could always detain you and your vehicle for extended periods of time while 
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claiming to be checking your licences with colleagues in offices elsewhere, while in fact they were only 
waiting for you or your boss to grow so sufficiently tired of the delay that you would be willing to pay a 
bribe in order to be let go. For this reason, Ali said, this team had actually been provided with a pool of 
‘road money’ by their boss, from which they could pay bribes if need be, since making the goods arrive 
on time at the destination was of greater importance. They had about 100 GH₵ in this pool that should 
cover potential bribes, urgent spare part purchases, and various repairs along the way, with part  of any 
surplus being paid out to the team as a bonus upon arrival at the destination. This, the guys on the 
truck all added, was a good reason to try and negotiate as much as possible with the demands of the 
officers. 
Fuel money was usually handled as a separate pool of funds aboard the cocoa truck, and 
the fuel consumption on such a long journey constituted a considerable expense. Ali told me how this 
team had recently switched over to making electronic payment transfers via a cell-phone app usable at a 
specific filling station franchise, with which the team’s boss had established an account. This measure 
now reduced their risk of cash losses during possible highway robberies along the way, although at 
times the unstable phone and data network services across the country now caused delays at filling 
stations as everyone waited for payments to be digitally processed. On another cocoa truck journey 
with a different team I had learned how this team still relied on cash purchases of their diesel fuel, 
something which with this truck’s approximately 200 litre fuel tank capacity had resulted in quite large 
sums transacted at a time at filling stations. On this other journey, furthermore, I found out that that 
the driver and his mate had colluded with a particular filling station attendant to write out a receipt for 
a larger amount of diesel than they actually purchased. This way the two truckers pocketed 50 GH₵ of 
their employer’s fuel cash money while the attendant also pocketed a smaller cash amount plus set aside 
the extra fuel to sell for private profit later. Afterwards, when the team’s boss inquired about the 
seemingly low fuel efficiency of their completed journey, the driver would explain it off as extra dense 
traffic conditions combined with a supposedly leaking diesel filter on their engine. Effectively, I suggest 
the view that the two truckers and the filling station attendant had succeeded in encroaching upon the 
boundaries of the truck owner’s space for va lue generation, splitting their secretly created marginal 
profit space by negotiating another boundary dividing the extractable value between them (50 GH₵ on 
one side, diesel fuel and an unknown future amount of Cedis on the other).  
Finally, as for yet other potential forms of losses during transport, truckers had stories 
aplenty about robbers hiding in the forests around some of the countryside roads. Such robbers would 
ambush cocoa trucks to steal their fuel, cash and cargo, later re-bagging and re-selling the stolen cocoa 
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beans to other depots. For this reason, all haulage business workers I interviewed were very concerned 
about avoiding any serious truck breakdowns or other causes of delays that might force a team to stop 
overnight along certain stretches of the rural road networks, especially southwest of Kumasi. This latter 
sort of danger posed perhaps the most extreme form of incursion, since it threatened to violently take 
over an entire space for value generation controlled by one group of actors (truck owner and crew) and 
extract its value potential into the hands of others (bandits and fences of stolen goods).  
Truckers, policemen, filling station attendants, and roadside robbers – the Ghanaian 
cocoa transport sector seemed to be teeming with profit-seeking actors not formally acknowledged as 
present in commodity chain depictions of the same. If continuing here with a throwback to the sort of 
commodity chain imagery discussed in Chapter 2, the objective from the cocoa commodity chain 
owners’ side would be to maximize their profits, which involves the protection of the volume and 
quality of the goods along the way. In this perspective, each of the aforementioned actors would appear 
as outsiders attempting to encroach upon a space for value generation, the ownership of which was 
claimed in the first instance by the haulage contractor and in the second instance by the Ghanaian state. 
As Ghanaian popular media would likely frame these types of incidents, as suggested by Hasty’s (2005) 
study, the acts of cheating and corruption among truckers, highway officials, and other roadside 
opportunity seekers can either be construed as immoral actions by individual voracious cheaters, or, in 
contrast as vigilante citizens attempting to secure their rightful fair shares of their society’s valuables, 
even as powerful vampiric kleptocrats work to extract it all for their own benefits. Again, the moral 
implications of such actions seem quite dependant on the positions each judging person occupies while 
observing the encroachments by others. 
  
Portside Practices and Tricks of the Cocoa Trucking Trade 
*** 
When after a day and a half on the road the cocoa truck of Ali, Muhammed, and Prince 
had finally arrived at the destination in the port of Tema, the team prepared themselves to wait around 
for a number of days at the PBC truck yard before their truck could be offloaded. According to the 
team, corrupt government logistics officials deliberately created bottlenecks at this offloading stage in 
attempts to pressure bribes out of truck owners, who were often in a rush to continue on with other 
contract jobs, and who could thus be induced to pay extra to get ahead in line. This time the truck’s 
owner, Mr. Sammy, was willing to pay such extra money, an amount he later confided to me was 500 
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GH₵, and so to the team’s slight but pleased surprise the truck was directed to proceed to a nearby 
cocoa storage facility for offloading after only a couple of days in Tema.  
 
Image 61: A line of trucks loaded with cocoa bags are parked at the PBC truck yard inside Community 5 of 
Tema. There they await clearance to proceed to various portside warehouses to offload. In the background lies a 
massive concrete silo, built for the purposes of cocoa storage during the Nkrumah presidency in the early 1960s, 
yet apparently never put to actual use. Photo taken March 2014 with the permission of the attending PBC 
watchman of the truck yard. 
 
While we had settled in for the wait in Tema, the trucking team had introduced me to 
their boss, Mr. Sammy. He in turn described himself as a hard working Ghanaian business entrepreneur 
who had sought to take advantage of the seasonal cocoa transport market. As a former expat now in 
his mid-forties residing near the port city of Tema, Mr. Sammy had some years ago started in the 
business by investing his European-made savings in the import of second hand trucks and cars from 
Europe and United States. He then either resold the vehicles to buyers in Ghana or put them to use in 
his own small haulage company. After first focusing on the inland transport of cement bags and tiles 
for a few years he, like many other Ghanaian truck owners, became tempted by the lucrative prospects 
of the country’s seasonal cocoa haulage opportunities.  
 Mr. Sammy happily agreed to let me tag along with him over a few of his next workdays 
so that I might also study the dynamics of the portside cocoa truck business more closely. One of the 
first places we visited was an abandoned lot near the commercial container port of Tema where Mr. 
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Sammy often met and spent time together with a group of other independent truck owners. This group 
of trusted friends and colleagues – “men who all know themselves”, as Sammy had phrased it when he 
first introduced them to me – worked together as a kind of informal transport employers’ union. All of 
them were middle-aged to elderly Ghanaian males, and, as they told me, they had years ago claimed this 
little outdoors spot by a failed hotel building project as their base of operations. Here they kept a 
simple office setup consisting of a couple of wooden benches and a few plastic chairs on the ground set 
against one of the crude outer concrete walls of a building that never fully was. Here the group met 
casually during the days to distribute new transport jobs amongst each other, to discuss the hiring and 
performances of drivers and mechanics, to organise the procurement of spare parts, and to consult 
each other on how to handle miscellaneous issues that occasionally cropped up, for instance specific 
transport licencing or contract documentation demands made by various government agencies or 
haulage customers. Most of the men owned between one and four trucks each, and from their 
convenient location here at the portside they were constantly keeping their cell phones at hand and 
ready to negotiate new business contracts and to keep themselves updated on the current status of their 
truck teams that were moving around on the interior roads as far north as Burkina Faso, picking and 
delivering goods. 
At this time in early November 2014 the main crop cocoa season was now in full swing, 
and this too was the most important part of the year for the independent haulage business. Mr. Sammy 
explained that he and his colleagues made most of their annual incomes from bringing cocoa down to 
the ports, and cocoa transport remained far more profitable than bringing container goods upcountry. 
As for the container goods, Sammy, like several of his colleagues, worked with portside agents who – 
for a commission – helped get them transport jobs from the import companies here in Tema. 
When it came to the matter of cocoa contracts, each truck owner instead communicated 
directly with individual depot keepers around the country. Mr. Sammy explained how the careful 
maintenance and nurturing of such personal contacts were imperative for becoming successful in the 
private cocoa haulage business. He had for instance meticulously established close contacts and 
understandings with a number of depot keepers of the PBC company around the rural Western Region 
of Ghana, with whom he now made “arrangements”, as he called it. For example, at the closing of the 
main crop season each year the PBC central administration would call their depot keepers around the 
country and ask them each to count how many independent trucks were currently still waiting to load 
outside their depots, then report that number and all the trucks’ registration plates  to the main PBC 
office and then admit no further trucks to the line. However, in exchange for 1.500 GH₵ Mr. Sammy 
had arranged with the depot keeper of one such depot to count two of Sammy’s trucks as present and 
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waiting, even though they were in fact not yet back there on the spot, when the PBC call came. This 
trick secured him another two cocoa hauls by the final closing days of the season and ultimately an 
extra net profit he would not have been able to access, unless he had made that particular 
‘arrangement’. At the beginning of this season, Sammy went on, due to the good terms he had 
developed with these rural depot keepers, one of them even called him on the phone and offered him 
to get the first three spots in his line for cocoa loading at that keeper’s depot. These advantageous 
arrangements meant that Sammy’s trucks were often ahead of the competing transport companies right 
from the start. Furthermore, during each season depot keepers would hand out numbers in line to 
cocoa trucks in the order that they arrived at their particular depot. This way each truck would be 
loaded according to its spot in the cue. With the special ‘arrangements’, though, a depot keeper might 
discretely withhold a few numbers so that Mr. Sammy’s trucks could arrive to immediately receive a 
number in, say, the 10-15 number range, even if there were already 26-28 trucks waiting. As Mr. Sammy 
added, none of the already waiting drivers would dare to get too angry about such preferential 
treatments of others, since they might risk losing future work opportunities at this particular depot 
location, if they made too much fuss. As long as the line skipping was not too excessive, people 
tolerated this ingenuity of others – after all, those others had likely paid for their privilege.  
 
 
Image 62: Trucks await their turn to be loaded outside a large cocoa depot in Bonsu Nkwanta. September 2015.  
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While Mr. Sammy and his fellow truck boss friends in this and other ways helped each 
other with tips and tricks to get ahead of competing haulage companies outside their informal group, 
they also shared common concerns and worries for the future of the private cocoa haulage business of 
Ghana. Increasingly, they said, the PBC and other licenced buying companies were only asking for 
private contractor transport from the very most remote rural areas and until warehouses in Kaase, near 
Kumasi in the central southern part of the country. From there the companies would use their own 
trucks to transport the cocoa the rest of the way down to the ports of Tema or Takoradi. The reason 
for this, the bosses explained, was that the roads from Kumasi and south were better maintained, so the 
PBC and other LBCs all tried to save expenses on long haulage costs while also sparing their own 
company vehicles from wear and tear on the very poor rural roads. 
Following this part of the conversation, one of Mr. Sammy’s fellow truck bosses 
expressed his surprise to hear that I had in fact already happened to have met one of the high-ranking 
PBC transport logistics officials whose department they had just mentioned134. As this truck boss said: 
“You met this man? – And he didn’t charge you anything?” I replied that indeed no words of gifts or 
payments had been mentioned at all. Hearing this, the truck owner shook his head and exclaimed: 
“Then that must be because you’re white – and he doesn’t expect you to know how things work 
around here. For us blacks, to ask this big man of his time, it would cost!” Evidently, there seemed to 
be quite a few more aspects to the transactions taking place through the Ghanaian cocoa commodity 
chain than that very same senior logistics official had once put onto paper for me inside his office. 
As I joined Mr. Sammy for his lunch at a Tema roadside eatery, I asked him to explain his 
operating costs in more detail. First, he estimated that the diesel fuel to go from Bonsu Nkwanta to 
Tema and back cost some 2.000 GH₵ total. Adding to that came the monthly salary of 300 GH₵ for 
the driver, along with another typically 300 GH₵ ‘sitting money’ (10 per day) for him to wait in line at a 
depot in Bonsu Nkwanta or elsewhere. Then there came a completion bonus of 200 GH₵ to the driver 
for successfully bringing the cocoa down to the port, and a 50 GH₵ bonus to the mate for the same (to 
note, the truck mates were picked by the drivers and not paid by the truck owners – except for this one 
instance). Also, there was 100 GH₵ set off as ‘road money’ to take care of road toll fees, necessary 
small ‘gifts’ for road officials, and small repairs along the way. Then there was 100 GH₵ to be paid to 
the depot boys who loaded the truck and 25 GH₵ for the depot boys offloading (the latter was easier 
                                                                 
134 Specifically, the senior logistics official who had drawn me the picture of  the country’s cocoa commodity 
chain discussed in Chapter 2. 
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and thus cheaper). Furthermore there was also the issue of paying a bribe to portside logistics contacts 
to get the truck offloaded quickly, a service which typically cost him 500 GH₵. All in all Mr Sammy 
counted that by also including the previously mentioned about 1.500 GH₵ seasonal ‘arrangements’ 
with individual rural depot keepers, he easily had expenses of around 5.000 GH₵ per haul before 
covering any larger truck repairs that frequently became necessary too, not least due to his aging trucks 
and the bad roads. 
The Ghanaian government’s compensation rates for cocoa transport contracts vary 
significantly according to geographical distances between the various administrative districts of the 
inland depots and the ports. Furthermore, once a single independent haulage contractor exceeds a 
certain total tonnage of cocoa carried per year, they will become eligible for obtaining a status of 
‘official contractor’, which entails better rates of payment. In 2014 Mr. Sammy stated that the 
government paid him about 9.000 GH₵ before taxes for a haul of 600 bags of cocoa from Bonsu 
Nkwanta to Tema. After taxes and various governmental fees the pay-out for one such haul amounted 
to somewhere short of 7.000 GH₵, leaving him a profit of about 1.500 - 2.000 GH₵, unless something 
had broken on the truck. As I learned, new spare truck tyres in Tema cost between 850 – 1.450 GH₵ a 
piece in 2014, while for instance a waterproof trailer tarpaulin, like those mandated for cocoa transport, 
would cost anywhere from 1.400 GH₵ for a second-hand one and much more for new ones. 
Meanwhile a major replacement part, such as a full truck gearbox, would however easily cost something 
like 7.000 GH₵. Therefore, while cocoa haulage contracts could be clearly profitable for truck owners, 
they also involved quite substantial hidden expenses in order to carry them out successfully, just like 
they also involved certain risks for every ride that those profits might turn into losses in case of road 
accidents and expensive vehicle component failures. 
As I spent more time with Mr. Sammy I came to realise that his sympathetic sharing of 
information for my academic research project had another side to it as well. During two days in Tema 
he had invited me to come along with him to his various business meetings. These included a visit to 
his bank to deposit the coveted CMC payment cheque the he had just received from the completed 
cocoa haul. We also went for a back-room meeting with the manager of a local fuel station with whom 
Mr. Sammy negotiated a tankful of diesel on credit for the next cargo truck he would be sending out on 
a job. Later we both joined up again with Ali to go visit a nearby scrapyard to rummage for spare truck 
parts, eventually tracking down a functional third gear replacement for the DAF truck  we had travelled 
with. Mr. Sammy then negotiated with the scrap dealer to add this spare part to an ongoing business 
deal of theirs already involving some number of Chinese made truck tires, as far I understood.  
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At the end of the second day I thanked Mr Sammy for letting me follow along and gain 
insights into some of his work tasks as an independent cocoa trucking boss. Mr Sammy promptly 
turned these words of gratitude around, as he commented that having a foreign white man accompany 
him for his meetings of these days had impressed his local business partners by discretely enhancing his 
appearance of having international connections and resources, which in turn helped boost his local 
image of credit worthiness. Therefore, as it turned out, it seems that I had unintentionally served the 
role as a useful prop for his business ambitions. Looking back, as previously mentioned in brief in 
regards to parts of Graeber’s work on value theory (Chapter 4, p.174), making oneself appear like a 
resourceful and well-connected person serves as a potent prescription for how one expects others to 
treat one in return. Likewise, as Tsing has pointed out (2005; 2000) the imagination of potentially 
profitable business ventures needs to be convincingly conjured first in order to attract investors, whose 
resources may – or may not – subsequently enable such imagined value to become material and 
extractable. In both cases, I recognize efforts of people towards the creation of perceived spatial 
entities, whether such involve the recognition of a ‘big man’ as exactly that, or a space for value 
creation either unclaimed by others or so weakly defended by others that the value that might 
potentially be gained appears worthwhile the efforts and the risks necessary in order to encroach, claim, 
and extract. 
 
A Greasy Commodity Chain and That Which Slips Away 
*** 
While the idealized movement of goods imagined in the ‘chain’ concepts, especially when 
applied within business contexts, tends to lump together all alternative, unapproved income generating 
activities along the chain as ‘corrupt’, ‘criminal’, or ‘cheating’, such denouncements seem largely 
founded on the invested commodity chain controller’s claim to principled ownership of an imagined 
totality of value that might become extracted and transformed into profits for the owners and their 
collaborating partners and investors. Comparing such various illicit activities to the commodity chain 
imagery, corruption in the form of bribery, dashes, and top-offs, can however also designate instances 
where unregistered transfers of money or goods take place completely within what appears to be the 
formally established links and channels of the system. In other words, such acts of corruption can 
arguably serve to “grease the links” inside a commodity chain and to hasten the throughput and overall 
performance of the system. As according to the previously discussed statements by the COCOBOD 
official, it is apparently possible in Ghana to have multiple practices of cheating and corruption take 
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place throughout the country while still having the officially expected numbers of the domestic cocoa 
commodity chain add up again at the export linkage point with the international markets.  
On the other hand, cheating in general can also refer loosely to instances of value 
generation that escape the boundaries formally set by the commodity chain owners. Additionally, while 
corruption represents activities of exchange for purposes of profit generation for a limited group of 
persons or companies involved, cheating seems more to represent activities of gaining or obtaining 
profits that take place through the actions of individuals acting for their own immediate benefit. As it 
was, Mr. Sammy’s willingness to pay bribes to both the inland depot keepers and to key portside 
logistics officials served to hasten the movement of the transported cocoa into the subsequent links of 
the commodity chain. Effectively, he re-allocated parts of his legally approved haulage service income 
to others in order to create and nurture an informal personal network across different links of the 
commodity chain, a network of people whose collaboration resulted in more rapid completions of their 
work tasks. This in turn enabled them to process larger volumes of cocoa annually than other 
contractors, and therefore effectively they each obtained larger shares of the total amount of funding 
invested in the country’s cocoa haulage sector each season. By creating such an informal network 
within the formal network, I suggest that this collaboration can be viewed analytically as the creation of 
an intricate space for value creation. Although the value generating activities of Mr. Sammy’s group 
involved ‘arrangements’ that others would likely describe as acts of corruption, the consequences of the 
group’s collaboration appear fully cost-neutral to the accounts of the national cocoa authorities, since 
the ‘arrangements’ were financed out of Mr. Sammy’s governmental contract money and furthermore 
served to aid the speed of the cocoa flow through the established commodity chain. In this particular 
perspective these acts of ‘cheating’ may appear quite benign from the point of view of COCOBOD – 
and therefore, perhaps, “it is not really our concern”, as the interviewed deputy administrator had said 
– as any value losses from bribery will only happen between competing haulage contractors and depot 
keepers rather than affecting the accounts of the national authorities as well. Likewise, the monetary 
‘dashes’ between LBC depots and QCOs and weighing scale chea ting between LPCs and farmers 
remain inconsequential for COCOBOD, since the profit seeking boundary encroaching activities 
among them create compensation seeking ripples of similar activities that move towards the weakest of 
the primary producers, the smallholder cocoa farmers, rather than through the chain to the national 
level. Therefore, even as acts of cheating and corruption cause “bleeding” beyond any and all of the 
officially defined entities and boundaries of the domestic commodity chain system, as long as this 
bleeding remains internal to this system as a whole, the national cocoa authorities can safely ignore it. 
Hence, resolving this chapter’s formerly posed seeming paradox of bleeding without actual blood loss. 
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In comparison, cross-border smuggling constitutes exactly a kind of value generating 
activity that exceeds the outer boundaries of COCOBOD’s control, and hence these types of activities 
provoke direct government attempts at intervention. Furthermore, the prior example of collusion 
between a truck team and a filling station attendant, along with the described case of the bribe 
demanding policeman, also show instances where monetary value are sought extracted into hands of 
people not formally recognized as recipients of any such by the owners of the domestic cocoa 
commodity chain. Such differently aligned interactions between people for the purposes of the 
obtainment of monetary value from the cocoa business can likewise be approached as attempted 
expansions of boundaries of spaces for value generation, this time however, spaces that actualize value 
in directions leading outside the formalized chain. Hence, such forms of value losses stand as 
potentially more problematic to these formally recognized participants in the Ghanaian cocoa business, 
as this represents encroachment acts into spaces claimed by them for their own value creation. As it 
appears, though, as long as the cocoa haulage contractors can still absorb these continued small profit 
losses and survive in the business despite them, COCOBOD can likewise afford to stand idly by with 
merely a blanket decree that cocoa trucks are exempt from roadside revenue and customs inspections. 
However, once the losses from delays and bribe demands by too many artificially established police and 
revenue/customs road barriers (or, boundaries for value extraction as I would designate them) exceed a 
certain level, then the national authorities would feel a need to step in – a political move which in fact 
has happened in May of 2017135. 
What I regard as most analytically relevant here is not so much the actual methods of 
cheating through which people strive to create extra profits through the Ghanaian cocoa business. 
Rather, the crux of the matter is to me rather the implications of cheating itself as a social phenomenon 
coupled with the characteristic secrecy surrounding the specific methods. Similar to my discussion in 
Chapter 4 of a condition of indeterminacy shrouding an interim period between empoverished cocoa 
farmers’ presently experienced time of poverty and a to them desired future time of wealth, so will I 
suggest that the overall practice of ‘cheating’ constitutes a factor of indeterminacy as well. Most people 
in rural southwestern Ghana earn only meagre incomes from cocoa farming while the material wealth 
of other people elsewhere in the same business remains evident to everyone. It is commonly known in 
Ghana that the cocoa business can make a person wealthy, but the exact ways one might actually do so 
remain largely hidden from public view. Similarly to popular images of commercial bankers and 
                                                                 
135 Again, as announced by the Ghanaian government on May 18th 2017 all Ghanaian roadside customs barriers 
would have to be removed, effectively September 1st the same year. (Ghana News Agency, May 18th 2017). 
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religious leaders, successful entrepreneurs in the cocoa business are recognized as gatekeepers to 
material wealth and guardians of the exact methods by which to obtain it. Effectively, a shroud of 
indeterminacy hangs over central aspects of the Ghanaian cocoa business, and rather than attempting 
to uncover each and all of the hidden actual practices beneath, I will suggest that this condition of 
concealment by itself constitutes perhaps the most important aspect of what can be theorized as 
spatialized value creation in regards to Ghanaian cocoa production. 
 
The All-Important Preservation of Indeterminacy 
*** 
Indeterminacy remains a significant aspect of human life in Ghana to this day, even if this 
condition is more often lamented rather than celebrated. In Chapters 2 and 3 I have recounted how a 
number of academic works have discussed cases where historical Asante and Sefwi-Akan 
conceptualizations of spatiality, time, territory, and material and spiritual entities over centuries have 
frustrated both colonial and post-colonial administrators’ ambitions to organize the region’s geography 
and populations according to systems based on definitive categorical clarity. In colonial times the local 
populations’ higher levels of tolerance for unresolved ambiguity and contestant claims to land and 
authority had repeatedly forced European colonial representatives to begrudgingly exercise flexibility in 
their own administrative practices, as for instance clearly summed up by Nugent & Asiwaju: “[C]olonial 
officials were dependent on the goodwill of local populations for their day-to-day existence. This 
inevitably fostered compromises which had no place in the official manual. Because colonial 
functionaries tended to keep up appearances, the deals that were struck tended not to enter the official 
record.” (Nugent & Asiwaju 1996: 5). Arguments like this go against simplified interpretations of 
European colonialists seen as the implementers of modern forms of society through systems of rational 
scientific and administrative development, as opposed to local populations presented as the adherents 
to outdated traditions, founded in superstition and irrational ambiguity. Rather, what these materials 
suggest is that everyday pragmatism has remained at the forefront among appointed government 
officials, colonial or not, and for this reason that the dynamics and tensions between definitional clarity 
and persistent uncertainty appear as much a part of Ghana’s colonial past as a part of its contemporary 
post-colonial present. As the authors quoted above go on to exemplify, in cases where border officials 
remain dependent on a rural border population to sell them food plus provide accommodation, then 
how is such an official supposed to go about arresting, say, his land lord or land lord’s family for 
smuggling? (ibid: 7-8). Such dilemmas fuelled by discrepancies between official doctrines and practical 
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conditions remained very much relevant among the border officials I interacted with in the 
contemporary southern Ghanaian – Ivoirian border zone136.  
Although critical public attention to matters of corruption among Ghanaian border 
officials has increased since the scandal caused by Anas’ journalistic exposures of 2010, the practical 
consequences remain difficult to spot. In 2014 residents of one of the many border town communities 
I stayed in told me how it remained an open secret that a lively array of smuggling activities still took 
place across the border in that very town. Rather than using the official border crossing smugglers of 
cocoa and other goods would instead discretely move their vehicles across at a wheel track less than 
100m south of the official border crossing. This spot was still so conveniently close that certain 
colluding border officials could monitor and collect bribes from the traffic, while also just far enough 
away and concealed behind a building so that the same officials could plausibly deny knowledge 
thereof, in case a superior officer visited the town on a surprise inspection. Smaller levels of smuggling, 
such as one or two bags of cocoa at a time on the back of a motorcycle or a cocoa bag inside the trunk 
of a car, was something that most border officials would typically either ignore or wave past at the 
official crossing point in exchange for a small cash amount, perhaps 5 GH₵, as one resident of this 
border region told me. 
When I in 2014 had asked one of the Immigration Officers stationed at the Akaatiso 
border crossing what had changed at that place since the Anas incident, the officer replied only that 
since then all photography had been prohibited near these border crossings. As an apparent solution to 
a corruption scandal, this measure at first appeared as profoundly counter-intuitive to me, as I had 
expected to hear about consequences along the exact opposite lines of enhanced surveillance efforts 
and increased regulatory oversight after such a documentation of illegal activities. In Ghana, however, 
efforts to effectively preserve or even enhance the indeterminacy of the actual activities carried out at a 
given border crossing serves multiple purposes. On one level it keeps the commanding officers of the 
Immigrations and Customs Services from being forced into situations where they have to directly 
confront and attempt to permanently prevent such types of activities that remain largely similar to other 
activities continuously carried out among many other public and private gatekeepers across the society. 
Efforts to effectively put a full stop to smuggling would likely increase antagonism between border 
officials and local border region populations benefitting from smuggling. Such efforts would likely also 
                                                                 
136 And as the Anas revelations of  2010 have further demonstrated, collusion among officials and cocoa 
smugglers had even reached a point where members of  a specially appointed national anti-smuggling task force 
were candidly video recorded while aiding smugglers in return for bribes (GhanaWeb April 15, 2010). 
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hurt the morale among ground level officials and their immediate superiors, as these would see a 
cherished source of supplementary income disappear. On another level I believe that these efforts to 
preserve the shroud of secrecy and indeterminacy governing the actual activities at the border crossings 
also reflect the contemporary tensions perpetuated by Ghana’s legal constitution. As discussed 
previously (Chapter 3), the constitution empowers a dual legal system which recognizes both the 
authority of tribal traditions and a national body of laws. Consequently, this duality enables the chronic 
conditions of indeterminacy in regards to the exact boundaries of land rights and the extent of 
authority of one governmental administrative sector or tribal stool compared to another. 
This ongoing ambiguity is a feature that has long been actively reproduced by traditional 
powerholders across Ghana, according to anthropologists Boni (2008) as well as Berry (2001). As 
argued by Boni, such preservation of indeterminacy effectively guarantees that people in positions of 
power (i.e. chiefs, elders, men, those identified as ‘natives’, and government officials) can maintain the 
faculty to decide the allocations of land rights and revenues (Boni 2008: 83).  Likewise, Berry’s research 
leads her to conclude that traditional Asante chiefs often intentionally refrain from specifying the exact 
demarcation of boundaries on the lands they orally consider as part of their own stool. This way the 
chiefs can both maintain a higher degree of flexibility towards their demands for tithes or recurrent 
tributes from users of such lands, as well as retain the ability to use their land claims based on oral 
traditions as part of ongoing or anticipated future struggles over power and jurisdiction against other 
neighbouring chiefs (Berry 2001). Exact boundaries, in other words, will only be clearly defined once a 
claimholder finds them self in a position where they feel confident that they will become satisfactorily 
compensated for doing so. As I have argued, a way to fruitfully analyse this condition entails 
approaching any given space as subjected to inherent expansionary agency by those claiming it. By 
intentionally maintaining the outer boundaries of one’s spatial claim as vague and fuzzy, one retains the 
ability to continuously attempt to expand its effective dimensions whenever the opportunity to do so 
appears. Of course, on the other hand, a person may likewise find themselves in a relatively weak and 
threatened position for the future maintenance of their own current spatial claim, say, if bordered by a 
more powerful neighbour exerting their own expansionary force, such as through gradual land 
incursions. The weaker party would then do well to strive for recognizable specificity of their spatial 
bounds, for instance through visibly planting and maintaining a particular farm space, continuously 
patrolling along a park boundary or national border, or by trying to obtain recognition of the exact 
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boundary from other powerful authorities, such as tribal stool chiefs and the national land registration 
authorities137. 
How do these practices of intentionally maintained indeterminacy then compare to the 
concept of spatialized value? Above all I find that when the bounds of the different spaces remain 
fuzzy, partially obscured to many actors, it becomes difficult to ascertain the true extent of any profit 
margins that resourceful actors may secure for themselves. This is in some ways reflected in the 
common economic recognition of the relativity of value and good business sense, which holds that the 
cheaper you can buy and the more expensively you can sell, the greater profit margin you will be able to 
secure for yourself. Making the cocoa appear to represent a lower value to those you obtain it from and 
a higher value to those you sell it to works toward this end. This level of meaningful difference is of 
course part and parcel of value in the purely economic sense, where acts of exchange crucially hinge on 
different value perceptions. Each party to a trade needs to valuate a given good higher than what they 
will in turn need to give up in order to obtain it, or else they would find little point in pursuing an 
exchange in the first place.  
The field of economics has since the dawn of the 20 th Century attempted to divest their 
field of study from its prior historical associations with matters of religious and moral concerns and 
instead rely only on terms of numerical calculations and choices by rational actors (Graeber 2005). 
Despite such insistence that economic activities should be treated as entirely amoral and that the true 
value of a good corresponds simply to whatever someone is willing to pay for it, the materials discussed 
in this present context indicate rather the opposite picture. As the arguments presented by not least 
Bayart (1993[1989]) and Hasty (2005) have shown, in the African context value accumulation is not 
only a matter of how much a person may effectively prove themselves capable of obtaining; it is even 
more so a matter of how much value that person’s social others are willing to tolerate that the person 
obtains. Demands for reciprocity meet those who show themselves to possess more than they need, 
and refusals to share may be met with social ostracization or lead to accusations of witchcraft. 
Accordingly, preservation of indeterminacy in regards to the exact extents of the 
boundaries delimiting the dimensions of a person’s available resources – their space for value creation – 
serves not only as a way by which individuals may extract higher profits than what appears visible to 
                                                                 
137
 Moving out to an international scale example for a moment, it has been argued that the reason why all post-
colonial African states eventually chose to maintain the inherited national borderlines once imposed by the 
colonizers, rather than seeking to redefine these boundaries according to ethnicity, was due to a fear of  a 
consequent total breakdown of  the young post-colonial states into a myriad of  minor states (Hughes 2004). 
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others; it also serves as an effective shield against social norms that demand of those who have more to 
share with those who have less. To obtain or maintain personal wealth amid these conditions – 
characterized by widespread poverty among one’s social peers – becomes a matter of a person’s ability 
to effectively obtain greater profits than other people fully realize. Accordingly, in such a way the 
person remains able to meet social expectations towards sharing while still keeping their secret surplus.  
I find that practices of cheating and corruption exemplify exactly this: deliberately 
maintained conditions of indeterminacy which enable a perceived boundary to seemingly appear 
elsewhere than where it is really enacted. The resulting margin created between the spatialized value as 
outwardly expressed and the spatialized value as really practiced translates in another word into profit. 
Across this and the previous chapters of the thesis I have identified these forms of discrepancy as 
practiced through cross-border smuggling, gradual land incursions, weighing scale adjustments, stab 
sampler horning, bribery and extortion by officials and of officials, collusion between friends and 
business associates, and theft by both insiders and outsiders to the Ghanaian cocoa business.  
At this point I shall now turn to the concluding part of the thesis, in which I will sum up 
and discuss the different key points analysed and argued over the preceding five chapters.  
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CONCLUSION: THROUGH THE (W)HOLE OF SEFWI 
*** 
The town of Sefwi Wiawso is considered the traditional home of the Sefwi tribe, and the 
district itself is named after the capital town of Wiawso, which is situated atop a steeply sloped hill 
rising above the abundant greenery below. Wiawso itself means “There  is sun in the sky” in the Sefwi 
language, and from the paramount chief’s palace grounds on the crest of the hill, there is indeed a 
splendid view to the other nearby forested hills as well as to the sprawling suburban area of Dwinase in 
the valley below. One of the neighbouring hills visible from here is traditionally held as a sacred burial 
place for the Sefwi chiefs and as such it is marked as off-limits to the commercial initiatives that over 
the past fifty years or so have turned almost every other bit of farmable land in this district into cocoa 
plantations. As one of the largest regional trade and transport hubs, Sefwi Wiawso and its suburbs are 
almost every day bustling with activity which rises to quite a crescendo during the main crop harvest 
season for cocoa.  
One day in March 2014 I chat with a local school teacher in this town. The teacher tells 
me about the history of the place and mentions that according to oral history the Sefwi tribe first came 
to settle in this area hundreds of years ago when they emerged from a hole in the ground on a nearby 
hilltop. Before the Sefwi, the Asante tribe had emerged from the same hole, but they did not think that 
the land here could feed them, so they returned back through the hole and instead founded the Asante 
kingdom at what is now Ghana’s second-largest city of Kumasi, some 150 km to the East. The Sefwi, 
however, liked what they saw, so they decided to stay here.  
The hole is still there, the teacher adds, and he tells me that I am welcome to see it. Thus, 
soon after I find myself sitting in a small battered taxi along with the teacher. As the car struggles up 
the steep dirt road to the sacred hill, a place locally known by the name of Bosomoiso138, we stop along 
the way to pick up a local woman with a baby on her back and two children at her side. They were 
walking back towards their farm near the hilltop and are grateful for the ride. Curiously they ask about 
the presence of a white man here, to which the teacher eagerly explains. Soon after at the hilltop our 
group turns into a small pilgrimage, as we all including the taxi driver walk the final way through a little 
footpath to the sacred hole. 
                                                                 
138
 The name for the sacred site of  the hole itself  is ’Bosomoi’, whereas the hill on which the hole is situated is 
called ’Bosomoiso’, the latter meaning: ”Bosomoi is there”. 
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The Bosomoi hole turns out to be situated in a little clearing in a grove behind some mud 
houses and it looks to be about half a meter in diameter, a roughly circular opening into the flat rocky 
ground. Going closer I see that it is about two meters deep, with a few shiny coins visible at the bottom 
amid a few scattered glass bottles and discarded plastic bags mixed with fallen leaves. Following the 
instructions of my companions I toss a 1 Cedi coin into the hole for good luck, and after that they 
eagerly encourage me to try and take a picture of the hole. As I raise my camera phone, their 
anticipation seems to intensify, and no sooner have I snapped a picture, before the teacher insists that I 
now open up the phone’s picture folder to check the file. As I show them the snapshot on my phone’s 
screen, they immediately break into an agitated discussion among themselves in Sefwi. A moment later 
the teacher notices the confused look on my face and goes on to explain in English that a local myth 
said that it was impossible to take clear pictures of the hole, but apparently this particular myth has now 
turned out not to be true. As we walk back to the taxi he waves his hand dismissively and says that, 
regardless, there are still plenty of other myths surrounding this place that remain true. For example, 
there are still the traces of the original footprints of the first Sefwi people that he had noticed on the 
rocky ground near the hole, so at least that myth is still correct.  
Returning down the hill again our taxi driver picks up another passenger, a traditionally 
dressed middle-aged woman who is walking towards the town. The teacher discusses a bit with her in 
Sefwi, and then he taps my shoulder, saying that the two of them have just discussed the incident, and 
they have now come to agree that the reason why I successfully got the photo onto my phone must 
have been because I had first tossed the coin in the hole for luck, before taking the picture. Because of 
that, the hole had allowed the picture to be taken. Therefore, the myth regarding the spiritual power of 
the hole is actually still true. 
I first recorded this event in my daily fieldnotes as an unexpected short diversion from 
the ethnographic research into the significance of cocoa across the Sefwi traditional area. However, 
despite the immediate absence of this particular natural good from the events of the visit as well as 
from the myths associated with the hole, there is something about the Bosomoi place and its mythical 
significance to the Sefwi people that has since then repeatedly made me recall and reflect upon it. The 
hole is locally considered to represent a direct linkage between two geographically distant places , two 
neighbouring tribal groups, as well as a linkage between the material and the spiritual realms, and also a 
linkage between the past and the present history of the Sefwi people. Peculiarly, I have later come to 
notice how these characteristics regarding the Bosomoi myth also link together the multiple topics 
analysed over the course of this thesis. I have therefore arranged the present concluding chapter 
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according to four topical sections, each framed and linked to the others by comparison to the Bosomoi 
myth. The topics are as follows: A) emergent and enclosing spaces, B) singular and multiple spaces, C) 
dynamic and static spaces, and finally D) solid and permeable boundaries. Afterwards, I will conclude 
with a final summation of the many issues discussed in relation to the value of Ghanaian cocoa. 
 
 
Image 63: The Bosomoi sacred hole near Sefwi Wiawso. Photo taken in March 2014 by this text’s author with 
the locally interpreted permission of the Bosomoi spiritual presence. 
 
Emergent and Enclosing Spaces 
*** 
The mythological designation of Bosomoi as the point of origin of the entire Sefwi ethnic 
lineage exemplifies the perception of entities that extend themselves outward in space from a single 
point of emergence rather than being defined through enclosing territorial boundary lines. As I have 
discussed through Chapters 2 and 3, the pre-colonial West African conception of ethnic and political 
powers was primarily based on this very idea of radiant power centres that gradually diffused or lapsed 
into contested or orphaned frontier zones or ‘marches’ around their outer peripheries. The adverse 
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approach to territorial divisions, the concept of encircled spaces defined by outer boundary lines, was 
also recognised in this regional West African tradition, something which in the Sefwi terminology is 
being referred to as twama [carving out] and which to this day not least becomes utilized in relation to 
designations of land plots for housing or farming purposes (Awanyo 1998). The emergent approach to 
spatial claims, in Sefwi termed doko [proceed onward/outward], was likely until the mid-20th Century 
sufficient for most practical purposes of assigning and managing individual household farmlands as 
well as the various local Sefwi village communities, and perhaps even also the overall territory of this 
ethnic group. However, once the historically low population density across the Sefwi territory changed 
through the massive immigration of prospective cocoa farmers into this region in the latter half of the 
20th Century, the need for enclosing rather than open-ended demarcations of individual land rights also 
became increasingly necessary. As I have suggested, this changing perception of available geographical 
spaces can be compared to the way that the European colonial powers over the final decades of the 19th 
Century adapted their own perceptions of their African territorial ambitions from a basis in ‘spheres of 
interest’ to a basis in unambiguously defined geographical boundary lines.  
I have found that the contemporary resilience of Ghanaian perceptions of entities as 
spatially emergent rather than entirely constant should not be interpreted as any form of old-fashioned 
backwardness, still not superseded by developments in the form of modern civilization as envisioned 
through the lens of Enlightenment natural science, either colonial or post-colonial. In this regard I have 
concurred with the objections of Hill’s classical (1997 [1963]) study of south Ghanaian migrant cocoa 
farmers. However, unlike Hill, my own present studies have not enabled me to fully agree with her 
conclusion that the expansionary entrepreneurity among such cocoa farmers ought to characterize 
them as rural capitalists instead. Capitalism as a concept, I have found, does not adequately account for 
all the factors involved in Sefwi-Akan ways of generating value through the many engagements of 
people with cocoa. The insufficiency, as I have argued, is first of all due to the concurrent perception of 
space as radiant and emergent rather than only enclosing and definite.  
As I have argued through reference to other studies (Wilks 1993, 1992; Awanyo 1998; 
Verran 2001) this foundational dynamism also involves the replacement of the primacy of numbers as 
referents to universal absolutes with numbers as indicators of parts-wholes. Dimensions of 
geographical space become contingent on performances of human bodily movement, for instance the 
livelihoods of cocoa truckers on the Ghanaian roads, similar to how the extent of the Asante kingdom 
was once understood as twenty-one days of travel outward from its capital city, effectively the reach of 
its warriors to enforce the Asantehene’s authority (hence, the claim that Greater Asante extended over 
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a geographical space, the diameter of which was principally defined as forty days of travel, 
corresponding with one month according to the traditional Asante forty-two day calendar (Wilks 1993: 
200-201)). Likewise, movement principally dictates the effective size of emergent doko style farm plots; 
the farmer continues until the need for subsistence or surplus has been fulfilled, the limits to the bodily 
abilities of the farm household members to manage the farm, or until some outside criteria is met (i.e. 
encountering a neighboring farmer’s land or another delimiting feature of the terrain). The twama farm 
type is also defined through human bodily movements, in this case the physical walk of granter, 
grantee, and witnesses around the plot about to be awarded. In each case, the boundaries of 
geographical spaces remain inherently dynamic as personal or outside agency both may lead to 
subsequent expansion or contraction of its dimensions.  
Despite the contemporary situation where no more unclaimed land remains accessible to 
people across southwestern Ghana, I have discussed how the propensity to treat territorial claims as 
emergent rather than enclosing has not been replaced by adherence to spatially fixed definitions. As 
demonstrated by Berry (2001), Asante chiefs continue to practice the tradition of inherently expansive 
spatial claims by intentionally refraining from specifying the exact boundaries of the lands they consider 
theirs, unless when they find direct advantage from doing so. As Boni (2008) and England (1993) have 
also shown, the ongoing cases of land disputes recorded among contemporary Sefwi chiefs and farmers 
likewise indicate that the same principle of emergent spatial claims remains practiced here among the 
Asante’s immediate tribal neighbours to the west. I have furthermore suggested that this expansionary 
approach to land use can also be observed today among individual farm households, most evidently 
expressed across my fieldwork area through the examples of the nationally designated nature 
preservation areas of Bia National Park, Krokosua Hills, and Bia Tawya, where the latter two areas in 
particular have become encroached upon by expansionary spatial agency of cocoa farmers over the past 
fifty years or so. 
 Effectively, I find that in Ghana maintenance of any personal or institutional claim to a 
particular plot of land becomes very much a matter of repeated actions to reaffirm one’s utilisation of 
the place and thereby to defend the outer boundaries of it. Recurrent payment of tributes to the chiefly 
stools that have once granted a person a particular land use is one such form of activity. Another form 
of spatial claims maintenance I have observed through the physical stationing and frequent perimeter 
patrol movements of Ghanaian and Ivoirian border officials, as well as the patrols by Bia National Park 
rangers in order to prevent boundary encroaching activities by neighbouring farmers or incursions by 
hunters, loggers, miners, or smugglers. Likewise, the continued efforts of some cocoa farmers to try 
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and deter elephant incursions coupled with their periodic ritual sacrifices and prayers to maintain the 
tolerance and protection from nature spirits furthermore exemplify such ongoing efforts to maintain 
the dimensions of a given spatial claim. Again, this sentiment is very clearly expressed in the Ghanaian 
proverb that if one does not accompany their uncle to the farm, the boundary of the farm will be crooked , i.e. outsiders 
may otherwise effectively encroach into parts of a household’s land. 
 
Singular and Multiple Spaces 
*** 
On a material level I consider it likely that the Sefwi mythical linkage of the Bosomoi hole 
with Kumasi may refer to the sacred grove of Asantemanso some 35 km south of the contemporary 
Kumasi city centre, an archaeological site which according to anthropologist R.S. Rattray in the early 
20th Century had been presented to him by the Asante as the place where “the first human beings […] 
came forth from the ground” (Rattray 1923: 121)139. At some other places in Ghana, for instance near 
the towns of Wenchi and Techiman in Brong-Ahafo Region to the north of Sefwi, people have also 
referred to their ancestors as having originally emerged from holes in the ground (Ofori 2004: 141), or, 
as in other cases elsewhere in southern Ghana, descended from the sky (Berry 2001: 152; Wilks 1993: 
66-67). As discussed in Chapter 3 this enduringly popular tradition of references to mythical lineage 
origins beyond places in the material realm is closely linked to the practices of Ghanaian customary law. 
This body of legal principles recognises claims to land based on oral history, a form of argument which 
is difficult, if not impossible to refute. References to mythical origin stories, whether those involve 
arrivals from the earth or the sky, set the stage for a type of “we were here first” arguments that work 
to preclude others from calling you a stranger on a section of land which you want to claim as rightfully 
yours (Berry 2009: 25; 2001).  
In my interpretation, the myth that the Sefwi people came to this area only after the 
Asante had first considered it for habitation may be understood to imply two things: first, it indicates 
that the Sefwi claim to traditional ownership of this land rests on the prior decision of the Asante to 
rescind their claims to it. Secondly, the myth may refer to the historical subservient relationship of the 
Sefwi to the Asante kingdom, to which the Sefwi from the 18th until the late 19th Century had acted as a 
vassal state (Daaku 1971). This inter-tribal hierarchy was to some degree nullified through the later 
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British recognition of the Sefwi kingdom as a British protectorate, following the Sefwi support of the 
British colonial military campaigns against the Asante in the closing decades of the 19th Century (see 
Chapter 3).  
Within the Sefwi geographical area, the hierarchical and multi-layered understanding of 
land rights, however, is widely practiced to this day, not least since traditional tribal authority remains 
recognised in the Ghanaian national constitution. The paramount chief residing in Sefwi Wiawso rules 
over two area chiefs in the towns of Boinzan and Debiso. However, as Boni (2000) has shown, the 
question of hierarchy remains actively contested among these traditional Sefwi authorities, where some 
people in Boinzan have pointed to some versions of oral history that speak of this community as 
autochthonous and hence cast doubt on their proclaimed subservience to Wiawso140. Likewise, the 
chieftancy in Debiso has expressed rebellious sentiments against the supposedly superior status of 
Wiawso by pointing to versions of oral history where both Debiso and Wiawso appear equally 
subservient to the Asante (ibid: 573-74). In any case, as England has argued, the Ghanaian customary 
law remains unclear as to which degree such area chiefs have the right to decide allocations of land 
plots independently of their paramount chief (England 1993: 166).  
Above all of these claims to land rights rest furthermore the traditional Akan 
cosmological understanding that all of existence is comprised of two foundational co-present and 
overlapping realms, ‘nea wohu’ [that which you see] and ‘nea wonhu’ [that which you do not see], 
where the latter in turn refers to the realm of the spirits and with both realms ruled over by the 
supreme being, ‘Nyankopɔn’ (McCaskie 1995; Minkus 1980; Meyerowitz 1951). 
 Effectively, land rights across Ghana are in this tradition administered hierarchically and 
stay concurrently claimable by multiple actors, rather than being administered horizontally in the form 
of having land rights assigned to only one true legal owner at a time. Each rights holder therefore 
preserves their own claim to a given area of land, even as they may choose to delegate its further use to 
others. This way, each spatial allocation of land remains inherently prone to contestant claims from 
multiple angles, as multiple legal claimants, as well as the chiefly hierarchical order itself and the exact 
extents of any actor’s claims to authority, may become challenged. The overall national ownership claim 
                                                                 
140
 To note, this unclarity over claims to historical superiority appears to also have been reflected in the academic 
literature. Both Austin (2005: xxi) and McCaskie (1995: 32) indicate Wiawso on their maps as a prominent 
settlement along the pre-colonial nineteenth century Asante southwestern high road route out of  Kumasi, 
omitting any indication of  Boinzan, whereas Wilks (1973: 11) instead indicates Boinzan [Bonzina] on his map of  
the same high road system of  that era, omitting any indication of  Wiawso. 
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made by the contemporary nation state of Ghana complicates all such matters further, as the 
constitutional recognition of both tribal and national authorities has so far effectively prevented legal 
resolution of the numerous cases where different authorities have parcelled the same land out in 
different dimensions and allocated it to different actors for different purposes of use. Across my 
fieldwork area I have found that the most extreme case of this type of discrepancy, without doubt, is 
the case of the governmentally demarcated Bia Tawya Forest Reserve, which has been effectively 
parcelled out by the Sefwi area chief of Boinzan, and which today hosts numerous cocoa farming 
communities, including the village of Topman (as detailed in Chapter 1) and the town of Bonsu 
Nkwanta (as detailed in Chapter 4). 
 As it stands, I find that the continued recognition of the Bosomoi sacred hole and the 
associated myths of its spiritual powers further point to the persistence of the Akan cosmological 
understanding of a world concurrently composed of a spiritual and a material realm with both aspects 
superimposed onto the same terrain. This perception of spaces as multi-layered remains practiced even 
as the material terrain of the Sefwi region over the past half a century has been radically transformed 
from mostly wild growing tropical forest frontier to mostly monocrop cocoa plantations.  
 
Dynamic and Static Spaces 
*** 
The Bosomoi Hole appears on one level as a specific material location, part and parcel of 
the surrounding geographical terrain, and yet at the same time the Sefwi myths of its spiritual powers 
recount how it has shown itself capable of defying any regular confines of the material realm by 
instantly whisking groups of people from one place to another, or furthermore by spoiling attempts to 
take photographic images of its appearance. In its spiritual nature Bosomoi is attributed with agency 
and the ability to dynamically extend itself beyond the immediate confines of its material dimensions.  
As first described through the ethnographic case that served as the initial introduction to 
the topic of this thesis, the River Bia is likewise recognised across Sefwi as a powerful spiritual entity, 
whose powers enable it to reach beyond its material confines amid the river banks, not least if called 
upon through reckless acts of cursing or challenges enacted by humans. Over the course of this thesis I 
have proceeded to analyse a number of other interplays between understandings of entities and 
bounded spaces as static on one side and dynamic on the other.  
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Among the primary forms of statically bound spaces discussed are the geographical 
impositions placed across the Sefwi-Akan terrain in the form of the international political boundary line 
towards Côte d’Ivoire as well as the various boundaries set to impose distinctions between areas of 
cocoa agriculture and areas of protected nature. Static boundaries have likewise been imposed through 
the implementation of a systematic approach to cocoa production in the form of a commodity chain 
enacted by both Ghanaian business and state actors. The boundaries defined through the commodity 
chain approach operate with fixed definitions regarding which types of actors get to become recognised 
as part of the chain network, along with the assigned range of work tasks delegated to each such actor, 
and the specific points by which and to whom any given actor should then pass on the cocoa they have 
processed. Only a very limited set of actors are granted the formal recognition as rightfully present 
within these solidly set systemic boundaries, and forms of activities – between different actors and 
cocoa – which do not conform to the predefined framework of the system are thus either ignored or 
problematized – the latter especially in such cases where those other forms of activities lead to 
perceived losses of value principally claimed by the commodity chain owners and administrators.  
Similarly, the fixed domestic price on cocoa imposed annually or bi-annually by the 
Ghanaian government stabilizes the relation between one 64 kg bag of cocoa and 212 GH₵,141 even as 
monetary inflation of the currency over the same period of time effectively reduces the purchasing 
power compared to other available goods. This latter case shows how a static boundary reproduction to 
one side may obscure an effective dynamic encroachment into domestic farmers’ and purchasers’ 
relative spaces for value generation from another side. 
Dynamically bound spaces I have found enacted almost everywhere across my Ghanaian 
fieldwork. From the lax national border enforcement around Topman village (Chapter 1), through the 
movement of people and goods along the road network of Ghana (Chapter 2), to the emergent, 
flexible, and inherently contestable understandings of land rights (Chapter 3). Then again also along 
people’s vestments of hopes and faith in the possibility of miraculous or ludic ways to achieve desired 
future wealth that seemingly remains impossible to reach through the more static or cyclical confines of 
an everyday life in poverty (Chapter 4). Finally, there I have also explored the perception of spaces as 
dynamic through acts of cheating and corruption (Chapter 5).  
Perhaps here, in all of these interplays between the dynamic and the static, one may also 
find the elusive final cocoa frontier nowadays – a frontier as an imagined and practiced unregulated 
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space, a dynamic flexible margin where advantage can be successfully pursued by those opportunistic 
persons who spot forgotten corners, blind angles, and non-commensurable gaps for potential profits 
between the spaces for value creation already recognised and claimed by others. 
 
Solid and Permeable Boundaries 
*** 
The Bosomoi hole is in a mythological and spiritual understanding connected to Kumasi, 
and the spirit route follows an ephemeral yet seemingly instantaneous path that avoids the long 
meandering traversal necessary through the physical terrain, a distance that even today could take some 
five hours or more to cover with a motorized vehicle. Bosomoi, in a way, links Sefwi Wiawso and 
Kumasi almost semiotically; as an instantiation of meaningful difference between a ‘here’ and ‘there’. In 
another view Bosomoi links through mythical and spiritual attributions two spatial localities that people 
recognise as related, yet where the geographical distances between them mean that to people in one 
place the other place remains mostly out of sight. 
 Ingold (2015, 2007) has argued for the use of ‘lines’ as a way to understand the 
movement of entities through their life worlds. In this terminology lines representing the lives of others 
are only partially visible to one actor as they move through different trajectories beyond one’s own 
direct experiental vantage point. I would suggest that such lines in the context of not only Sefwi and 
Asante traditions but also to contemporary Ghanaian cocoa workers can even be perceived as taking on 
appearances as ‘dotted’ rather than contiguous; of disappearing from view and reappearing, seemingly, 
again later on and a further distance. 
For instance, consider the cocoa that disappears from the farmlands under the tarpaulins 
of the departing trucks. It reappears somewhat again in the radio broadcasts and newspaper comments 
on national prices, exports, international markets, corruption charges, and the like. Then it disappears 
into the portside containers and the waiting ships off the coast and only reappears again in the form of 
images and imaginings of “white people” afar, as well as the limited number of cocoa-containing 
chocolate products that make their way back to the markets and town shops around the rural cocoa 
frontier. In between each instantiation there are presumably linear connections, yet these parts are all 
fraught with unknown sections, devoid of direct contact. Myths may serve to fill out these voids where 
experiental knowledge remains absent or obscured. The Sefwi population is related to the Asante and 
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other Akan tribes, yet the exact connection is not – or no longer – explicable. The Bosomoi hole at 
Sefwi Wiawso serves in this perspective as a spiritual, mythical point of connection that ties together 
populations across distances. The first Sefwi tribal group, if likening them to a bundle of individual 
lines in Ingold’s terminology (ibid), arrived here in the material realm at Sefwi Wiawso similarly to how 
a thread would emerge from a hole in a fabric, the underside of which would then correspond to the 
underlying spiritual realm. Elsewhere, in material realm Kumasi, the line emerges again, linking the 
people together in spirit despite their geographical separation. 
A strong power associated with the Akan spirit realm is the capability to reach beyond by 
permeating or ignoring any boundaries imposed across the material realm. This, as I have discussed in 
Chapter 4, is one of the allures of the ‘money rituals’ and other forms of spiritual assistance offered by 
spiritualist practitioners in Western Ghana. With spiritual aid a person may gain access to a shortcut 
that bypasses the experienced spatio-temporal boundaries between that person’s present poverty and 
their dreams of future wealth. I find that many Ghanaians seem to apply such desires for opportunistic 
shortcuts to many aspects of their everyday lives – and cocoa has often come to represent a connecting 
opportunity hub for these purposes; a means for getting ahead. While some put their faith in superior 
powers to help them move forward in life, others instead seek to rely on their own ingenuity. In 
Chapter 5 I have explored many of the ways in which personal agency in the form of acts of cheating 
and corruption has become a way to generate personal wealth across the entire Ghanaian cocoa 
business from farmlands to ports. 
Cross-border cocoa smuggling as well as the secret uses of cocoa stab samplers at depots 
both exemplify ways in which some people have succeeded in making supposedly solid boundaries turn 
porous instead. By moving cocoa across the border to Côte d’Ivoire or by tampering with the contents 
of already tested, sealed, and approved cocoa bags actors become able to extract and materialize 
potential monetary value for themselves, which state or business owners have otherwise sought to 
claim for themselves through their boundary impositions.  As discussed in Chapter 5, the actions of the 
many different people trying to generate money through the Ghanaian cocoa transport sector, despite 
their formal exteriority to the commodity chain from the perspective of the authorities, likewise appear 
as an ongoing struggle between people attempting to make the imposed commodity chain boundaries 
either more or less permeable. 
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Spatiality and the Value of Cocoa 
*** 
This finally brings me back to the overall question concerning the value of cocoa in 
Ghana. I have proposed the use of the term I call ‘spatialized value’, since the conditions of value 
creation across my fieldwork area express characteristics that are different from the conditions most 
commonly considered in academic value literature. 
The various academic approaches to value, as discussed in Chapter 2, have focused on 
the movement of commercial goods across boundaries understood as moments of transaction, while 
the spatial dimensions of the goods themselves remain practically unchanged. The commodity chain 
approach in particular is deeply premised on this. Academic contention on value theory has meanwhile 
tended to revolve around the issue of whether value should be treated as an alienable or an inalienable 
quality of the material good in question. While the academic discussants have largely agreed to the 
inherently ephemeral and dynamic characteristics of value itself, the materiality of the goods enabling or 
expressing such value has in turn been largely assumed to remain constant and a moot point of 
discussion. Material goods and properties appear in these contexts as particular classifiable types of 
entities with certain qualities and spatial dimensions, all of which can be objectively measured and 
defined. 
However, I have found that the ways in which cocoa becomes valuable across my 
Ghanaian fieldwork setting necessitates an analytical approach that is capable of acknowledging that 
both value and space (of commercial goods as well as of land) to people there are understood as 
dynamic and emergent.  
Spaces and boundaries are both seen as inherently dynamic in the sense of being porous 
and moveable, and only through efforts of some actors do they sometimes appear as solid. The 
movements of boundaries may lead to encroachments into spaces claimed by other actors, overlapping 
spatial claims, or vacuous areas between spaces. Fixed dimensions of a space and solid boundaries in 
turn require deliberate and recurrent effort to uphold. 
Maintenance of overall indeterminacy serves a crucial function for value creation, as it 
eases the creation of marginal spaces between boundaries as outwardly declared and boundaries as 
actually performed. Such intentionally made incommensurability enables the creation of marginal value 
gains for those actors who can take advantage thereof. Any numerical attribution is also form of a 
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boundary demarcation, and throughout the cocoa business of Ghana everybody knows – or should 
know – that publicly expressed number indications cannot be trusted at their face value.   
All across Ghana conditions of uncertainty persist through the traditionally contestable 
land rights and dynamic boundary demarcations, flexible weight and price measurements, along with 
many not formally acknowledged relations and collaborations between people all contribute to 
situations where individuals and collectives repeatedly need to reaffirm or renegotia te their rights to 
shares of the spaces and resources, rather than rely on definitions firmly set once and for all . A 
characteristic of these inherently dynamic conditions can, to my view, be likened to human bodily acts 
of gently and persistently pushing against others in a crowd, of exerting or yielding to pressures, and of 
staying ready and alert to quickly reposition oneself  into the occupation of any extra space that might 
open up. I hope with this imagery it should be possible to recognize the analyt ical comparison I have 
previously made to Latour’s (2013) take on ‘Gaia theory’ and its concept of a world consisting of 
innumerable actors always in the process of brushing up against, encroaching upon, or yielding to one 
another (see Chapter 2). Permanently fixed boundaries stifle movement, locks in positions, and hamper 
options for future expansionary movement, even as the same boundaries also protect what is currently 
recognized as being there. Expansionary movement entails expressions of force that effectively push 
the dimensions of one space for potential value creation into spaces of others, who in turn have to 
resist, yield, or become absorbed.  
Throughout my fieldwork area of Ghana I have found an opportunistic readiness among 
people to perform expansionary pushing in all of life’s aspects, material as immaterial, to enhance their 
own entanglements with property, interpersonal connections and resources, and the prestige associated 
therewith. To obtain success a person recognises a need to create for them self a margin of opportunity 
for profit, a certain space for value creation, the dimensions of which are in fact larger than what it 
appears so to others. Preservation of indeterminacy, keeping some wealth and resources hidden from 
view of others, can help a person accomplish this. If others know that someone is in possession of 
extensive resources they will call on norms of social responsibility towards family, friends, or local or 
ethnic ties to try and make that person share with them, leaving the wealthy individual to choose 
between redistributing their excess gains between others or becoming socially ostracized if insisting on 
keeping them. To navigate these expectations towards social obl igations without alienating one’s social 
networks, a person needs to carefully manage how much they reveal to others that they actually have – 
and in turn how much they therefore need to share with those others. 
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My suggestion is that ‘spatialized value’ as analytics may potentially encompass value 
expressed as concurrently numerical and ephemeral, essential and relational, a matter of facts and a 
matter of feelings. Therefore, overall the value of cocoa can be approached as a notion that depends on 
certain conceptualizations of space, and furthermore that increases in value can come about through 
either expansions of already perceived boundaries or movement across boundaries. It is on this 
background that I have proposed to treat value as spatialized and in turn that the value of cocoa in 
Ghana can be understood as a dynamic complex of spatio-temporal boundaries of differences enacted 
among numerous different actors. 
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MISCELLANY 
*** 
List of Abbreviations used throughout the Thesis: 
AEO  Agricultural Extension Officer. 
BPU  Border Patrol Unit. A subdivision under GIS (Ghana Immigration Service).  
CEPS  Customs Excise and Preventive Service. Subdivision under GRA (Ghana Revenue 
Authority). 
CHED  Cocoa Health and Extension Division. Ghanaian state institution under COCOBOD 
working to improve the outputs of cocoa farms by teaching farmers and by carrying out 
treatments against plant diseases and pests.  
CMB  Cocoa Marketing Board. The governmental agency preceding COCOBOD from 1947 
to 1979. 
CMC  Cocoa Marketing Company. The Ghanaian state agency handling all cocoa sales and 
exports to the world markets. A subsidiary of COCOBOD. 
COCOBOD  Cocoa Board of Ghana. The Ghanaian governmental agency in charge of the overall 
cocoa production sector of the country. COCOBOD is a direct subsidiary under the 
Ghanaian Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP). 
CRIG  Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana. Governmental research institution under 
COCOBOD, conducting research into the development and maintenance of the 
national cocoa production. 
GH₵  Ghanaian Cedis. The official currency of Ghana. 
GIS  Ghana Immigration Service. Agency under the Ghanaian Ministry of the Interior 
charged with protecting and regulating traffic across the international borders of Ghana.  
GRA  Ghana Revenue Authority. Government agency under MoFEP (Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning). 
GSB  Ghana Standards Board. 
LBC  Licensed Buying Company. 
LPC  Licensed Purchasing Clerk. 
PBC  The Produce Buying Company. The former Ghanaian state-run cocoa purchasing 
company that now acts as a privatized LBC.  
QCC  Quality Control Company (formerly the Quality Control Division). Ghanaian 
governmental institution handling all domestic cocoa quality control tests and 
certifications. A subsidiary of COCOBOD. 
QCO  Quality Control Officer. 
SPD  Seed Production Division. A subsidiary of COCOBOD.  
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A Note on Currency: 
Throughout this thesis I apply an exchange rate of 3.20 GH₵ to 1.00 USD. The value of the Ghanaian 
Cedi fluctuated quite significantly over the course of my fieldwork periods in 2014 and 2015 (and has 
continued to do so afterwards), but this rate corresponds quite accurately to the value at the time most 
of my data was collected. 
 
A Note on Names: 
Many people have contributed to the contents of this work, and I have attempted to give exact credit 
by name whenever applicable. However, some of my contacts have also provided types of information 
that might result in negative repercussions for themselves, if their real names were to be linked to the 
exact activities or locations they described or showed to me. Therefore, in a few cases I have chosen to 
either replace the names such informants with aliases, or otherwise simply omit the use of their names 
altogether. As a rule of thumb, if any named person in this thesis has been described in connection with 
any activity of dubious legality, presume that their names and identities have been anonymized in the 
text. 
 
A Note on Photos: 
All photos in the present work have been taken by the work’s author, except where credited elsewhere. 
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